# AVERYTT v. MAGEE-WOMENS HOSPITAL OF UPMC

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · September 22, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11142453

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 22, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH

JAMIA AVERYTT, )
)

) 2:24-CV-00742-MJH
Plaintiff,
)

)
vs.
)

)
MAGEE-WOMENS HOSPITAL OF UPMC,
)
)
Defendant,

OPINION
Plaintiff, Jamia Averytt, pro se, brings the within action against Defendant, Magee-
Women’s Hospital of UPMC, for sex discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. (ECF No. 5). Magee now moves for summary judgment pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. (ECF No. 30). The matter is now ripe for decision
Upon consideration of the relevant pleadings, Magee’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 30), the respective briefs (ECF Nos. 34, 36, and 38), Concise Statements of Material
Fact and Appendix (ECF No. 32, 37, and 39), and for the following reasons, Magee’s Motion for
Summary Judgment will be granted.
I. Background

Ms. Averytt began working at UPMC Magee in 2019 as a housekeeper, in the
Environmental Services (“EVS”) Department. (ECF No. 32at ¶1). A few years before her
termination, she was promoted to a “Team Lead” position which required her to oversee a group
of housekeepers on the night shift. Id. at ¶4.
Euguene Brundage and Justin Mills were Ms. Averytt’s supervisors. Id. at ¶5. Ms.
Averytt testified as follows, about her relationship with Mr. Brundage:
Q. Okay. How did you get along with Eugene?
A. We were fine. We worked together those five years. He pretty much trained me and

taught me a lot of the job.
Q. He was involved in promoting you? A. Yes. He recommended it.
(ECF No. 32-2 at pp. 37-38). Ms. Averytt testified that she was evaluated fairly. Id. She also
testified that she got along with Mr. Brundage’s boss, Justin Mills, for the most part, although
she seldom interacted with him. Id. at p. 36.
On December 30, 2022, Ms. Averytt was allegedly involved in a verbal altercation with
Operations Manager, Justin Mills, resulting in a final written warning for “unprofessional,
profane, and disrespectful” interactions toward Justin Mills. (ECF No. 32 at ¶12). Six months
later, on June 20, 2023, while working the night shift, Ms. Averytt allegedly engaged in
misconduct, which resulted in her discharge. That misconduct is described in her termination

letter as follows:
On your scheduled shift, Tuesday night, 6/20/2023, into Wednesday morning,
6/21/2023, it was reported that you were missing from the department. Upon
review of your badge swipes and camera footage, it showed that you entered your
car at 11:23 pm and did not leave your car to return to the building until 3:41 am,
all while remaining clocked in. Being outside the hospital, away from your
department not working during your shift is considered theft of UPMC time. On
6/28/2023, you provided a statement denying this occurred which is dishonesty.

Id. at ¶ 22. Ms. Averytt was discharged on June 29, 2023 because of this incident, in addition to
her final written warning issued for the December 30, 2022 incident mentioned above, as well as
for lying about the incident when confronted with it. Id. at ¶23.
Ms. Averytt’s absence from her shift was captured on video, and was confirmed by her
badge swipes, as leaving the building at 11:21 p.m. on June 20 and swiping back in at 3:31 a.m.
on June 21. The tele-tracking report shows Ms. Averytt’s last activity on the shift was at 11:12.
Id. at ¶¶ 14-17. When Ms. Averytt was given the opportunity to explain her absence, she told

Mr. Brundage that “this is simply not true.” Id. at ¶ 18. Ms. Averytt offered inconsistent
statements about the incident resulting in her discharge, and at one point she admitted she was
sleeping, because of medication; and at another point, she denied that it occurred, while at
another point she stated that she did not remember. Id. at ¶¶ 18-21.
Ms. Averytt testified that she was not aware of any similarly situated male employee
who, to the knowledge of her managers, left work without clocking out, was paid for the time
and not disciplined. Id at ¶¶ 32-33. 32. The only person about whom Ms. Averytt was aware of
who left the building without clocking out, who was paid for that time, and who was reported to
management, was a temporary employee, named Gil. The employee was leased from a staffing
company, and was not a UPMC Magee employee reporting to Justin Mills. Id. at ¶ 32. Ms.

Averytt did not know whether Gil was disciplined. Id. at ¶ 33.
After her termination, on June 30, 2023, Ms. Averytt sent an email to the human
resources service account, alleging that she was treated “unfairly because I am a female,” and
otherwise raising claims of sex discrimination. Id. Ms. Averytt acknowledges that her post-
termination email is the only written communication that mentions discrimination based on sex.
Id. at ¶ 27.
Following her termination, Ms. Averytt filed a grievance, wherein she stated:
[T]he only explanation I have for this inappropriate conduct was that the
medication that I take for my severe depression had caused me to have an adverse
effect and I don’t recall what time I went on break or if I possibly fell asleep
during my break.
Id. at ¶ 28.

