# Lewis Francois v. City of Miami

> District Court, S.D. Florida · September 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11144628

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** September 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11144628

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing a hostile-work-environment claim brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1981
- noting that hostile-work-environment claims brought under section 1981 and Title VII are “subject to the same standards of proof and employ the same analytical framework” (citation omitted)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-23943-CIV-ALTONAGA/Reid

WESLYNE LEWIS FRANCOIS,

Plaintiff,
v.

CITY OF MIAMI,

Defendant.
_____________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant, City of Miami’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [ECF No. 36], filed along with a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
(“Def.’s SOF”) [ECF No. 35], on July 29, 2025. Plaintiff, Weslyne Lewis Francois filed an
Amended Response (“Resp.”) [ECF No. 47] and a Response to Defendant’s Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts and Statement of [Additional] Material Facts [ECF No. 48] (“Pl.’s
Resp. SOF”). Defendant filed a Reply [ECF No. 55] and a Reply to Plaintiff’s Statement of
[Additional] Material Facts [ECF No. 53] (“Def.’s Reply SOF”). The Court has reviewed the
parties’ written submissions, the record, and applicable law.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a Black Haitian Bahamian woman and an 18-year employee of the City of
Miami Police Department. (See Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 136, 141; Def.’s Reply SOF ¶¶ 136, 141
(disputed on other grounds)). She was promoted to commander in January 2020. (See Def.’s SOF
¶ 3; Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 3, 138; Def.’s Reply SOF ¶ 138). On September 2, 2022, Chief of Police
Manuel Morales demoted her to lieutenant. (See Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 1, 3; Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 1, 3).
Plaintiff contends that events leading to her demotion, and the demotion itself, reflect
unlawful discrimination and retaliation. (See generally Compl. [ECF No. 1]; Pl.’s Resp. SOF, Ex.
1, Pl.’s Am. Sworn Decl. (“Pl.’s Aff.”) [ECF No. 48-1]). Without recounting the full record, the
Court sets out relevant facts below.

The discrimination allegedly began with comments Morales made to Plaintiff. (See
generally Compl.). Morales criticized Plaintiff’s hairstyle at least four times — including during
a February 2020 phone call, when he told her to “tone her hair down[.]” (Def.’s SOF ¶ 23
(alteration added); see id. ¶¶ 21–22; Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 21 (disputed on other grounds), 22, 23
(disputed on other grounds)). Between 2020 and 2021, Morales made five to ten additional
comments and gestures Plaintiff interpreted as being about her hair. (See Def.’s SOF ¶ 21; Pl.’s
Resp. SOF ¶ 21 (disputed on other grounds)). According to Plaintiff, Morales also compared her
hairstyle unfavorably to that of Bianca Joseph, another Black Haitian female commander; referred
to Plaintiff as “Bianca” five to ten times; and joked about Plaintiff using a voodoo doll. (See Def.’s
SOF ¶¶ 17, 20; Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 17, 20 (disputed on other grounds), 143; Def.’s Reply SOF ¶

143 (disputed)). Plaintiff “objected to” Morales’[s] behavior and told him he was violating anti-
discrimination laws. (Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 145 (alteration added)).
Other incidents involve discipline that Plaintiff maintains was pretextual. (See generally
Compl.). For instance, in November 2021, Morales reprimanded Plaintiff and removed her from
the Honor Guard — a voluntary detail responsible for ceremonial flag presentations — for failing
to fill a staffing request on short notice. (See Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 39–42; Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 39–42
(disputed on other grounds)). Plaintiff asserts she was on a pre-approved vacation and
substantially met the request. (See Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 41–42). In another incident, a supervisor
reprimanded her for not responding to an incident while she was injured. (Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 171–
73; Def.’s Reply SOF ¶¶ 171–73 (all disputed on other grounds)). By contrast, a male officer also
did not respond but was not reprimanded. (See Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 173, 175; Def.’s Reply SOF ¶¶
173, 175 (both disputed on other grounds)).
In early 2022, Major Um Set Ramos transferred to Plaintiff’s district and became her

