# Schleuderer v. Town of Woodstock

> District Court, N.D. New York · September 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11143021

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 23, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ANTHONY SCHLEUDERER,

Plaintiff,

-against- 1:25-CV-155 (LEK/DJS)

TOWN OF WOODSTOCK, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION
On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff Anthony Schleuderer commenced this action in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Ulster against Defendants Town of
Woodstock (“Town”), Chief of Police Clayton Keefe, and Town Supervisor Bill McKenna
(collectively “Town Defendants”), for alleged wrongdoing during his time as a Police Officer
with the Town of Woodstock Police Department. Dkt. No. 2 (“Complaint”). On February 03,
2025, Defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New
York. Dkt. No. 1. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint. Dkt. No. 4
(“Motion”). Plaintiff filed a response, Dkt. No. 10 (“Response”), and Defendants filed a reply,
Dkt. No. 11.
For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is granted.
II. BACKGROUND
The factual summary of this action is taken from the Complaint and the attached exhibits.
Plaintiff began working as a Police Officer for the Town of Woodstock in late 2011. See
Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8. In March 2023, Plaintiff received a diagnosis of Parkinson’s Disease, and
afterwards, “informed [Defendants] of his diagnosis and expressed his desire to remain
employed with the police department.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 10. Plaintiff stated that he “began experiencing
difficulties” maintaining his firearms qualification, but “was otherwise capable of performing the
essential functions of his job.” Id. ¶ 11.

Plaintiff made multiple requests for a “reasonable accommodation” to continue on as an
Officer, seeking to transition to roles “such as a dispatcher.” Id. ¶¶ 12, 14. Such requests were
either “ignored or outright denied by Defendants.” Id. ¶ 14. Defendants “insist[ed] that Plaintiff
could not remain employed as a police officer unless he passed the firearms qualification, despite
his demonstrated ability to perform other duties.” Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff also “inquired about taking
the Civil Service examination . . . to qualify for a full-time dispatcher position,” but “Defendants
subverted the New York Civil Service Law by appointing two part-time employees to perform
work of a full-time dispatcher position.” Id. ¶ ¶ 16, 17. Further, “Defendants took adverse actions
against Plaintiff, including instructing him to exhaust his personal leave and indicating that he
would need to step down or face termination.” Id. ¶ 15.

On January 5, 2024, Plaintiff was fired from his role as a Police Officer “without a
hearing or an open forum discussion with the Town of Woodstock Board.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.
Subsequently, “[p]laintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) alleging disability discrimination and retaliation,” and the EEOC issued
Plaintiff a “Right to Sue Letter” on September 24, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 20, 21.
Plaintiff brings five claims against the Town Defendants pursuant to: 1) Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA); 2) Civil Rights Act of 1964; 3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4) New York’s Civil
Service Law (NYCSL); and 5) New York’s Human Rights Law (NYHRL).
Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, 1) a declaratory judgment that Defendants violated the ADA,
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § l 983, New York Civil Service Law, and New York’s Human Rights Law;
2) an injunction requiring Defendants to provide reasonable accommodations to the Plaintiff and
end their “discriminatory practices;” and 3) compensatory and punitive damages. See Compl. at

5.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court must accept as true the factual allegations
contained in a complaint and draw all inferences in favor of a plaintiff. See Allaire Corp. v.
Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249–50 (2d Cir. 2006). A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) only where it appears that there are not “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plausibility requires “enough fact[s] to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct].” Id. at
556.
The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Supreme Court
has stated that “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the pleader has not
demonstrated that she is entitled to relief and the action is subject to dismissal. Id. at 679.
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants support their Motion with several arguments. The Court considers each of
Defendants’ arguments below.
A. Timeliness

Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to timely file his ADA claim because “the instant
lawsuit was filed . . . on December 26, 2024,” three days after the time period established in
EEOC “Right to Sue Letter,” had lapsed. Mot. at 9–10.1 “In order to be timely, a claim under the
ADA must be filed in federal district court within 90 days of the [Plaintiff’s] receipt of a right-to-
sue letter from the EEOC.” Tiberio v. Allergy Asthma Immunology of Rochester, 664 F.3d 35, 37
(2d Cir. 2011). As Defendant describes, both “[P]laintiff and his counsel were emailed the EEOC
‘Right to Sue Letter’ on the September 2024 date,” which ultimately required that the instant suit
be filed no later than December 23, 2024. Mot. at 10; Ex. B. Defendant points to the December
26, 2024 date printed on the Complaint as evidence that Plaintiff failed to timely file their
Complaint. Plaintiff avers that the date the Defendant identifies is a “typographical error” and

