# KL v. Dunmore School District

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · September 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11144062

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11144062

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “funding recipients are properly held □ QR - liable in damages only where they are deliberately indifferent to [student-on-student] sexual harassment] of which they have actual knowledge’
- holding that punitive damages may not be awarded in suits brought under Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the RA
- holding that the surreptitious videotaping of an officer undressing by fellow officers was actionable as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive-due-process “right to privacy in _ one’s unclothed body”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KL, a minor, by and through his
parents and natural guardians,
JOSEPH and STACEY LOCKER,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-01461
V. (SAPORITO, J.)
DUNMORE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
This federal civil rights action was brought on behalf of a minor
child, KL, by his parents, Joseph and Stacey Locker. KL is a student in
the Dunmore School District, where he is eligible to receive special
education services as a child with disabilities. The action commenced
when the plaintiff filed his fourteen-count complaint on August 28, 2024.
Doe. 1.
In November 2021, KL was a 14-year old eighth grader at Dunmore
Middle School. Another minor student, JM, used a cellphone to
photograph KL inside of a bathroom stall while he was urinating with his
genitals exposed. JM shared the photograph with other students via

Snapchat.!
Another student informed the middle school principal, Christopher
Lucas, about the existence of the photograph. Lucas and the school
resource officer, SRO Springer, began an investigation, which included
speaking with KL. Lucas notified KL’s parents, but he advised them that
there was nothing the school could do to track down the photograph
shared on Snapchat. The complaint alleges that Lucas spoke with JM
about the incident, but no disciplinary action was taken against JM. The
complaint characterizes Lucas’s treatment of the matter as “sweeping the
incident under the rug.”
The complaint alleges that, as a result of this incident, KL has
continued to be bullied by other students, and he has suffered severe and
permanent psychological damage, physical harm, and emotional distress.
In particular, the complaint alleges that KL was at one point hospitalized
for serious and severe suicidal ideation, and he has also suffered from
anxiety, depression, embarrassment, and mental anguish.

1 See generally Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 1418.
Ct. 2038, 2043 (2021) (“Snapchat [is] a social media application that
allows users to post photos and videos that disappear after a set period
of time.”).

29s

KL now brings this action for damages against the District, against
Christopher Lucas, in both his personal capacity and his official capacity
as principal of the District’s middle school, and against Kristie
Maldonado, both personally and as parent and natural guardian of JM.
He asserts federal civil rights claims against the District and Lucas
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and
equal protection clauses, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seg., Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seqg., Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504” or the “RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794,
and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), DOTES
§ 1681 et seqg., claiming that the bathroom incident could have been
prevented by the exercise of reasonable diligence by the District and
Lucas, and that the District and Lucas further failed to take immediate
and appropriate action to prevent further harm after they learned about
the photograph. KL further asserts state-law tort and contract claims
against the District and Lucas, and state-law tort claims against
Maldonado, both personally and as JM’s parent and guardian.
Maldonado has not entered an appearance in this case. But default

□□□

has neither been requested nor entered against Maldonado.
The District and Lucas, jointly represented, have filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 5. That motion is fully
briefed and ripe for decision. Doc. 10; Doc. 16; Doc. 17.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
At the time of the incident giving rise to this suit, KL was a
fourteen-year-old, male, eighth-grade student at Dunmore Middle
School, within the Dunmore School District. He is eligible for special
education services and has disabilities that impact his life. Specifically,
he was diagnosed in first grade with attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (“ADHD”), and he has been receiving special needs education
ever since.
KLs educational instruction is substantially through a general
education classroom and curriculum, but he is entitled through an
Independent Educational Plan (“IEP”) to receive several modifications,
including: (a) he is permitted to take quizzes in a resource room: (b) he is
allowed extended time to complete tests and quizzes; (c) his general
education teacher provides him with a copy of notes for science and civics

nlf &

classes; (d) he is allowed the use of a calculator for math assessments;
and (e) he is provided reduced answer choices on multiple choice
assessments.
On November 7, 2021, KL and his parents were informed by the
District that JM had used a cellphone provided to him by his parent to
photograph KL inside a bathroom stall at the Dunmore Middle School.
The photograph was taken while KL was urinating with his genitals
exposed.
KL remembered that, a few days earlier, he had requested to go to
the restroom while in class. When KL went into the hallway, he was
followed out of the classroom by JM. When KL entered the restroom, he
immediately went to a stall to try to protect his privacy.2 KL knew JM
was in the restroom, and he saw JM in the stall next to him. KL also

2 The complaint alleges that it was “common knowledge” among
Dunmore students that “people were taking photographs and videos of
students using the rest room.” Compl. § 30, Doc. 1. We decline to credit
this entirely unsupported conclusion as fact. See Druskin v. Ans werthink,
Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (rejecting conclusory
allegation that it was “known” or “common knowledge” that certain
accounts were uncollectible); see also Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160,
165 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). But we do find it reasonable to infer from
the allegations of the complaint that KZ may have been concerned about
such activity.

