# Love v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 19, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141797

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 19, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141797

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION

RENEE LOVE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 5:24-cv-318-MMH-PRL

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1
Plaintiff appeals the administrative decision denying her applications for a period of
disability, disability insurance benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Insurance Income (SSI).
Upon a review of the record, the memoranda, and the applicable law, I recommend that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND
For the sake of convenience, the administrative history, which is not in dispute, is
copied from the Government’s brief:
On September 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed concurrent applications
for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and
Supplemental Insurance Income, alleging disability beginning
April 24, 2020 (Tr. 244-59). Following a February 2024 hearing
(Tr. 47-70), the ALJ issued a decision on February 28, 2024,
finding Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. 24-46). The Appeals Council

1 Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party
may file written objections to the Report and Recommendation’s factual findings and legal
conclusions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). A
party’s failure to file written objections waives that party’s right to challenge on appeal any
unobjected-to factual finding or legal conclusion the district judge adopts from the Report and
Recommendation. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
subsequently denied Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. 10-15).
This case is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3).
(Doc. 17 at 2).
As of Plaintiff’s alleged onset date of disability, Plaintiff was 41 years old. (Tr. 244,
253). Plaintiff has a tenth-grade education, and worked previously as a security guard, key
holder at Petco, and an assistant manager at Family Dollar. (Tr. 277, 298, 331). Based on a
review of the record, the ALJ found that the claimant had severe impairments including a
seizure disorder, headaches, and obesity. (Tr. 30). The ALJ found that the claimant did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equaled an
impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the listings) or that functionally
equaled the listings. (Tr. 31).
The ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform work
with the following limitations:
lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally 10 pounds frequently; sit for
six hours in an eight hour workday; stand and/or walk for six
hours in an eight hour workday; occasional climbing of ramps or
stairs, but no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequent
balancing as defined by the SCO; frequent stooping, kneeling,
and crouching; occasional crawling; frequent handling and
fingering with the left upper extremity; no commercial driving;
work environments of moderate noise as defined by SCO noise
code 3; no exposure to extreme bright lights like stage lights,
headlights, or bright inspection lights, but normal home and
office lighting is acceptable; must avoid concentrated exposure
to vibration; and no exposure to hazardous machinery or
unprotected heights.
(Tr. 32).
Based on the RFC and considering the testimony of a vocational expert (VE), the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work as a customer service
representative and security guard. The ALJ found that those jobs do not require the
performance of work-related activities precluded by Plaintiff’s RFC. (Tr. 39). Accordingly,
the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 40).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A claimant is entitled to disability benefits when he or she is unable to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to either result in death or last for a continuous period of
not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§416(i)(1), 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §404.1505(a).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis for evaluating a
claim of disability, which is by now well-known and otherwise set forth in the ALJ’s decision.
See 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th
Cir. 2001). The claimant, of course, bears the burden of persuasion through step four and, at
step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5
(1987).

The scope of this Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ
applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings are supported by substantial
evidence. McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). Indeed, the Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla – i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a
fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing
Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,

401 (1971)); accord Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991). Where the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the District Court will affirm,
even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the
reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards,
937 F.2d at 584 n.3; Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). This is clearly a

deferential standard.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises a single issue on appeal, whether the ALJ properly relied on the
testimony of the vocational expert (VE) that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform past
relevant work.
1. Past Relevant Work as Customer Service Representative
First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the VE’s testimony because the
VE misclassified Plaintiff’s past relevant work. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the VE
classified Plaintiff’s work as a store manager, customer service representative, and security

guard, but it is unclear which of Plaintiff’s prior jobs he believed qualified as a customer
service representative. (Doc. 12 at 9-10). In response, Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s
assertion that she did not have past relevant work as a customer service representative. (Doc.
17 at 6).
Although not expressly explained by Defendant, even if the ALJ mischaracterized
Plaintiff's past relevant work as a customer service representative, Plaintiff failed to carry her
burden because she has not demonstrated, by citation to the record or otherwise, that she was
unable to return to that past work (whether in the key holder for Petco job or the assistant
manager at Family Dollar job) as she performed it or as generally performed in the national
economy or that her RFC precluded these positions. See Davis v. Kijakazi, No. 8:20-cv-1058-
TGW, 2021 WL 4167885, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2021) (“The plaintiff failed to carry her
burden because she provided no citations to the record to support a conclusion that she was
unable to return to her past work.”). Notably, Plaintiff fails to allege that she cannot return to
her past relevant customer service-related work as she actually performed it or as performed

