# Haddox v. Central Freightlines, Inc.

> District Court, N.D. Oklahoma · September 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11144526

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** September 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

DANNY HADDOX, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 18-CV-266-SEH-CDL

CENTRAL FREIGHTLINES, INC.;
NICHOLAS ROSHON MOORE,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Central Freightlines, Inc. and Nicholas
Roshon Moore’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’
Expert, Daniel Phillips [ECF No. 61], and Motion in Limine with Respect to
Anticipated Testimony by Plaintiffs’ Expert Daniel Phillips [ECF No. 83].
Defendants argue that Phillips, an accident reconstructionist, is not qualified
to provide the expert testimony he proffers, that his testimony will not help
the jury, and that his opinions are unreliable. The Court agrees and will
preclude Phillips’s anticipated testimony from trial.
I. Background
This case arises from a fatal automobile accident that occurred on
September 22, 2017. [ECF No. 2 at ¶¶ 8-10]. Blake Haddox was traveling
southbound on a motorcycle as Defendant Moore drove a semi-truck in a
northbound lane and turned left across traffic. [Id.]. The two collided, and
Haddox died as a result. [Id. at ¶ 16]. Plaintiffs plan to present the testimony

and opinions of Daniel Phillips as an expert in accident reconstruction. [ECF
No. 69 at 2]. Defendants move to prohibit his testimony. [ECF No. 61].
Phillips’s report indicates he has a wide range of expert opinions. [ECF
No. 69-2 at 15–16]. The Court finds that many of his opinions pass on the

credibility of witnesses, provide unqualified statements of fact from an
accident he did not witness, and ultimately opine about the cause of the
accident. For example, Phillips’s opinions include:
 “Mr. Moore’s testimony concerning the location of the southbound
traffic is clearly in error.”

 “Mr. Haddox had his headlight illuminated upon approach.”
 “Mr. Moore’s decision to turn across the path of approaching traffic
was causal to the crash.”

[ECF No. 69-2 at 15–16].
The Court will perform its gatekeeping function in analyzing Phillips’s
proffered opinions.
II. Discussion
Admissibility of expert witness testimony is evaluated under Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, which permits a qualified expert to testify and render an
opinion when the witness “is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education” and “it is more likely than not that:”
(a) The “expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue;”

(b) The “testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;”

(c) The “testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and”

(d) The expert has reliably applied “the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.”

Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Pursuant to Rule 702, the Court must perform a “gatekeeping role ... of
ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). The objective of this “gatekeeping requirement ... is
to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional
studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant
field.” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). “When
an objection to an expert’s testimony is raised, the court must perform
Daubert gatekeeper duties before the jury is permitted to hear the evidence.”
Bright v. Ohio Nat’s Life Assur. Corp., 11-CV-475-GKF, 2013 WL 12327512,
at *1 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 2013) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; Kumho Tire,
526 U.S. at 149).
In exercising its gatekeeper duties, a district court must undertake a two-
step analysis. Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., 787 F.3d 1297, 1307

(10th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “First, the court must determine whether
the expert is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
to render an opinion.” Id. (cleaned up). “If so qualified, the Court must then
determine whether the expert’s opinion is reliable under the principles set

forth in Daubert and Kumho Tire and relevant, in that it will assist the trier
of fact.” Lippe v. Howard, 287 F.Supp.3d 1271, 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2008)
(citations omitted). The party offering the expert testimony has the burden to
prove that the expert is qualified and that his opinions are based in sound

methodology and sufficient facts. Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1222
(10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
A. Phillips is qualified to testify as an accident reconstructionist,
but unqualified to testify about “human factors” or make
credibility determinations.

The first step in the Daubert inquiry is to determine whether Phillips is
qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to render an
opinion. Lippe, 287 F.Supp.3d at 1277–78. An expert’s qualifications must
provide “a foundation for a witness to answer a specific question.” Id. at 1279
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An expert’s qualifications
must be both “(i) adequate in a general, qualitative sense (i.e., knowledge,
skill, experience, training or education as required by Rule 702) and (ii)
specific to the matters he proposes to address as an expert.” Id. (quotation
and internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants argue that Phillips is unqualified to testify about “human
factors,” unqualified to provide an “opinion as to whether Moore had a
protected green arrow when he proceeded to make his turn,” and unqualified
to make credibility determinations. [ECF No. 61 at 6]. Notably, Defendants’

attacks do not relate to Phillips’s qualifications as an accident
reconstructionist.
Plaintiffs attach Phillips’s curriculum vitae to their response. [See ECF
No. 69-1]. Phillips earned a Bachelor of Science degree in mathematics with a

minor in physics from the University of North Texas, and a Master of Science
degree in mathematics from Texas A&M University. [Id. at 1]. He is fully
accredited by the Accreditation Commission of Traffic Accident
Reconstruction and has worked as an accident reconstructionist for over 20

years. [Id. at 1, 3]. Phillips also has received specialized training in accident
reconstruction. [Id. at 1–6]. Therefore, the Court finds Phillips qualified by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education to render opinions about
accident reconstruction.