5 a

heard JM laughing while in the restroom. While walking back to class,
JM told KL that he took a picture of KL, but JM seemed to be saying this
in a joking manner. Thus, at the time, KL did not believe that JM took a
photograph.
However, JM had actually taken a photograph of KL in the
bathroom with his genitals exposed, using a cellphone provided by his
parent, and he used that same cellphone then to disseminate the
photograph of KL's genitals to other students through the application
Snapchat.
Additionally, KL later became aware through a published news
story that JM is a transgender student, who identifies as male but was
born female. JM was nonetheless allowed by the District and by Lucas to
use the boy’s restroom. Thus, at the time of this incident, JM, a biological
female student, was in the boy’s restroom with KL, a male student.
The District has published a student handbook that sets forth rules
and regulations for students who attend Dunmore Middle School. The
handbook prohibited students from having their cellphones while in
school, requiring that, upon entering the school, students place all
electronic devices in their lockers or in device holders in their classrooms

- 68

for each particular class. This policy was clearly not enforced with respect
to the cellphone used by JM to photograph KL in the restroom. In
addition, the handbook also prohibits the taking of videos or photographs
of other students without their consent.
Another student informed the middle school principal, Lucas, of the
existence of the photograph. After Lucas and SRO Springer learned of
the incident, an investigation was commenced. KL spoke with Lucas and
SRO Springer and told them what had occurred on the day when he was
in the restroom with JM.
Lucas informed KL’s parents that he believed JM had taken a
pornographic photograph of KL, that the photograph was shared on
Snapchat, and—because of the ephemeral nature of Snapchat
communications—there was nothing else the school could do to track
down when and where the photograph was shared.4

3 The complaint alleges that it was “common knowledge” among
Dunmore staff and students that “the regulation regarding the use of
cellular phones was not effectively enforced by the staff and
administration” of the District. Compl. §/ 41. We decline to credit this
entirely unsupported conclusion as fact. See Druskin, 299 F. Supp. 2d at
1333; see also Morrow, 719 F.3d at 165. But it was clearly not enforced
with respect to JM’s cellphone.
4 The complaint also alleges that this last statement by Lucas to
KL’s parents was not true.

= 7 =

As part of the investigation, JM was brought into Lucas’s office and
asked about the incident, but nothing was done—no suspension or other
punishment was handed down by the District or Lucas with respect to
JM’s violations of the student handbook. In his complaint, the plaintiff
has characterized Lucas’s conduct of this investigation as merely
“sweeping the incident under the rug.”
As a minor, JM did not have the capacity to contract for cellphone
service on his own. Thus, the plaintiff alleges that Maldonado had
dominion and control over the use of the cellphone in JM’s possession on
the day of the incident. Moreover, as JM’s parent, Maldonado was in
position to supervise JM’s use of the cellphone, but did not do so.
After and because of this incident, KL has continued to be bullied
by other students. The plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the defendants’
misconduct, he has suffered severe and permanent psychological
damage, physical harm, and emotional distress. KL has suffered from
anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, embarrassment, and mental
anguish. On one occasion, KL was required to be hospitalized for serious
and severe suicidal ideation as a result of the incident.

iGo

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a
defendant to move to dismiss for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction when challenged under Rule
12(b)(1). See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d
Cir. 1991). A defendant may challenge the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction in one of two fashions: it may attack the complaint on its face

or it may attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact,
relying on evidence beyond the pleadings. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United
States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass‘n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Where a defendant attacks

a complaint as deficient on its face, “the court must consider the
allegations of the complaint as true.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. “In
deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack, the court may only consider the
allegations contained in the complaint and the exhibits attached to the
complaint: matters of public record such as court records, letter decisions
of government agencies and published reports of administrative bodies;

and ‘undisputably authentic’ documents which the plaintiff has identified
as a basis of his claims and which the defendant has attached as exhibits
to his motion to dismiss.” Medici v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 09-
CV-2344, 2010 WL 1006917, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010). However,
when a motion to dismiss attacks the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction in fact, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s
allegations,” and “the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy
itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Mortensen, 549
F.2d at 891. This case falls into the former category.
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a
defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a
motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff’s claims lack facial
plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56
(2007)). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged

16

on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice.” TJellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322
(2007). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the
complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions
and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Nor is
it required to credit factual allegations contradicted by indisputably
authentic documents on which the complaint relies or matters of public
record of which we may take judicial notice. Jn re Washington Mut. Inc.,
741 Fed. App’x 88, 91 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018); Sourovelis v. City of Phila., 246
F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1075 (E.D. Pa. 2017); Banks v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 568
F. Supp. 2d 579, 588-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
III. DiscUssION
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under IDEA
Counts I through V of the complaint assert that the District and
Lucas failed to provide KL with a free appropriate public education

(“FAPE”),> as required under the IDEA, but they bring these claims under
other statutes. The District and Lucas first raise a threshold argument
that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims because
the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies available to him
under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(). The plaintiff responds that
administrative exhaustion is not required because he seeks a damages
remedy only, and not any of the equitable relief ordinarily available under
the IDEA.
“Section 1415() requires that a plaintiff exhaust the IDEA’s
procedures before filing an action under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act,
or similar laws when (but only when) her suit seeks relief that is also
available under the IDEA.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154,
165 (2017) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). But here,
the plaintiff seeks damages only. Thus, although this suit is “premised on
the past denial of a free appropriate public education,” it may
“nonetheless proceed without exhausting IDEA’s administrative

