# Krasner Loan Co., Inc d/b/a American Loan Company v. Ferraris

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · August 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11144707

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** August 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

KRASNER LOAN CO., INC.
d/b/a AMERICAN LOAN COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case 2:24-cv-02177-MSN-cgc

EMIL S. FERRARIS,
BRENT E. WEIRICH,
MATT ROBINSON,
and CITY OF BARTLETT, TENNESSEE
GOVERNMENT,

Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________________

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
CITY OF BARTLETT, TENNESEE GOVERNMENT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
_____________________________________________________________________________

Before the Court is Defendant, the City of Bartlett, Tennessee Government’s (the “City”)
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Docket Entry (“D.E.”) #70). The instant motion
has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for Report and Recommendation. (D.E.
#64). For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
be GRANTED.
I. Background
The crux of the federal claims in this case, which are brought pursuant to 42 United States
Code Section 1983 (“Section 1983”), are that Detective Matt Robinson (“Detective Robinson”) of
the Bartlett Police Department (“BPD”) violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by seizing
property, including firearms, that Brent E. Weirich (“Weirich”) pawned to Plaintiff’s business
without affording Plaintiff the appropriate due process rights or complying with Tennessee law.
(Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-34, 40-41).
With respect to its Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff alleges that the City deprived it of its due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution “by demanding

and removing the property in Plaintiff’s possession without any hearing and failing to follow the
law which had been put in place to protect it and by not protecting Plaintiff’s possessory rights to
the seized property by returning those items” to the alleged original owner. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 34).
Plaintiff alleges that the City “has a pattern and practice of ignoring the State Law regarding
pawnshop owners thereby depriving them of their possessory rights without due process.” (Id. ¶
25).
Plaintiff further alleges that the City “failed to take any reasonable steps or investigative
measures to confirm the actual ownership of the property.” (Id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff alleges that the
City “has a duty to properly train and supervise employees on compliance with state statutory laws
regarding pawnbrokers as well as the Constitutional rights of pawnbrokers and the duty to properly

train and supervise law enforcement officers on the proper handling of the investigation of claims
involving pawnbrokers and allegedly stolen property.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the City “failed
to properly train and supervise its employees regarding the above matters in such a manner that
the training policy or lack of training policy amounts to a deliberate indifference to constitutional
rights of pawnbrokers and in particular the Plaintiff.” (Id.)
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the City violated its Fourth Amendment rights under the
United States Constitution “for the illegal seizure of property in which Plaintiff held possessory
rights” and “for the failure to properly train and supervise their employees and a training policy or
lack thereof which was deliberately indifferent to the Constitutional Rights of pawnbrokers and in
particular Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶¶ 40-41).
With respect to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 45-6-213, et seq., Plaintiff alleges that
the City failed to comply with its duty to provide a “law enforcement agency’s report on the

misappropriate of theft.” (Id. ¶ 16). Plaintiff further alleges that, pursuant to the same statute, the
City had a duty to provide notice from the alleged owners that “any property in its possession was
claimed to be misappropriated or stolen.” Plaintiff alleges that the City was required to complete
this latter duty on behalf of the alleged owner because it became the alleged owner’s agent by
providing Plaintiff with an affidavit on behalf of the alleged owner. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17).1
The City’s Motion to Dismiss argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against it
because it does not allege any municipal policy or custom inflicted an injury upon Plaintiff. The
City further argues that Plaintiff fails to state that any violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment rights.

II. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a claim may be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
In addressing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to plaintiff and accept all well-pled factual allegations as true. League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff can support
a claim “by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Bell Atlantic

1 While Plaintiff’s Complaint mentions a state law claim (Id. ¶ 8), Plaintiff does not specifically
state a claim for relief under Section 45-6-213 under its causes of action, (Id. ¶¶ 31-41). Further,
Plaintiff’s Response to the City’s Motion to Dismiss discusses the Section 45-6-213 issues under
the umbrella of deprivation of due process rights. (See D.E. #80-1 at PageID 522-25, 527-28).
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). This standard requires more than bare assertions of
legal conclusions. Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 2001). “[A]
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Any claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . .claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Nonetheless, a complaint must contain sufficient facts “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face’” to survive a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A plaintiff with no
facts and “armed with nothing more than conclusions” cannot “unlock the doors of discovery.” Id.

at 678-79.