However, the opinions proffered by Phillips extend beyond the realm of an
accident reconstructionist. The Court agrees with Defendants that Phillips is
unqualified to testify about “human factors.” His curriculum vitae does not
reflect any specific training in this area. And during his deposition, Phillips
acknowledged that his training in “human factors” stems from “some

coursework at Northwestern University,” what has been “provided by Crash
Safety Solutions,” and that which is “intrinsic … within reconstruction.” [See
ECF No. 61-2 at 4:19–22].1 Additionally, as discussed in more detail below,
the Court agrees that Phillips is unqualified to make credibility

determinations.
B. Phillips’s proffered opinions are neither relevant nor reliable.

Because the Court has found Phillips qualified to testify as an accident
reconstructionist, it must now determine whether his opinions are reliable
and relevant. Lippe, 287 F.Supp.3d at 1278.
Evidence or testimony must “assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. This condition goes primarily to
relevance. Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is

not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quotations and
citations omitted). “The touchstone of admissibility of expert testimony is its
helpfulness to the trier of fact.” Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1219 (10th
Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

1 For clarity, the Court will cite to the CM/ECF record page number as opposed to
the deposition page number for any deposition testimony referenced throughout this
order.
Defendants contend Phillips’s testimony will not aid the jury. [ECF No. 61
at 7]. One area of his proffered testimony concerns whether an eyewitness,

Bruce Gourd, could view the traffic light at the time of the accident. [ECF No.
69-2 at 15 (“Mr. Gourd’s stated vantage point upon approach would allow for
him to observe the traffic lights including the absence of the left turn
arrow.”)]. Plaintiffs assert that Phillips’s testimony and his recreation of the

accident scene using 3D models will help the jury parse through conflicting
testimony from individuals present at the scene of the subject accident. [ECF
No. 69 at 6–7]. The Court is not persuaded that Phillips’s testimony about
whether Gourd could view the traffic light at the time of the incident is

helpful to the jury. Gourd is listed as one of Plaintiffs’ witnesses. [ECF No.
137]. The Court does not find it helpful for an expert to explain what Gourd
observed when Gourd can tell the jury himself.
Additionally, the Court does not believe Phillips’s other opinions or

proposed testimony are helpful to the jury. “No special skill, knowledge, or
expertise is needed to understand and draw conclusions from facts about
common experiences.” Navarrete v. Wiebe, No. CIV-13-708-D, 2014 WL
4716087, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 22, 2014). The Court is confident the jury

will be fully equipped to form its own conclusions about the weight of Gourd’s
testimony, other fact witnesses’ testimony, and the ultimate issues in this
case. See Stewart v. Brotherhood Mut. Ins. Co., No. 16-CV-488-JED-FHM,
2018 WL 4092018, at *1 (July 10, 2018) (excluding opinion testimony about
the ultimate cause of an accident). Further, the facts here and the applicable

traffic rules are “easily understood and within the common experience of
jurors in Oklahoma, where private motor vehicle travel is the primary mode
of transportation.” Navarrete, 2014 WL 4716087 at *2.
Moreover, many of Phillips’s opinions are statements of fact that are

adequately covered by fact witnesses who were at the scene the night of the
accident. For example, Phillips offers opinions that “Mr. Haddox was
traveling southbound in the left lane of S. Memorial Drive immediately prior
to the crash”; “Mr. Haddox had his headlight illuminated upon approach”;

“Mr. Moore was attempting to turn left at the subject intersection”; and “[t]he
independent witnesses were traveling in opposite directions ….” [ECF No. 69-
2 at 15]. These are all factual statements that do not require expert
testimony.