that “the proof of the documents’ filing on December 23, 2024 . . .is the date that controls.”
Resp. at 12–13.
Plaintiff clearly met this requirement. The Complaint, in conspicuous, bold lettering,
reads: FILED: ULSTER COUNTY CLERK 12/23/2024 03:10 PM. See Compl. at 1. Perhaps
Defendant erroneously confused the date the Complaint was received in the State Court’s
electronic filing system as December 26, 2024. “It is well established, however, that when papers
are mailed to the clerk's office, filing is complete . . . upon the clerk's receipt of those papers.”

1 Citations to the parties’ filings refer to the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s
electronic filing system.
Nearhood v. Tops Markets, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 304, 305 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing U.S. v. White,
980 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir.1992)). Given that the Complaint appears to have been accepted by
the Ulster County Clerk on December 23, 2024, the Complaint is timely.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure bring this

suit within the period allowed by EEOC is denied.
B. Federal Law Claims
1. There is no individual liability under the ADA or Title VII.
Defendants further contend that Counts I and II of the Complaint should be dismissed as
to the individual Defendants Keefe and McKenna, because there can be no individual liability
under the ADA or Title VII. Mot. at 6, 9. The Court agrees.
“[T]he ADA does not provide for individual liability in the employment context.” Butrym
v. Sarsick, No. 20-CV-292, 2021 WL 1927073, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 13, 2021) (citing Spiegel v.
Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). Similarly, courts in this Circuit
have held that Title VII does not provide for individual liability. See, e.g., Smith v. New York

City Hous. Auth., No. 25-CV-283, 2025 WL 1031063, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2025) (“Title VII
does not provide for individual liability; rather, only the employer may be named.”) (citing
Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004)); Edelman v. NYU Langone
Health Sys., 708 F. Supp. 3d 409, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing Cayemittes v. City of N.Y. Dep't of
Hous. Pres. & Dev., 641 F. App'x 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order)).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations under the ADA and Title VII are against two individuals,
Clayton Keefe and Bill McKenna, in addition to the Town. Therefore, Plaintiff’s ADA and Title
VII claims against the individuals must be dismissed.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ADA and Title VII claims as against Defendants Keefe and
McKenna are dismissed with prejudice.
2. Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief under the ADA.
As to Plaintiff’s ADA claim against the Town, he alleges 1) he was terminated because of

his disability, and 2) he was denied a reasonable accommodation despite his request. Compl. ¶¶
12–14, 19, 24. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot adequately state a claim for relief under the
ADA because he has failed to allege how his Parkinson’s diagnosis affects a “major life
activity,” and further, how such an activity has been “substantially limited” by his condition.
Mot. at 8–9. Defendants’ arguments carry the day.
The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment against any “qualified individual on
the basis of disability in regard to . . . [the] discharge of employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
“Discrimination claims under the ADA may be brought under a theory of adverse employment
action or of failure to provide reasonable accommodation.” Berger v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 304
F. Supp. 3d 360, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). To state an adverse employment action claim under the

ADA, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the employer is subject to the ADA; (2) [] [P]laintiff is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA or perceived to be so by [Plaintiff’s] employer; (3) [Plaintiff]
was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation; (4) [Plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment action; and (5) the adverse
action was imposed because of [Plaintiff’s] disability.” Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 804 F.3d
231, 235 (2d Cir. 2015). “Under the last element, a plaintiff must show that the adverse
employment action ‘took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination’” Id. (quoting Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Moreover, “[a] failure-to-accommodate claim considers the same first three factors, but for the
fourth factor the question is whether the employer has refused to make a reasonable
accommodation.” Butrym v. Sarsick, No. 20-CV-292, 2021 WL 1927073, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. May
13, 2021) (cleaned up). Defendants contend that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of
the ADA and therefore has failed to meet the second prong of the test. Mot. 8–9.