III. Proposed Analysis and Conclusions of Law
a. Section 1983
For a municipality to be held liable under Section 1983, the deprivation of rights must be
due to the “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Otherwise stated, the municipality must not
merely employee a wrongdoer, Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; it must itself be the wrongdoer, Collins v.
City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992), and its own actions must be the moving
force behind the deprivation of rights, Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997).
To plead municipal liability, the plaintiff must allege one of the following: (1) the existence
of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making

authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision;
(4) the existence of a custom of tolerance of or acquiescence to federal rights violations; or, (4) a
municipal hiring decision that reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a
particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision. Sweat v. Butler, 90 F. Supp. 3d
773, 780 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (quoting D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 2014));
Brown, 520 U.S. at 441).
Here, Plaintiff has only conclusorily alleged that the City has any illegal policy or
inadequate training policy that led to the alleged deprivation of rights, but it has not identified any
such policy. This is insufficient to plead municipal liability, as the complaint must provide factual
“information about the nature, source, or form of the alleged policy.” Turner v. Lowen, 823 Fed.

App’x 311, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2020); Sweat, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 780.
Likewise, he has not alleged that any authorized policymaker with final authority to
establish municipal policy ratified Detective Robinson’s actions. See Feliciano v. City of
Cleveland, 900 F.2d 649, 656 (6th Cir. 1993). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to allege that
Detective Robinson is a policymaker, “[m]ere authority to exercise discretion which performing
particular functions does not make a municipal employee a final policymaker”; instead, to be a
policymaker, the official’s decisions must be final and unreviewable and not constrained by the
official policies of superior officials. Id. at 655. There is no allegation that Detective Robinson
maintained this status with the City.
Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that the City approved of Detective Robinson’s
actions, “[r]atification . . . requires more than acquiescence – it requires affirmative approval of a
particular decision made by a subordinate.” Id. at 656. “Otherwise, the City would be liable for
all of the discretionary decisions of its employees, and this would be indistinguishable from

respondeat superior liability,” Id., which is not a basis for Section 1983 liability, Monell, 436 U.S.
at 694.
Finally, Plaintiff has only conclusorily alleged that the City has a custom of depriving
pawnshop owners of their rights. For municipal liability to be based upon a custom, the custom
must be permanent and well-settled such that has a force of law. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. “[B]are
allegations of a custom or policy, unsupported by any evidence, are insufficient to establish
entitlement to relief.” Boyles v. Correctional Med. Servs. Inc., No. 08-1638, 2009 W.S. App.
LEXIS 5494, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 2009). Plaintiff’s Complaint relies solely upon its own
experience, but alleged mistreatment of the plaintiff alone is insufficient to plead a pattern of
misconduct. Nouri v. Cty. of Oakland, 615 Fed. Appx. 291, 296 (6th Cir. 2015).

Ultimately, Plaintiff’s Complaint follows a “formulaic recitation” of the elements, but legal
conclusions may not take the place of factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-81; Sweat, 90 F.
Supp. 3d at 783. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against
the City fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the City’s Motion to Dismiss
be GRANTED.

DATED this 26th day of August, 2025.

s/ Charmiane G. Claxton
CHARMIANE G. CLAXTON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ANY OBJECTIONS OR EXCEPTIONS TO THIS REPORT MUST BE FILED WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE REPORT. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). FAILURE TO FILE SAID OBJECTIONS OR EXCEPTIONS
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR
FORFEITURE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE OBJECTIONS, EXCEPTIONS,
AND ANY FURTHER APPEAL.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11144707. Public record. Not legal advice.