II. Relevant Standard

Summary judgment may only be granted where the moving party shows that there is no
genuine dispute about any material fact, and that judgment as a matter of law is warranted. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court must enter summary
judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential
to his or her case, and on which he or she will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In evaluating the evidence, the court must interpret the facts
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in his or
her favor. Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2007).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to weigh the
evidence, make credibility determinations, or determine the truth of the matter; rather, its
function is to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 150–51 (2000) (citing decisions); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986);
Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1998). The mere
existence of a factual dispute, however, will not necessarily defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Only a dispute over a material fact—that is, a fact that would affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing substantive law—will preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.
III. Discussion

A. Sex Discrimination

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating
against any employee based on the employee’s sex. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1). A claim of
intentional employment discrimination, disparate treatment, may be proven by either “direct”
evidence of discriminatory intent or “indirect” evidence from which one can infer an intent to
discriminate. Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir. 2008).

To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, a plaintiff must show that “1) [she]
is a member of a protected class, (2) [she] was qualified for the position [she] sought to attain or
retain, (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the action occurred under
circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.” Sarullo v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003); Veverka v. Human Services Center, 2023 WL
2500370 at *10 (W.D. Pa. March 14, 2010).
If a plaintiff satisfies the elements of a prima facie case for sex discrimination, the burden
then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for why the
plaintiff was discharged. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The
burden upon the defendant at the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework is “relatively

light,” and the employer need only introduce “evidence which, taken as true, would permit the
conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment decision.”
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 706 (3d Cir. 1994).
To avoid summary judgment, therefore, a plaintiff must offer evidence which, if true, is
sufficient to show that an employer’s explanation for her discharge was a pretext to mask an
unlawful motive. Pretext may be shown by offering facts that would allow the court to (1)
disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reason for taking the adverse employment
action; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not the real
reason for the action. Willis v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 646-49 (3d Cir.
2015); Brandon v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 2023 WL 309341 at *4 (W.D. Pa. April 26,
2023), To establish pretext under the first prong of the foregoing standard, a plaintiff must show
that the defendant’s reason for her discharge is “so weak as to render it “unworthy of credence.”
Willis, supra, at 648, quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F. 3d 757, 765 (3d Cir. 1994). Put a different

way, “the plaintiff must point to “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons [such] that a
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence’” and hence infer that the
proffered nondiscriminatory reason “did not actually motivate” the employer's action. Fuentes,
supra, at 765; Schreiver v. Moon Area School District, 2019 WL 3307249 (W.D. Pa. 2019).
1. Prima Facie Case
Magee argues that, while Ms. Averytt alleges that her supervisors “never took
disciplinary actions against male employees for policy violations. Yet they would constantly
write up and terminate female employees,” she has not substantiated this allegation with
admissible evidence. Magee further asserts that disciplinary records do not support a pattern of

favoring one gender over another. Ms. Averytt contends that a male employee named Gil was
treated differently than her.
Ms. Averytt plausibly satisfies the first three elements of a prima facie sex discrimination
claim, but the fourth, and final, element is at issue. “The means by which a claimant most often
satisfies the [final] element is by showing that she was treated less favorably than similarly
situated employees who are not in the same protected class.” Neidigh v. Select Specialty
Hospital–McKeesport, 150 F.Supp.3d 573, 577 (W.D. Pa. 2015), aff'd, 664 Fed.Appx. 217 (3d
Cir. 2016); Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 357 (3d Cir. 1999).
Here, as to the final element, Ms. Averytt cannot support a prima facie claim for sex
discrimination. The only specific complaints of favoritism, that are disclosed in the record,
involve favoritism towards a female employee. Although Plaintiff alleges that male employees
were never disciplined, Defendant has produced a business record which refutes that allegation.
Ms. Averytt suggests a person named Gil as a comparator. Gild had allegedly engaged in similar

behavior, but he was not discharged. However, the evidence of record, unrefuted by Ms.
Averytt, demonstrates that Gil was not similarly situated. The record demonstrates that Gil was
a temporary employee of a staffing company, and he did not report to Ms. Averytt’s supervisors.
(ECF No. 31-2 at pp. 83-87). Further, Ms. Averytt produced no evidence of record to
demonstrate whether Gil was disciplined or not. Without such evidence for a factfinder to find
an inference of discrimination on that basis, Ms. Averytt cannot satisfy the final element of her
prima facie case.
Accordingly, on this basis alone, Magee would be entitled to summary judgment on Ms.
Averytt’s sex discrimination claim. Further, even if Ms. Averytt could have satisfied a prima
facie case, her claim cannot satisfy the remainder of the McDonnell Douglas framework.

2. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason
Assuming Ms. Averytt could could have met her burden of proof on her prima facie sex
discrimination claim, Magee must offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her
termination. As referenced above, the defendant’s burden on the second step of the McDonnell
Douglas framework is light.
Here, Magee produced a declaration from Ms. Averytt’s supervisor, Eugene Brundage,
plus a written discharge letter, which details why Ms. Averytt was discharged. Specifically, her
discharge was based upon evidence of time theft, for when she left her shift for four hours
without signing out or reporting the absence and then lying about the incident. Through such
evidence, Magee sufficiently meets its burden that Ms. Averytt’s discharge was for a reason
other than sex
3. Pretext Analysis
As Magee has met its burden under the second stage of

the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden shifts to Ms. Averytt to offer evidence that the
Magee’s non-discriminatory reasons were offered as mere pretext. Under the first prong of the
pretext analysis, there is no evidence to disbelieve Magee’s articulated legitimate reason to
discharge Ms. Averytt. Evidence of Ms. Averytt’s culpability, which led to her discharge, is
indisputable. Such evidence includes a video of Ms. Averytt exiting the building, approaching
her car, and returning to work four hours later. Ms. Averytt also does not dispute that
production of her card swipes showing her going out of and into the building, plus the evidence
showing no work activity during this time period, all support Magee’s reason for her termination.
Moreover, when confronted with such evidence, Ms. Averytt denied she was out of the building.
And later, when submitting a grievance, Ms. Averytt admitted her absence and blamed the

adverse effects of medications caused her to fall asleep. Ms. Averytt has otherwise produced no
evidence to justify any finding that Magee’s explanation for her discharge was implausible or
unworthy of belief.
Under the second prong of the pretext test, Ms. Averytt does not identify evidence in the
record that “would allow a factfinder to believe unlawful discrimination was more likely than not
a motivating or determinative cause of her termination.” Willis, supra, at 649. As in the prima
facie analysis, Ms. Averytt adduces no evidence connecting her discharge with any
discriminatory motive or cause. Therefore, Ms. Averytt has not met her burden of establishing
any fact issue as to second pretext prong.
Accordingly, Magee’s Motion for Summary Judgment, as regards to Ms. Averytt’s Title
VII sex discrimination claims, asserting that her termination was on account of her gender, will
be granted. Judgment will be entered in favor of Magee on said claim.
B. Retaliation

Magee maintains that Ms. Averytt cannot support her retaliation claim, because she did
not engage in any protected activity. Ms. Averytt contends that she made written complaints of
sex discrimination and disparate treatment. Title VII prohibits retaliation, by making it unlawful
for employers to discriminate against “any individual ... because he has opposed any ... unlawful
employment practice” or because that individual has “made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).
To establish “a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
employee engaged in a protected employee activity; (2) the employer took an adverse
employment action after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a
causal link exists between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.”

Brown-Baumbach v. B&B Automotive, Inc., 437 F. App’x 129, 134–35 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir.2000) (emphasis added). As with
her disparate treatment claim, without direct evidence, Ms. Averytt must establish her claim
through indirect or circumstantial evidence under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Daniels v.
Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015).
A causal connection cannot be established if the employment decision is made before the
alleged protected activity. Clark County School District, supra, at 272 (protected activity took
place on the day after supervisor expressed intent to transfer); Yan Yan v. Penn State Univ., 529
F. App'x 167, 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (decision to reschedule exam made two days prior to receiving
a letter that complained of discrimination).
Here, Ms. Averytt made complaints during her employment, but there is no evidence that
she opposed sex discrimination or any other practice made unlawful by Title VII. The complaint
documentation from Ms. Averytt contains no evidence referencing sex discrimination. Further, in
discovery, Ms. Averytt admitted that a post-termination email “is the only written
communication [to UPMC] that mentions discrimination based on sex.” (ECF No. 32-4 at p. 3).
She has also not identified any pre-termination written complaints of sex discrimination. While
one email complained about favoritism shown to a co-worker, Ms. Averytt testified that the co-
worker referred to in the e-mail was female. As regards any verbal complaints about sex
discrimination, Ms. Averytt testified that any verbal complaints made to her supervisors,
Brundage and Mills, were not about sex discrimination. (ECF 32-2 at pp. 38 to 53). Without
such evidence of any pre-termination protected activity, Ms. Averytt cannot support a prima
facie case of retaliation.
Accordingly, Magee’s Motion for Summary Judgment, as regards to Ms. Averytt’s Title
VII retaliation claims, will be granted. Judgment will be entered in favor of Magee on said claim.
TV. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, Magee’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
Judgment will be entered in favor of Magee and against Ms. Averytt. As separate order will
follow.
Dated: September 22, 2025

United States District Judge

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11142453. Public record. Not legal advice.