# State of Tennessee v. Robert Vernon Johson a/k/a Robert Vernon Griffin

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · September 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11142906

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** September 23, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court
- **Judges:** Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11142906

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding any statement made by the accused during a custodial interrogation without the benefit of procedural safeguards is inadmissible in court

## Opinion text

09/23/2025
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
August 13, 2025 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROBERT VERNON JOHNSON A/K/A
ROBERT VERNON GRIFFIN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
No. 2021-D-2113 Steve R. Dozier, Judge
___________________________________

No. M2024-01398-CCA-R3-CD
___________________________________

Defendant, Robert Vernon Johnson a/k/a Robert Vernon Griffin, was convicted by a
Davidson County jury of second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. He received an effective sentence of thirty-one years’ imprisonment.
Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions
and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying probation for the firearm
conviction and ordering consecutive sentences. Upon review of the entire record, the
briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments
of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. ROSS DYER and
TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Manuel B. Russ (on appeal), Nashville, Tennessee, and Anthony Q. Thompson and
Michael Freeman (at trial), Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert Vernon
Johnson a.k.a. Robert Vernon Griffin.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Glenn Funk, District Attorney General; and Jeff George and J. Wesley
King, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural Background

This case arose from the shooting death of Orlando Montez Hall by Defendant on
July 21, 2021, in the parking lot of a Marathon gas station and market (“market”). The
events leading up to and including the shooting and its aftermath were captured on the
market’s surveillance cameras. Defendant admitted to shooting the victim but maintained
that he acted in self-defense. For this conduct, the Davidson County Grand Jury returned
a true bill charging Defendant with first degree premeditated murder (count one) and
possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a violent felony (count two).
At trial, the parties stipulated that Defendant had been previously convicted of attempted
aggravated robbery, a violent felony.

Officers Anna Clayton and Jonathan Foote with the Metropolitan Nashville Police
Department (“MNPD”) were the first two officers to respond to the shooting. Both
officers observed a woman attempting to perform CPR on the victim. To Officer
Clayton, it was clear that the victim was “beyond help by the time that [she] got there.”
The victim was “bleeding profusely” and had obvious wounds to his head and neck.
Officer Foote testified that “it was fairly obvious that the victim had suffered from a
gunshot wound to the head.” The dispatch for the shooting was made at 10:53 p.m. The
victim was pronounced dead at the scene at 11:07 p.m.

Officer Foote was aware that the market had surveillance cameras and spoke with
the clerk to review the footage. Officer Foote, along with MNPD Detective Ryan Russell
and Detective Timothy Morgan, examined the footage to attempt to identify the shooter.
After the victim was identified, his mother, Latasha Hall, was contacted and came to the
market. Ms. Hall reviewed the surveillance footage and identified the shooter as Robert
Griffin, someone who spent “a lot” of time with the victim.

Video footage from the market’s surveillance cameras was played for the jury at
trial; all of the footage lacked audio. The interior cameras showed that the victim entered
the market at 10:47 p.m. Visible in his right pants pocket was the handle of a black gun.
He purchased some items at the counter closest to the entrance and briefly turned his
head when Defendant and a man later identified as Lavonte Coleman entered the market.
The victim then left the store; no words were exchanged between the parties. Defendant
was dressed in a black t-shirt and a black baseball cap bearing the words “billion dollar
baby.” He stood in line with Mr. Coleman to make a purchase after the victim left.
Although not as obvious, visible in Defendant’s right pants pocket was the end of the
handle of a gun. Less than one minute later, the victim walked back into the market and
waved at a shirtless man who was entering the market. The victim stood at the cash
register behind a woman in front of Defendant and Mr. Coleman. The shirtless man
stood to the right of Defendant as he talked to the victim. After completing a second
purchase, the victim left the market. Defendant then said something to Mr. Coleman as
he followed Defendant out. The victim held the door open for Defendant and the two
began to talk.

-2-
A second video from inside the market showed that when the victim exited the
market, Defendant lightly tapped Mr. Coleman twice on the back as he walked out behind
the victim. Neither video showed a confrontation or conversation between the victim and
Defendant inside the market.

The footage from the exterior camera faced the parking lot and the fuel pumps. 1
Because the victim backed his car into a parking space close to the front entrance of the
market, the camera did not have a clear view of the driver side of the victim’s car where
the shooting occurred. Defendant backed his Nissan Titan truck into a parking space in
front of the market. Defendant and the victim exited the market and walked causally to
the driver side of the victim’s car; the car blocked a view of the two men from the
shoulders down. The victim’s back faced the camera throughout the footage. He opened
the door and bent down; Defendant walked to the victim’s right and faced him with the
car door between them. An enlarged clip of this footage showed that Defendant became
more animated as he spoke to the victim and his head moved quickly from side to side.
Defendant then moved to the victim’s left and leaned into the victim. Then, suddenly,
Defendant moved to his right, within the camera frame, and fired a gun into the victim’s
head and neck area. The victim collapsed immediately, no longer in the frame.

