# Mazzie v. Admar Supply Co., Inc.

> District Court, N.D. New York · September 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145189

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145189

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________

RANDON MAZZIE,

Plaintiff,

-v- 1:22-CV-01181 (AJB/TWD)

ADMAR SUPPLY CO., INC., et al.,

Defendants.
_____________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

CHARNY & WHEELER P.C. H. JOSEPH CRONEN, ESQ.
Attorneys for Plaintiff NATHANIEL K. CHARNY, ESQ.
42 West Market Street
Rhinebeck, NY 12572

MICHAEL G. MCCARTIN LAW PLLC MICHAEL G. MCCARTIN, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendants
38 Mall Way #513
West Sand Lake, NY 12196

BOLAÑOS LOWE PLLC WILLIAM Q. LOWE, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendants
16 S. Main Street – Suite B
Pittsford, NY 14534

Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:
DECISION & ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Randon Mazzie brings this action against Admar Supply Co., Inc., Timothy
Wells, and Laurie Alund, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and

discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law
(“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. See Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 13. Before the Court is
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 43. For the reasons set forth below,
defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
Randon Mazzie (“Mazzie”) worked as a “Rental Coordinator / Dispatcher” for Admar
Supply Company, Inc. (“Admar”), a construction equipment supplier, in its Latham, New York
location from December 2020 to March 2021. See Dkt. No. 43-5 at 1; Pl.’s Depo., Dkt. No. 45-4
at 41–42; Pl. Resp., Dkt. No. 48-5 at 8.
There, Mazzie shared a workstation, which was located at a ten-foot-long counter, in the

front showroom alongside defendant Laurie Alund (“Alund”) and Tim Bolliger (“Bolliger”), a
rental manager and Alund’s immediate supervisor. Pl.’s Depo., Dkt. No. 45-4 at 43, 48–49.
Mazzie kept only one personal item at the workstation: a picture of him with his son. Pl.’s
Depo., Dkt. No. 45-4 at 49. About five feet away from the counter, defendant Tim Wells
(“Wells”), the Latham branch manager, had an enclosed office. Pl.’s Depo., Dkt. No. 45-4 at 48–
49; Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 13 ¶ 15.
Near the beginning of his time with Admar, in December 2020, Mazzie separately
informed Alund and Wells that he suffered from PTSD, anxiety, and depression. See Mazzie
Depo., Dkt. No. 45-4 at 50–51 (“Q: [D]o you recall any of the symptoms that you described for
[Wells]? A: I don’t know off the top of my head, no. I don’t remember specifically how the
conversation [went].”); Alund Depo., Dkt. No. 48-3 (“We had a conversation one morning when
he came in and seemed to be distressed. I asked him if he was alright, and he explained that he
did have anxiety, extreme anxiety and PTSD.”).

At the time that Admar hired Mazzie, there was no dedicated ‘dispatcher’ at the Latham
branch. Dkt. No. 43-6 ¶ 6; see Dkt. No. 45-4 at 48 (“[U]ntil I took over, everybody did [it]—it
was never consolidated to one person.”). As Mazzie had experience in such a role, Admar hired
him to handle both dispatching and renting, at a higher rate of pay than previous rental
coordinators, intending to have him eventually focus on dispatch duties. Wells Decl., Dkt. No.
43-6 ¶¶ 6, 7; Dkt. No. 48 at 2.
A month into the job, in early January, Mazzie took over dispatch operations. See Dkt.
No. 45-4 at 53. Mazzie found juggling his dispatching and coordinating duties to be difficult.
See Dkt. No. 45-2 at 16 (“[B]oth jobs became very overwhelming with learning a new position
that I was never familiar with and performing my old one.”). In short order, Mazzie broached

the subject with Wells. See Dkt. No. 45-2 at 16 (“[Wells] said that he would make rental
coordinator my secondary position, but it was still to be known that I was to perform both if
needed.”); id. at 17 (“Q: [D]o you recall what you requested from [Wells]? A: Just a little bit of
help. If I was on the desk and dispatch needed to be done that I could have help on the rental
coordinator side.”); id. (“Q: Did you tell [Wells] why you needed that modification? A: Yes.
Q: What did you tell him? A: I told him that it was overwhelming, that I wasn’t receiving
support from either [Bolliger] or [Alund], that I was feeling that I had to . . . stay equal with them
while performing my rental coordinator duties as well as doing dispatch operations by myself.”);
id. at 17–18 (“Q: Did you tell them that this had anything to do with any of your disabilities[?]
A: Absolutely, I explained . . . that the overwhelming circumstances between holding both
positions really triggered my anxiety and it made it very hard for me to focus on my job.”).
Sometimes, Mazzie would ask for assistance with his responsibilities and how to perform
them from Alund and Bolliger. Dkt. No. 45-4 at 52–53; Dkt. No. 13 ¶ 43. From Mazzie’s

telling, Alund was not thrilled by the arrangement at which Mazzie and Wells had arrived: “She
had one time said that it wasn’t her fault that . . . I had anxiety and couldn’t perform my duties to
standard[:] [W]hy should it be taken out on her[?] Why should she have to pull extra weight[?]”
Dkt. No. 45-2 at 18–19. But Wells “brushed [the remark] off,” telling Alund and Mazzie that
“this is the way it’s going to be.” Dkt. No. 45-2 at 19.
Despite Wells’ directive, Mazzie claims that Alund would “respond to [Mazzie’s] requests
for assistance with insults about [his] mental abilities, further exacerbating [his] disabilities.”
Dkt. No. 45-4 at 53. Mazzie asserts that it was during this first week of his assuming dispatch
responsibilities that Alund first insulted his mental acumen; although Mazzie does not remember
precisely what was said. Id. at 54 (“Q: [W]hat did she say on that occasion? Do you remember?

A: Verbatim, I do not. Q: Suffice it to say, she said something you perceived as insulting;
correct? A: That’s correct.”).
Even so, Mazzie does recall attempting to de-escalate the perceived tension, telling
Alund, “I didn’t appreciate that; I’m just trying to learn this new job, and . . . I’m looking for
help.” Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-4 at 54; see id. at 54–55 (“I don’t know if it was a request for
assistance[,] it wasn’t a formal request. It was just at our desks and something came up. I don’t
remember exactly what it was. I know that she ha[d] more experience than I did, so I leaned on
her for help. She seemed to get frustrated[.]”); Dkt. No. 45-4 at 55 (“Q: Did you report that
interaction to anyone? A: No. [Alund] seemed apologetic. And at first, it felt like she didn’t
realize that she had done it. So, I made her aware and left it at that.”).
That same week, Mazzie mistakenly sent an Admar driver to retrieve equipment en route
to deliver a different piece of equipment, failing to realize that the two pieces of equipment could

not fit simultaneously on the truck. Dkt. No. 45-4 at 56; id. (“I sent a driver out . . . due to my
inexperience in my role, and [Alund] got really frustrated at it because . . . the driver had already
left, and it could have been done a better way.”). Mazzie noted, “[I]nstead of just telling me it
could have been done a better way, [Alund] decided to . . . say I was stupid[:] ‘You shouldn’t
have done it. You should have asked me.’” Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-4 at 56; But see id. at 57
(“She did not say, ‘You’re stupid.’ That was—no. She said, ‘That was stupid’ and along the
lines of, ‘Use your head’ or ‘If you don’t know the answer, just ask me.’”). Mazzie, taken aback
by Alund’s reaction, “gave [him]self a chance to cool off,” steered clear of Alund for the rest of
their shift, and “then discussed it with [defendant] Wells the next day.” Dkt. No. 45-4 at 57.
On January 15, 2021, Mazzie brought his first complaint regarding Alund to Wells. See

Dkt. No. 45-2 at 31; id. at 34 (“Q: Do you remember what you told [Wells] about how your
ability to do your job was impaired? A: Not verbatim. But I do know that it had to do—along
the lines of her being frustrated that I was given . . . special treatment for my disabilities. That if
I couldn’t do my job to standard, that I shouldn’t be given extra . . . responsibilities, extra
duties.”); Dkt. No. 45-4 at 57 (“I was like, ‘this is—it wasn’t that serious of an issue. [L]esson
learned.’”).
A few weeks later, Mazzie made a comparable misstep. Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-2 at
1; id. (“We had a similar situation with . . . just what was able to fit on a truck. I had made a
mistake.”). According to Mazzie, “in [his] opinion, [Alund] felt that at that time in [Mazzie’s]
position, [Mazzie] shouldn’t have made mistakes.” Dkt. No. 45-2 at 1. Though Mazzie does not
recall what Alund said, he asserts that she was “extremely upset” and used the word “idiotic[.]”
Dkt. No. 45-2 at 2 (“I believe I told her it was unprofessional. I didn’t appreciate it.”).
Alund used the term “idiotic” on one other occasion in reference to Mazzie. Dkt. No. 45-