Finally, Phillips’s proposed opinions impermissibly invade the province of
the jury. His opinions include, for example: “Mr. Moore’s decision to turn
across the path of approaching traffic was causal to the crash”; “[t]he
independent witness statements are consistent with one another and indicate

that Mr. Haddox had a green light upon approach”; and “Mr. Moore’s
testimony concerning the light sequence is not consistent with either of the
independent witnesses.” [ECF No. 69-2 at 15–16]. “Expert testimony
concerning the credibility of witnesses is prohibited, because the jury can
make its own determinations of witness credibility and expert testimony on

this issue is ‘prejudicial and unfairly influences the jury.’” Morris v. City of
Tulsa, No. 19-CV-073-CVE-JFJ, 2020 WL 7360283, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 15,
2020) (quoting United States v. Hill, 749 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2014)).
For these reasons, Phillips’s proposed testimony about which witnesses to

believe is inadmissible. Additionally, causation is an issue of fact for the jury
and, as noted above, specialized knowledge is not required in this case for the
jury to reach a decision. See Schovanec v. Archdiocese of Okla. City, 188 P.3d
158, 173 (Okla. 2008) (“Causation usually is determined as a question of fact

and not of law.”).
For all the reasons set out above, the Court concludes that Phillips’s
opinions will not assist the jury and are therefore not relevant.
It is unnecessary for the Court to consider the reliability of Phillips’s

opinions when it has concluded his opinions are not relevant. Lippe, 287
F.Supp.3d at 1278 (evidence must be both relevant and reliable). However,
the Court will address this factor because the parties briefed the issue.
In assessing reliability, the Court must focus “solely on principles and

methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at
595. Daubert cited four factors that aid in making a reliability determination:
(1) Whether a theory has been or can be tested or falsified, (2)
whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review
and publication, (3) whether there are known potential rates of
error with regard to specific techniques, and (4) whether the
theory or approach has “general acceptance.”

Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94). However, Daubert recognized that many
factors will “bear on the inquiry” and explicitly chose not to make a
“definitive checklist or test.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593; see also Kumho Tire
Co. at 150–151 (“[Daubert] made clear that its list of factors was meant to be
helpful, not definitive.”). A trial judge has “considerable leeway in deciding in
a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert
testimony is reliable.” Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152. Whether other courts
are familiar with and have accepted a methodology is relevant in determining
the reliability of expert testimony. See Att’y Gen. of Okla. v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 780 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen experts employ established

methods in their usual manner, a district court need not take issue under
Daubert; however, where established methods are employed in new ways, a
district court may require further indications of reliability.”).
Defendants argue Phillips’s opinions are not reliable because they are

based on speculation and conjecture. [ECF No. 61 at 12–13]. Plaintiffs
respond that Phillips’s methodology is based on sufficient facts and data, that
he reviewed an extensive list of documents to formulate his report, and that
he input the facts and data into a Virtual CRASH simulation. [ECF No. 69 at
7]. According to Plaintiffs, these factors render Phillips’s opinions reliable.

[Id.]. Focusing on Phillips’s principles and methodology, the Court disagrees.
Throughout his report, Phillips relies on unreliable data to reach his
opinions. For example, his report states, “an exact impact speed of the
motorcycle cannot be determined with the available evidence” but the next

sentence provides, “[a] subjective analysis of the damage using my experience
does not suggest impact speeds over 30 mph.” [ECF No. 69-2 at 13]. Phillips
fails to explain what his subjective analysis takes into consideration. Further,
he acknowledged in his deposition that the exact speed of the motorcycle

cannot be determined from the evidence. [ECF No. 61-2 at 11:17–20].
Nevertheless, Phillips provides an opinion that “the physical evidence does
not indicate excessive speed by Mr. Haddox.” [ECF No. 69-2 at 13]. It appears
Phillips unilaterally decided that Haddox was not travelling at an excessive

speed.
Further, Phillips opines, “Mr. Haddox made a timely reaction to the
intruding tractor-trailer but was unable to avoid a collision.” [ECF No. 69-2
at 15]. His report states there was “pre-braking for either 42 or 62 feet” but

does not indicate how he determined these distances. [Id. at 13]. Phillips
testified that the evidence of Haddox braking is from witness Andrew Little’s
report that indicated “Mr. Haddox was unable to stop in time ….” [ECF No.
61-2 at 5:19–22]. However, Little’s report states in total:

Deceased was heading south on memorial going thru intersection
at 51st Expressway and memorial when semi pulled out and he
clipped the trailor [sic]. Approximate speed was around 55 mph.
Semi driver OBVIOUSLY didn’t see us coming! I was riding 10 ft
back in outer lane, deceased was in inner lane. No helmet! Semi
was heading north on Memorial and turning onto expressway
heading west, we had a green light!