Defendant ran to his truck and waited for Mr. Coleman. After the gunshots, Mr.
Coleman slowly exited the market and looked down where the victim had collapsed. He
did not approach the victim but got inside the passenger side of Defendant’s truck and the
two drove off.

The wide-angle view of the surveillance footage showed at least seven people in
the parking lot when Defendant shot the victim. Most of them left after the shooting;
however, about two minutes after the shooting, a woman ran to the victim. While her
actions were obscured by the victim’s car, she appeared to be performing CPR on the
victim as testified to by officers on the scene. While the woman rendered aid to the
victim, an unidentified man dressed in a red jersey and red tennis shoes approached the
victim’s car. His specific actions could not be seen but he walked around the back of the
car and emerged in view of the camera holding something down by his waist and
concealing it in his jersey or right-hand side pants pocket. At trial, the parties appeared to
acknowledge that the man in the red jersey had taken the victim’s gun, as it was never
recovered.

1
The market had another exterior security camera but for reasons unknown, was not
operational. The parties acknowledged that this camera, had it been working, would have
provided an unobstructed view of the shooting based on its location.
-3-
MNPD crime scene investigators recovered a bullet projectile and three 9mm
cartridge casings in and around the victim’s car. One cartridge casing was lodged in the
driver side front tire. The investigators explained that a cartridge casing will typically
land closer to where the gun is fired, whereas a projectile could be found anywhere near
the scene. The victim’s car engine was idling, and blood splatter was observed on the
interior of the driver side door. The victim was clutching two packs of unopened
cigarillos and one bag of unopened Lifesaver gummies in his left hand when he was shot;
he had nothing in his right hand.

Through social media, Officer Foote identified an address for Defendant’s mother.
In the early morning hours of July 22, 2021, Detective Ryan Russell, lead Detective
Timothy Morgan, and a team of other officers went to Defendant’s mother’s apartment in
Antioch to look for Defendant. Officers could see a man inside the apartment matching
the description of Defendant’s build. Defendant’s mother initially denied that Defendant
was there but finally admitted he was inside and consented to a search of her apartment.
Defendant came out of the apartment without incident and was taken into custody. From
the apartment, officers retrieved a black baseball cap with the words “billion dollar baby”
on the front, a bill of sale, a motor vehicle registration, and car keys for a Nissan Titan
truck. The documents showed Robert Griffin as the owner of the truck.

Defendant was transported to the police station. His mother and the two other
people in the apartment at the time of the arrest also went to the station. Defendant
waived his Miranda 2 rights and agreed to be interviewed by Detective Morgan and
Sergeant Adam Reed. During his interview, which was recorded and played for the jury,
Defendant identified himself as Robert Vernon Griffin.

Defendant stated that he and the victim, whom he referred to as “Hatch,” grew up
together, “never” had any issues, and always got along. He said his text messages and
Facebook posts would verify this. He knew the victim’s parents and was close to the
victim’s brother, Jerry Woodland, who was incarcerated. When Defendant saw the
victim at the market, he wanted to talk to the victim about Mr. Woodland. For reasons
not clear in the record, Defendant had been putting money into Mr. Woodland’s jail
account for his use while incarcerated and had recently given the victim’s mother $60 to
put in Mr. Woodland’s account. According to Defendant, the victim had been spreading
rumors that Defendant had not funded the victim’s brother’s account as promised.

2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding any statement made by the accused
during a custodial interrogation without the benefit of procedural safeguards is inadmissible in
court).
-4-
Defendant testified that on the night of the shooting, he was in his truck in the
market parking lot with Mr. Coleman when he saw the victim. He denied knowing the
victim would be at the market. Defendant said he could see the victim’s gun, “a nine or a
forty” with an extended magazine, in the waistband of his pants as the victim entered the
market. Defendant admitted that he was carrying a 9mm Glock which he purchased “off
the street” for $300. He bought the gun “for protection” because he had been robbed
multiple times.

Defendant and Mr. Coleman entered the market after the victim, greeted the victim
at the cash register, and asked if they could talk. Defendant admitted that he was
“buzzed” and said the victim “wasn’t straight,” suggesting that the victim was under the
influence. Defendant asked the victim why he was spreading rumors that he had not put
money into Mr. Woodland’s account and said, “[I]f you look at the video, [the victim]
had his hand on [his gun] from the jump.”

Defendant again referred to the surveillance video and insisted that he was trying
to keep the peace and prevent the interaction from escalating. He became fearful when
he saw the victim put his hand on his gun because the victim “don’t fight.” He explained
that the victim “don’t know how to fight” and would rather use his gun than fight.

Defendant described the interaction with the victim as follows:

Sergeant Reed: And it, was it in his, what, his right left, right?

