# Brown v. Talavera

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · September 19, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141470

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** September 19, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141470

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing the reluctance of attorneys “to undertake the specific and complex challenges of a Title VII lawsuit which are not common to more frequently litigated areas of the law”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GWENDOLYN BROWN * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 25-1199

JULIE M. TALAVERA * SECTION “E” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before me is Plaintiff Gwendolyn Brown’s Motion to Appoint Counsel. ECF No. 11.
Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel in this case alleging race and color discrimination for which
she has been granted in forma pauperis status. ECF Nos. 1, 3. Plaintiff’s motion simply states
that she seeks counsel and will cooperate and provide all necessary information. ECF No. 11.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed suit alleging that she was terminated based on race and color, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. ECF No. 1.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
Title VII provides for the appointment of an attorney upon request “in such circumstances
as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). Courts consider: (1) the merits of the
claims of discrimination; (2) the efforts taken by plaintiff to obtain counsel; and (3) plaintiff's
financial ability to retain counsel.1 The evaluation of the merits of the claim is most important,
considering the unfairness of imposing service upon a member of the bar particularly when there
is little chance of success,2 though no one factor is conclusive. Determinations by the EEOC are

1 Gonzalez v. Carlin, 907 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1309
(5th Cir. 1977); Neal v. IAM Local Lodge 2386, 722 F.2d 247, 250 (5th Cir. 1984)).
2 Buesgens v. Snow, 169 F. App'x 869, 871 (5th Cir. 2006).
“highly probative” of the merits of a plaintiff's case and properly considered when assessing a
request to appoint counsel.3 These factors are suggestive, not exclusive.4
Appointment of counsel is also available under the in forma pauperis statute. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(1). This statute requires “exceptional circumstances” considering (1) the type and
complexity of the case; (2) whether the indigent is capable of adequately presenting his case;5

(3) whether the indigent is in a position to investigate adequately the case; and (4) whether the
evidence will consist in large part of conflicting testimony so as to require skill in the presentation
of evidence and in cross examination.6 Section 1915(e)(1)’s “exceptional circumstances” standard
does not apply to Title VII cases that are not filed in forma pauperis.
The appointment of counsel in a civil case is a privilege, not a constitutional right.7 Thus,
while these statutes authorize appointment of counsel, a litigant generally has no right to a court-
appointed attorney in a civil case.8 The decision whether to appoint counsel rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court,9 and the court may not appoint counsel as a matter of course or ordinary
practice.10 The court should consider whether appointment would be a service to the court and all

parties in the case by “sharpening the issues . . . . , shaping the examination of witnesses, and thus
shortening the trial and assisting in a just determination.”11 See also May 1, 2024, Resolution of

3 Paskauskiene v. Alcor Petrolab, L.L.P., 527 F. App'x 329, 333 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Gonzalez, 907 F.2d at 580).
4 White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d. 203, 205 (5th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).
5 Oviedo v. Lowe's Home Improvement, Inc., 184 F. App'x 411, 412 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Buesgens, 169 F. App’x.
at 870–71).
6 Norton v. DiMazana, 122 F.3d 286, 293 (5th Cir. 1997); Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982); Ulmer
v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982); Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 353–54 (5th Cir. 2001);
see also Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1992).
7 Paskauskiene, 527 F. App'x at 333 (citing Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982)); see also Ulmer, 691 F.2d
at 212; Naranjo v. Thompson, 809 F.3d 793, 801–02 (5th Cir. 2015).
8 See FTC v. Assail, Inc., 410 F.3d 256, 267 (5th Cir. 2005) (constitutional right to counsel does not apply to civil pro
se litigants); Gonzalez, 907 F.2d at 579 (no automatic right to appointment of counsel in Title VII case) (citing Caston,
556 F.2d at 1309).
9 Gonzales, 907 F.2d at 579 (citing Caston, 556 F.2d at 1308).
10 Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 126 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Hadd v. LSG-Sky Chefs, 272 F.3d
298, 301 (5th Cir. 2001); Becken, 256 F.3d at 353–54.
11 Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 213.
the En Banc Court of the Eastern District of Louisiana concerning appointment of counsel from
this Court's Civil Pro Bono Panel.
III. ANALYSIS
This Court previously granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, and thus, she has

sufficiently established the financial inability to retain counsel. ECF No. 3. The claims asserted
in this case, however, include a provision for the award of attorneys’ fees, which is relevant to the
analysis. While some courts deny a request for appointment of counsel when a plaintiff has the
ability to engage counsel,12 other courts recognize that even a plaintiff with a meritorious claim,
capable of paying an attorney, may sometimes be unable to secure representation.13
Further, before counsel may be appointed under Title VII, a claimant must make a
reasonably diligent effort to secure counsel without the court's assistance. A reasonably diligent
attempt to secure counsel means, at a minimum, speaking to an attorney about the merits of the
case and pursuing a contingent fee arrangement.14 Plaintiff’s motion fails to set forth what efforts,
if any, she has undertaken to obtain counsel on her own behalf.

Moreover, at this point, Plaintiff’s claims do not appear particularly complex. Whether the
evidence will consist of conflicting testimony is undetermined at this stage.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the potential availability of a fee award and Plaintiff’s failure to identify any efforts
to obtain counsel, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient information to enable this Court to exercise

12 See Poindexter v. F.B.I., 737 F.2d 1173, 1186 (5th Cir. 1984).
13 See Petete v. Consolidated Freightways, 313 F. Supp. 1271, 1272 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (recognizing the reluctance of
attorneys “to undertake the specific and complex challenges of a Title VII lawsuit which are not common to more
frequently litigated areas of the law”).
14 Weber v. Holiday Inn, 42 F. Supp. 2d 693, 698 (E.D. Tex. 1999); see also Smith v. Baton Rouge Radiology Grp.,
No. 12-400, 2013 WL 3246142, at *2 (M.D. La. June 24, 2013) (plaintiff failed to make diligent effort to obtain
counsel where she contacted several attorneys, but failed to “state whether or not she had inquired about the possibility
of a contingency fee agreement with any attorney”).
its discretion to compel unwilling counsel to represent her or even whether there is a sufficient
basis to seek a volunteer attorney from the EDLA’s Civil Pro Bono Panel.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 11) is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE as stated herein.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 19" day of September, 2025.

ren PHILL i CURRAULT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141470. Public record. Not legal advice.