in the national economy or that her RFC precluded these jobs or types of work. (Doc. 12 at
10).
Even if the ALJ mischaracterized Plaintiff's past relevant work as a customer service
representative, any error is harmless because Plaintiff failed to show that her impairments
precluded her from returning to her past relevant work or that her RFC precluded her past
work. Courts have applied the harmless error rule to social security cases and declined to
remand where doing so would be a “wasteful corrective exercise.” Morris v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., No. 8:22-CV-1023-DNF, 2023 WL 4702069, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2023), citing Pons
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-13028, 2022 WL 1214133, at *2 (11th Cir. Apr. 25, 2022).

Further, any alleged error on behalf of the ALJ in relying on the VE’s testimony
regarding the customer service representative job would be harmless if the ALJ identified
other past relevant work that the plaintiff can perform. See Hunter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 609
Fed. App'x 555, 557 (11th Cir. 2015) (“To the extent that an administrative law judge commits
an error, the error is harmless if it did not affect the judge's ultimate determination.” (citing
Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983))). Here, the ALJ also found that Plaintiff
could perform her past work as a security guard as generally performed in the national
economy. See Morris, 2023 WL 4702069, at *4 (applying the harmless error rule where plaintiff
failed to show that she was precluded from returning to past relevant work), and Wooten v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 787 F. App'x 671, 674 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding that even if an apparent
conflict existed, it would be harmless error because ALJ identified a different job plaintiff
could perform and substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that the unaffected job
existed in significant numbers in the national economy).
Accordingly, I submit that any classification error regarding the customer service

representative job would amount to harmless error because the ALJ also found that Plaintiff
could perform her past relevant job of security guard as generally performed in the national
economy, and as explained below, that finding was based upon substantial evidence.
2. Past Relevant Work as Security Guard
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff
retained the ability to perform her past relevant work as a security guard. Plaintiff contends
that the ALJ did not seek a reasonable explanation from the VE to resolve apparent conflicts
between the VE’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) regarding the
job of security guard. In her work history report, Plaintiff stated that her work as a security
guard included duties such as driving around a gated community and making rounds in a golf

cart or on foot. (Doc. 12 at 10, Tr. 303). Plaintiff asserts that those duties conflict with the no
commercial driving limitation in the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE. (Doc. 12 at 10).
Plaintiff argues that although the ALJ found that she could perform the security guard job as
generally performed, Plaintiff’s “commercial driving duties are incompatible with the DOT.”
(Doc. 12 at 11). Plaintiff cites the DOT definition of security guard as including periodic
patrolling of buildings and grounds. Plaintiff contends that there is at least an apparent conflict
with the DOT description of the security guard job duties and the VE’s testimony, triggering
the ALJ’s duty to inquire about the conflict.
Similarly, Plaintiff asserts that an apparent conflict exists between the DOT and the
VE’s testimony because the ALJ limited her to work not requiring “exposure to extreme bright
lights like stage lights, headlights, or bright inspection lights.” (Tr. 32). While Plaintiff
concedes that the DOT does not explicitly mention bright lights, Plaintiff suggest that the

security guard job’s requirement of inspecting “doors, windows, gates, equipment,
machinery, fire hazards, water pipes, and security doors” to guard against damage such as
fire, theft, vandalism and illegal entry “shows an apparent conflict between the no bright
lights, such as inspection lights limitation, and the DOT.” (Doc. 19 at 2).
The DOT description of the security guard job is as follows:
Guards industrial or commercial property against fire, theft,
vandalism, and illegal entry, performing any combination of
following duties: Patrols, periodically, buildings and grounds
of industrial plant or commercial establishment, docks, logging
camp area, or work site. Examines doors, windows, and gates to
determine that they are secure. Warns violators of rule
infractions, such as loitering, smoking, or carrying forbidden
articles, and apprehends or expels miscreants. Inspects
equipment and machinery to ascertain if tampering has occurred.
Watches for and reports irregularities, such as fire hazards,
leaking water pipes, and security doors left unlocked. Observes
departing personnel to guard against theft of company property.
Sounds alarm or calls police or fire department by telephone in
case of fire or presence of unauthorized persons. Permits
authorized persons to enter property.
DICOT 372.667-034, 1991 WL 673100.
Under SSR 00-4p, when an apparent unresolved conflict exists between VE evidence
and the DOT, the ALJ “must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying on
the VE [ ] evidence to support a determination or decision about whether the claimant is
disabled.” 2000 WL 1898704, at * 2 (Dec. 4, 2000).2 The ALJ must inquire, on the record,
whether a conflict exists. Id. If a conflict exists, the ALJ must resolve the conflict by
determining whether the explanation provided by the VE is reasonable and provides a basis
for relying on the VE testimony rather than on the information contained in the DOT. Id.