Defendant: Right waistband.

Sergeant Reed: So it was in his right waistband?

Defendant: Yep. And that’s when he did like that, and that’s when
he came back. Just – I just . . .

Sergeant Reed: So did he actually reach for it?

Defendant: No, no. His hand was already on it.

Sergeant Reed: His hand was on it?

Defendant: Yes. From the, the time we had first talked. That’s
why I was going like, like if you see I’m going like
that, “We ain’t on that.” And then he was just like, I
said, “why is your hand on your [gun]?” I don’t know
-5-
you can see it, you just look at the video. I was just
like, “Why your hand on your gun, bro?” And he was
just like, “You acting like uh” what did he say? “You
act like you uh, uh bumping.” He said, “You acting
like you bumping down on me.” That’s the last words
that came out of this mouth. And then he did
something, and I was like . . .

Sergeant Reed: And he turned towards you with his hand on the gun?
Did he ever take it out?

Defendant: I don’t know. I didn’t get that –

Sergeant Reed: Okay.

Defendant: (incomprehensible) like, I was already like under. I
ain’t going to lie, I was already under the influence.

Sergeant Reed: Okay.

In response to Detective Morgan’s questioning, Defendant said he was trying to
hit the victim with his gun but that “it just went off[.]” Defendant could not recall the
number of times he fired his gun and said he did not realize the victim had been hit until
the victim fell to the ground. Defendant denied that he shot the victim again when the
victim fell to the ground after the first shot. Defendant fled the scene in his truck which
he abandoned in the parking lot of an elementary school in East Nashville. He admitted
that he “panicked” and dropped the gun “somewhere.” Someone drove him to his
mother’s apartment in Antioch. He told his mother “a portion” of what had occurred.
There was a man named Donald at his mother’s apartment, and Defendant told Donald
that the shooting had resulted from a “misunderstanding.”

Defendant maintained that it was never his intention to shoot and kill the victim
and that he had no reason to shoot the victim. He considered the victim “a threat” and
accused him of making the situation “worse.” He conceded that he had a criminal record
but said it was “weak” and did not involve crimes of violence. He revealed that he and
the victim had been charged together on a gun-related offense in 2013 when Defendant
was driving the victim, his brother, and others. They were pulled over, and “they had
guns” but no one claimed ownership of the guns. Defendant had just been released from
a three-year sentence, and he was charged with reckless driving, instead of a gun-related
offense.

-6-
After the recording of the interview was played to the jury, Detective Morgan
explained that “bumping down” in street parlance was equivalent to getting in one’s face
or confronting someone physically. Detective Morgan testified that MNPD officers are
issued the same type of gun used by Defendant, a semi-automatic 9mm Glock. He
explained that it is possible to fire three shots in rapid succession with a semi-automatic
gun but that each shot requires a trigger pull and cannot be discharged accidentally.

David Zimmerman, a forensic pathologist and medical examiner, performed the
victim’s autopsy and noted the victim’s cause of death as gunshot wounds to the head and
neck; the manner of death was homicide. The victim sustained three gunshot wounds to
his head and neck. One projectile entered the victim’s left cheek and exited the right side
of his scalp. A second projectile entered the front of the victim’s left ear and exited on
the right side of the scalp. A third projectile entered the left side of the victim’s neck just
below the jaw and exited on the rear right side of the neck.

Dr. Zimmerman testified that it is generally difficult to determine the order in
which bullets hit a body, as it was in the victim’s case. The gunshot wound to the left
cheek penetrated the skull and perforated several areas of the brain. Dr. Zimmerman
testified that a wound of that magnitude would either incapacitate or “immediately kill” a
person. Additionally, an injury to the brain causes a minor seizure, causing the muscles
to contract such that if a gunshot victim is holding something in his hands, he is unlikely
to let go of it. Dr. Zimmerman confirmed that it was unlikely that the victim would have
been able to move after the shot to his left cheek.

Dr. Zimmerman explained that a contact range wound is a wound where the
muzzle of the gun is pressed against the skin and a shot fired at close range would deposit
gunpowder on the skin. He added, however, that a gun can be fired at close range
without depositing gunpowder into the skin. Although no gunpowder stippling was
observed on the wound to the victim’s neck, a small laceration suggested that the gun was
fired at contact range. Moreover, Dr. Zimmerman found a metal fragment and a piece of
copper jacketing in the victim’s hair.

A toxicology report showed that the victim had elements of heroin and fentanyl in
his blood. Dr. Zimmerman denied that heroin contributed to the victim’s death.