> “As defined in the Act, a FAPE comprises ‘special education and
related services—both ‘instruction’ tailored to meet a child’s ‘unique
needs’ and sufficient ‘support services’ to permit the child to benefit from
that instruction.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 158 (2017).
-12-

processes [because] the remedy [the] plaintiff seeks is not one the IDEA
provides.” Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598 U.S. 142, 150 (2023).
Accordingly, we find the court’s exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction in this matter to be appropriate.
B. Count I: Section 1983 and IDEA
In Count I, the plaintiff brings a claim for damages against the
District and Lucas under § 1983 and the IDEA. Based on their failure to
protect KL from the incident described above, in which JM took a
photograph of KL’s genitals while he was using the restroom, and their
failure to protect KL from harassment and bullying by other students as
a result of the photograph, the plaintiff claims that the District and Lucas
failed to provide KL with a FAPE, as required under the IDEA. For relief,
the plaintiff does not seek the compensatory education, private school
tuition reimbursement, private evaluations, or other prospective relief
ordinarily available under the IDEA. Instead, the plaintiff seeks only
damages under § 1983.
Under binding Third Circuit precedent, however, because the IDEA
provides its own comprehensive remedial scheme, § 1983 is not available
to provide a damages remedy for violations of the IDEA. See A.W. ry.

-13-

Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 803 (3d Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the
plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on violation of the IDEA, as set forth in
Count I, will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
C. Counts I and IT: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Between both Counts I and II, the plaintiff brings claims for
damages against the District and Lucas under § 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause. Specifically, Count I asserts a
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim based on a
violation of KL’s right to personal security and bodily integrity, and Count
II asserts a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim based
on a failure to provide KL with a FAPE.¢

6 Although captioned as a Section 1983 claim brought under the
IDEA, Count I also includes a paragraph asserting that the alleged denial
of a FAPE violated KL’s Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due
process, based on a fundamental liberty interest in personal security and
bodily integrity. Compl. §] 85. Meanwhile, Count II asserts, somewhat
vaguely, that “[t]he Defendants’ conduct in failing to provide KL with a
free appropriate public education constitutes unlawful discrimination
against KL and other special education children... in violation of due
process contrary to the 14th amendment to the United States
Constitution.” Jd. § 91. It also pleads that the alleged conduct of the
District and Lucas “shocks the conscience.” Jd. § 95. See generally
Morrow, 719 F.3d at 170 (reciting elements of a state-created danger
(continued on next page)

- 14 -

We begin with the substantive due process claim articulated in
Count II, which simply fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. “The denial of a FAPE does not give rise to a substantive due

process violation because the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause does not protect educational interests.” Vicky M. v. Ne. Educ.
Intermediate Unit 19, 486 F. Supp. 2d 437, 456 (M.D. Pa. 2007); see also
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)
(“Education . . . is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under
our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is
implicitly so protected.”); Fiedler v. Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist., 427 F
Supp. 3d 539, 555 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (“[T]here is no fundamental right to a
public education under the United States Constitution.”).
We turn then to the substantive due process claim articulated in
Count I. The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause protects against
government interference with an individual’s fundamental right to bodily
integrity. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); see

substantive due process claim, including “a state actor acted with a
degree of culpability that shocks the conscience”).

« 7A

also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“Individuals have a constitutional liberty interest in personal bodily
integrity that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74 (1977)));
Black ex rel. Black v. Ind. Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 709 n.1 (3d Cir.
1993) (“Plaintiffs have a liberty interest in their bodily integrity that is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing Ingraham, 430 U.S. at
673-74, and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982))).
But, in this case, there is no allegation of an intrusion upon bodily
integrity.’ The complaint alleges only that JM surreptitiously took a

7 In his brief, the plaintiff has cited Kane v. Barger, 902 F.3d 185
(3d Cir. 2018), a case involving a sexual assault victim’s claim that an
investigating police officer violated her right to bodily integrity by
touching her and photographing her intimate bodily areas with his
personal cellphone. Br. Opp’n 16, Doc. 16. But Kane is inapposite to this
case, which involves no physical contact whatsoever.
We note, however, that the Third Circuit has also recognized “a
right to privacy in a person’s unclothed or partially clothed body”
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. See Doe ex
rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 527 & n.53 (3d Cir.
2018); see also Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 176—77 (3d Cir. 2011)
(“Privacy claims under the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily require
fact-intensive and context-specific analyses, and unfortunately, bright
lines generally cannot be drawn.”); Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
516 F.3d 489, 497-98 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding a privacy violation where a
middle school’s surveillance cameras recorded the plaintiff students in
(continued on next page)

= 16 a

photograph of KL’s genitalia, which he then shared with others via social
media. It does not allege any physical contact whatsoever. See Shaefer v.
Corba, No. 3:23-0019, 2023 WL 6217355, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2023)
(teacher’s taking multiple photographs of student without any sexual
interaction or physical contact did not implicate the student’s right to
bodily integrity). Furthermore, it is well established that “reputation
alone is not an interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Clark v.
Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Barnett v. Penn
Hills Sch. Dist., 705 Fed. App’x 71, 74 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal
of substantive due process claim based on combined interests in public
employment and reputation).
Moreover, the wrongful conduct at issue in this case was not by a
school official, but another student. It is well established that “l[a]ls a

their undergarments while in the school locker room), cited in Boyertown,
897 F.3d at 527 n.53; Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding that the surreptitious videotaping of an officer undressing by
fellow officers was actionable as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive-due-process “right to privacy in _ one’s
unclothed body”), cited in Boyertown, 897 F.3d at 527 n.53; York v. Story,
324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963) (allowing witness who was forced to undress
while being questioned at a police station to assert a Fourteenth
Amendment violation of privacy claim), cited in Boyertown, 897 F.3d at
527 n.53. But the plaintiff’s complaint does not articulate such a claim.