The ADA defines a “disability” as any “physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Though, “[n]ot every
impairment is a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the ADA.” Capobianco v. City of New York,
422 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2005). To prove they are disabled, a plaintiff must show: (1) the
impairment limits a “major life activity” and (2) the limitation is “substantial.” Id. Major life
activities include activities such as walking, standing, and working. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). An
impairment is substantial if it “significantly restricts the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that
same major life activity.” McSweeney v. Cohen, 776 F. Supp. 3d 200, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)

(citing Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1998)). But “the inability to
perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life
activity of working.” Woolf v. Strada, 949 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2020). Accordingly, under Woolf,
“a plaintiff alleging a work-related disability must show that his condition precludes him from
working in a class or broad range of jobs.” Id. at 95 (alteration in original)
Here, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a disability within the meaning of the ADA. The
Complaint explains that “[d]ue to his [Parkinson’s] condition, Plaintiff began experiencing
difficulties with certain job functions, including firearms qualification,” but “[d]espite these
challenges, [he] was otherwise capable of performing the essential functions of the job.” Compl.
¶ 11. Further, Plaintiff’s EEOC Letter explains that he “was permitted to continue his work as a
police officer despite that he did not qualify on the shooting range.” Dkt. 10-1 at ¶ 11. Nowhere
in his Complaint or Response does Plaintiff explain how his condition substantially impairs his
ability to perform a major life activity or how this condition “precludes him from working in a

class or broad range of jobs.” Woolf, 949 F.3d at 95. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s EEOC Letter
suggests he was able to continue working as a police officer despite his condition. Dkt. 10-1 at ¶
11. While the Court agrees that Parkinson’s is a serious medical condition, “[h]aving a diagnosed
disability does not automatically equate to having a ‘disability’ as defined under the ADA.”
Stevens v. City of Oneonta, No. 21-CV-1258, 2024 WL 3595565, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. July 31,
2024), aff'd, No. 24-CV-2334, 2025 WL 1466186 (2d Cir. May 22, 2025) (summary order).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ADA claim against the Town is dismissed.2
3. Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief under Title VII.
Plaintiff brings a Title VII claim against the Town alleging the “Defendant[]
discriminated against [him] based on his disability.” Compl. ¶ 31. But “Title VII does not

prohibit discrimination based upon disability.” Billings v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty.
Supervision, 2021 WL 4150925, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2021); see Lee v. Saul, 802 Fed.
App'x 663, 664 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[D]iscrimination and retaliation based only on physical
disability ... is not covered by Title VII.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is dismissed
with prejudice.

2 In his Response, Plaintiff asks this Court to sua sponte add a claim to the Complaint under 29
U.S.C. § 794. See Resp. 22–23. The Court declines because this is a new cause of action raised in
the Response and “[p]laintiffs cannot introduce new claims in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”
In re Eastman Kodak Co. Sec. Litig., 632 F. Supp. 3d 169, 187 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing
Mathie v. Goord, 267 F. App'x 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2008)).
4. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § l 983 claim also fails.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants “discriminat[ed] against him based on his
disability” in violation of Section 1983. Compl. ¶ 31. Yet, “courts in this Circuit have long held
that ‘claims of employment discrimination based on disability,’ including disability-based

retaliation claims, ‘are not cognizable under [Section] 1983.’” Baptiste v. City Univ. of New
York, 680 F. Supp. 3d 415, 425–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Bonds v. County of Westchester,
No. 19-CV-1712 (KMK), 2020 WL 4347704, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2020)); see also Apatow
v. Town of Stratford, 651 F.Supp.3d 573, 584 (D. Conn. 2023) (“The rule barring section 1983
claims arising out of disability discrimination in this context also applies to employment
retaliation based on disability.”) (internal quotes omitted); Dotson v. City of Syracuse, No. 18-
CV-750, 2019 WL 2009076, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019) (“[T]he courts [in this Circuit] have
uniformly held that disability discrimination claims cannot proceed under Section 1983 because
there are specific statutes that provide for such relief.”) (collecting cases).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the Town Defendants is dismissed with

prejudice.
C. State Law Claims
Given that the bases for this Court’s federal question jurisdiction have been disposed of,
the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s NYCSL and NYHRL
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that a district court “may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over [pendent state law claims] if ... the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d
154, 158 n.6 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[A] district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over state and local law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.”).
Accordingly, any state law claims Plaintiff wishes to bring against Defendants are
dismissed.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 4, is GRANTED; and it is
further
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs Title VII and Section 1983 claims against the Town
Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's ADA claim against Defendants Keefe and McKenna is
DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's ADA claim against the Town is DISMISSED without
prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's state law claims against the Town Defendants are
DISMISSED without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk close this action; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on all
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 23, 2025
Albany, New York
AWRENCE E. KAHN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11143021. Public record. Not legal advice.