[ECF No. 69-6 at 1]. Little’s report makes no mention of stopping or braking. 2
Id. Phillips’s report does not reflect that he reviewed any other statement,
interview, or deposition of Little. [ECF No. 69-2 at 2–3]. Phillips also testified
he had no way to know where Haddox was located when he began to react to
the impending crash. [ECF No. 61-2 at 13:23–14:5]. Therefore, Phillips’s
conclusions that Haddox made a timely reaction and engaged his brakes for
either 42 or 62 feet are not explained or supported by any scientific fact or
reliable expert analysis and cannot assist the jury in its fact finding.
Phillips’s opinion that “[t]here is no reason to think Mr. Haddox was
inattentive or slow to react” is similarly unreliable. [ECF No. 69-2 at 14]. He
does not explain how he devised this opinion. His report contains no

2 The report states that “police materials indicated that [Little] informed the
officer(s) that he “slammed on his front break, but almost couldn’t get stopped in
time.” [ECF No. 69-2 at 13]. However, it’s unclear whether Little was referencing
his own successful braking attempt, or the decedent’s unsuccessful braking attempt
with this comment. The report does not state where in “police materials” this
statement could be found.
information indicating he has a way to determine when or how Haddox
reacted. Thus, this opinion is also unreliable.

Nor is Phillips’s opinion that “Mr. Moore intruded into the southbound
lanes approximately 2.7 to 3.3 seconds before impact” reliable. [ECF No. 69-2
at 15]. He reaches this conclusion by stating:
Analysis of the turning path of the tractor-trailer using typical
acceleration values would indicate that Mr. Moore’s travel took
approximately 10-12 seconds from the stop bar to the point of
impact. However, when the front of the tractor-trailer began to
penetrate the southbound lanes would only be approximately 2.7
to 3.3 seconds.

[Id. at 14]. Nowhere does Phillips reference in his report the mass of Moore’s
truck or the load he was hauling. And Phillips does not explain what he
considers to be a “typical acceleration value” or how such a value could be
reliably derived from available evidence. Once again, this opinion is
unreliable.
The only opinions in Phillips’s report that may be helpful to the jury are:
11. Mr. Haddox collided with the passenger side of the truck
tractor in the left lane of southbound S. Memorial Drive.

12. Mr. Haddox collided with the front of the trailer in the left
lane of southbound S. Memorial Drive.

13. Mr. Moore continued forward, running over the motorcycle
and dragging it to the northwest.

14. Mr. Moore continued forward, running over Mr. Haddox and
dragging him to the northwest for approximately 40 feet.
[ECF No. 69-2 at 15]. However, Phillips does not explain how he reached
these conclusions. The information containing the lane Haddox was in when

he collided with the semi-truck contradicts the Tulsa Police Department’s
diagram indicating Haddox was travelling in the center lane, not the left turn
lane when he hit the semi-truck. [See ECF No. 69-2 at 4]. And Phillips does
not explain how he came to this different conclusion. Further, Phillips does

not explain how he reached the conclusion that Moore ran over Haddox and
dragged him for 40 feet. [See id. at 15]. Phillips potentially reached this
conclusion by reviewing photographs from the accident scene. [See id. at 5–7].
However, his report is devoid of any reasoning or measurements and states

that “the faint tire mark referenced in police records is likely unrelated to the
subject crash.” [Id. at 13]. In the absence of any explanation of how Phillips
reached his conclusions, the Court cannot assume these conclusions are
reliable. Fact witnesses who were present at the scene of the accident will be

able to provide testimony that covers the same topics as Phillips’s report.
The Court concludes that Phillips’s opinions are not relevant and are
unreliable. Therefore, his testimony is inadmissible.
III. Conclusion

Although the Court finds Phillips qualified to testify as an accident
reconstructionist, it nonetheless concludes that his testimony should be
precluded from trial. As reflected above, his testimony will not aid the jury,
impermissibly encroaches upon the jury’s role, and is not reliable.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs’ Expert Daniel Phillips [ECF No. 61] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion in Limine with
Respect to Anticipated Testimony by Plaintiffs’ Expert Daniel Phillips [ECF
No. 83] is DENIED as moot.

DATED this 25th day of September, 2025.

Raw F. bl
Sara E. Hill
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11144526. Public record. Not legal advice.