Defendant testified and admitted to shooting the victim but claimed he acted in
self-defense. Defendant met the victim through the victim’s brother, Jerry Woodland.
Defendant was close to Mr. Woodland and had put money in Mr. Woodland’s jail
account. Before the shooting, Defendant testified that there was “no bad blood” between
him and the victim. According to Defendant, the victim had wrongly accused Defendant
of not funding Mr. Woodland’s jail account.
-7-
Defendant testified that he drove Mr. Coleman to the market after helping a cousin
move furniture. Mr. Coleman’s mother was to pick him up at the market. Defendant
denied knowing that the victim was inside when he pulled into the parking lot.
Defendant said he went inside to purchase water and other items. His interaction with the
victim inside the market was cordial. He agreed that when the victim left the market the
second time, Defendant tapped Mr. Coleman on the back and followed the victim outside
as depicted on the surveillance footage. Defendant denied, however, that he followed the
victim out to confront him about the rumor that Defendant had not funded Mr.
Woodland’s jail account. Defendant testified that he “was already headed out the market
anyway.” By the time they exited the market, the parking space between the victim’s car
and Defendant’s car was empty; Mr. Coleman’s mother had left without Mr. Coleman.

Defendant testified that he asked the victim if they could talk. Defendant stated
that the victim then “grabbed” or “brandished” his gun as they began talking outside.
According to Defendant, the victim “seemed . . . impaired.” Defendant testified that he
stepped back from the victim and told him, “we wasn’t on that.” Defendant stated that he
had “never known [the victim]” to resolve a conflict by fighting. Defendant testified that
he tried to de-escalate the situation and referred to the portion in the surveillance footage
where he was seen moving “back and forth with [the victim].” Defendant asserted that
the victim was acting “aggressive” and that he feared for his safety.

Although he did not recall seeing the victim point his gun at him, Defendant
testified that when the victim pulled out his gun, he believed the victim “was fixing to
shoot.” Defendant testified that he “reacted” and shot the victim. He maintained that he
would be dead had he not shot the victim first. Defendant could not recall the number of
times he pulled the trigger but denied that he shot the victim after the victim collapsed to
the ground. After he shot the victim, Defendant ran to his truck and drove away.
Defendant denied that he intended to kill the victim.

Defendant testified that he carried a gun “everywhere” for his safety although he
was not supposed to carry one. He explained that he had been carjacked at the same
market.

The jury convicted Defendant of the lesser-included offense of second degree
murder, a Class A felony, in count one and possession of a firearm by a person previously
convicted of a violent felony, a Class B felony, as charged in count two of the indictment.
T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A), -(b)(2).

At the sentencing hearing, the State introduced Defendant’s presentence report.
The victim’s mother, Latasha Denise Hall, testified and described the victim as “a good
person” who was close to his three brothers and two sisters. She was “stressed,
-8-
depressed, [cries] every day, and miss[es the victim] so much.” She requested the
maximum punishment. On cross-examination, Ms. Hall acknowledged that the victim
carried a gun but did so only for his protection. She denied that he always carried a gun
or that he had a drug problem.

Defendant’s mother, Ingrid Gail Griffin, testified that she knew the victim and his
mother. The victim and Defendant grew up together and spent time socially with each
other as adults. On cross-examination, Ms. Griffin acknowledged that Defendant had “a
problem with guns since he was [eighteen.]” Specifically, she confirmed that Defendant
and “some other kids held a man up at gunpoint outside of his car and tried to rob him[.]”
Ms. Griffin testified that she could not recall all the details of Defendant’s plea in that
case because she had recently suffered a stroke. However, she recalled that he pled to a
reduced charge and received probation. She also recalled that while Defendant was on
probation, he was “caught with a gun again.” According to Ms. Griffin, Defendant was
not reinstated to probation but “did time[.]” Ms. Griffin had not seen the surveillance
videos of the shooting.

The victim’s aunt, Quineetra Smith, testified that Defendant was “a good kid” but
was faced with issues growing up in a neighborhood with “violence, drugs, gangs.” Ms.
Smith testified that she did not witness Defendant having any issues with the victim or
acting violently toward anyone.

Mr. Coleman, Defendant’s cousin, confirmed that he was in the market with
Defendant on the night of the shooting. He testified that Defendant’s interactions with
the victim were “always friendly.” He accused the victim of being someone who was
“very easy to upset” and had a reputation for shooting people instead of fighting. A
portion of the surveillance video from inside the market was played during his cross-
examination testimony. He identified himself on the video standing in line behind the
victim with Defendant. Mr. Coleman confirmed that it was Defendant who initiated the
conversation with the victim.

Mr. Coleman said he was unaware Defendant had a gun. Mr. Coleman exited the
market when he heard the gunshot. He testified that when he got outside, the victim was
already dead on the ground with a drink in one hand and a gun in the other hand. Mr.
Coleman stated that he was “in shock.” He did not try to help the victim, call 911, or call
the police to report the shooting. Defendant admitted to Mr. Coleman that he shot the
victim. Mr. Coleman did not recall Defendant getting rid of the gun as they drove away
from the market.

