# Vujakovich v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, W.D. New York · September 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11143141

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 23, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11143141

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that Plaintiff's allegations of disability were undermined by her failure to seek regular treatment for her allegedly disabling mental impairments

## Opinion text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SESTERN DisTRICL
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ALYSSA V., 22-CV-809-MJR
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
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COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c), the parties consented to have a United States
Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this case. (Dkt. No. 11)
Plaintiff Alyssa V." (“Plaintiff’) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (“Commissioner” or “defendant”) denying her application for Supplemental
Security Insurance (“SSI”) pursuant to the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Both parties
have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. No. 7) is denied, and
defendant’s motion (Dkt. No. 8) is granted.

'In accordance with the District's November 18, 2020, Standing Order, plaintiff is identified by
first name and last initial.

BACKGROUND?
Plaintiff filed for SSI on April 30, 2018, with an alleged onset date of August 1,
2017. (Administrative Transcript ["Tr.”] 15, 307-12). The application was initially denied
on August 29, 2018. (Tr. 15, 136-41). Plaintiff filed a written request for hearing on
September 24, 2018. (Tr. 142-44).
An administrative hearing was conducted by Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Paul V. McGinn via telephone on June 1, 2021, at which Plaintiff participated, along with
her counsel. (Tr. 37-75). A medical expert and a vocational expert also testified.
On August 3, 2021, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 12-36). The
Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1-6). This case followed.

DISCUSSION
I. Scope of Judicial Review
The Court’s review of the Commissioner's decision is deferential. Under the Act,
the Commissioner's factual determinations “shall be conclusive” so long as they are
“supported by substantial evidence,” 42 U.S.C. §405(g), that is, supported by “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the]
conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “The substantial evidence test applies not only to findings on basic
evidentiary facts, but also to inferences and conclusions drawn from the facts.” Smith v.
Colvin, 17 F. Supp. 3d 260, 264 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). “Where the Commissioner's decision

2 The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with Plaintiff's medical history, which is summarized
in the moving papers.

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rests on adequate findings supported by evidence having rational probative force,” the
Court may “not substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Veino v. Barnhart,
312 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, the Court’s task is to ask “whether the record,
read as a whole, yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the
conclusions reached’ by the Commissioner.” Silvers v. Colvin, 67 F. Supp. 3d 570, 574
(W.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Two related rules follow from the Act’s standard of review. The first is that “[iJt is
the function of the [Commissioner], not [the Court], to resolve evidentiary conflicts and to
appraise the credibility of witnesses, including the claimant.” Carroll v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983). The second rule is that “[g]enuine
conflicts in the medical evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve.” Veino, 312 F.3d
at 588. While the applicable standard of review is deferential, this does not mean that the
Commissioner's decision is presumptively correct. The Commissioner's decision is, as
described above, subject to remand or reversal if the factual conclusions on which it is
based are not supported by substantial evidence. Further, the Commissioner’s factual
conclusions must be applied to the correct legal standard. Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d
260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008). Failure to apply the correct legal standard is reversible error. /d.
II. Standards for Determining “Disability” Under the Act
A “disability” is an inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than twelve (12) months.” 42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
Commissioner may find the claimant disabled “only if his physical or mental impairment

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or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether
such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” /d. §§423(d)(2)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(B). The Commissioner must make these determinations based on “objective
medical facts, diagnoses or medical opinions based on these facts, subjective evidence
of pain or disability, and . . . [the claimant’s] educational background, age, and work
experience.” Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1550 (2d Cir. 1983) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981)).
To guide the assessment of whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner has
promulgated a “five-step sequential evaluation process.” 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4). First, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is “working” and
whether that work “is substantial gainful activity.” /d. §§404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claimant is “not disabled regardless
of [his or her] medical condition or . . . age, education, and work experience.” /d.
§§404.1520(b), 416.920(b). Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful
activity, the Commissioner asks whether the claimant has a “severe impairment.” /d.
§§404.1520(c), 416.920(c). To make this dstereinatten the Commissioner asks whether
the claimant has “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits
[the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. §§404.1520(c),
416.920(c). As with the first step, if the claimant does not have a severe impairment, he
or she is not disabled regardless of any other factors or considerations. □ /d.