ss Ly a

general matter,... a State’s failure to protect an individual against
private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Deptt of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
197 (1989). “The Due Process Clause forbids the State itself from
depriving ‘individuals of life, liberty, or property without ‘due process of
law, but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative
obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm
through other means.” Morrow, 719 F.3d at 166 (quoting DeShaney, 489
U.S. at 195 (emphasis in original)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 235
(“[Tlhe Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative obligation on
the state to protect its citizens.” (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-96)).
As recognized by the Third Circuit, the “state-created danger
doctrine” is “a narrow exception to the general rule that the state has no
duty to protect its citizens from private harms.” Henry v. City of Erie, 728
F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Vorobyev v. Wolfe, 638 F. Supp. 3d
410, 424 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (“The Third Circuit has... recognized, but
narrowly construed, the state-created danger doctrine as a carefully
crafted and specifically defined exception to DeShaney’s scope.”). Under
this theory, “liability may attach where the state acts to create or enhance

-

a danger that deprives the plaintiff of his or her Fourteenth Amendment
right to substantive due process.” Morrow, 719 F.3d at 177 (citing Kneipp
v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1205 (8d Cir. 1996)) (emphasis in original). To

state a claim under this theory, a plaintiff must plausibly allege the
following four elements:
1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and
direct:
2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that
shocks the conscience;
3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff
existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim
of the defendant’s acts, or a member of a discrete class
of persons subjected to the potential harm brought
about by the state’s actions, as opposed to a member of
the public in general; and
4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority
in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that
rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than
had the state not acted at all.
Id. (quoting Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir.
2006)).
Here, the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to plausibly
establish the first element of a state-created danger claim. The complaint
alleges that KL “suffered severe and permanent psychological damage,
physical harm, and emotional distress.” Compl. §4 62, 83, Doc. 1. The

= 19 a

complaint further alleges that KL suffered “anxiety, depression, suicidal
ideations, embarrassment, mental anguish, and other injuries,” and it
alleges that KL was at one point hospitalized for “serious and severe
suicidal ideations.” Jd. (63-64, 84. The complaint fails to plausibly
allege a foreseeable and fairly direct harm because it alleges no facts
whatsoever in support of these vague allegations of injury. The conclusory
allegation of “physical harm,” without any further factual support, is
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See M.S. ex rel. Hall □□
Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 43 F. Supp. 3d 412, 430-31 (M.D. Pa.
2014). Moreover, mental or emotional distress alone is insufficient to
constitute the requisite harm in a state-created danger claim. See Carey
v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 410 Fed. App’x 479, 483 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding
that the plaintiff's allegation of anxiety did “not rise to the level of
foreseeable and fairly direct harm,” and “the emotional distress alleged
by [the plaintiff] is not a cognizable harm”); see also Doe #1 v. Delaware
Valley Sch, Dist., 572 F. Supp. 3d 38, 75 n.11 (M.D. Pa. 2021); Moore v.
Solanco Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 3d 640, 667 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
The complaint also fails to plausibly allege the fourth element of a
state-created danger claim—an affirmative act by the District or Lucas

- 20 -

that created a danger to KL or that rendered KL more vulnerable to

danger than had the District or Lucas not acted at all. In his opposition
brief, the plaintiff identifies “allowling] students to take cellular phones
with cameras into restrooms’ as the affirmative act. Br. Opp’n 18, Doc.

16. Looking to the allegations of the complaint, we find that any state-
created danger claim® rests entirely on the District’s and Lucas’s alleged
inaction or failure to act, pointing only to their failure to enforce a school
policy limiting the possession or use of cellphones by students within the
school.? But the Third Circuit has “repeatedly held that an alleged failure

to do something, standing alone, cannot be the basis for a state-created

danger claim.” Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 2020)
(emphasis in original); Luu v. Esterly, 367 F. Supp. 3d 335, 348 (E.D. Pa.
2019) (““[T]he Third Circuit Court of Appeals has routinely held that an
alleged failure to enforce its own policies is not equivalent to an

8 The complaint does not explicitly articulate a state-created danger
claim, but the plaintiff’s substantive due process claim is essentially
recast as one in his opposition brief.
9 The complaint alleges that the policy required students to either
secure their cellphones in their lockers or to place them in cellphone
holders when in class. While it is not clear that that such a policy
necessarily prohibited possession of a cellphone in the hallways between
classes, or in the restrooms, we find it reasonable to infer that the policy
did so for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.

