# Boudreaux v. Prevost

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · September 19, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141415

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** September 19, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141415

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that courts may consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss if they “are referred to in the pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims.”
- holding that warrantless arrests for minor non-violent crimes are constitutional

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ROGER BOUDREAUX, JR. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-1073

NOPD OFFICER PREVOST, ET AL. SECTION “R” (1)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is defendants the City of New Orleans, NOPD Officer
Christopher Prevost, and NOPD Officer Rydell Floyd’s motion to dismiss1
plaintiff’s amended complaint.2 Plaintiff Chief Little Sun Roger Boudreaux,
Jr. has filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint,3 and has filed
multiple additional motions that are currently pending before the Court.4
For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s amended complaint, denies plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend,
and denies as moot all other motions.

1 R. Doc. 24.
2 R. Doc. 22.
3 R. Doc. 28.
4 R. Docs. 13, 17, 23.
I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a traffic stop conducted by NOPD Officer’s
Prevost and Floyd, and the subsequent arrest of plaintiff and impoundment
of his vehicle.5 Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against NOPD
Officers Prevost and Floyd, Gary’s Towing Company, and the City of New
Orleans.6 Defendants, NOPD Officer’s Prevost and Floyd, and the City of

New Orleans move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).7 Plaintiff did not file an opposition but instead seeks
leave to amend his complaint for the second time.8 Plaintiff also brings

various motions before the Court.9
The Court considers the motions below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). A claim is facially

5 R. Doc. 22 ¶¶ 8-14.
6 Id. at ¶¶ 15, 2-4.
7 R. Doc. 24.
8 R. Doc. 28.
9 R. Docs. 13, 17, 23.
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 678. The Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2009). But the Court is not
bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a “sheer
possibility” that the party’s claim is true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need

not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must go beyond “‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’”
See id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The claim must be dismissed if
there are insufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face
of the complaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, see Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must limit its review to the

contents of the pleadings, including attachments. Brand Coupon Network,
L.L.C. v. Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014). The Court
may also consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss or an
opposition to that motion when the documents are referred to in the
pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims. Id. “The district court ‘may

also consider matters of which [it] may take judicial notice.’” Hall v.
Hodgkins, 305 F. App’x 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Lovelace v. Software
Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Because plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the Court will “apply less stringent

standards . . . than [it would] to parties represented by counsel.” Grant v.
Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). This does not mean,
however, that a court “will invent, out of whole cloth, novel arguments on

behalf of a pro se plaintiff in the absence of meaningful, albeit imperfect,
briefing.” Jones v. Alfred, 353 F. App’x 949, 951-52 (5th Cir. 2009).
Therefore, even a liberally construed pro se complaint “must set forth facts
giving rise to a claim on which relief may be granted.” Johnson v. Atkins,

999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Claims Against the City

To state a section 1983 claim against a municipal entity, plaintiffs must
satisfy the requirements outlined in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). See Los Angeles Cty. v. Humphries, 562
U.S. 29, 36-37 (2010). Under Monell, plaintiffs must allege the existence of
(1) an official policy or custom, of which (2) a policymaker can be charged

with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation
whose “moving force” is that policy or custom. Valle v. City of Houston, 613
F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010). These elements are necessary “to
distinguish individual violations perpetrated by local government employees

from those that can be fairly identified as actions of the government itself.”
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted).

Here, plaintiff has not identified any policy or custom attributable to
the City of New Orleans, let alone that such a policy or custom was the
moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff’s
amended complaint does not mention any custom of the City of New Orleans

whatsoever. Plaintiff has plainly failed to identify the policy or custom which
allegedly caused the deprivation of his federal rights. The Court therefore
must dismiss plaintiff’s allegations against the City of New Orleans.
B. Claims Against Officers Prevost and Floyd in Their Official

Capacities
Boudreaux states that he is suing Officers Prevost and Floyd in their
official capacities. Section 1983 prohibits “persons” acting under the color
of law from depriving another of any “rights, privileges, and immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Officers

Prevost and Floyd are not “persons” under Section 1983. Because claims
against officers in their professional capacities are really claims against the
government entity, these claims require that a policy or custom of the City of
New Orleans directly led to the constitutional violation found. Estate of

Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir.
2005). Accordingly, Boudreaux must plead facts that plausibly establish: (1)
an official policy or custom of the City of New Orleans, (2) a policymaker,

and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the
violation of that policy or custom. Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., Tex., 948 F.3d
281, 285 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Boudreaux’s complaint is wholly
devoid of any mention of a policy or custom of the City of New Orleans, let

alone that such policy or custom was the “moving force” of the alleged
constitutional violation. As such the Court must dismiss plaintiff’s claims
against the Officer defendants in their official capacities.
C. Claims Against Officers Prevost and Floyd in Their
Individual Capacities

To the extent that Boudreaux is attempting to sue Officers Prevost and
Floyd in their individual capacities, these claims must likewise be dismissed.
Officers Prevost and Floyd invoke the defense of qualified immunity.
It is well established that qualified immunity shields public officials

from suit and liability under § 1983, “so long as their conduct ‘does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11

(2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)); accord
Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453, 463 (5th Cir. 2022). At the motion-
to-dismiss stage, the Court looks to “defendant’s conduct as alleged in the
complaint” to determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996) (emphasis added).
“Once a defendant invokes the qualified immunity defense, the
plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating its inapplicability.” Floyd v.
City of Kenner, 351 F. App’x 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). To satisfy

that burden at the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to demonstrate (1) that the defendant violated a constitutional
right, and (2) that the violated right was “clearly established” at the time of
defendants’ alleged actions. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

In plaintiff’s amended complaint, he alleges that the Officer defendants
are liable because they “unlawfully stopped [plaintiff] . . . while traveling on
public highways,” “attempted to unlawfully assert jurisdiction over
[plaintiff],” “unlawfully falsified impound documents,” and “trespassed on

[p]laintiff’s land and arrested him,” during which he was injured.10
Construing plaintiff’s complaint liberally, he is attempting to bring claims
against the Officer defendants for unreasonable search and seizure, and use

of excessive force.
1. Unreasonable search and seizure
The Court begins with the threshold question of whether plaintiff has
plausibly alleged that defendants violated a constitutional right. See Lytle v.

Bexar Cnty., 560 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2009) (“If we determine that the
alleged conduct did not violate a constitutional right, our inquiry ceases
because there is no constitutional violation for which the government official
would need qualified immunity.”). Police officers may constitutionally stop

a vehicle and check the driver’s license and registration if there is an
“articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an

10 R. Doc. 22.
automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is
otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440

U.S. 648, 663 (1979). Plaintiff provides no factual allegations as to how the
stop was “unlawful,” outside of an unsupported assertion that defendants
lacked “jurisdiction over him.” Plaintiff admits that he was “travelling on
public highways” and alleges that defendants stated that his “private license

plate” was the reason for the stop. In Louisiana, cars must have a permanent,
visible license plate. La. R.S. 32:53(2). Plaintiff’s “private license plate”
provided the Officer defendants with reasonable suspicion to stop him. Once

stopped, Boudreaux was cited for several traffic violations—driving with a
suspended license, lacking proof of insurance, and operating an unregistered
vehicle with a fraudulent license plate.11 Boudreaux was then arrested, and
his vehicle was impounded.

As the Officers had cited Boudreaux for multiple traffic violations, the
arrest was lawful. See United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 435 (5th Cir.
2009) (“The Supreme Court has held that warrantless arrests for traffic

11 R. Docs 24-1 at 1-2; 24-2. Because the Louisiana Uniform Traffic
Ticket and Complaint and municipal court record are central to
plaintiff’s claims, the Court considers them in connection with the
motion to dismiss. Brand Coupon Network, 748 F.3d at 635 (finding
that courts may consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss
if they “are referred to in the pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s
claims.”).
offenses, such as driving with a suspended license, are permitted when the
officers have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed in

their presence.”); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)
(holding that warrantless arrests for minor non-violent crimes are
constitutional). And the impoundment of the vehicle was required under
Louisiana law, which provides that “[i]f the operator of a motor vehicle is

unable to show compliance with [insurance requirements under Louisiana
law] by displaying the required document when requested to do so, the motor
vehicle shall be impounded.” La. R.S. 32:863.1C.(1)(a) (emphasis added);

see also United States v. Swan, 259 F. App’x 656, 660-61 (5th Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to allege any constitutional violation related
to the traffic stop and resulting arrest and vehicle impoundment.
2. Excessive force