2 at 1; id. at 1–2 (“Q: So that’s a total of two occasions; is that correct? A: That’s correct.”); id.
at 2–3 (“Q: Did you believe that [Alund] was using that term specifically in reference to any of
your disabilities? A: I don’t know. I don’t know [her] reasoning behind it. It’s not personally
something I would have done.”).
Mazzie also believes that Alund used the word “stupid” regarding him about five times.
See Dkt. No. 45-4 at 57–58. On one such occasion Tim Bolliger, Alund’s manager, was present.
Dkt. No. 45-4 at 58. Bolliger, according to Mazzie, “addressed it immediately.” Id. Bolliger
chastised Alund, informing her “it was unacceptable,” they were there “to work as a team,” and
Mazzie was “not going to ever get better if [he’s] being put down.” Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-4
at 58; see also id. (“Q: What was [Alund’s] response to that? A: She didn’t seem to care. She

didn’t really respect [Bolliger] much.”); see also id. at 59 (“Q: [D]id you ever hear or observe . . .
Alund call anyone else stupid or referring to their actions as stupid? A: Yes, I have.”).
Mazzie asserts that he informed Alund that her words negatively affected him. See
Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-2 at 12 (“I informed Laurie [on] multiple occasions that when words
are being used that are provocative or inappropriate towards me that, you know, it flusters my
brain. It’s hard for me to learn. It’s hard for me to think. A lot of the times it will take over
completely. It will take over my mind completely because I don’t know how to . . .
compartmentalize that type of stuff. I don’t think somebody should have to learn how to put that
aside.”); Dkt. No. 45-2 at 23 (“Q: [H]ow many times would you say that you told Defendant
Alund that the way she was treating you was negatively affecting your disabilities? A: I don’t
know exactly how many, but it was more than once[.] I’d say it was around ten[.]”).
Specifically, Mazzie points to an interaction in early January 2021 in which he
complained to Alund about her demeanor. See Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 13 ¶ 59; Mazzie Depo.,

Dkt. No. 45-2 at 28 (“I told her how I was feeling and she seemed frustrated by it. She seemed
to realistically just blow off the fact that I was feeling—you know, I had anxiety and that I was
becoming very anxious. And I felt that—in my mind, I felt that she was upset that I had taken
over dispatch operations, and if she could hinder my job performance in any way, she would.”).
Mazzie also felt that Alund “contemptuously dismissed [his] concerns.” See Am. Compl., Dkt.
No. 13 ¶ 60; Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-2 (“She would act like I was invisible. She would turn
around, stare at her computer, or do something else or walk away, making it completely awkward
to work next to somebody like that.”).
Several weeks later, in early February 2021, Mazzie complained again to Wells about
Alund’s behavior in a one-on-one meeting. See Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 13 ¶ 67 (reiterating that

“it was worsening Plaintiff’s anxiety and other disabilities”); Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-2 at 34
(“Q: Do you recall what words you used with Mr. Wells on this occasion? A: I don’t know
exactly the words no.”). Mazzie contends that during this conversation he “again request[ed] a
reasonable accommodation for disability.” Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 13 ¶ 67; see Mazzie Depo.,
Dkt. No. 45-2 at 37 (“Q: [W]hat is it that you asked [Defendants] to do at this meeting for an
accommodation? A: The same accommodation I asked for before. Just reiterated it[.] That I
needed more opportunity to do my dispatch operations role if it was going to be done properly.”);
id. (“Q: Any accommodation that you requested at this meeting beyond . . . more help in doing
the dispatch role? A: I don’t know. Q: [W]as there any specific action, again, that you wanted
Tim Wells to take[?] A: At that point, I was just overwhelmed, I didn’t know what to do or what
to ask for[.] I felt that [Alund] was very vindicative towards the position I was in and really
upset at . . . the request for accommodations that I had asked for because of my disabilities. It
seemed that she felt that my disabilities weren’t valid and that it was just an excuse.”).

Mazzie also relates a complaint he lodged with Alund in February 2021. Mazzie Depo.,
Dkt. No. 45-2 at 24 (“I remember one time . . . mid-February, I had told her that it has to stop,
that, you know, her—her—the way she speaks to me does not translate well to my anxiety. [I]t
really hurts my head, my learning, my ability to do my job.”); id. at 25 (“Q: Do you remember
her response to that? A: Again, [Alund] doesn’t have responses. She would just pretend like I
didn’t exist, ignore me completely, walk past me, make it a completely awkward workplace,
seeing as we were eight feet apart, and I had to be over on her side of the office almost all day
because that’s where the dispatch board was. [I]t got to the point where I would just not speak to
her unless I absolutely had to or if it had to do with my job.”).
Alund’s behavior extended beyond verbal comments, Mazzie asserts; she would also take

work orders from the office printer and keep them, which Mazzie claims interfered with his
work. See Dkt. No. 45-2 at 9–10 (“[Alund] would take . . . some of our orders . . . and she would
keep them to herself, which hindered my ability to do my new job[.] I can’t schedule something
for delivery or pickup if I don’t have the order . . . in front of me or available at the printer where
it’s supposed to be[.]”).
On March 9, 2021, Mazzie met a third time with Wells to discuss Alund. Am. Compl.,
Dkt. No. 13 ¶ 70; Dkt. No. 45-3 (“I had told [Wells] that [I] was still having difficulties doing my
job. He asked what the difficulties were. I explained to him that [i]t’s extremely overwhelming
with [Alund] constantly belittling me, to be able to do my job. I asked for [Wells] to ask [Alund]
to make it stop or—yeah. Yeah[,] asked him to ask her to make it stop. Q: [A]ny other actions
that you requested from Wells at that time? A: No, not really. I don’t think so. Q. [D]id he tell
you anything in response to your complaint at that meeting? A: No, he did not. Q: He didn’t
indicate that he was going to do anything? A: Well, he always said he was going to. I don’t

know if he ever did. If he did, she wasn’t listening[.]”).
Matters came to a head on the morning of March 11, 2021, when Alund again “belittled
[Mazzie’s] mental abilities” by “yelling at [Mazzie] and calling him ‘stupid.’” Shortly afterward,
Alund referred to Mazzie as a “crybaby” behind his back and told a coworker that she could not
wait for Mazzie to quit. Dkt. No. 45-2 at 4; Dkt. No. 45-3 at 23.
Mazzie overheard both remarks. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 45-2 at 4 (“[I] had overheard her
saying that I was a crybaby. I was being a crybaby about the situation.”). “Extremely
agitated[,]” Mazzie took the picture of his son off his desk and left work. Dkt. No. 48-5 at 9; see
Alund Depo., Dkt. No. 48-3 at 11 (“[A]fter a little while, [Mazzie] got up from his desk and
walked out the front door[;] I believed at that time he was going to get something out of his

car.”).
At about 8:54 am, Mazzie then texted Wells: “I just left, I’m not dealing with the constant
attitude[,] the constant talking down and talking behind my back from [Alund.] I’m going to
rethink my position here at ADMAR.” Dkt. No. 43-4 at 2. Within the hour, Wells replied that he
would pull Alund into his office and “have a pretty cut and dry conversation[,]” and that—if
Mazzie intended to come in the next day—Wells would like to have both him and Alund in his
office. Dkt. No. 43-4 at 2. Receiving no response from Mazzie, at around 10:25 am, Wells
texted Mazzie again, stating he just left a voicemail and asking Mazzie to call him. Dkt. No. 43-
4 at 3.
After not hearing back from Mazzie, Wells texted again at 3:13 pm, inquiring, “[W]hat is
your plan moving forward? Since you literally cleared everything out is it safe to assume I will
not be seeing you[?]” Dkt. No. 43-4 at 3. At 4:35 pm, Mazzie responded: “I’m not quitting. I
was/am mad[.] I was going to call you after I calmed down[.] I don’t want to flip out because

again no one should have to do that a [sic] workplace. I am overwhelmed by it and her and I
need a few days and I’ll be back Monday.” Dkt. No. 43-4 at 4. In fact, Thursday, March 11
would be Mazzie’s last day in the office. Dkt. No. 45-3 at 40.
The next day, Friday, March 12, 2021, Wells spoke with Mazzie on the phone, informing
Mazzie that he “was no longer an employee at Admar for job abandonment.” Dkt. No. 45-3 at
29. In a text message exchange following that call, Mazzie contested that characterization of
events. See Dkt. No. 43-4 at 6 (“No I went home early due to conflict with another employee
that you failed to handle when it was brought to your attention two days prior.”). In that text
exchange, Mazzie asserted that Wells had just fired him, which Wells denied immediately. See
Dkt. No. 43-4 at 7 (“I am not firing you. You cleared out your desk and took all personal

items[.]”). Moreover, Wells added, “you also just told me you were resigning anywa[y]s.” Dkt.
No. 43-4 at 7; see Dkt. No. 45-3 at 27 (“Q: Did you state on that call that you were resigning or
intended to resign? A: No. Not that I remember.”); But see Dkt No. 43-4 at 5 (“You did fire me
you just called me and said I’m no longer an employee at ADMAR because of job abandonment
for leaving yesterday. And yes I was resigning with notice.”).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 56, summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A genuine factual dispute exists, and summary judgment is
therefore inappropriate, ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.’” Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
A fact is ‘material’ if “it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]”