= P21 =

affirmative act.”) (collecting cases); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236
(holding that, if a plaintiff’s “allegations, at their core, are omissions, not
commissions—inactions rather than actions,” the plaintiff has failed to
adequately plead a state-created danger claim); Dorley v. S. Fayette Twp.
Sch. Dist., 129 F. Supp. 3d 220, 237 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (“Courts must
assess... whether state officials ‘created or increased the risk’
themselves, or whether they simply ‘might have done more’ to protect
individuals from harm.”) (citing Morrow, 719 F.3d at 179). The moving
defendants’ alleged failure to take action does not constitute affirmative
conduct that triggers a duty to protect under the state-created danger
doctrine. See Bright, 443 F.3d at 282 (“It is misuse of state authority,
rather than a failure to use it, that can violate the Due Process Clause.”).
Indeed, to characterize their inaction as an “affirmative exercise of
authority” would permit “the state-created danger exception [to] swallow
the rule.... Any and all failures to act would be transformed into an
affirmative exercise of authority.” Morrow, 719 F.3d at 178 (emphasis in
original); see also Gayemen v. Sch. Dist. of City of Allentown, 712 Fed.
App’x 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2017) (“This Court has repeatedly rejected similar
efforts to recharacterize inaction as action.”).

89

Accordingly, the plaintiff's §1983 Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process claims, as set forth in Counts I and II, will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
D. Count II: Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
In Count II, the plaintiff also brings a claim for damages against
the District and Lucas under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal protection clause. The entire substance of the plaintiff's equal
protection claim is alleged as follows: “The Defendants’ conduct in failing
to provide KL with a free appropriate public education constitutes
unlawful discrimination against KL and other special education children
in violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment .. . to
the United States Constitution.” Compl. § 91.19
But “[a] school’s failure to provide FAPE to a particular student
does not automatically trigger a violation of the equal protection clause.”

10 Count II includes other paragraphs. One paragraph incorporates
all preceding paragraphs, Compl. § 90, and four allege legal conclusions,
including causation, id. § 92, that KL’s statutory rights were violated, id.
{| 93, that KL suffered damages as a result, zd. § 94, and that the
defendants’ conduct shocked the conscience, jd. § 95. None address the
requisite elements of an equal protection claim.

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Ronald E. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., No. 05-2535, 2007 WL
4225584, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2007) (granting summary judgment),
aff'd in relevant part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Chambers

ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 196—
97 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 368 (2001) (“If special accommodations for the disabled are to be
required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal
Protection Clause.”); Irene B. v. Phila. Academy Charter Sch., No. 02-
1716, 2003 WL 24052009, at *13 n.28 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2003) (rejecting
conclusory argument that “a school’s failure to provide FAPE to children
with disabilities constitutes a violation of the equal protection clause”).
To sufficiently plead a violation of the equal protection clause, the
plaintiff must allege that KL “received different treatment from other
similarly situated individuals or groups.” Jereance D. ex rel. Wanda D. v.
Sch. Dist. of Phila., 548 F. Supp. 2d 162, 169 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting
Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 850 (3d Cir. 1994)). Here, the
complaint simply does not allege that the District or Lucas treated KL
different from any other similarly situated student in any way. See
Roquet v. Kelly, No. 4:11-cv-01763, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2013)

= BA «

(dismissing equal protection claim that failed to allege that disabled
student was treated differently from any other similarly situated student
in any way).
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s § 1983 equal protection claim asserted
in Count II will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
E. Count III: Damages Under the IDEA
In Count III, the plaintiff brings a claim for damages against the
District and Lucas under the IDEA directly. Based on their failure to
protect KL from the incident described above, in which JM took a
photograph of KL’s genitals while he was using the restroom, and their
failure to protect KL from harassment and bullying by other students as
a result of the photograph, the plaintiff claims that the District and Lucas
failed to provide KL with a FAPE, as required under the IDEA. For relief,
the plaintiff does not seek the compensatory education, private school
tuition reimbursement, private evaluations, or other prospective relief
ordinarily available under the IDEA. Instead, the plaintiff seeks only
damages.
But, under binding Third Circuit precedent, monetary damages are

~ 95 -

simply not an available remedy under the IDEA. See Chambers, 587 F.3d
at 185-86. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim for damages under the IDEA
directly, as set forth in Count III, will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
F. Counts IV and V: Disability Discrimination
In Counts IV and V, the plaintiff brings disability discrimination
claims for damages against the District under Title II of the ADA and
Section 504 of the RA, and in Count XIV, the plaintiff brings a
corresponding claim for attorney fees under fee-shifting provisions of the
ADA and the RA. Based on the District’s failure to protect KL from the
incident described above, in which JM took a photograph of KL’s genitals
while he was using the restroom, and its failure to protect KL from
harassment and bullying by other students as a result of the photograph,
the plaintiff claims that the District discriminated against KL on the
basis of his disabilities.
As a threshold matter, we note that the plaintiff’s disability
discrimination claims seek both compensatory and punitive damages.
But punitive damages are simply not an available remedy under either