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§§404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Third, if the claimant does have a severe impairment, the
Commissioner asks two additional questions: first, whether that severe impairment meets
the Act’s duration requirement, and second, whether the severe impairment is either listed
in Appendix 1 of the Commissioner’s regulations or is “equal to” an impairment listed in
Appendix 1. /d. §§404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant satisfies both requirements
of step three, the Commissioner will find that he or she is disabled without regard to his
or her age, education, and work experience. /d. §§404.1520(d), 416.920(d).
If the claimant does not have the severe impairment required by step three, the
Commissioner's analysis proceeds to steps four and five. Before doing so, the
Commissioner must “assess and make a finding about [the claimant’s] residual functional
capacity [“RFC”] based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the record. /d.
§§404.1520(e), 416.920(e). RFC “is the most [the claimant] can still do despite [his or
her] limitations.” /d. §§404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The Commissioner’s assessment
of the claimant's RFC is then applied at steps four and five. At step four, the
Commissioner “compare[s] [the] residual functional capacity assessment . . . with the
physical and mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant work.” /d. §§404.1520(f),
416.920(f). If, based on that comparison, the claimant is able to perform his or her past
relevant work, the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled within the
meaning of the Act. /d. §§404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Finally, if the claimant cannot perform
his or her past relevant work or does not have any past relevant work, then at the fifth
step the Commissioner considers whether, based on the claimant's RFC, age, education,
and work experience, the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work.” □□□□
§§404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant can adjust to other work, he or she is

«Bs

not disabled. /d. §§404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). If, however, the claimant cannot
adjust to other work, he or she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. □□□□
§§404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1).
The burden through steps one through four described above rests on the claimant.
If the claimant carries his burden through the first four steps, “the burden then shifts to
the [Commissioner] to show there is other gainful work in the national economy which the
claimant could perform.” Carroll, 705 F.2d at 642.
II. The ALJ’s Decision
At step one of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found the Plaintiff had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since April 30, 2018, the application date. (Tr. 17). At step
two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: seizure
disorder; neurocognitive disorder secondary to seizure disorder; hypoxic brain injury;
learning disorder; asthma; headaches; and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder. (Tr.
18). At step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff's impairments or combination of
impairments met or equaled the criteria for any impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Listings). (Tr. 18-21). Before proceeding to step four of the
sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determined that, despite Plaintiff's impairments,
she could perform light work, except that she: must avoid concentrated exposure to
fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poorly ventilated areas, and other pulmonary irritants; could
have no exposure to unprotected heights, dangerous moving mechanical parts, loud
noises, and vibration; could only understand, remember, and carry out simple and routine
tasks and instructions; could have no strict production quotas, no supervisory duties, and
no independent decision making; could only have only minimal changes in work routine;

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and could only perform jobs with a GED level education with level 1-2 math skills. (Tr. 21-
29). Next, at steps four and five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have any past
relevant work, but could perform work that existed in significant numbers in the national
economy. (Tr. 29-30). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the
Act. (Tr. 30).
IV. Plaintiff's Challenge
Plaintiff argues that the case must be remanded, because the ALJ: (1) at step
three, failed to evaluate properly Listing 12.02 (Neurocognitive disorders); (2) made
multiple errors evaluating the supportability and consistency of the medical opinions of
record; and (3) failed to evaluate properly Plaintiff's well-supported subjective complaints
of memory issues. The Court disagrees.
The Court finds that there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s RFC
finding. For instance, the ALJ considered that, despite Plaintiff's childhood brain injury
and seizures, the treatment records consistently documented no significant motor or focal
neurological deficits. (Tr. 23-28; citing Tr.610, 710, 732, 740, 785). Physical examinations
also regularly documented intact or normal motor strength, tone, sensation, reflexes,
coordination, gait, heel-toe gait, and tandem gait. (Tr. 22-23, citing Tr. 645, 710, 732; see
also, e.g., Tr.610, 612, 615-16, 622, 770). Similarly, Plaintiff's mental status examinations
were generally normal. (Tr. 19-20, 23, 25; see, e.g., Tr. 465, 612, 615, 622, 624, 626,
629, 635, 639, 644, 648, 650, 652, 657, 682, 770, 777, 785, 788, 791, 834, 840).
The ALJ also considered Plaintiff's lack of mental health treatment as undermining
her allegations that anxiety and other mental impairments rendered her too disabled to
perform any work. (Tr. 20, 22, 25); see Navan v. Astrue, 303 F. App’x 18, 20 (2d Cir.