Red Tree Invs., LLC v. Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., 82 F.4th 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2023). In
reviewing the motion, the district court must “draw all reasonable inferences against the party
whose motion is under consideration.” Suluki v. Credit One Bank, NA, 138 F.4th 709, 719 (2d
Cir. 2025). However, “[a] question of material fact does not exist merely because the plaintiff
disagrees with the deposition testimony and documentary evidence produced by the
defendant[s].” Andrade v. Cultural Care, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 3d 348, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2023), appeal
withdrawn, 2024 WL 1651337 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2024).
“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts[.]” Felton
v. Monroe Cmty. Coll., 747 F. Supp. 3d 603, 616 (W.D.N.Y. 2024) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)). Rather, the nonmovant “must identify
specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party to
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Ethelberth v. Choice Sec. Co., 91 F. Supp. 3d
339, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). “Where
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
there is no genuine issue for trial.” Michel v. Yale Univ., 110 F.4th 551, 560 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587).
IV. DISCUSSION
Mazzie brings claims against defendant Admar Supply Co., Inc. (“Admar”) alleging
disability discrimination in the form of failure to accommodate and discriminatory termination
under the ADA. Mazzie also brings a retaliation claim against Admar under the ADA.

Additionally, Mazzie brings disability discrimination and retaliation claims against all three
defendants under the NYSHRL. Defendants move for summary judgment with respect to all
claims. The Court now considers each claim in turn.
A. Reasonable Accommodation Claim
The ADA requires employers to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A); McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (“An
employer may also violate the ADA by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation.”);
McSweeney v. Cohen, 776 F. Supp. 3d 200, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2025).
“To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on an employer’s failure to

accommodate a disability, under . . . the ADA [,] a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is a
person with a disability under the meaning of the statute in question; (2) an employer covered by
the statute had notice of his disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could
perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such
accommodations.” Stanley v. City Univ. of New York, 2023 WL 2714181, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
30, 2023), aff’d sub nom. Stanley v. Phelon, 2024 WL 1453872 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2024) (cleaned
up).
Mazzie states repeatedly that he made requests for accommodation. But it is difficult to
identify the contours of those requests. For example, the operative complaint lacks any detail on
the issue and is phrased largely in conclusory terms. See, e.g., Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 13 ¶ 58
(“[P]laintiff repeatedly . . . requested reasonable accommodation(s) for his disability in good
faith.”); id. ¶ 67 (“[P]laintiff again complained to Defendant Wells regarding Defendant Alund’s
behavior, reiterating that it was worsening Plaintiff’s anxiety and other disabilities and again

requesting a reasonable accommodation for disability.”); id. ¶¶ 72–73 (“Plaintiff again explained
that this treatment was triggering his anxiety and other disabilities as well as impeding his ability
to do his job. As such, Plaintiff renewed his . . . requests for reasonable accommodation.”); id.
¶¶ 93–94 (“Despite Plaintiff’s numerous requests for accommodation, Defendants failed to
discuss with Plaintiff how they might be able to accommodate Plaintiff’s disabilities. As such,
Defendants failed to enter into an interactive process with Plaintiff to determine how they could
accommodate Plaintiff’s reasonable requests to accommodate his disabilities.”).
At points, Mazzie’s deposition testimony regarding the substance of his alleged
accommodation requests is similarly vague. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 45-2 at 38 (“A: [I] felt that
[Alund] was very vindicative towards the position I was in and really upset at—you know, at the

request for accommodations that I had asked for because of my disabilities.”); id. at 19–20 (“A:
[I]t did not make it easier . . . with [Alund’s] frustration seemingly towards my disabilities and
the accommodation I had asked for. Q: Just to be clear, when you say, ‘the accommodation you
had asked for,’ which accommodation are we referring to? A: The accommodation of—that
we’ve been talking about.”).
Elsewhere, his testimony is unclear and fails to provide a consistent account of the facts.
See, e.g., Dkt. No. 45-2 at 37 (“Q: Any accommodation that you requested at this meeting
beyond that, beyond asking for more help in doing the dispatch role? A: I don’t know.”); id. (“Q:
[S]o I’m clear, you were asking for more help in doing your dispatch role. Was there any
specific action . . . that you wanted Tim Wells to take that you thought would accomplish that for
you? A: At that point, I was just overwhelmed. I didn’t know what to do or what to ask for at
that point.”).
In the few instances in which Mazzie’s testimony provides some semblance of specificity,

he divulges that the thrust of his purported accommodation requests was for “more availability to
learn [his] new job.” Dkt. No. 45-2 at 21; see Dkt. No. 45-2 at 37 (“Q: Okay. What is it that you
asked them to do at this meeting for an accommodation? A: The same accommodation I asked
for before. Just reiterated it. Q: [W]hat accommodation is that? That you needed help? A: That
I needed more opportunity to do my dispatch operations role if it was going to be done
properly.”); Dkt. No. 45-2 at 21 (“[I] asked for modification . . . for the rental coordinator duties.
So I feel that all of these [duties] are in the job description so they would all fall under the same
accommodation and the same modification.”).
To the extent that these appeals for “more opportunity” and “more availability” can be
construed as accommodation requests, Mazzie has proffered no evidence that they were denied

by his supervisor. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 45-2 at 18 (“Q: [W]hat was [Wells’] response to that? A:
He understood. [H]e sent out an email to . . . myself, Bolliger, and [Alund] stating that I was to
be a primary dispatch operations with (sic) still functioning secondary as a rental coordinator.”).1
Mazzie pivots on the nature of his alleged accommodation requests in his opposition
papers. There, Mazzie articulates—for the first time—that he had “requested two primary
accommodations: (1) that Alund stop triggering his disabilities[,] and (2) to take two days off[,]

1 Although Mazzie contends that Wells’ response was insufficient to ameliorate the difficulties he was having with
his dual roles, Mazzie does not elaborate or explain why. Instead, he complains about Alund’s reaction to the
accommodation measures that Wells provided. See Dkt. No. 45-2 at 18 (“Q: Did that take care of the difficulties that
you were having with managing both of these positions? A: No. Q: Did you revisit the issue with [Wells] then? A:
Yes. Q: [W]hat did you tell him?” A: I told him that it seemed to me that Laurie was very frustrated with my
disabilities, that she felt that it was unfair that I didn’t have to pull my weight on the rental counter.”).
March 11–12[,] because of his disabilities.” Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 48-5 at 23. Ultimately, neither
protestation is availing; both merely attempt to reframe Mazzie’s actions as qualifying ADA
accommodation requests in a manner that is wholly uncorroborated by the available record.
The latter “request” identified in Mazzie’s opposition papers demonstrates this lack of

evidentiary foundation most clearly. There, Mazzie now contends that the message he sent Wells
on March 11, slightly before 9:00 am, after leaving the office was “a simple request for
accommodation[.]” Dkt. No. 48-5 at 28.
Hey man I know you’re not at work today. I just left, I’m not dealing with the
constant attitude in [sic] the constant talking down and talking behind my back from
Laurie. I’ve done nothing but try to help end [sic] it’s getting to the point where
I’m on the verge of being a disrespectful person and that’s not who I am. I’m going
to rethink my position here at ADMAR.

Dkt. No. 43-4 at 3.