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Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the RA. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536
U.S. 181, 189-90 (2002) (holding that punitive damages may not be
awarded in suits brought under Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the
RA); see also Talley, 2023 WL 118470, at *1 n.2 (““[Plunitive damages are

not available under Title II of the ADA.”); A.W, 486 F.3d at 804 (“The
remedies for violation of Section 504 lof the ADA]... include
compensatory damages, injunctive relief, and other forms of relief
traditionally available in suits for breach of contract. Punitive damages
are not available.”) (citation omitted). Thus, the plaintiff has failed to
state a claim for punitive damages under the ADA and the RA.
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a
disability shall by reason of such disability be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the RA provides that “[nlo otherwise
qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,

or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

□□ -

Claims under the ADA and the RA are generally subject to the same
substantive standard.!! See Matthews v. Pa. Dep’ of Corr., 613 Fed.
Appx 163, 166-67 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
have the same standard for liability and are to be interpreted
consistently.”) (citing Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNE. LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 274
(3d Cir. 2012); S.A. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d
248, 260 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The same standards govern both the RA and the
ADA claims.”); Bowers v. Nat? Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524,
5385 n.12 (8d Cir. 2007) (“Although the language of the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act differs, the standards for determining liability under
the two statutes are identical.”). “To state a claim under either the ADA

or the RA, [a plaintiff] must allege that he is a qualified individual with
a disability, who was precluded from participating in a program, service,

11 To make out a claim under the RA, a plaintiff must establish the
same elements as under the ADA, but he or she must also prove that the
program in question received federal funding. CG v. Pa. Dept of Educ.,
734 F.3d 229, 235 n.10 (3d Cir. 2013). Moreover, the causation elements
of the ADA and the RA differ in that the “RA allows a plaintiff to recover
if he or she were deprived of an opportunity to participate in a program
solely on the basis of a disability, while the ADA covers discrimination on
the basis of disability, even if there is another cause as well.” Jd. at 235—
36 (emphasis added). But both statutes require plaintiffs to prove “that
they were treated differently based on the protected characteristic,
namely the existence of their disability.” Jd. at 236.

28

or activity, or otherwise was subject to discrimination, by reason of his
disability.” Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. 933 F.3d 285, 288-89 (3d Cir.
2019); see also Durham y. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2023);
Matthews v. Pa. Dept of Corr, 827 Fed. App’x 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2020)
(citing Bowers, 475 F.3d at 553 n.32).
In the primary or secondary school context,!2 the Third Circuit has
recognized that the denial of a FAPE to a disabled student will “almost
always” also be a violation of the RA and the ADA. Andrew M. vy, Del.
Cnty. Office of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 350
(3d Cir. 2007); see also CG v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir.
2013) (“Failure to provide a FAPE violates Part B of the IDEA and
generally violates the ADA and RA because it deprives students of a
benefit that non-disabled students receive simply by attending school in
the normal course—a free, appropriate public education.”) (footnote
omitted); TR. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 223 F. Supp. 3d 321, 333 (E.D. Pa.
2016) (citing CG, 734 F.3d at 235). As the Third Circuit has explained:

2 Under the IDEA, states accepting federal funds are required to
provide a FAPE to children with disabilities who are between the ages of
3 and 21, inclusive. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1); Andrew M. v. Del. Cnty.
Office of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 350 (3d Cir.
2007).

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[W]hen a state fails to provide a disabled child with a
free and appropriate education, it violates the IDEA.
However, it also violates the RA [and the ADA] because
it is denying a disabled child a guaranteed education
merely because of the child’s disability. It is the denial
of an education that is guaranteed to all children that
forms the basis of the claim. Therefore, a plaintiff can
prove an RA [or ADA] violation where “(1) he is
‘disabled’ as defined by the Act: (2) he is ‘otherwise
qualified’ to participate in school activities; (3) the
school or the board of education receives federal
financial assistance;!3l and (4) he was excluded from
participation in, denied the benefits of, or subject to
discrimination at, the school.”
Andrew M., 490 F.3d. at 350 (quoting Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex
rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 1999)).
But the plaintiff here faces an additional hurdle under the ADA and
the RA: He “must also show intentional discrimination under a deliberate
indifference standard because he seeks compensatory damages.”
Furgess, 933 F.3d at 289; see also Durham, 82 F.4th at 226; Matthews,
827 Fed. App’x at 187; Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 537
Fed. App’x 90, 95-96 (3d Cir. 2013); Durrel], 729 F.3d at 261 (“[C]laims
for compensatory damages under § 504 of the RA and § 202 of the ADA
also require a finding of intentional discrimination.”); id. at 263 (“[A]

13 Of course, the federal financial assistance element does not apply
to a disability discrimination claim under the ADA.

3 30 =

showing of deliberate indifference may satisfy a claim for compensatory
damages under § 504 of the RA and § 202 of the ADA.”). To plead
deliberate indifference, an ADA or RA claimant must allege
“(1) knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially
likely, and (2) a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Durrel/, 729 F.3d at
263 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Durham, 82 F.4th at
226; Matthews, 827 Fed. Appx at 187. Moreover, the “deliberate
indifference must be a deliberate choice, rather than negligence or
bureaucratic inaction.” Durrell, 729 F.3d at 263 (internal quotation
marks omitted); Chambers, 537 Fed. App’x at 96 (quoting Durrell, 729
F.3d at 263).
The complaint alleges no facts whatsoever to support a finding that
the District was subjectively aware that a harm to KlL’s federally
protected right to a free appropriate education was substantially likely,
or that the District failed to act upon that likelihood. In particular, the
complaint includes no non-conclusory allegations that the District or its
policymakers“ were aware of a pattern of similar prior incidents

