# GIBBS v. PENNSYLVANIA PAROLE BOARD

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · September 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145244

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145244

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a party challenging the Board’s parole revocation decision is “required to exhaust his available state remedies by filing a petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court”
- affirming dismissal because custody level claims “do not challenge the basic fact or duration” of one’s imprisonment

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIE DIVISION
HENRY GIBBS JR., )
)
Plaintiff ) 1:24-CV-00209-RAL
)
vs. ) RICHARD A. LANZILLO
) Chief United States Magistrate Judge
PENNSYLVANIA PAROLE BOARD, )
SUPERINTENDENT SCI FOREST, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ON PETITION
) FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Defendants )
) IN RE: ECF NO. 3
)
I. Introduction
This matter is before the Court for consideration of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
filed by Henry Gibbs (“Gibbs” or “Petitioner”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (““AEDPA”). ECF No. 3. Gibbs, a
Pennsylvania inmate, challenges the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole’s (“the Board”)
recalculation of his maximum sentence date following his arrest while on parole. Jd. The parties
have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings
in this case, including the entry of final judgment, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 636. For the
following reasons, Gibbs’ Petition will be denied and no certificate of appealability will be issued.
Il. Background
In 1994, Gibbs was sentenced in state court to a term of incarceration of five years to
twenty-six years. ECF No. 6-1. His maximum sentence date was calculated as February 1, 2014.
Id. Gibbs was released from custody on September 22, 2003. He was then approved for a transfer
of parole to the State of [Jlinois and reported to supervision in that jurisdiction. But in December

of 2006, Gibbs was declared delinquent effective December 1, 2006, by the Board as his
whereabouts were unknown. Jd. While delinquent on parole, Hlinois authorities arrested Gibbs
on a charge of aggravated battery on January 20, 2007. ECF No. 6-4, p. 2. He was also charged
with armed robbery and automobile theft for offenses committed in the State of Mississippi in
January of 2007. See id The Board then lodged an interstate warrant to commit and detain Gibbs
based on these new criminal charges. See ECF No. 6-7.
On January 25, 2013, Gibbs pleaded guilty to the Illinois aggravated battery charge in that
jurisdiction and was sentenced to thirteen years of incarceration, with credit for time served. ECF
No. 6-8. He also pleaded guilty to the Mississippi charges in April of 2015. The Mississippi court
sentenced Gibbs to thirteen years, with eight years to be served in that state followed by five years
supervision. ECF No. 6-10, p. 2.
Gibbs was returned to Pennsylvania state custody on January 5, 2022. See id. In March
of that year, Gibbs waived his right to a parole violation hearing, a revocation hearing, and his
right to counsel. ECF No. 6-11, p. 2. Gibbs then admitted to the parole violations and to being
convicted of new criminal charges. ECF No. 6-12. On April 7, 2022, the Board recommitted,
based on these violations, ordering Gibbs serve twenty-four months. Jd. The Board then
recalculated Gibbs’ February 1, 2014, maximum sentence date to March 18, 2032. Id.
Gibbs unsuccessfully challenged that decision by filing an administrative appeal with the
Board and appealing that decision to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. See ECF Nos. 6-
14, 6-15, 6-16. He sought further review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied.
ECF No. 6-18.

Gibbs filed the instant petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in this Court on August 9,
2024. ECF No. 3. He argues that the Board’s recalculation of his maximum sentencing date
violates his rights under the United States Constitution.
I. Discussion and Analysis
A. Exhaustion
As a general matter, a federal district court may not consider the merits of a habeas petition
unless the petitioner has “exhausted the remedies available” in state court. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). A petitioner satisfies the
exhaustion requirement “only if [he or she] can show that [they] fairly presented the federal claim
at each level of the established state-court system for review.” Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707,
714 (3d Cir. 2004). The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to “give the state courts a full
and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to
the federal courts ... by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review
process.” O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.
An important corollary to the exhaustion requirement is the doctrine of procedural default.
“Just as in those cases in which a state prisoner fails to exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner
who has failed to meet the State's procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims” has
deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address the merits of those claims “in the first
instance.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). Thus, when an applicant has
failed to “fairly present” his claim to the state courts, and state procedural rules now bar him from
doing so, the exhaustion requirement is deemed satisfied due to the lack of available state process,
but the claims “are considered to be procedurally defaulted.” McKenzie v. Tice, 2020 WL
1330668, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2020) (quoting McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 Gd