Mazzie claims that by sending this message, “[he] advised Wells that he had left for the
day because of his disability.” Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 48-5 at 28 (emphases added). But the record
is devoid of any indication that Mazzie told defendants before, or on, that day that last-minute or
emergency absences might be warranted due to his disabilities. See also Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No.
45-3 at 25 (“Q: Have you ever left work early in the day from any [prior] jobs in response to a
disability? A: No, I have not. Q: Okay. Put another way, have you ever taken a mental health
day from any of those? A: Not that I can recall, specifically for a mental health day.”).
Even assuming Mazzie had previously informed defendants of such a potential need, no
rational factfinder could conclude that his text message makes a request of any sort. Rather, the
message—as Mazzie himself puts it—“advised” Wells of actions Mazzie had already taken, and
no evidence in the record ties Mazzie’s message or the sudden departure to his disabilities.
Only at the end of that workday, at around 4:30 pm, after ignoring Wells’ attempts over
the prior eight hours to reach him, did Mazzie reply:
I’m not quitting. I was/am mad. And sick of it. I was going to call you after I
calmed down. It’s bull and no one should have to deal with that daily. She does
that shit on purpose and when you’re not there she’s worse. I don’t want to flip out
because again no one should have to do that a [sic] workplace. I am overwhelmed
by it and her and I need a few days and I’ll be back Monday.

Dkt. No. 43-4 at 4.

This message, at least, does mention taking off a discrete number of days. Still, it was
not a request for a disability accommodation. Again, it was not a request of any sort. It was a
notice—and one of an action that Mazzie had already undertaken unilaterally.
Mazzie’s messages on that day and the next offer no hint of a connection between his
conduct, the time off, and his disabilities. Yet “[a]n employer’s duty to accommodate an
employee’s disability is ordinarily activated by a request from the employee, and the request
must be sufficiently direct and specific to give the employer notice of the needed
accommodation.” See Dooley v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 636 F. App’x 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2015)
(citing Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 121, 129 (1st Cir. 2009)).
Hence, “[p]laintiff cannot hold [d]efendant[s] liable for reasonable accommodations that
[]he never requested.” Dolac v. Cnty. of Erie, 2018 WL 10780484, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 2840071 (W.D.N.Y. June 1, 2020), aff’d,
2021 WL 5267722 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2021) (quoting DeMar v. Car-Freshner Corp., 49 F. Supp.
2d 84, 95 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)); Beaton v. Metro. Transportation Auth. New York City Transit, 2016
WL 3387301, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2016) (“An employer cannot refuse to make an
accommodation that it was never asked to make.”) (internal citations omitted). Even if Mazzie’s
texts amounted to an accommodation request, it would not have necessarily entitled him to
approval by defendants. “[E]mployers are not required to provide a perfect accommodation or
the very accommodation most strongly preferred by the employee.” Noll v. Int’l Bus. Machines
Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2015).
Based on the record before the Court, no reasonable jury could find that Mazzie

prospectively and sufficiently requested any absence-related disability accommodation. Rather,
when viewed in the light most favorable to Mazzie, his requests can, at best, be interpreted as
asking the defendants to excuse his unapproved absence. But “[a] requested accommodation that
simply excuses past misconduct is unreasonable as a matter of law.” McElwee v. Cnty. of
Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 2012); accord Casanova v. Wyndham Grand Rio Mar Beach
Resort & Spa, 205 F. Supp. 3d 220, 233 (D.P.R. 2016) (granting summary judgment to defendant
on failure-to-accommodate claim where plaintiff, “[i]n essence, ask[ed] [the court] to conclude
that her present justification of past performance issues, namely, unauthorized absences from
work constitute[d] a request for reasonable accommodation”); Morgan v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.
Int’l, Inc., 2020 WL 1083210, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 5, 2020) (granting summary judgment

dismissal where employee, shortly after suspension and shortly before termination, requested as
an accommodation to use accrued vacation time to cover prior unexcused absence); Reese v.
Zimmer Prod., Inc., 2018 WL 4510453, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 19, 2018) (dismissing claim where
plaintiff had “not pointed to any case where the retroactive excusing of absences, or of any other
conduct that would normally justify termination of employment, was identified as a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA”); Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 90 (1st Cir.
2012) (“When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes
clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be ‘too little, too late.’”)
(listing cases); cf. Pierre v. Univ. of Dayton, 143 F. Supp. 3d 703, 710 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (“[T]he
majority of federal courts agree that an after-the-fact accommodation request is not timely[.]”).
Neither is there anything in the record to suggest that Mazzie put defendants on notice, or
that they should have otherwise been on notice, that Alund’s sporadic comments and general

demeanor towards Mazzie had an impact on any disability. See, e.g., Woloshin v. Rutgers Univ.,
2016 WL 5660460, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2016) (“[T]here is nothing in the record evidence to
suggest Defendants were aware that Plaintiff needed an accommodation, or that he did not know
how to ask for one. Accordingly, Defendants’ obligation to participate in the interactive process
with Plaintiff . . . was not triggered.”).
Even if Mazzie’s complaints about Alund amounted to an accommodation request,2 there
is no evidence from which to conclude that Mazzie requested a reasonable accommodation. See
McMillan, 711 F.3d at 126 (“In discrimination claims based . . . on failures to accommodate, the
plaintiff ‘bears the burdens of both production and persuasion as to the existence of some
accommodation that would allow [him] to perform the essential functions of [his]

employment[.]’”) (quoting McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir.
2009)).
The first of the two purported “primary” accommodation requests mentioned in Mazzie’s
opposition papers—“that Alund stop triggering [Mazzie’s] disabilities” and that “[she] not
discriminate against him”3—is so nebulous and conclusory as to be a non-starter. See, e.g.,

2 “Notably lacking are the details of th[e] conversation, or details regarding any follow-up conversations that may
have occurred in which a requested accommodation was discussed[.]” Angelika P. v. Town of Meredith, 2022 WL
706849, at *10 (D.N.H. Mar. 9, 2022).

3 Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 48-5 at 24; see also id. at 25–26 (“Plaintiff merely requested that his interactions
with Alund be limited only to what was necessary for him to do his job and that she not mock him for his
disabilities because it was impairing his ability to do his job.”); id. at 27 (“Plaintiff requested the simple
accommodation that Alund not abuse him or limit her conversations with him to work-related topics so that
Plaintiff could do his job.”).
Schwarzkopf v. Brunswick Corp., 833 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1122–23 (D. Minn. 2011) (“[Plaintiff]
argues that he requested a reasonable accommodation by asking that his supervisors (and others)
not yell at him[.] [S]uch a request is not reasonable. Indeed, courts have found that there exists
‘no authority for the proposition that cessation of harassment is a required reasonable

accommodation.’ Rodriguez v. John Muir Med. Ctr., 2010 WL 3448567, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
31, 2010); accord, e.g., Cox v. Peak, 2010 WL 3860499, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 16, 2010) [ ]
(plaintiff failed to propose reasonable accommodation by asking her ‘supervisors to leave me
alone, you know, and my coworkers to stop bothering me and harassing me, intimidating me,
making me feel like I’m this high (indicating)’), adopted, 2010 WL 3769105 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
24, 2010).”); see also Becker v. Linn Cnty., Iowa, 2021 WL 5746000, at *11 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 1,
2021) (“[E]ven if a reasonable jury found that a plaintiff requested a harassment-free workplace,
that reasonable jury could not find that the plaintiff requested a ‘reasonable accommodation’
because no legal authority treats the elimination of harassment as a reasonable
accommodation.”); id. at *11 (“The [c]ourt . . . declines to extend a reasonable accommodation

to include a harassment-free workplace.”).
Considered in the light most favorable to Mazzie, these requests may be interpreted as
efforts to avoid working with or alongside Alund. Yet “[t]o the extent [the] ADA claim might be
construed as a request for an accommodation that involved no contact with . . . a single co-
worker[,] that request [is] unreasonable as a matter of law.” Butrym v. Burnt Hills-Ballston Lake
Cent. Sch. Dist., 2022 WL 1102413, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2022) (Hurd, J.); see Wang v. HP,
Inc., 2020 WL 674352, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2020) (“[T]he Second Circuit has affirmed
summary judgment rulings that conclude, for example, that a ‘request for an accommodation of
no contact with any co-workers . . . [is] unreasonable as a matter of law.’”) (quoting Theilig v.
United Tech Corp., 415 F. App’x 331, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order)); see also Kennedy v.
Dresser Rand Co., 193 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[Plaintiff’s] request was . . . for protection
from any interaction with [supervisor][;] in the context of the particular workplace described in
the record before us, it would be virtually impossible for [plaintiff] to perform her job of

coordinating workers’ compensation claims without at least some contact with [supervisor], who
supervises all health care personnel and who is the plant ‘expert’ on workers’ compensation[.]”)
(emphasis in original); accord Rough v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 2022 WL 2966440, at *8 (D.
Mont. July 27, 2022), aff’d, 2023 WL 4557741 (9th Cir. July 17, 2023) (collecting cases).
Any other construction of Mazzie’s reported complaints about Alund—those supported
by record evidence, at least—amounts to a request that is impracticable. See Mazzie Depo., Dkt.
No. 45-3 at 21–22 (“Q: Would a reasonable accommodation—in your opinion, would that have
entailed restricting the use of certain words? A: I mean . . . I don’t know how to—I don’t know.
I don’t know—certain words. Q: [W]ould a reasonable accommodation have included
prohibiting Ms. Alund from using the words we’ve talked about[:] stupid, idiotic, crybaby? A: I

mean, yeah. Those are general words you shouldn’t use towards anybody regardless of their
disabilities, but yeah. I suppose.”).
Supposing that an accommodation amounting to a set of speech restrictions imposed by
Mazzie—applicable solely to one coworker4—would be lawful, let alone appropriate under the
ADA, the words cited above are presumably not the only ones that Mazzie would find
demeaning.5 Yet Mazzie offers no indication of what other words, terms, or phrases warrant