14 “The final policy maker for a school district in Pennsylvania is
typically the school board or the superintendent.” #.N. v. Susquehanna
(continued on next page)
-31-

involving students taking photographs of other students in school
restrooms, much less circulating them via social media.
Accordingly, the plaintiff's disability discrimination claims for
damages against the District under Title II of the ADA and Section 504
of the RA, as set forth in Counts IV and V, and his claim for attorney fees
under the ADA and the RA, as set forth in Count XIV, will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
G. Count VI: Title IX
In Count VI, the plaintiff brings a claim for damages against the
District and Lucas under Title IX. Based on their failure to protect KL
from the incident described above, in which JM took a photograph of KL’s
genitals while he was using the restroom, and their failure to protect KL
from harassment and bullying by other students as a result of the
photograph, the plaintiff claims that the District and Lucas were

Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 1:09-CV-1727, 2011 WL 3608544, at *8 (M.D. Pa. July
5, 2011); see also Flood v. Sherk, 400 F. Supp. 3d 295, 311 (W.D. Pa. 2019)
(finding that the school board, not a high school principal, was the final
policymaker for a school district with respect to student discipline,
through whom actual knowledge of prior incidents could be attributed to
the district).

- 32 -

deliberately indifferent to JM’s sexual harassment of KL.
As a threshold matter, it is well established that Title IX does not
authorize suits against individual defendants. See Fitzgerald v.
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257 (2009) (“Title IX reaches
institutions and programs that receive federal funds,... but it has
consistently been interpreted as not authorizing suit against school
officials, teachers, and other individuals.”). Thus, the plaintiff has failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to his Title
IX claim for damages against Lucas individually.
Title IX provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a). The Supreme Court has recognized an implied private cause of
action for monetary damages under Title IX. See Gebser v. Lago Vista
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1998). To state a claim of
deliberate indifference to student-on-student sexual harassment under
Title [X, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the defendant received federal funds; (2) sexual
harassment occurred; (3) the harassment took place

- 33-

under “circumstances wherein the funding recipient
exercised substantial control over both the harasser
and the context in which the harassment occurred”;
(4) the funding recipient had “actual knowledge” of the
harassment; (5) the funding recipient was “deliberately
indifferent” to the harassment; and (6) the harassment
was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive
that it could be said to have deprived the victims of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits
provided by the school.”
Dawn L. v. Greater Johnstown Sch. Dist., 586 F. Supp. 2d 332, 365 (W.D.
Pa. 2008) (quoting Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645, 650 (1999) (ellipsis and brackets omitted)).
The parties do not contest the first element. The District received
federal financial assistance.
With respect to the second and third elements, the complaint
alleges that KL was subjected to sexual harassment when JM took a
photograph of his exposed genitalia in a school restroom during a school
day—a time and location where the District clearly exercised substantial
control over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment
occurred—and also when that photograph was then disseminated to
others via social media. At this, the pleadings stage, we decline the
moving defendants’ invitation to find that the surreptitious taking of a
pornographic photograph of an adolescent boy’s exposed genitalia by an

a 34

adolescent transgender boy, and the subsequent distribution of that
pornographic photograph to other students via social media, has “nothing
to do with gender” or sex. See Br. Supp. 15, Doc. 10. But we do find that

any subsequent harassment through dissemination of the photograph
among Dunmore students and possibly other social media users via
Snapchat did not occur under circumstances where the District exercised
substantial control over either the unidentified harassers or the context
in which the harassment occurred. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 645-46;
Gebser, 526 U.S. at 645; M.S. v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 1:13-
cv-02718, 2017 WL 6397827, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017) (involving
social media harassment), R. & R. adopted, 2017 WL 6403007 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 16, 2017), aff'd sub nom. M.S. ex rel Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch.
Dist., 969 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2020).
With respect to the fourth and fifth elements, a school district may
only be found to be deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-
student sexual harassment—the “actual notice” required by Title IX
cannot be based on a mere possibility that such harassment might occur.
See Bostic v. Smyrna Sch. Dist., 418 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 2005); see also
Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (holding that “funding recipients are properly held

□ QR -

liable in damages only where they are deliberately indifferent to
[student-on-student] sexual harassment] of which they have actual
knowledge’) (emphasis added); id. at 648 (“[Flunding recipients are
deemed ‘deliberately indifferent’ to acts of student-on-student [sexual]
harassment only where the recipient’s response to the harassment or lack
thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the Anown circumstances.”)
(emphasis added). Where a single incident of harassment is alleged, or
where the failure to prevent a particular incident of harassment is
asserted, the school district must have had actual knowledge of the
sexual harassment in advance of the incident. See Ariel B. ex rel.
Deborah B. v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 428 F. Supp. 2d 640, 667 (S.D.
Tex. 2006); see also Doe v. Grandville Public Sch. Dist., No. 1:18-CV-309,
2019 WL 3050671, at *4 (W.D. Mich. July 12, 2019) (on summary
judgment). The complaint alleges that school officials only became aware
of JM’s alleged sexual harassment of KL afterthe photograph was taken,
and it alleges no further sexual harassment by JM thereafter. No prior
similar incidents involving either JM or KL are alleged in the complaint.
The plaintiff suggests only that school officials should have previously
recognized that their lax enforcement of the District’s cellphone policies