ofs

2008) (citing Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that Plaintiff's
allegations of disability were undermined by her failure to seek regular treatment for her
allegedly disabling mental impairments)); Sa/vaggio v. Apfel, 23 F. App’x 49, 51 (2d Cir.
2001) (“the result of the plaintiff's choice to seek only minimal medical attention of her
symptoms...supports the finding that the plaintiff was not under a disability.”).
Further, as explained below, Plaintiff's arguments on appeal are unavailing.
At step three of the sequential evaluation, Plaintiff bears the burden to show that
her impairments meet or equal the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the Listings). See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987)
(explaining the allocations of burdens of proof under the sequential evaluation); Poupore
v. Comm’r, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009) (claimant bears the general burden of
proving disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act and the burden of proof at
the first four steps of the sequential process). The Commissioner's regulations explicitly
state that, to meet a Listing, Plaintiff must show that her condition meets of the criteria
of that particular Listing. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(c)(3):; Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521,
530 (1990) (“For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet
all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those
criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.” (emphasis in original)).
Here, the ALJ considered multiple possible Listings—such as 3.03 (asthma), 11.02
(epilepsy), 12.02 (neurocognitive disorders), and 12.11 (neurodevelopmental
disorders)—and reasonably determined that Plaintiff did not meet or equal the criteria of
any Listing. (Tr. 18-21). Most relevant here, the ALJ carefully considered whether Plaintiff
satisfied the criteria of Listing 12.02 and determined that she did not. See id. Listing 12.02

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contains three parts, or “paragraphs,” and to satisfy its requirements, a claimant must
show that she meets paragraphs A and B, or paragraphs A and C. 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listing 12.02. The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet either
paragraphs B or C and thus her mental impairments could not meet or equal the criteria
of Listing 12.04. (Tr. 18-21).
The ALJ first found that Plaintiff's mental impairments did not meet the paragraph
B criteria. (Tr. 19-21). As the ALJ explained, Paragraph B of Listing 12.02 requires one
extreme limitation or two marked limitations in the four broad areas of functioning and
Plaintiff had only moderate limitations in all four areas, which are: 1) understanding,
remembering or applying information; 2) interacting with others; 3) concentrating,
persisting or maintaining pace; and 4) adapting or managing oneself. /d. The ALJ’s
determination that Plaintiff did not meet the Paragraph B criteria is supported by
substantial evidence. See id.
Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet the Paragraph C criteria. (Tr. 21).
Paragraph C first requires a “serious and persistent” mental disorder with evidence of
both “[mJedical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly
structured setting(s) that is ongoing and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of your
mental disorder.” See id. Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not receive or require
Ongoing medical treatment or mental health therapy to diminish the symptoms of her
allegedly disabling impairments. Nor does Plaintiff suggest that living in an apartment with
her mother, in the community, constitutes a “highly structured setting.” See id. Rather,
Plaintiff alleges that she meets the criteria of Paragraph C because she receives
“psychosocial” support from her mother (/d.), but this argument is unavailing.