4 See Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-3 at 22 (“Q: [W]ould a reasonable accommodation to you in this case have entailed
modifying any employee’s behavior besides Laurie Alund[?] A: [L]aurie was the one that really affected me on a
daily basis, day to day.”)

5 See Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-2 at 12 (“I informed Laurie [on] multiple occasions that when words are being used
that are provocative or inappropriate towards me that, you know, it flusters my brain. It’s hard for me to learn. It’s
hard for me to think. A lot of the times it will take over completely.”).
prohibition, and the Court is unaware of any means by which defendants could otherwise foretell
all of them—short of clairvoyance, for which the record provides no evidence. In essence, an
accommodation targeting Alund’s speech would require that Mazzie wield approval authority
over what Alund could say to, around, or about him.

But “the ADA protects against disability discrimination[;] [it] is not otherwise a general
civility code for the American workplace.” Marini v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 64 F. Supp. 3d
317, 326 (D. Conn. 2014) (citing Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc., 688 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 2012));
see also Calise v. New York State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 2020 WL 1309062, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 19, 2020) (“[R]ude and derogatory comments, absent any discriminatory connotation, are
not enough to establish a . . . discrimination claim.”).
An accommodation permitting Mazzie to prohibit comments by Alund that he
subjectively perceives as discriminatory, despite not being objectively so, is unreasonable as a
matter of law. In any event, it is unclear that restrictions on Alund’s speech would suffice. See
Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-2 at 25 (remarking that Alund’s silence made for “a completely

awkward workplace, seeing as [the two] were eight feet apart . . . all day”); id. at 29 (“She would
act like I was invisible. She would turn around, stare at her computer, or do something else or
walk away, making it completely awkward to work next to somebody like that.”).
The unreasonableness of such an accommodation is clear; it merits no further
consideration. Mazzie’s failure to accommodate claim must be dismissed.6

6 To the extent Mazzie argues that defendants failed to engage in the interactive process (see Dkt. No. 48-5 at 27–
28)—“even if the record supported as much, which it does not—that is not an independent basis for an ADA claim.”
Muller v. NAES Corp., 2023 WL 2165343, at *10 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2023) (Sannes, C.J.); see also McBride,
583 F.3d at 101 (“[W]e adopt the reasoning of our sister Circuits and hold that an employer’s failure to engage in a
sufficient interactive process does not form the basis of a claim under the ADA and evidence thereof does not allow
a plaintiff to avoid summary judgment unless she also establishes that, at least with the aid of some identified
accommodation, she was qualified for the position at issue.”).
B. Hostile Work Environment Claim7
Mazzie also submits that summary judgment is precluded on his hostile work
environment claim, “because Alund tormented [him] for two months because of his disabilities.”
Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 48-5 at 7.

“Unlike claims based on discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation, incidents that give
rise to a hostile work environment occur over a series of days or perhaps years and a single act of
harassment may not be actionable on its own.” Hawley v. OPWDD-Cent. NY DDSO, 2025 WL
1127447, at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2025) (citing Banks v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242, 258
(2d Cir. 2023)). Thus, “the alleged conduct in many hostile work environment cases must be
repeated or ongoing before it is adequately severe or pervasive to constitute a violation.” Id.
(quoting Gonzalez v. Hasty, 802 F.3d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 2015)).
“To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, [a plaintiff] must show (1) that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and
create an abusive working environment, and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the

objectionable conduct to the employer.” Stanley v. Phelon, 2024 WL 1453872, at *4 (summary
order) (quoting Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2019)); see also Knope
v. Garland, 2021 WL 5183536, at *4 (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2021) (summary order) (noting the
elements of a hostile work environment claim are substantially similar under the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and Title VII).

7 In response to defendants’ motion, Mazzie asserts that he was also subjected to a retaliatory hostile work
environment. See Dkt. No. 48-5 at 11. However, no such claim was asserted in the amended complaint. See
generally Dkt. No. 13. “A plaintiff may not assert a claim for the first time in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment.” Vitti v. Macy’s Inc., 758 F. App’x 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (citing Zann Kwan v.
Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 2013)).
“An employee must prove both objective and subjective elements of [their] claim.”
Knope, 2021 WL 5183536, at *4. “First, the employee must prove the objective requirement,
i.e., that the employer created an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). “Second, the

employee must prove the subjective requirement, i.e., that the employee subjectively perceived
the employer’s conduct as hostile or abusive.” Id. “Finally, the employee must demonstrate a
causal element: that the employer created a hostile environment because of a protected
characteristic.” Id.
“Here,” Mazzie argues, “the hostile work environment started in early-to-mid January
and lasted until March 12, 2021[.]” Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 48-5 at 29. In support of his claim,
Mazzie asserts the following: Alund “called [him] ‘stupid’ about five times—at times in the
presence of others[,”] [s]he said was [sic] ‘idiotic’ twice[,] [and] called him a crybaby within in
[sic] earshot” of him. Dkt. No. 48-5 at 29.
Mazzie adds that, “[b]eyond this[,] Alund’s demeanor was hostile and aggressive[,] [and]

Alund would go out of her way to make his job harder, for example by taking work orders he
needed to do his job off the printer.” Id. at 29–30. Alund also “complained about having to give
him what [she] saw as special treatment.” Id. at 30. “Alund’s mockery hampered [Mazzie’s]
ability to perform his job’s core functions, such as learning how to handle his new
responsibilities and thinking so he could interact with customers and complete assignments.”
Dkt. No. 48-5 at 8.
Mazzie maintains that Alund’s “comments are clearly associated with [his] disabilities
because they speak to his mental abilities.” Dkt. No. 48-5 at 30; But see, e.g., Mazzie Depo.,
Dkt. No. 45-4 at 59 (“[W]hy did you believe that the use of that term, [‘stupid’], was related
specifically to your disabilities? A: I’m not sure if it was related just to my disabilities.”); see
also Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-2 at 7 (“A: I believe that [the complaint] says that she disliked
working with me—specifically me—and that I suffer from disabilities such as PTSD, depression,
and anxiety.”); id. at 7 (“Q: [J]ust so I’m clear—you intend to mean that [Alund] disliked

working with you and you have disabilities. You are not opining as to her reasons for disliking
working with you; is that correct? A: I don’t know her reasons for disliking me. Q: Okay. A: I
have no idea why she disliked me.”).
He also complains of Alund’s removal of work orders from the office printer. See Mazzie
Depo., Dkt. No. 45-2 at 9–10 (“A: She would take [work orders] off the printer and she would
keep them to herself, which hindered my ability to do my new job because I can’t schedule
something for delivery or pickup if I don’t have the order in front—in front of me or available at
the printer where it’s supposed to be—where it’s supposed to remain or in the file—the wall files
where they’re supposed to be filed if not given to me directly. [I]f a client needs a piece of
equipment for a job to start at 9 a.m., and I don’t see the work order that’s been on her desk until