Defendant made an allocution apologizing to the victim’s family. Defendant
insisted that he acted out of fear and “reacted to the danger [he] perceived.” He
-9-
maintained that he and the victim “had lost our self control” and that “if we had the time
to listen, we could have compromised.” He also faulted “everything that had been said to
[the victim]” about the funding of his brother’s jail account for “literally destroy[ing]
us[.]”

Defendant also introduced a report by a forensic social worker and mitigation
specialist who investigated Defendant’s social history. The report detailed Defendant’s
turbulent upbringing and his criminal history, including an association with Pirus, a
subset of the Bloods criminal organization.

In its argument, the State noted that Defendant had refused to take responsibility
for his actions and had called on witnesses to blame the victim for the shooting, to
badmouth the victim’s character, and to trumpet Defendant’s version of the shooting.
The State highlighted Defendant’s criminal history and noted the number of times his
criminal charges had been reduced to lesser-included offenses. Significantly, although he
was charged with attempted aggravated robbery, Defendant was given a reduced sentence
on probation which he violated twice. The State added that Defendant had burglary and
motor vehicle offenses reduced to reckless driving and possession with intent to sell or
deliver reduced to simple possession. The State argued for consecutive alignment of the
two sentences because Defendant was a dangerous offender.

Defense counsel argued that Defendant “regret[ted]” shooting the victim and that
he was being “punished by his own conscience” and by being unable to see his family.
Defense counsel requested concurrent sentences and that the trial court consider
probation for the firearm conviction.

In a written order filed on June 27, 2024, the trial court applied two enhancement
factors and no mitigating factors. The trial court found that Defendant had a history of
criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the range and that he
employed a firearm during the commission of an offense. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1),
(9). The trial court imposed a twenty-one-year sentence at 100% by operation of law for
the second degree murder conviction and a ten-year sentence at 85% by operation of law
for the felon in possession of a weapon conviction.

The trial court recognized that Defendant was statutorily eligible for probation for
the firearm conviction because the convicted offense was not among the listed offenses
ineligible for probation and the length of the sentence was ten years. T.C.A § 40-35-
303(a)(1)(A)-(K). However, the trial court found that the principles of sentencing in
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103 all mitigated against a sentence involving
release into the community and denied Defendant’s request for probation.

- 10 -
As for sentence alignment, the trial court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that Defendant was a dangerous offender to warrant discretionary consecutive
sentencing.

Following the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial, Defendant filed a
timely notice of appeal.

Analysis

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to support both of his convictions.
However, his brief focuses entirely on his second degree murder conviction and the jury’s
rejection of his self-defense claim. Thus, he has waived any claim regarding his firearm
conviction. Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012) (“An issue may be
deemed waived, even when it has been specifically raised as an issue, when the brief fails
to include an argument satisfying the requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7).”). 3 The
State contends the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s rejection of Defendant’s
claim of self-defense. We agree with the State.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this court is obliged
to review that claim according to certain well-settled principles. “A guilty verdict
‘removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt.’”
State v. Reynolds, 635 S.W.3d 893, 914 (Tenn. 2021) (quoting State v. Gentry, 538
S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tenn. 2017)); State v. Allison, 618 S.W.3d 24, 33 (Tenn. 2021). The
burden is then shifted to the defendant on appeal to demonstrate why the evidence is
insufficient to support the conviction. Allison, 618 S.W.3d at 33; State v. Jones, 589
S.W.3d 747, 760 (Tenn. 2019). The relevant question the reviewing court must answer is
“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Allison, 618 S.W.3d at 33-34 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979)); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).

On appeal, “all reasonable and legitimate inferences from the evidence must be
drawn in favor of the prosecution and all countervailing evidence discarded.” State v.
Weems, 619 S.W.3d 208, 221 (Tenn. 2021); State v. Rimmel, 710 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn.

3
Waiver notwithstanding, the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction in count two.
Defendant admitted to shooting the victim with a firearm and he stipulated that he had a prior
conviction for a violent felony thus satisfying the elements under the statute. T.C.A. 39-17-
1307(b)(1)(A).
- 11 -
2025). As such, this court is precluded from re-weighing or reconsidering the evidence
when evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Stephens, 521 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tenn.
2017). Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to
be given to evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by such evidence, are resolved by
the trier of fact and not the appellate courts. Rimmel, 710 S.W.3d at 645; Allison, 618
S.W.3d at 34; Jones, 589 S.W.3d at 760. “This standard of review is identical whether
the conviction is predicated on direct or circumstantial evidence, or a combination of
both.” State v. Williams, 558 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tenn. 2018) (citing State v. Dorantes,
331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011)).