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In support of this argument, Plaintiff points to her testimony that she was with her
mother most of the time and particularly when she leaves the house, but Plaintiff
mischaracterizes this testimony. Plaintiff actually testified that her mother accompanies
her most places because of Plaintiff's anxiety and then, as the ALJ noted, Plaintiff
immediately testified that she has never been treated for anxiety, thereby belying her
allegations that she could not function independently because of it. (Tr. 44-45); see
Navan, 303 F. App’x at 20; Sa/vaggio, 23 F. App’x at 51.
Further, Plaintiff's allegation that she needs ongoing psychosocial support from
her mother is at least arguably inconsistent with the overall evidence. Plaintiff appeared
at the hearing without her mother (Tr. 37) and testified independently, answering all
questions clearly and appropriately. (Tr. 41-61). As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff consistently
told providers that she lived with her mother but was independent in her activities of daily
living and completed errands by walking or having a family member drive. (Tr. 19-21; see,
e.g., Tr. 568, 571, 574, 577, 581, 584, 587, 590, 592, 595, 597, 600). Plaintiff told her
primary care providers that she did not find it difficult to meet her daily needs, interact with
others, or maintain adequate social skills. (Tr. 587). And Plaintiff reported that she used
“Medicaid cabs” to get to medical appointments, but there is no indication that her mother
accompanied her to these appointments, or that she had any difficulty independently
communicating with her providers, further undermining her allegations. (See generally Tr.
567-658; see also, e.g., Tr. 568, 571, 580 (treatment notes indicating “no communication
barriers” with claimant)). There is nothing in Plaintiff's treatment notes to indicate that she
required ongoing psychosocial support from her mother in her daily life. Thus, Plaintiff's
allegations are unsupported. See Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1553 (2d Cir.

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1983) (“The [Commissioner] is entitled to rely not only on what the record says, but also
on what it does not say.”); Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2012) (a lack of
supporting evidence on a matter for which the claimant bears the burden of proof,
particularly when coupled with other inconsistent record evidence, can constitute
substantial evidence supporting a denial of benefits).
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff failed to prove, as is her burden, that she meets
the other Paragraph C criteria—a “[m]arginal adjustment, that is . . . minimal capacity to
adapt to changes in your environment or to demands that are not already part of your
daily life.” Rather, as the ALJ explained, Plaintiff exhibited no evidence of a minimal
capacity to adapt to changes in her environment or demands that are not already a part
of her daily life. (Tr. 21). For instance, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff consistently reported
that she was independent with her activities of daily living and engaged in a wide variety
of hobbies. (Tr. 21; citing, e.g., Tr. 590, 597, 600 (primary care doctor noting that Plaintiff
was independent with activities of daily living) and Tr. 455, 494-95, 768 (Plaintiff reporting
that her hobbies included texting and spending time with friends, making jewelry,
decorating cakes, drawing, exercising, seeing her grandparents, and listening to the
radio)).
Plaintiff alleges that she meets these criteria because consultative examining
psychologist Dr. Kevin Duffy opined that she had a moderate to marked limitation in
learning new tasks, but Dr. Duffy also found that “[t]here do not appear to be any
significant deficits in adaptive functioning at this time” and that Plaintiff could perform
simple tasks independently. (Tr. 455, 460-61). Further, Dr. Duffy’s opinion is consistent
with the ALJ’s RFC finding and thus does not prove that Plaintiff could not work because