supervisor. (See Def.’s SOF ¶ 62; Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶ 62). Plaintiff was aware of an allegation that
Ramos had used a racial slur while working as a police sergeant. (See Def.’s SOF ¶ 63; Pl.’s Resp.
SOF ¶ 63; see also id., Ex. 2, July 25, 2022 Civilian Investigative Panel Letter (sustaining the
allegation)). She complained to Ramos that she was being targeted based on race, gender, and
ethnicity. (See Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 242).
Later, on Morales’s staff’s orders, Ramos reprimanded Plaintiff twice. (See Def.’s SOF ¶¶
55, 108, 110; see generally Def.’s SOF, Sept. 2, 2022 Reprimand [ECF No. 35-4]; see also Pl.’s
Resp. SOF ¶¶ 55, 108, 110 (all disputed on other grounds); id., Ex. 5, Ramos Dep. Tr. [ECF No.
48-5] 16:6–13).1 One reprimand carried a ten-hour suspension that was unanimously reversed by
the Civilian Review Board. (See Def.’s SOF, Ex. 16, July 19, 2022 Reprimand [ECF No. 35-16]).

Ramos testified that leadership had never before directed him to reprimand an officer. (See Ramos
Dep. Tr. 18:3–20). And according to Plaintiff, white, and Hispanic male officers in leadership
positions were reprimanded, but not suspended, for violations more severe than any she was
accused of. (See Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 244–50; Def.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 244–49 (all disputed on other
grounds)).
After these reprimands, Morales placed Plaintiff on a 90-day action plan under the
supervision of a third-party trainer. (See Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 84, 88; Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 84 (disputed

1 The Court uses the pagination generated by the electronic CM/ECF database, which appears in the headers
of all court filings. Citations to deposition testimony rely on the pagination and line numbering in the
original document.
on other grounds), 88). According to Morales, he imposed the plan because Plaintiff’s personality
“inhibited the chemistry of the executive staff.” (Def.’s SOF ¶ 84; Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶ 84
(disputed)). Defendant maintains Plaintiff did not complete the plan, and it cites that failure —
and the reprimands — as reasons for her demotion. (See Def.’s SOF ¶ 5; Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶¶ 5

(disputed), 231; see generally id., Ex. 24, Aff. of Lisa Gilbert (“Gilbert Aff.”) [ECF No. 35-24];
see also Def.’s Reply SOF ¶ 231 (disputed on other grounds)).
Plaintiff states five claims for relief: disparate-treatment discrimination, based on race and
gender, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”)
(Counts I and IV) (see Compl. ¶¶ 113–16, 128–31); hostile-work-environment discrimination
under Title VII (Count II) (see Compl. ¶¶ 117–22); retaliation under Title VII (“Count III”) (see
Compl. ¶¶ 123–27); and retaliation under Florida’s Whistleblower Act, section 112.3187, Florida
Statutes (Count V) (see Compl. ¶¶ 132–35). Defendant moves for summary judgment on each
count (see generally Mot.), and Plaintiff insists material facts are disputed (see generally Resp.).
II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, discovery materials, and any affidavits
show there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome
of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine”
if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party. See id.; see also
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).
The court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. See
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Where, as here, the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party
may obtain summary judgment either by (1) affirmatively establishing that no genuine dispute
exists as to any essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or (2) showing that there is an
absence of evidence in the record to support that element. See Blackhawk Yachting, LLC v.