- 36 -

could result in the sort of harassment that occurred here. But, as noted
above, the mere possibility that such an incident might occur does not
satisfy the actual notice requirement of Title IX. Moreover, after school
officials were made aware of the incident, they conducted an
investigation, interviewing both KL and JM. Although KL is unhappy
with the alleged failure of school officials to impose disciplinary sanctions

on JM as a result, “li]neffective responses [to student-on-student sexual
harassment] . . . are not clearly unreasonable.” See Sanches v. Carrollton-
Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 168 (5th Cir. 2011).
With respect to the sixth element, to be actionable, student-on-
student sexual harassment must be “sufficiently severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive as to deprive the victim of access to the school’s
educational benefits and services.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. “An isolated
incident, unless extremely serious, is not sufficient to sustain a hostile
educational environment claim.” Katchur v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 354
F. Supp. 3d 655, 664 (E.D. Pa. 2019); see also, e.g., Carabello v. NY.C.
Dept of Educ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 627, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (single incident
of student-on-student sexual abuse, involving touching but not extreme
sexual assault or rape, was not so severe, pervasive, or objectively

-37-

offensive that it deprived victim of access to educational opportunities);
Ariel B,, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 667 (single incident in which a male student
pulled down female student’s shirt and took a photograph of her breast
did not rise to the level of severe or pervasive sexual harassment that
would trigger Title IX protections). See generally MDB v. Punxsutawney
Christian Sch., 386 F. Supp. 3d 565, 579 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (‘Although the
Supreme Court noted in Davis that it was unlikely that Congress would
have thought a single instance of peer harassment could rise to the level
of denying a victim equal access to an educational program, other Courts
have found ‘sufficiently severe’ harassment under Title IX based on a
single incident of sexual assault or rape.” (citation omitted)). The
complaint here alleges a single, isolated incident that did not involve any
physical contact at all, much less sexual assault or rape, which thus did
not rise to the level of the sort of severe or pervasive sexual harassment
that would trigger Title IX protections. Furthermore, the complaint
alleges no facts to support a finding that KL was actually deprived of

access to the school’s educational benefits and services.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s Title IX claim for damages against the
District and Lucas under Title IX, as set forth in Count VI, will be

- 38 -

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
H. Count VII: Section 1983 Failure to Train
In Count VII, the plaintiff brings a claim for damages against the
District under § 1983 based upon a failure-to-train theory of recovery. But
to hold the District liable for failure to train under § 1983, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that there was a constitutional violation and that the
violation was caused by a policy or custom of the District. See Monell v.
Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Bridges ex rel. D.B. v.
Scranton Sch. Dist., 644 Fed. App’x 172, 178 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Monell,
436 U.S. at 690-91). We have dismissed the plaintiff’s underlying due

process and equal protection claims. See supra. The District cannot be
held hable for failure to train under § 1983 if its failure to train has not
resulted in an underlying constitutional violation. See Bridges, 644 Fed.
App’x at 178 (“Appellants cannot recover from the School District under
Section 1983 for failure to train because there was no underlying
constitutional violation.” (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1212 n.26
(3d Cir. 1996)); Moore v. Solanco Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 3d 640, 669 n.20
(E.D. Pa. 2020) (quoting Bridges, 644 Fed. App’x at 178); Page ex rel.

- 39 -

Page v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 45 F. Supp. 2d 457, 467-68 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(citing Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1212 n.26).
Accordingly, the plaintiff's failure-to-train claim for damages
against the District under § 1983, as set forth in Count VII, will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
I. State-Law Tort and Contract Claims
The plaintiff has also asserted a variety of state-law tort and
contract claims against the District, Lucas, and Maldonado.!5 Where a
district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original
jurisdiction, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Whether the court will
exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within its discretion. Kach v. Hose,

15 In addition to the federal civil rights claims discussed above,
Count VIII of the complaint asserts a state-law “vicarious liability” tort
claim against the District and Lucas, Count IX asserts a state-law
negligence claim against the District and Lucas, Count X asserts a state-
law breach of contract claim against the District, Count XI asserts a
state-law negligent entrustment claim against Maldonado in her
personal capacity, Count XII asserts a state-law intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim against Maldonado in her capacity as parent
and natural guardian of JM, and Count XIII asserts a broadside claim
for punitive damages against all defendants on all claims, of which only
the state-law claims remain.

= 40 =

589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009). That decision should be based on “the
values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie-
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 348, 350 (1988); Borough of W. Mifflin v.
Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (8d Cir. 1995). “[I]n the usual case in which
all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of
factors... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims.” Cohil/, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7. Upon
consideration of these factors and the record before us, we find nothing
to distinguish this from the usual case. Therefore, the remaining state-
law claims will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3).
J. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that, if a civil rights complaint is
vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must
permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be
inequitable or futile, Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108
(3d Cir. 2002). This instruction applies equally to pro se plaintiffs and
those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir.
2004). In this case, based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it is not

-AL-

clear that further amendment would be futile, nor is there any basis to
believe that such amendment would be inequitable. Therefore, the
dismissal of the complaint will be with leave to amend.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss by the District and
Lucas will be granted and the plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims
against them, set forth in Counts I through VII of the complaint, will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The plaintiff's remaining state-law
tort and contract claims against the District, Lucas, and Maldonado will
be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
However, the complaint will be dismissed with leave to file an amended
complaint within a specified time period.
An appropriate order follows.

Dated: September __, 2025 E degra
JOSEPH FS RITO, JR.
United States District Judge

- 49 -

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11144062. Public record. Not legal advice.