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she meets a Listing. Plaintiff's allegation that the opinion of Dr. Robert Glover, her treating
neurologist, provided evidence of “marginal adjustment” is without merit. The ALJ found
that Dr. Glover's restrictive opinion was unpersuasive as it was unsupported by, and
inconsistent with, the overall evidence. (Tr. 28).
Next, Plaintiff's argument that remand is required for the ALJ to consider more
explicitly the “conflicting evidence” on whether Plaintiff meets Listing 12.02 is not
persuasive. The ALJ explicitly considered Paragraphs B and C of Listing 12.02 and the
relevant evidence to find that Plaintiff did not meet their criteria. (See Tr. 19-21). The
ALJ’s analysis here passes muster, even if Plaintiff does not agree with its outcome. See
Coleman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-CV-6894, 2020 WL 5792974, at *4 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2020), citing Sa/mini v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 371 F. App’x 109, 112-13 (2d Cir.
Mar. 25, 2010) (“Although we have cautioned that an ALJ should set forth a sufficient
rationale in support of his decision to find or not to find a listed impairment, the absence
of an express rationale for an ALJ’s conclusions does not prevent us from upholding them
so long as we are able to look to other portions of the ALJ’s decision and to clearly credible
evidence in finding that his determination was supported by substantial evidence.”).
Moreover, under the substantial evidence standard of review, it is not enough for
Plaintiff to merely argue that the evidence in the record could support her position. See
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. Plaintiff must show that no reasonable factfinder could have
reached the ALJ’s conclusions based on the evidence in the record. See Brault, 683 F.3d
at 448; see also Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1991) (reviewing court must
afford the Commissioner's determination considerable deference and cannot substitute
its own judgment even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo

~ □□

review). Here, substantial evidence, such as treatment notes and Plaintiff's consistent
reports that she was independent with activities of daily living, provide substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff did not meet the criteria of Listing 12.02.
(See Tr. 19-21). Plaintiff has not proven that no reasonable factfinder could have reached
the ALJ’s conclusion.
Next, contrary to Plaintiff's arguments otherwise, the ALJ adequately considered
opinions from consultative examining psychologist Dr. Duffy, Plaintiff's own providers
Family Nurse Practitioner (FNP) Danielle Minazzi and neurologist Dr. Robert Glover, and
consultive examining neurologist Dr. Nikita Dave. (See Tr. 17-29).
The ALJ found Dr. Duffy’s opinion “generally persuasive.” (Tr. 26-27). As the ALJ
noted, after examining Plaintiff, Dr. Duffy opined that Plaintiff could: follow and understand
simple directions and instructions; perform simple tasks independently; make appropriate
decisions; relate adequately with others; and deal appropriately with stress. (Tr. 26-27,
citing Tr. 460-61). Dr. Duffy also found, as the ALJ noted, that Plaintiff may have mild-to-
moderate difficulties maintaining a regular schedule and moderate-to-marked difficulties
learning new tasks. (Tr. 26-27, citing Tr. 460-61). Plaintiff does not take issue with the
ALJ finding Dr. Duffy’s opinion “generally persuasive,” but argues that the ALJ erred by
not mirroring Dr. Duffy’s findings regarding her abilities to maintain a regular schedule
and learn new tasks in his RFC finding. This argument is unpersuasive.
As an initial matter, even where an ALJ finds an opinion fully persuasive, he or she
need not incorporate every aspect of the opinion into his or her RFC finding. See Schillo
v. Kijakazi 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. Apr. 6, 2022) (“[A]n ALJ’s conclusion need not ‘perfectly
correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his decision,’ because the

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ALJ is ‘entitled to weigh all of the evidence available to make a residual functional capacity
finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole.’”) (quoting Matta v. Astrue, 508 F.
App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Warren v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:15-CV-1185-
GTS-WBC, 2016 WL 7223338, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2016), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Warren v. Colvin, No. 3:15-CV-1185-GTS-WBC,
2016 WL 7238947 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2016) (“An ALJ does not have to strictly adhere to
the entirety of one medical source’s opinion.”).
Moreover, Plaintiff's allegation that a moderate limitation in maintaining a schedule
is inconsistent with an RFC for simple work is incorrect. See Bennett v. Saul, No. 19-CV-
6522-DGL, 2020 WL 1915303, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2020) (RFC for a range of
unskilled work was supported by opinion finding, among other things, moderate-to-
marked limitations in maintaining a schedule).
Similarly, courts in this Circuit have rejected Plaintiff's argument that a moderate-
to-marked, or greater, limitation in learning new tasks is inconsistent with an RFC for a
range of simple work. See Collins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-00298, 2020 WL
5742677, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2020), quoting Saxon v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-165, 2015
WL 3937206, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. June 26, 2015) (“The ALJ considered the functional
limitations suggested by the medical evidence, including plaintiffs moderate limitation in
the ability to learn new tasks. . . . These limitations are incorporated into the RFC, which
limits plaintiff to simple routine tasks. . .”); Warren, 2016 WL 7238947 at *7 (finding no
error when an ALJ granted great weight to a consultative examiner’s opinion of moderate-
to-marked limitations learning new tasks and assessed an RFC for a range of unskilled
work). Moreover, here, the ALJ did not only restrict Plaintiff to simple work—he restricted