Second degree murder is a “knowing killing of another.” T.C.A. § 39-13-
210(a)(1). A person acts knowingly “with respect to a result of the person’s conduct
when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result[.]” Id.
§ 39-11-106(a)(23). “To sustain a finding that a defendant acted knowingly, the State is
not required to prove that the defendant wished to cause his victim’s death but only that
the defendant knew that his or her actions were reasonably certain to cause the victim’s
death.” State v. Brown, 311 S.W.3d 422, 432 (Tenn. 2010). In assessing the defendant’s
intent, the jury may rely on “the character of the assault, the nature of the act and [on] all
the circumstances of the case in evidence.” State v. Inlow, 52 S.W.3d 101, 105 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2000) (citing State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)).
Whether a defendant acted “knowingly” in killing another is a question of fact to be
addressed by the jury. Brown, 311 S.W.3d at 432 (citations omitted).

While he admits to shooting the victim with a weapon he was prohibited from
possessing, Defendant claims he did so in self-defense. He argues that the State failed to
show that “no reasonable jury could have found self-defense[.]” By their verdict, the jury
found that Defendant acted knowingly when he aimed and fired a deadly weapon into the
victim’s head and neck. The autopsy revealed that the victim was shot three times.
Defendant used a weapon that required him to release and pull the trigger for each
subsequent shot. Defendant’s act of aiming and firing two more times at the victim
supported the inference that he was aware of the fatal consequences of his action. Absent
legal justification, Defendant’s act of knowingly killing the victim was supported by the
evidence.

Defendant asserts that he was legally justified in shooting the victim because he
was acting in self-defense. Because Defendant used deadly force, this court is guided by
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611(b)(2) which provides justification to use
lethal force as follows:

- 12 -
Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, 4 a person who is not engaged in conduct
that would constitute a felony or Class A misdemeanor and is in a place
where the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat before threatening
or using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, if:

(A) The person has a reasonable belief that there is an imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury;

(B) The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily
injury is real, or honestly believed to be real at the time; and

(C) The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds.

T.C.A § 39-11-611(b)(2) (2021).

A defendant’s conduct and mental state must meet an objective standard of
reasonableness for the conduct to be justified under this statutory defense. State v. Bult,
989 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). “Thus, the mere fact that the defendant
believes that his conduct is justified would not suffice to justify his conduct.” Id.
“Reliance on self-defense is not limited to the exact moment of the assault that may be
considered in connection with the entirety of the events leading to the assault.” State v.
Ivy, 868 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (citation omitted). “If proven to the
satisfaction of the jury, self-defense is a complete defense to crimes of violence.” Id. at
727 (citations omitted).

To prevail on judicial review, Defendant must show that as a matter of law, the
proof of self-defense raises a reasonable doubt as to his conduct being criminal. State v.
Clifton, 880 S.W.2d 737, 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); see State v. Benson, 600 S.W.3d
896, 907 (Tenn. 2020) (agreeing with the trial court that there was no proof to permit a
jury to conclude that the defendant had reasonable grounds to fear imminent bodily injury
or death where the defendant responded to a punch in the nose by shooting a small,
unarmed woman five times including twice in the back).

Under the facts of this case, the proof supports the jury’s conclusion that it was
unreasonable for Defendant to believe deadly force was immediately necessary to protect
him from the victim. While the video of the shooting does not show the victim’s arms
and hands, it does show that the position of the victim’s shoulders was inconsistent with

4
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1322 provides a defense for weapons violations
when a person uses a handgun in justifiable defense.

- 13 -
any action of his brandishing or withdrawing his gun. The victim collapsed immediately
from the first gunshot. The medical examiner testified that the brain injury the victim
suffered would have either incapacitated or immediately killed the victim. The additional
shots fired by Defendant were an unreasonable use of force on someone who simply
possessed a gun but otherwise showed no act of threatening or harming Defendant. State
v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 404-05 (Tenn. 2017) (holding harmless jury instruction on
self-defense where “no reasonable person” could find that the defendant should fear
imminent bodily injury or death where only words were exchanged and no one had used
or attempted to use unlawful force on the defendant in a convenience store shooting);
State v. Gaines, No. M2023-01389-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 1514049, at *6 (Tenn. Crim.
App. May 28, 2025) (finding no error in trial court’s refusal to give self-defense
instruction where under de novo review, this court found that it was “unreasonable for the
Defendant to use deadly force in a public place against the unarmed and oblivious victim
merely because the victim had a hand inside his clothing and happened to be in proximity
to someone else the Defendant feared and considered to be a threat”), perm. app. filed
(Tenn. July 29, 2025).

Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient for the jury to find a
knowing killing beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor has Defendant shown that the proof of
self-defense raises, as a matter of law, a reasonable doubt as to his conduct being
criminal.

II. Sentencing

Defendant complains that the trial court abused its discretion by running his
sentences consecutively and by denying his request for probation for count two. The
State contends that the manner and alignment of the sentences are presumptively
reasonable. We agree with the State.