Reasonable explanations may include the availability of information about a particular job’s
requirements or about occupations not listed in the DOT but available in other reliable
publications, information obtained directly from employers, or from a VE's experience in job
placement or career counseling. Id.
In considering the application of SSR 00-4p, the Eleventh Circuit has concluded that
ALJs maintain “an affirmative duty to identify apparent conflicts between the testimony of a
[VE] and the DOT and resolve them.” Washington v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1356
(11th Cir. 2018). In carrying out that duty, the ALJ must do more than simply ask the VE
whether his or her testimony is consistent with the DOT. Id. According to the Eleventh

Circuit, when a conflict has been identified, SSR 00-4p requires the ALJ to provide a
reasonable explanation for the discrepancy and to detail in the decision how the ALJ resolved
the conflict. Id. The failure to do so means that the ALJ's decision, if based upon the
contradicted VE testimony, is not supported by substantial evidence. Id.
An “apparent conflict” is one “that is reasonably ascertainable or evident from a
review of the DOT and the VE’s testimony.” Id. at 1365. “At a minimum, a conflict is
apparent if a reasonable comparison of the DOT with the VE's testimony suggests that there
is a discrepancy, even if, after further investigation, that turns out not to be the case.” Id.

2 Pol'y Interpretation Ruling : Titles II & XVI: Use of Vocational Expert & Vocational
Specialist Evidence, & Other Reliable Occupational Info. in Disability Decisions, SSR 00-4P (S.S.A.
Dec. 4, 2000).
In response to Plaintiff’s arguments, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not shown an
apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT description of the security job
position. Defendant asserts “Plaintiff has offered no evidence that operating a golf cart is a
requirement of this job, that operating a golf cart requires a commercial driver’s license, or

that she required a commercial driver’s license to perform this job.” (Doc. 17 at 8-9). Likewise,
Defendant asserts that there is no apparent conflict between the DOT and the VE’s testimony
as relating to lights, as the DOT makes no reference to exposure to extreme bright lights or
inspection lights. (Doc. 17 at 10).
Defendant also points out that it was Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that she was
unable to perform past relevant work and that she failed to avail herself of the opportunity to
cross examine the VE at the hearing regarding whether the security guard position involved
exposure to extreme bright light. Defendant contends that the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff
could perform her past relevant work provided substantial evidence upon which the ALJ
could rely in his decision.

The Court therefore must consider whether, upon a reasonable comparison of the
DOT with the VE’s testimony, a discrepancy exists as to the security guard job. Notably, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable performing the security guard job as “generally
performed in the national economy.” (Tr. 39). Plaintiff cites no case law or other authority
beyond her own reasoning for her proposition that the RFC limitation regarding extreme
bright lights creates an apparent discrepancy between the VE’s testimony and the DOT.
Similarly, Plaintiff’s argument relating to making rounds via a golf cart and a commercial
driver’s license appears to be little more than conjecture. In both cases, I submit that there is
no apparent conflict between the DOT and the VE’s testimony that a person with Plaintiff's
RFC could perform the security guard position.
The ALJ’s decision thoroughly considered Plaintiff's condition as a whole. Here, the
ALJ presented a thorough, comprehensive hypothetical to the vocational expert that
specifically identified the limitations consistent with Plaintiff's RFC. (Tr. 65). The vocational
expert’s testimony that a person with Plaintiff's RFC could perform the job of security guard
constituted substantial evidence upon which the ALJ could rely. See Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d
1224, 1229 (11th Cir. 1999). Moreover, “the claimant bears the burden of proving he is
disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence to support his claim.”
Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff has failed to meet this
burden.
I therefore recommend that the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed because substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff's condition, the RFC, and Plaintiff's
limitations. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (“If the Commissioner's
decision is supported by substantial evidence we must affirm, even if the proof preponderates
against it.”).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully recommend that the ALJ’S decision be
AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Recommended in Ocala, Florida on August 19, 2025.
Le
PHILIP R. LAMMENS
United States Magistrate Judge

Copies furnished to:

Presiding District Judge
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party
Courtroom Deputy

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141797. Public record. Not legal advice.