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her to work that involved only “minimal changes in work routine” and “simple and routine
tasks and instructions,” further accommodating any limitation in learning new tasks. (See
Tr. 21).
Plaintiff also alleges that the ALJ erred by finding the opinions from treaters FNP
Minazzi and Dr. Glover generally persuasive but also noting that they were “vague.” This
argument is unavailing.
NP Minazzi and Dr. Glover each opined that Plaintiff had “no evidence of limitation”
or was “moderately limited” in all areas of physical and mental functioning. (Tr. 752, 754).
It is well-settled that even moderate limitations in physical and mental functioning are
consistent with an ability to perform light, unskilled work. See White v. Berryhill, 753 F.
App’x 80, 82 (2d Cir. 2019) (upholding a light RFC based on an opinion that the claimant
had “moderate limitations” in standing, sitting, and performing other activities); Mcintyre
v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 152 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that a limitation to unskilled work
accounted for the claimant’s moderate limitations); Whipple v. Astrue, 479 F. App’x 367,
370 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming the finding that a consultative examiner's and a State agency
consultant's assessment of mild-to-moderate limitations were accounted for by RFC
limitations to simple tasks in a low-stress environment); Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402,
410 (2d Cir. 2010) (“None of the clinicians who examined her indicated that she had
anything more than moderate limitations in her work - related functioning . . . .”). Thus,
these opinions supported the ALJ’s RFC finding. To the extent that he noted them to also
be vague, is harmless error. (See Tr. 27).
The ALJ found Dr. Glover’s opinion that Plaintiff had marked limitations to be
unpersuasive, explaining that it was unsupported by the notation in his opinion that

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Plaintiff had only one to two seizure episodes a year and his treatment notes in general,
which indicated that Plaintiff was consistently neurologically stable, with no evidence of
motor or neurological deficits and that she consistently presented with a stable gait and
normal mental status, including that she was alert and fully oriented with good attention
and fund of knowledge. (Tr. 28; citing Tr. 732, 740, 777, 785).
Plaintiff's argument that remand is required for the ALJ to explain his consideration
of Dr. Glover’s opinion that low-stress work would increase the frequency of her seizures
and cause her condition to deteriorate is unavailing. Rather, Dr. Glover submitted multiple
opinions and, under the regulations governing Plaintiff's claim, “the ALJ was not required
to articulate how [he] considered each medical individual opinion or multiple medical
findings from one medical source.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-04554-
KAM, 2021 WL 2940842, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2021), citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(b)(1) (“We are not required to articulate how we considered each medical
opinion or prior administrative medical finding from one medical source individually”). And
even if the ALJ could have more explicitly explained his reasons for finding this statement
unpersuasive, that is not a reason for remand because the entirety of the ALJ’s decision
that Plaintiff could perform a range of unskilled work with “no strict production quotas; no
supervisory duties; no independent decision making; [and] minimal changes in work
routine” is supported by substantial evidence. See Tr. 21-28; see also Bonet ex rel. T.B.
v. Colvin, 523 F. App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) citing Brault, 683 F.3d at 448 (“Indeed, even
if the ALJ was not as explicit in his reasoning on this issue as possible, ‘[aJn ALJ does not
have to state on the record every reason justifying a decision,’ nor is an ALJ ‘required to
discuss every piece of evidence submitted.””); Sergio A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-