10:00 a.m., you can’t get a piece of equipment there on time.”).
In addition, he complains that Alund would not always update internal records to reflect
that returned equipment was available for rental. See Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-2 at 11 (“I
don’t know what her reasoning was[,] but a lot of the times it was because she wanted the piece
of equipment if it was a high item, and she knew that . . . [if] one of her top customers was going
to need it, she would save it.”). Aside from these comments and conduct, Mazzie asserts that
“Alund’s demeanor” towards him was “hostile and aggressive[.]” See Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No.
45-3 (“I was receiving an attitude being, you know, sort of general demeanor of her tone and
tone of her voice towards me was very aggressive, I would say, and just rude and uncalled for.”).
When reviewing hostile work environment claims, “[c]ourts are . . . ‘cautioned to
consider the totality of the circumstances, and to evaluate the quantity, frequency, and severity of
the incidents,’ and must consider those factors ‘cumulatively,’ so that [they] may ‘obtain a
realistic view of the work environment.’” Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 F.4th 55, 74

(2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Richardson v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 437
(2d Cir. 1999)).
Yet Mazzie’s filings and the record, “read in their totality, [only] reveal workplace
rudeness, which is ‘not enough to give rise to an actionable hostile work environment claim.’”
Marecheau v. Equal Emp. Pracs. Comm’n, 2014 WL 5026142, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014)
(quoting De la Cruz v. City of New York, 783 F. Supp. 2d 622, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
The Court is not insensitive to Mazzie’s condition; however, to reiterate, “the ADA does
not impose a civility code.” Id. (quoting Krist, 688 F.3d at 97); see also Schneidermesser v. NYU
Grossman Sch. of Med., 2024 WL 4135701, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2024). (“Isolated incidents
or episodic stray remarks are not sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed

pervasive.”).
Simply put, Mazzie’s assertions of defendants’ misconduct are insufficient to permit a
rational factfinder to conclude that his working environment was ever objectively hostile.
Further, there is no evidence to support Mazzie’s claim that either Admar or Wells is
liable for any alleged incidents involving Alund.8 The record is clear that the two defendants
“provided several avenues for [p]laintiff to complain about allegedly hostile incidents in his work
environments, and that [Admar] supervisors responded promptly to his complaints—often in

8 Pannikadavil, 2008 WL 2876525, at *9 n.28 (“Plaintiff also alleges that [supervisor]’s actions contributed to the
hostile work environment, but he presents no evidence to support that claim. Therefore, none of [supervisor’s]
conduct in the record can be imputed to make Defendants liable for a hostile work environment claim.”) (internal
citations omitted).
[p]laintiff’s favor.” See Pannikadavil v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2008 WL
2876525, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2008). Mazzie’s hostile work environment claim thus also
fails for failure to impute the alleged conduct of Alund to defendants Admar or Wells.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mazzie’s ADA hostile work

environment claim.
C. Discriminatory Discharge Claim
i. Wrongful Termination
Mazzie further alleges that defendants discriminated against him by wrongfully
terminating his employment because of his disability. See Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 13 at 12–13.
Claims alleging disability discrimination in violation of the ADA are subject to the
burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
See McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125. Under this framework, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of
proving their prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Kirkland-
Hudson v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist., 665 F. Supp. 3d 412, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

To establish a prima facie discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) his employer is subject to the ADA; (2) he was
disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential
functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he suffered adverse
employment action because of his disability.” McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125 (quoting Sista v. CDC
Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Specifically, a plaintiff must satisfy the last element of his prima facie case by showing
that the adverse employment action “took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference
of discrimination.” See Carter v. TD Bank, N.A., 2023 WL 3818589, at *12 (D. Conn. June 5,
2023), aff’d, 2024 WL 2828470 (2d Cir. June 4, 2024) (quoting Davis v. New York City Dep’t of
Educ., 804 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2015)).
“If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, and if the defendant then proffers a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the burden shifts back

to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s proffered reason was pretextual.” Carter, 2023 WL
3818589, at *13 (citing Heyman v. Queens Vill. Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty.
Adolescent Program, Inc., 198 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1999)). “The plaintiff will ultimately prevail
on his ADA discrimination claim only if he proves that his disability was ‘the but-for cause’ of
the adverse employment action.” Carter, 2023 WL 3818589, at *13 (citing Natofsky v. City of
New York, 921 F.3d 337, 349 (2d Cir. 2019)).
Here, the parties dispute whether Mazzie has demonstrated the fourth prong. Mazzie
asserts that “Defendants fired [him],” thus, he believes, “satisfying the adverse employment
prong[.]” Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 48-5 at 13. In turn, defendants argue that Mazzie was not fired;
he resigned. See, e.g., Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 43-10 at 24 (“[T]he facts show that [Mazzie] was

not terminated in the first place, rather, [he] left voluntarily on March 11, 2021.”); id. at 25–26
(“[M]azzie has provided no evidence of an adverse employment decision against him, much less
that any decision by defendants was motivated by a discriminatory animus.”).
Per Mazzie, since defendants “contend that [he] did not experience an adverse
employment action because he quit[,] genuine issues of material fact preclude summary
judgment on this point.” Dkt. No. 48-5 at 13. Mazzie proclaims that removing the picture of his
son from his workstation on March 11, “at this stage—when [he] is entitled to every favorable
inference—[c]annot be seen as evidence that he resigned[,]” once again “rendering summary
judgment inappropriate.” Id. at 14. Mazzie misses the forest for the trees.
For purposes of resolving the pending motion, and drawing all reasonable inferences
against defendants, the Court will accept Mazzie’s supposition that he was terminated. As a
result, “defendant must produce evidence supporting an explanation for the termination which,
‘taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the

adverse action.’” Turner v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 3d 123, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2023),
appeal withdrawn sub nom. Turner v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2023 WL 4311227 (2d Cir. June 14,
2023) (quoting Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2000)).
“[T]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was motivated by the reason it
provides; rather it must simply articulate an explanation that, if true, would connote lawful
behavior.” Sotak v. Bertoni, 501 F. Supp. 3d 59, 78 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (Hurd. J.). “[T]his burden
is one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment.” Musante v.
Mohawk Valley Cmty. Coll., 270 F. Supp. 3d 564, 577 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (Hurd, J.); see also
Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch. Dist., 691 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[W]hile the
presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant, the ultimate burden of persuading

the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all
times with the plaintiff.”) (internal alterations and citations omitted).
“[C]ourts have consistently held that they may not second-guess an employer’s non-
discriminatory business decisions, regardless of their wisdom, unless there is actual evidence that
they were motivated by discrimination. Federal courts do not hold a roving commission to
review business judgments.” Peters v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 2010 WL 1372686, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 30, 2010) (citing Montana v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Rochester, 869 F.2d 100, 106
(2d Cir. 1989)).
Defendants have articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Mazzie’s
termination: job abandonment. As Mazzie highlights, he “texted Wells on March 12[,] ‘[Y]ou
just called me and said I’m no longer an employee at ADMAR because of job abandonment for
leaving yesterday.’” Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 48-5 at 16 (quoting Dkt. No. 43-4 at 5); see Mazzie

Depo., Dkt. No. 45-3 (“Q: [S]o what was discussed on the call between you and Wells if not your
resignation? A: [H]e called me and said, ‘I’m calling to inform you that you are no longer an
employee at Admar for job abandonment.’ Q: What was your response to that? A: I didn’t
abandon my job. Q: That’s what you told him? A: Yes.”); Am. Compl. ¶ 85 (“Defendant Wells
informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff was no longer employed by Defendant Admar, claiming that
Plaintiff had abandoned his position.”); id. ¶ 89 (“Defendant Wells replied that Plaintiff would
not be returning to work with Defendants, realleging that Plaintiff had abandoned his position.”);
see also Pl.’s Statement of Additional Material Facts in Dispute, Dkt. No. 48 ¶ 30 (reiterating
Wells informed Mazzie that he was no longer an Admar employee because of job abandonment).
Mazzie argues, then and now, that his absence did not qualify as job abandonment. See

Dkt. No. 43-4 at 7 (texting Wells: “FYI – me leaving work yesterday was not job abandonment
as you stated as the reason for firing me”); id. (accompanying screenshot of unidentified New
York Department of Labor document stating a worker abandons their job if “absent for five
consecutively previously scheduled days without prior notification”).
But that’s beside the point. “An employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad
reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a
discriminatory reason.” Altman v. New Rochelle Pub. Sch. Dist., 2016 WL 3181153, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2016) (quoting DeLuca v. Allied Domecq Quick Serv. Restaurants, 2006 WL
1662611, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2006)). Even if defendants were mistaken about the number
of days of absence required to appropriately consider an employee as having “abandoned” their
job, they still have presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Mazzie’s termination.
“If the defendant satisfies its burden of production, then the presumption raised by the
prima facie case is rebutted and drops from the case.” Shaham v. Vertrax, Inc., 2023 WL