Cir. 1999)). Such claims may not ordinarily be reviewed by a federal court. Davila v. Davis, 582
U.S. 521, 527-28 (2017) (“[A] federal court may not review federal claims that were procedurally
defaulted in state court—that is, claims that the state court denied based on an adequate and
independent state procedural rule.”’) (citations omitted).
Apropos of the instant case, Gibbs needed to do three things to properly exhaust his claims
against the Board. First, Petitioner had to file a timely petition for administrative review of the
Board’s decision. See 37 Pa. Code § 73.1. Next, he needed to appeal that decision to the
Commonwealth Court in a timely manner. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 763(a). Finally, he needed to file a
petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court within thirty days of the -
Commonwealth Court’s decision. Pa. R.A.P. 1114. See also Williams v. Wynder, 232 Fed. Appx.
177, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a party challenging the Board’s parole revocation decision
is “required to exhaust his available state remedies by filing a petition for allowance of appeal in
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court”). The record reflects that Petitioner completed these steps.
Thus, his habeas challenge based on the Board’s parole revocation decision and calculation of his
maximum sentence is exhausted.
B. Merits of the Petition
Citing various federal constitutional principles, Gibbs’ claims for relief challenge the
Board’s authority to recalculate his maximum sentence after he was recommitted as a convicted
parole violator. ECF No. 3, generally. His petition initially identifies two claims: first, that the
Board’s recalculation of his sentence violated the Constitution’s “Contracts Clause,” and second,
that the Board’s actions violated the Ex Post Facto clause located in Article I, section 10 of the

Constitution. See ECF No. 3, § 2. Later, the petition alleges due process and equal protection
violations.' See id. p. 7. These claims are legally frivolous.
1, The Board’s recalculation did not violate the Contracts Clause.
Gibbs first attempts to raise a claim under Article I, section 10, clause 1 of the United States
Constitution, which provides that “[n]o State shall ... pass any .. . Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts....”.* He contends that the Board’s statutorily delegated right to extend a parolee’s
maximum sentence under 61 Pa. C. S. § 6138(a)(2)2 impaired his contract with the Erie County
District Attorney’s Office vis-a-vis his plea agreement. See ECF No. 3, p. 5, 4 16. As a matter of
federal law, this argument lacks merit. “[T]he Contract Clause of the United States Constitution
protects compacts from impairment by the states.” Lines v. Wargo, 271 F. Supp. 2d 649, 671
(W.D. Pa. 2003) (quoting Aveline v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 729 A.2d 1254,
1257 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth.1999)). Here, Gibbs’ allegations do not demonstrate that a “change in state
law has ‘operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.” ” Moss v.

Without citation to the petition, the Respondents contend that Gibbs also brings a claim based on the “separation of
powers doctrine.” See ECF No. 6, p. 10. The Court does not understand Gibbs’ petition to raise such a claim but to
the extent one can be inferred, it would not be cognizable in habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Shelton v. PA Bd. of Prob.
& Parole, 2023 WL 3901988, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 18, 2023). Further, Gibbs’ petition included language which can
be read as an attempt to raise a claim of deliberate indifference/failure to protect claim against the Board under the
Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 3, pp. 7-8. He submits that the Board’s actions “reunited me with unknown enemies
due to my law enforcement cooperation.” Jd. p. 7. This claim is meritless. “Challenges to the validity of any
confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on
circumstances of confinement may be presented in” other legal proceedings. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750
(2004) (citation omitted). Therefore, “unless the claim would fall within the ‘core of habeas’ and require sooner release
if resolved in the [prisoner’s] favor,” a prisoner should bring a prison condition claim through other legal avenues.
Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002). A claim that the Board failed to protect him from “unknown
enemies” is not only speculative, but a ruling in Gibbs’ favor, such as changing his custody level or location, or finding
that his placement violates the Eighth Amendment, “would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction.” Leamer,
288 F.3d at 542. Thus, he cannot raise this claim in a habeas petition. See, e.g., Cohen v. Lappin, 402 Fed. Appx.
674, 676 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal because custody level claims “do not challenge the basic fact or duration”
of one’s imprisonment); Levi v. Ebbert, 353 Fed. Appx 681, 682 (3d Cir. 2009).
? Article I, section 10 provides that “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment
of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any
Title of Nobility.”

Pennsylvania, 838 Fed. Appx 702, 708 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing General Motors Corp. v. Romein,
503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244
(1978)); see also Transport Workers Union, Local 290 v. SEPTA, 145 F.3d 619, 621 Gd Cir.
1998); Petway v. Francis, 2009 WL 260347, at *1 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 2, 2009) (“. .. the Obligation
of Contracts Clause is only directed at impairments by legislation, not court judgments, and thus
is not implicated in this case).
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court recognized Gibbs’ challenge to be based on an
alleged violation of the United States Constitution, and addressed the claim on its merits. See ECF
No. 6-17, pp. 20-21. In denying this claim, the state court noted that although plea agreements
implicate contract principles, “the parties to such a contract are the defendant and the
Commonwealth, not the Board.” Jd. p. 20 (citing Staton v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
171 A.3d 363, 366 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017)). The state court further noted that once he was
released on parole, the conditions for parole, which he agrees to, do not form a new contract with
the Board, but instead are an “acknowledgement of the Board’s statutory authority to recommit
him as a parole violator.” Jd. (citing Das v. Talaber, 2021 WL 1625404, at *5 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct.
Apr. 27, 2021)). It is Gibbs’ burden to show that the state court’s decision was contrary to or an
unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent and/or an unreasonable
determination of the facts. Ross v. Atty. Gen. of State of Pennsylvania, 2008 WL 203361, at *5
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2008). This means that he “must point to specific caselaw decided by the United
States Supreme Court and show how the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of such United States Supreme Court decisions.” Engram v. Mason, 2025 WL 777171,
at *25 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2025) (citing Owsley v. Bowersox, 234 F.3d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 2000)
(“To obtain habeas relief, [Petitioner] must therefore be able to point to a Supreme Court precedent