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CV-1739-DB, 2022 WL 1004345, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2022) (even where ALJ could
have more fully articulated the basis for his conclusion, any such failure is harmless,
where it was “possible to glean the ALJ’s rationale” from a review of the entire decision)
citing Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1983).
For instance, the ALJ considered that Plaintiff alleged difficulty handling stress, but
noted that she also endorsed the abilities to groom and take care of her personal needs,
fix meals consisting of fruits, vegetables, and soups, pay bills, socialize, play board
games, and craft. (Tr. 20, citing, e.g., Tr. 335-38, 494-95, 590); see Salmini, 371 F. App’x
at 112 (noting that a court may “look to other portions of the ALJ’s decision and to clearly
credible evidence” to find that the decision was supported by substantial evidence). The
ALJ also considered, and found persuasive, Dr. Duffy’s opinion that Plaintiff could
appropriately deal with stress. (Tr. 26, citing Tr. 461). This is sufficient. See Herb v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 366 F. Supp. 3d 441, 447 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that when
evaluating an ALJ’s RFC for stress-based limitations, courts do not demand an
exhaustive analysis of the issue).
Plaintiffs further argument that remand is required because the ALJ found the
opinion of consultative neurologist Dr. Nikita Dave, M.D., to be “generally persuasive” but
did not include all her seizure precautions in his RFC finding is again without merit. As
stated previously, simply because an ALJ finds an opinion “generally persuasive,” he or
she is not required to mirror the entire opinion in his or her RFC finding. The ALJ explained
that his RFC finding included “environmental limitations to account for seizure precautions
and possible headache triggers.” (Tr. 24; see Tr. 21 (RFC finding stating that Plaintiff
“must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor[ly] ventilated

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areas, and other pulmonary irritants “and have “no exposure to unprotected heights,
dangerous moving mechanical parts, loud noises, and vibration.”). Plaintiff has not shown
that further restrictions are necessary, which is her burden.
Further, Plaintiff is incorrect in her assertion that mirroring Dr. Dave’s opinion in
the RFC would preclude the performance of any of the jobs identified by the ALJ at step
five of the sequential process. The jobs of Photocopy Machine Operator and Ticket Seller
do not involve exposure to bright lights or any of the relevant environmental triggers. See
DOT No. 207.685-014 (photocopy machine operator), 211.467-030 (ticket seller). Thus,
even if the ALJ did mirror Dr. Dave’s opinion into his RFC finding, the outcome would be
unchanged.
Plaintiff's allegation that the ALJ erred by not fully crediting her complaints of
memory difficulties is also unpersuasive. Plaintiff's centers her argument on her 2017
brain MRI, which she interprets to mean that her subjective allegations are supported, but
an MRI, by itself, does not prove functional limitations. The mere presence of a disease
or impairment is not dispositive under the Act; the functional limitations stemming
therefrom are what is relevant. See Ryan v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-74S, 2017 WL 2240256,
at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017); Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F. Supp. 3d 282,
296 (W.D.N.Y. 2016).
Further, the ALJ considered other evidence in addition to this MRI that does not
support Plaintiff's allegations. For instance, after Dr. Duffy examined Plaintiff and
conducted intelligence and memory testing, he found that she could perform simple tasks
independently, which is consistent with the ALJ’s RFC finding. (See Tr. 25-27, citing Tr.
453-62). The ALJ also considered that treatment notes generally found that Plaintiff

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exhibited normal or intact memory and recall. (Tr. 19-20, 23; see, e.g., Tr. 610, 622, 657;
see also Tr. 624, 626, 635, 644, 648, 650 (noting that “naming, comprehension, repetition”
were intact or good)).
In sum, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and must therefore
be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No.
7) is denied and defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No.8) is granted.
The Clerk of Court shall take all steps necessary to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September a, 2025
Buffalo, New York

MICHAEL J. ROEMER
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11143141. Public record. Not legal advice.