2600207, at *11 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2023) (quoting Bucalo, 691 F.3d at 129). “At the final stage,
the plaintiff then has ‘the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true
reason for the employment decision’—a burden that ‘merges with the ultimate burden of
persuading the court that [he or] she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.’” Bucalo,
691 F.3d at 129 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
Mazzie has put forth insufficient evidence to rebut defendants’ non-discriminatory reason
for his separation from Admar. See Dkt. No. 45-3 at 32–33 (“Q: Why do you believe that [Wells]
didn’t want to [continue to] employ you because you were disabled?” A: I felt that he was —I
felt that he just didn’t want to accommodate for the disability anymore. I felt that it was making
him do his job too much. I mean, he was never in the office, and I had to always bring stuff to

his attention. And when I did, he started getting frustrated by it. It felt like it was a burden to
him, and I felt like my disabilities were a burden to him, and he just didn’t want to deal with it
anymore.”); see also Dkt. No. 45-3 at 33 (“Q: Any other basis for your belief that he didn’t want
to employ you anymore because you are disabled? A: Well. Besides the fact that I asked to take
a mental health day, and less than 24 hours later, I was being terminated, no.”).
As already discussed, Mazzie did not ask Wells for a “mental health day.” Mazzie left his
workstation, notified Wells after the fact of his departure, and at no point conveyed to Wells that
his exit was related in any way to his disability. Mazzie offers only his sense that Wells harbored
some discriminatory animus, which resulted in his termination. But Mazzie’s feelings that his
termination was motivated by a discriminatory animus, absent any evidence supporting those
feelings, cannot satisfy his burden of persuasion. He has not shown that his termination took
place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
ii. Constructive Discharge

Mazzie also argues, for the first time in his opposition papers, that “in the alternative,
Defendants constructively discharged Plaintiff[.]” Dkt. No. 48-5 at 16. “Constructive discharge”
has two legally relevant meanings in employment discrimination actions. Noh v. Admarketplace,
Inc., 2025 WL 965882, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025).
The first is as an independent claim for relief. “This type of constructive discharge claim
has been characterized as a ‘hostile-environment constructive discharge’ claim and requires that
a plaintiff sufficiently allege a hostile work environment in order to adequately allege a
constructive discharge claim.” Bright-Asante v. Saks & Co., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 3d 229, 243
(S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 855 F. App’x 40 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (citing Pennsylvania
State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004)).

“Where an alleged constructive discharge stems from an alleged hostile work
environment, a plaintiff ‘must show working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person
would have felt compelled to resign,’” which amounts to a “standard . . . higher than the standard
for establishing a hostile work environment.” Fincher v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 604
F.3d 712, 725 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pennsylvania State Police, 542 U.S. at 147)); Atkinson v.
Singh, 2022 WL 137634, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2022).
“Constructive discharge may also be asserted as the adverse employment action element
of a separate employment discrimination claim.” Noh v. Admarketplace, Inc., 2025 WL 965882,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025) (emphasis in original); see Dall v. St. Catherine of Siena Med.
Ctr., 966 F. Supp. 2d 167, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“A constructive discharge is functionally the
same as an actual termination and therefore is considered an adverse employment action.”). The
adverse employment action of constructive discharge can occur “when an employer intentionally
creates a work atmosphere so intolerable that the plaintiff is forced to quit involuntarily.”

Atkinson, 2022 WL 137634, at *14 (citing Borski v. Staten Island Rapid Transit, 413 F. App’x
409, 411 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order)) (internal alterations omitted).
Whichever meaning Mazzie intends to apply in this case, it does not matter. If Mazzie
endeavors to present constructive discharge as an independent claim, he may not do so. “It is
well established that ‘it is inappropriate to raise new claims for the first time in submissions in
opposition to summary judgment.’” Lichtman v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 2020 WL 1989486, at
*4 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2020) (quoting Wilson v. City of N.Y., 480 F. App’x 592, 594 (2d Cir.
2012) (summary order)).
Moreover, this assertion of constructive discharge contradicts his pleading. See generally
Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 13; see also id. ¶¶ 90–92 (“On or about March 12, 2021, Defendants

terminated Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not resign from his position with Defendants. Plaintiff did not
abandon his position with Defendants.”). And, although presented in his opposition papers, this
assertion appears to contradict his contemporaneously filed counterstatement of material facts.
Dkt. No. 48 at 4 (“Disputed that Plaintiff quit. Plaintiff was fired.”).
Regardless, “[a]lleging that Plaintiff was terminated or that Plaintiff suffered a loss of
employment is not a sufficient means by which to assert a constructive discharge theory.” Facci-
Brahler v. Montgomery Cnty., 2025 WL 743949, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2025) (Nardacci, J.).
“A plaintiff must prove first that he was discriminated against by his employer to the point where
a reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to resign[;] [b]ut he must also
show that he actually resigned.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555 (2016). Mazzie has
presented no evidence that he resigned. “Absent evidence of actual resignation, [plaintiff] cannot
avail himself of the constructive discharge doctrine.” Perry v. Floss Bar, Inc., 2021 WL 871436,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2021); cf. Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 48-5 (“Defendants cannot have it both

ways—[Mazzie] either quit or he was terminated[.]”).
If Mazzie meant to offer constructive discharge as the adverse employment action for his
discriminatory discharge claim, that too is unavailing. Because Mazzie has failed to establish a
hostile work environment, he cannot meet the higher standard required here; thus, his claim of
constructive discharge would also fail. Fincher, 604 F.3d at 725.
Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that Mazzie was subject to unlawful
discrimination “because of” his disability. Mazzie’s ADA discrimination claim must be
dismissed.
D. Retaliation Claim
The ADA prohibits retaliation against an individual who has opposed any act or practice

made unlawful under the ADA. Harris v. Bronx Parent Hous. Network, Inc., 2020 WL 763740,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2020) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12203)). “As with ADA discrimination
claims, retaliation claims under the ADA are also subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework.” Telesford v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 2023 WL 6366051, at *1 (2d
Cir. Sept. 29, 2023) (citing Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002)).
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, [a plaintiff] must show that: ‘(1) he
engaged in an activity protected by the ADA; (2) the employer was aware of this activity; (3) the
employer took adverse employment action against him; and (4) a causal connection exists
between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity.’” Frantti v. New York, 850 F.
App’x 17, 21 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir.
2002)); see also Mitchell v. Planned Parenthood of Greater New York, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 3d 68,
96–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (noting similarity between ADA and Title VII retaliation provisions).
“An employee’s activity is protected even if ‘his condition was not a disability within the

meaning of the ADA,’ so long as he alleges ‘that he possessed a good faith, reasonable belief
that the underlying challenged actions of the employer violated’ the ADA, and that ‘the
employer understood, or could reasonably have understood’ that the employee believed the
challenged conduct was discriminatory.” Batista v. Consol. Edison of New York, Inc., 2025 WL
1042338, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 842940
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2025) (quoting Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d
155, 159 (2d Cir. 1999) and Trotter v. Nat’l Football League, 737 F. Supp. 3d 172, 182
(S.D.N.Y. 2024)).
To prove a causal connection for an ADA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that
‘but for’ the protected activity, the adverse action would not have been taken. Sharikov v.

Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th
111, 125 (2d Cir. 2023)).
i. Protected Activity
As with his other claims, Mazzie is reluctant to provide necessary details here. He fails
to clearly identify specific adverse employment actions taken in retaliation for any particular
protected activities.