that he thinks the Missouri state courts acted contrary to or unreasonably applied.”)). Here, Gibbs
has not met his burden. He has not identified any decision of the state court that was contrary to
precedent of the United States Supreme Court. Instead, his petition alleges only generalities and
unmoored citations to the Constitution. See, e.g., ECF No. 3, J] 16-17.
2. Gibbs’ claims that the Parole Board violated his due process rights, the Ex
Post Facto clause, and the Equal Protection Clause are not cognizable in
habeas corpus proceedings.
Gibbs next contends that the Board’s recalculation of his maximum sentence violated his
due process rights, the ex post facto clause and amounted to an equal protection violation. Similar
claims have been uniformly rejected by courts in this Circuit. See, e.g., Smith v. Bd. of Prob. &
Parole, 2025 WL 1105798, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2025), report and recommendation adopted,
2025 WL 1425538 (W.D. Pa. May 16, 2025). That is to say, the contention at the heart of Gibbs’
petition—that the Board does not possess the authority to recalculate his maximum sentence—is
simply without merit. See, e.g., Darby v. Delbalso, 2019 WL 5541224, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28,
2019). Thus, it is axiomatic that a federal court cannot entertain a habeas petition on any ground
other than that the petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Alleged violations of state law do not
fall within the scope of § 2254(a) and, accordingly, are not cognizable in a federal habeas action.
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Reinert v. Larkins, 379 F.3d 76, 94 n.4 (3d Cir.
2004) (“[W]e, as a federal court sitting in habeas jurisdiction, would not have the authority to
review a violation of the state constitution.”). Gibbs’ challenge to the Parole Board’s statutory
authority to recalculate his maximum sentence under Pennsylvania law falls squarely into this
category.? See, e.g, Crosby v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 2024 WL 2941539, □

3 Even if Gibbs’ claim was cognizable, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly rejected it several decades ago in
Young v. Com. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 409 A.2d 843 (Pa. 1979). In Young, the court explained that the Board’s

at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2024) (argument that an inmate’s maximum sentence date cannot be
recalculated by the Board under state law is not cognizable under § 2254); Coker v. Mason, 2021
WL 1853387 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2021) (“[A] habeas petition is not an appropriate vehicle to
challenge the reasonableness of a state court’s application of state law.”). See also U.S. ex rel.
Heacock v. Myers, 367 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1966) (holding that the Circuit was “in complete accord”
with the district court’s determination that “[n]o constitutional question is involved in the Parole
Board’s failure to give relator credit for time on parole and its adjustment of the expiration date of
his new maximum.”) (citing U.S. ex rel. Heacock v. Myers, 251 F.Supp. 773 (E.D. Pa. 1966)).
Here, the Board recalculated Gibbs’ maximum sentence date under state statutory authority
to revoke street time credit for parole violators. See 61 P.S. § 331.21a (repealed 2009), now 61
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6138. This recalculation power—which extends maximum dates when parolees
commit new crimes—raises no federal constitutional concerns. The Third Circuit explicitly held
that “[n]o [federal] constitutional question is involved in the Parole Board’s failure to give relator
credit for time on parole and its adjustment of the expiration date of his new maximum.” United
States ex rel. Heacock v. Myers, 367 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1966). Courts have consistently rejected
constitutional challenges to this statute on due process, equal protection, double jeopardy, bills of
attainder, cruel and unusual punishment, and ex post facto grounds. See id.; United States ex rel.
Brown y. Pennsylvania Board of Parole, 309 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Gomori v. Maroney,
300 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1962). Accordingly, Gibbs’ claims are meritless, and his petition will be
denied.

recalculation of a parole violator’s maximum sentence is not a modification of his judicially imposed sentence, but
rather a requirement that he serve his entire original sentence. As such, the Board’s power to deny credit for “street
time” is “not an encroachment upon the judicial sentencing power.” /d. at 848. Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly
cited to and relied on Young to deny identical challenges brought by convicted parole violators. See Crosby, 2024
WL 2941539, at *2 (citing Edmondson v. Pennsylvania Parole Bd., 2022 WL 2713204, at *2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July
13, 2022) (“It is well settled that the Parole Board does not violate the separation of powers doctrine when it
recalculates a [convicted parole violator’s] maximum sentence date.”)).

IV. Certificate of Appealability
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 codified standards governing
the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of
a habeas petition. It provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from ... the final order in a habeas
corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State
court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue

... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” la.
§ 2253(c)(2). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without
reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue
when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Applying that standard here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable
whether Gibbs’ claims should be denied as untimely. Accordingly, no certificate of appealability
will issue. A separate order follows.
DATED this 26th day of September, 2025.
oe
Ao LANZILLO
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145244. Public record. Not legal advice.