This court reviews a trial court’s sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion
standard with a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707
(Tenn. 2012). This presumption applies to “within-range sentencing decisions that reflect
a proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.” Id. This
standard of review applies to decisions involving alternative sentencing and to
consecutive sentencing decisions. State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn.
2012); State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 859 (Tenn. 2013).

A trial court’s proper application of the purposes and principles of sentencing is
demonstrated in the trial court’s findings. To facilitate meaningful appellate review, the
trial court must state on the record the factors it considered and the reasons for imposing
the sentence chosen. T.C.A. § 40-35-210(e); Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. “Mere
- 14 -
inadequacy in the articulation of the reasons for imposing a particular sentence . . . should
not negate the presumption [of reasonableness].” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705-06.

In determining the proper sentence, the trial court must consider: (1) the evidence,
if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the pre-sentence report; (3) the
principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and
characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by
the parties on the mitigating and enhancement factors set out in Tennessee Code
Annotated sections 40-35-113 and -114; (6) any statistical information provided by the
Administrative Office of the Courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in
Tennessee; (7) any statement the defendant made on the defendant’s own behalf about
sentencing; and (8) the result of the validated risk and needs assessment conducted by the
department and contained in the pre-sentence report. See T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -
210(b); see also Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 697-98. The trial court must also consider a
defendant’s potential or lack of potential for rehabilitation or treatment. See T.C.A. § 40-
35-103(5). The party challenging the sentence on appeal bears the burden of establishing
that the sentence was improper. T.C.A. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts.

A. Denial of Probation – Count Two

When imposing a sentence of confinement, the trial court should consider
whether:

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant who
has a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense
or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others
likely to commit similar offenses; or

(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been
applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]

T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C).

“Probation is a privilege or act of grace which may be granted to a defendant who
is eligible and worthy of this largesse of the law.” State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 259
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1
(Tenn. 2000). As such, a defendant bears the burden of proving his suitability for this
“largesse.” State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 347 (Tenn. 2008) (citing T.C.A. § 40-35-
303(b)). “This burden includes demonstrating that probation will ‘subserve the ends of
- 15 -
justice and the best interest of both the public and the defendant.’” Id. (quoting State v.
Housewright, 982 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)). To determine whether a
defendant has met this burden, trial courts are to consider “(1) the defendant’s
amenability to correction; (2) the circumstances of the offense; (3) the defendant’s
criminal record; (4) the defendant’s social history; (5) the defendant’s physical and
mental health; and (6) special and general deterrence value.” State v. Trent, 533 S.W.3d
282, 291 (Tenn. 2017).

Defendant contends that the record does not support the denial of probation under
the principles of sentencing as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-
103(1). He argues that 1) his one failure to abide by conditions of a release into the
community – a probation violation for a 2011 conviction – was neither recent nor
numerous; 2) incarceration did not justify or support deterrence; and 3) he lacks a “long
history of criminal conduct.”

In denying probation, the trial court made the following findings:

Defendant has a lengthy history of criminal conduct, including the repeated
appearance of firearms. The ongoing plague of gun violence robs the
citizenry of peace of mind, sense of safety, and lives lost to death or
incarceration. The Court cannot emphasize enough the seriousness of this
type of offense and declines to depreciate the deterrent effect by releasing
Defendant onto any type of supervised probation. Referenced during the
sentencing hearing and through an exhibited judgment form for [simple
possession]. 5 Defendant appears to have violated his probation in the past.
The STRONG-R risk and needs assessment classifies Defendant at an
overall moderate risk level. Thus, having considered the above factors and
the overall purposes of sentencing, the Court declines to grant alternative
sentencing for Count [two].

We find no error in the trial court’s judgment in its denial of probation. In 2011,
Defendant pled guilty to attempted aggravated robbery and received a three-year sentence
of probation along with the dismissal of two additional counts. Yet, while on probation,
he committed a new offense, felon in possession of a firearm in 2013, resulting in the
violation of his probation. The fact that he stands convicted of the same offense –
convicted felon in possession of a firearm – in this case demonstrates his unwillingness to
abide by the conditions of an alternative sentence and supports the trial court’s finding
that Defendant is not entitled to the “largesse” of probation.

5
The judgment form indicates that the eleven-year, twenty-nine-day sentence was to be
served concurrently to a sentence for “P.V.”, probation violation.
- 16 -
Contrary to his assertion, Defendant has a history of criminal conduct. In addition
to the convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and felon in possession of a deadly
weapon, Defendant’s criminal history included convictions for evading arrest, criminal
trespass, a drug-related offense, reckless driving, and driving on a revoked license. He
also had additional charges that were either dismissed or retired. Not in the presentence
report but reported by the mitigation specialist was Defendant’s involvement in a subset
of the Bloods, a criminal organization. Defendant’s history of criminal conduct, which is
not limited to convictions, also supports the trial court’s denial of probation.

Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment in ordering confinement for Defendant’s
within-range sentence in count two, was presumptively reasonable and not an abuse of
discretion. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at 278-79.

B. Consecutive Sentencing

The presumption of reasonableness applies where a trial court “properly articulates
reasons for ordering consecutive sentences, thereby providing a basis for meaningful
appellate review[.]” Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 862. This means that the reviewing court
will give “deference to the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to impose
consecutive sentences if it has provided reasons on the record establishing at least one of
the seven grounds listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b).” Id. at 861.

As relevant to this case, the trial court may order sentences to run consecutively if
it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is “a dangerous offender
whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about
committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high[.]” T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(4).
Before a trial court may impose consecutive sentences on the basis that a defendant is a
dangerous offender, the trial court must find that consecutive sentences are reasonably
related to the severity of the offenses committed and are necessary to protect the public
from further criminal conduct. State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 937-39 (Tenn. 1995).
“The adoption of the abuse of discretion standard with the presumption of reasonableness
has not eliminated this requirement.” Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 863. To limit the use of the
“dangerous offender” category to cases where it is warranted, the trial court must make
specific findings about “particular facts” which show that the Wilkerson factors apply to
the defendant. State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999).

When imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court must also consider the
general sentencing principles that each sentence imposed shall be “justly deserved in
relation to the seriousness of the offense,” “no greater than that deserved for the offense
committed,” and “the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which

- 17 -
the sentence is imposed.” T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102(1), -103(2), -103(4); State v. Imfeld, 70
S.W.3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002).

Defendant contends that the trial court’s findings under Wilkerson are inadequate
and erroneous because the trial court cited both the dangerous offender factor and the
extensive criminal activity factors in its analysis. T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(2), (4). In its
consideration of whether the severity of the offenses justified consecutive sentencing, the
trial court drew upon the facts of the case:

First, the Court finds that consecutive sentencing reasonably relates to the
severity of the offenses. One victim was robbed of his life and patrons
were placed in grave danger due to Defendant’s actions. Absent
consecutive sentencing, Defendant’s sentence for possessing a firearm
where he has been previously convicted of a felony crime of violence
would effectively be moot, as it would be subsumed into the class A felony
sentence.

Additionally, the proof at trial supported the trial court’s determination that
Defendant was a dangerous offender as contemplated by the statute and that the
imposition of consecutive sentences was reasonably related to the severity of the
offenses. Defendant fired a loaded weapon three times at the victim in the parking lot of
a busy gas station and market; surveillance video showed at least seven people nearby
when he fired the shots. His actions not only resulted in the victim’s death but also
created a high risk of death or serious bodily injury to the other patrons seen fleeing to
avoid getting shot. Such behavior showed little or no regard for human life and involved
a high risk to life.

Reflecting on whether consecutive sentencing was necessary to protect the public
against further criminal conduct by Defendant, the trial court examined Defendant’s
criminal history:

Second, the Court finds that consecutive sentencing is “necessary to protect
the public against further criminal conduct by the defendant.” The Court is
deeply concerned with the continuation of Defendant’s violent felonies.
Given Defendant’s apparent disregard for the value of human life, and
willingness to employ firearms, the Court is of the opinion Defendant
should be incarcerated and separated from society. Therefore, consecutive
sentencing is necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct
by Defendant.

- 18 -
Defendant’s record showed continuous criminal behavior that progressed to more
violent offenses. The shooting in this case was violent and severe. In addition,
Defendant’s decision to arm himself with a gun in violation of his status as a convicted
felon showed a wanton disregard of the law and a risk of continued criminal conduct.
Moreover, the record displayed few, if any, signs of rehabilitation or improvement.

Finally, the trial court considered the principles of sentencing:

Next, the Court finds that consecutive sentencing is consistent with the
“general principles of sentencing.” The Court recognizes that Defendant
has been convicted of offenses involving weapons and violence, including
an attempted aggravated robbery. As the Court previously noted, these past
convictions dovetailed with the present criminal matter to a fatal result.
Also, Defendant’s commission of a homicide in conjunction with being a
convicted violent felon in possession of a weapon warrants the Court to
recognize serious and separate crimes through consecutive sentencing.

Lastly, the Court finds that the purposes of sentencing are served where the
requirement of consecutive sentencing provides an effective deterrent. The
Court is concerned that fully concurrent sentencing provides no deterrent
effect where two distinct serious crimes were committed. Accordingly, the
Court finds that all these factors support consecutive sentencing by a
preponderance of the evidence.

(internal citations omitted).

We observe no error or inadequacy in the trial court’s analysis or findings. The
trial court made the requisite Wilkerson findings and cited specific facts to support the
imposition of consecutive sentences. Defendant is not entitled to relief.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

S/Jill Bartee Ayers________
JILL BARTEE AYERS, JUDGE

- 19 -

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11142906. Public record. Not legal advice.