For instance, the operative complaint suggests that Mazzie believes his termination was
retaliatory, but it does not identify the protected activity or activities that prompted the alleged
retaliation. See, e.g., Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 13 ¶ 102 (“Plaintiff was repulsed, offended,
disturbed, humiliated, and disgusted by this blatantly unlawful, discriminatory, and retaliatory
termination.”). Similarly, although the complaint references conduct that Mazzie believes
prompted retaliation—chiefly, his objections to Alund’s actions—it fails to identify what
retaliatory actions were taken in response. See, e.g., id. ¶ 103 (“Defendants retaliated against
Plaintiff because Plaintiff objected to Defendant Alund’s discriminatory and unlawful
conduct.”). The remainder of the complaint offers no further clarification. See, e.g., id. ¶ 107
(“The above are just some of the ways Defendants . . . retaliated against Plaintiff while

employing Plaintiff.”).
Mazzie’s opposition papers provide slightly more insight. He asserts that his theory of
liability is based on his “repeated[] object[ions] to the hostile work environment that Alund
created[,] and Admar tolerated[.]” Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 48-5 at 17; see also id. at 23 (“The
request related to Alund’s conduct are [sic] clearly related to [Mazzie’s] disabilities.”). He
further claims that he engaged in protected activity when “he took the day off on March 11
because of his disability and because he again objected to Alund’s discriminatory conduct that
day.” Dkt. No. 48-5 at 18.
“Making a good faith request for an accommodation is a protected activity”; as is
“[c]omplaining to a supervisor, instituting litigation, or filing a formal complaint about the
defendant’s discriminatory conduct.” McSweeney v. Cohen, 776 F. Supp. 3d 200, 251 (S.D.N.Y.
2025) (listing cases). And “[a] complaint to a supervisor need not have had merit to make it a

protected activity.” Id. (citing Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 157 (2d Cir. 2012)).
Rather, “an employee’s complaint must only be sufficiently pointed to be reasonably understood
as a complaint about discrimination, and the employee must have a good faith, reasonable belief
that the underlying employment practice was unlawful.” Id. (internal citations and alterations
omitted).
Even under this lenient standard, the competent evidence in the record shows that the
verbal complaints Mazzie made to defendants regarding Alund were so vague and generalized
that they could not reasonably be understood as complaints about legally prohibited conduct.
See, e.g., Mazzie Depo., Dkt. No. 45-2 at 33 (“Q: [D]o you recall what words you used with Tim
Wells, what you told him? A: No, I don’t.”); id. at 34 (“Q: During the second conversation that

you had with Wells[,] did you ask him to take any specific actions? A: Maybe to speak to—I
don’t know—recall specifically at this moment, but I know that he spoke to us both afterwards,
so I may have asked him to, you know, maybe diffuse the situation.”); id. at 35 (“Q: ‘In or
around early February 2021, Plaintiff again complained to Defendant Wells regarding Defendant
Alund’s behavior, reiterating it was worsening his anxiety[.]’ Do you recall what words you
used with Mr. Wells on this occasion? A: I don’t know exactly the words, no.”); see also
Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 594 (2d Cir. 1988)
(plaintiff failed to meet his burden where he “neither pointed out discrimination against
particular individuals nor discriminatory practices”).
The only written communications from Mazzie that are in the record also fail to suggest a
belief on Mazzie’s part that Alund’s conduct was discriminatory. As discussed at length above,
the text exchange from March 11–12, 2021, although critical of Alund, is not sufficiently
specific to be understood as a complaint regarding discrimination.

Likewise, the text exchange on March 2, 2021, in which Mazzie expressed frustration
over Alund allegedly spreading a rumor that an Admar driver quit due to a personality conflict
with Mazzie, does not indicate any belief that her conduct was discriminatorily or unlawfully
targeted at him. Rather, Mazzie’s comments suggest annoyance at Alund’s generally abrasive
behavior. See Dkt. No. 43-4 at 1 (“Thank you for that. She’s been really snotty and has given me
attitude all day.”); id. (“[S]he literally talks shit about every person here behind their backs.”).
Even construed in the light most favorable to Mazzie, the substance of his conversations
with Wells, as reflected in the record, were too vague to constitute protected activity. See, e.g.,
Barney v. H.E.L.P. Homeless Serv. Corp., 2021 WL 4267629, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2021)
(“Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that [manager] necessarily knew that he was emailing [senior

vice president] to complain about her alleged discriminatory comments—when he had never
before complained about discrimination, and his email indicated nothing of the sort—does not
compel a different finding.”); Bisang v. New York State Educ. Dep’t, 2023 WL 5351159, at *17
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2023) (Sannes, C.J.) (holding that a plaintiff’s statements that supervisor had
“been on her back,” that she was “at the end of her rope,” and her request that management “do
something about [supervisor] and keep her away” were too vague to constitute protected
activity); see also Barney, 2021 WL 4267629, at *21 (“complaint ‘too generalized’ where it
indicated that plaintiff was ‘suffering harassment,’ but ‘[said] nothing about the harassment being
based on a protected characteristic’”) (citing Gonzalez v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp.,
2019 WL 2435622, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2019)); id. (employee’s complaint to employer
“insufficient where plaintiff ‘conceded in his deposition that he did not suggest [in that
complaint] that he had encountered any race or national origin discrimination’”) (quoting Lugo v.
Le Pain Quotidien, 2015 WL 1808558, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2015), aff’d, 654 F. App’x 7 (2d

Cir. 2016)) (emphasis in original); Ochei v. Coler/Goldwater Mem’l Hosp., 450 F. Supp. 2d 275,
287 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[Plaintiff] has claimed that she was retaliated against for complaining
about observations of her work, and other allegedly adverse actions[;] [h]owever, because she
does not allege that she ever complained to her supervisors that she was the victim of
discrimination, these complaints are not protected activity as a matter of law.”).
ii. Causation
Even assuming the Court were to find that some of Mazzie’s actions constituted protected
activity, he cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation, as he has failed to demonstrate a
causal connection between any allegedly protected activity and his termination.
A plaintiff may demonstrate a causal connection between their “engagement in protected

activity and materially adverse retaliatory action either ‘directly, through evidence of retaliatory
animus directed against the plaintiff by the defendant’ or ‘indirectly, by showing that the
protected activity is followed closely by discriminatory treatment or through other circumstantial
evidence such as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct.’”
O’Brien v. City of New York, Dep’t of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 3d 221, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting
Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2010)).
“Temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action may suffice to
establish a prima facie claim of retaliation.” Bisang, 2023 WL 5351159, at *17. However,
“[t]emporal proximity alone is insufficient to defeat summary judgment[.]” Clawson v. City of
Albany Dep’t of Fire & Emergency, 2023 WL 2456065, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2023)
(D’Agostino, J.), aff’d, 2024 WL 1044531 (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 2024) (quoting Zann Kwan v.
Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir. 2013)).
Mazzie insists that “the record is rife with evidence . . . [that] Defendants held a

retaliatory . . . animus towards Plaintiff[,]” but leaves it to the Court to ascertain what that
evidence might be. See Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 48-5 at 22.
Yet Mazzie offers the same, or even less, specificity in support of his retaliation claims as
he does for his claims of discrimination. Many of the conclusory statements he makes about
alleged discrimination are identical to those he asserts in support of his retaliation claim. See,
e.g., Dkt. No. 48-5 at 22 (“[T]he record is rife with evidence that Defendants held a retaliatory
and discriminatory animus towards Plaintiff.”); id. (“[D]efendants’ conduct that created the
hostile work environment and that established Plaintiff’s prima facie cases for retaliation and
discrimination should be considered during the discussion of pretext.”); id. at 25 (“[D]efendants
contend that Plaintiff’s request that Defendants not condone the discriminatory and retaliatory

hostile work environment that Alund created was a per se unreasonable request[.]”); id. at 26
(“Here, Plaintiff requested that Defendants not condone Alund’s discriminatory and retaliatory
behavior and was not offered any sort of accommodation.”); id. at 7 (“[S]ummary judgment is
improper for Defendants have failed to adequately challenge Plaintiff’s prima facie cases of
discrimination and retaliation.”).
The Court need not belabor this analysis. The record, viewed in the light most favorable
to Mazzie, reflects only his speculative belief that his termination was retaliatory. But “whether
Defendants’ actions were unreasonable, unfair or even untrue, . . . without any showing of
retaliatory motive, they do not support Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.” Rapp v. Esper, 2023 WL
2666673, at *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2023).
Mazzie’s ADA retaliation claim must be dismissed.
E. NYSHRL Claims

Having disposed of Mazzie’s claims under the ADA, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining NYSHRL claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). When
deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts consider “the traditional values of
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Bibliotechnical Athenaeum v. Am. Univ. of
Beirut, 527 F. Supp. 3d 625, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), aff’d, No. 21-1642, 2022 WL 710896 (2d Cir.
Mar. 10, 2022) (internal citations omitted). “Once all federal claims have been dismissed, the
balance of factors will ‘usually’ point toward a declination.” Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long
Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.
343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Because this is a “usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated
before trial,” Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 119 (2d Cir. 2006), and there

are no exceptional circumstances present, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Mazzie’s state-law claims and will dismiss those claims without prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 43) is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff’s claims under the Americans with Disability Act are DISMISSED with
prejudice; and
3. Plaintiff’s New York Human Rights Law claims are DISMISSED without
prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the pending motion (Dkt. No. 43), enter a
judgment accordingly, and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 26, 2025 "
Anthony J. Brindisj
U.S. District a

41

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145189. Public record. Not legal advice.