Tognum Am., Inc., No. 12-14208-Civ, 2015 WL 11176299, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2015) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986)). “Once the moving party discharges its
initial burden, a non-moving party who bears the burden of proof must cite to . . . materials in the
record or show that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute.” Id. (alteration added; quotation marks omitted; quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Disparate-Treatment, Retaliation, and Whistleblower Claims (Counts I, III–V)
To begin, Defendant’s requests for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII disparate-
treatment and retaliation claims and her Florida Whistleblower Act claim do not merit discussion.
Plaintiff has presented “circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning

[Defendant’s] discriminatory intent.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir.
2019) (alteration added; quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Copeland v. Ga. Dep’t of
Corrs., 97 F.4th 766, 783 n.9 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). And the parties’ filings confirm
that undisputed facts, like Morales’s comments and Plaintiff’s demotion — as well as key factual
disputes, such as whether discipline was pretextual — preclude summary judgment on other
elements of the claims. (See generally Mot.; Resp.; Reply); see also, e.g., Keen v. Reg’l Emergency
Med. Servs. of Georgia, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2012); Spencer v. Reg’l
Acceptance Corp., No. 05-60292-Civ, 2006 WL 4590707, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2006) (citation
omitted). Consequently, Defendant’s Motion is denied as to Counts I and III–V.
B. Hostile-Work-Environment Claim (Count II)
Regarding Count II, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has not produced
sufficient evidence to support her Title VII hostile-work-environment claim. (See Mot. 12–16;
Compl. ¶¶ 117–22). To prevail on this claim, Plaintiff must show she was subjected to unwelcome

harassment based on a protected characteristic and that the harassment, viewed objectively, was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment. See Smith v.
Naples Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 433 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
Four factors are relevant to whether harassment objectively alters an employee’s terms or
conditions of employment: the conduct’s (1) frequency; (2) its severity; (3) whether it was
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether it
unreasonably interfered with the employee’s job performance. See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195
F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The conduct must be evaluated “in context,
not as isolated acts[.]” Id. (alteration added; citations omitted).
Applying this standard, courts have held that humiliating and derogatory remarks based on

protected characteristics were not sufficiently severe or pervasive when they were “isolated and
sporadic[,]” occurring over months or years rather than daily or weekly, Corbett v. Beseler, 635 F.
App’x 809, 816 (11th Cir. 2015) (alteration added) — even in the context of racially derogatory
language, see McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1379 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Barrow v.
Georgia Pac. Corp., 144 F. App’x 54, 58 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing a hostile-work-environment
claim brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1981); Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296 n.20 (11th
Cir. 2009) (noting that hostile-work-environment claims brought under section 1981 and Title VII
are “subject to the same standards of proof and employ the same analytical framework” (citation
omitted)).
CASE NO. 24-23943-CIV-ALTONAGA/Reid

As with these cases, the conduct Plaintiff describes — viewed in the light most favorable
to her — is not sufficiently severe or pervasive under the applicable standard. Plaintiff asserts that
over roughly two years of employment, Morales made between ten and fifteen comments about
her hair, called her “Bianca” five to ten times, and made one remark about a voodoo doll. (See
Def.’s SOF 4 17, 20, 21-23; Pl.’s Resp. SOF □□ 17, 20 (disputed on other grounds), 21 (disputed
on other grounds), 22, 23 (disputed on other grounds); Def.’s Reply SOF § 143 (disputed)). Over
the same period, Defendant subjected Plaintiff to several allegedly pretextual disciplinary actions.
Even if each of these actions qualifies as harassment based on ethnicity, the actions are too isolated
and sporadic to alter the terms and conditions of employment. See Corbett, 635 F. App’x at 816;
see also Small v. City of Hollywood, 661 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1200 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (“Three
comments made during a period of over three months is infrequent.” (citations omitted)). As
Plaintiff has not met her burden to show a genuine dispute of material fact on this threshold
requirement, summary judgment on Count II is appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant, City of Miami’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 36] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Summary judgment is
granted in favor of Defendant on Count II of the Complaint [ECF No. 1].
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 25th day of September, 2025.

(o ule UW. LE
CECILIA M. ALTONAGA
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ce: counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11144628. Public record. Not legal advice.