To the extent that Boudreaux is attempting to bring an excessive force
claim, that too fails. To establish an excessive force claim, the plaintiff must
show that he suffered “(1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from
the use of force that was excessive to the need and that (3) the force used was

objectively unreasonable.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir.
2006) (citing Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Boudreaux alleges that during his arrest he “fell to the ground, injuring his
left knee, which required medical attention.”12 Boudreaux alleges no facts as
to what caused him to fall, let alone enough facts to support that the fall

“resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the
need.” Id. In his amended complaint, plaintiff linked multiple videos which
he alleges support his claims. Most of these videos are no longer viewable on
YouTube, but the videos the Court was able to review provide no evidence to

support plaintiff’s claims. Video one displays a man, presumably plaintiff,
refusing to cooperate with an arrest and refusing to stand up. It provides no
evidence of excessive force. As plaintiff provides no other evidence of

excessive force, he has failed to establish an excessive force claim.
D. “Right to Travel Unencumbered”
Plaintiff additionally alleges that defendants have violated his “right to
travel unencumbered.” “[T]he constitutional right to travel from one State

to another is firmly embedded in [Supreme Court] jurisprudence.” Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (cleaned up). The right to travel has three
components: (1) “the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave
another State”; (2) the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an

unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State”; and (3) the
right “for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, . . . to be

12 R. Doc. 22 at ¶ 11.
treated like other citizens of that State.” Id. at 500. This right is not absolute.
And this right is not violated by state traffic laws at issue here. See e.g.,

Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915) (“[A] state may rightfully
prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in
respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles.”); Hughes
v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 840 F.3d 987, 995 (8th Cir. 2016) (“A state

may enforce conventional traffic regulations—even if they deter travel—
without violating the fundamental right to travel.”). That plaintiff is subject
to Louisiana’s traffic laws does not mean that his right to travel has been

violated. As Louisiana is within its authority to prescribe and enforce traffic
laws of the sort that underlie Boudreaux’s arrest and the impoundment of his
vehicle, he has failed to adequately plead an infringement on his right to
travel.

E. Claims Against Gary’s Towing
District Courts have the inherent authority to sua sponte dismiss a pro
se litigant’s frivolous or malicious complaint even when they are not
proceeding in forma pauperis. Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street

Tenants, 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000); Curtis v. Kunz-Freed, 2017
WL 7371194, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May, 16, 2017); Holman v. Wooten, 2010 WL
691263, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2010). Further, the Supreme Court has stated
in dicta “that federal courts have the inherent power to dismiss frivolous
lawsuits.” Curtis, 2017 WL 7371194, at *3 (citing Mallard v. United States

District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08
(1989) (“Statutory provisions may simply codify existing rights or powers.
Section 1915(d), for example, authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or
malicious’ action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so

even in the absence of this statutory provision.”)).
Plaintiff’s allegations, as they apply to Gary’s Towing, are undeniably
frivolous. The only allegation that plausibly applies to Gary’s Towing is that

Boudreaux’s car was seized and, as of the time of his amended complaint, not
returned. The impounding of Boudreaux’s vehicle following his arrest was
not a violation of Boudreaux’s constitutional rights.13 Nor does the
continued storage of his vehicle constitute a constitutional violation. As

stated above, Louisiana law requires a police officer to impound a vehicle if
its operator is unable to provide proof of insurance. La. R.S.
32:863.1C.(1)(a). The law further provides that “[t]he impounded vehicle
shall remain impounded . . . until such time as proof of valid insurance is

13 Boudreaux also alleges that this was a violation of Louisiana law, but
he brings no claim under Louisiana law. And, as described above,
Louisiana law instructs that Gary’s Towing may not release
Boudreaux’s vehicle until certain conditions have been met.
given to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections” and “in no event
shall a car be released from impoundment until such time as proof, in

writing, has been presented from the Department of Public Safety and
Corrections that all penalties, fees, fines and requirements of this [La. R.S.
32:863] have been met.” La. R.S. 32:863.1C.(6) (emphasis added).
Boudreaux’s car was impounded after he was found to be driving

without a valid license, license plate, and proof of insurance. Accordingly,
the impoundment was both required and lawful. And, under Louisiana law,
Gary’s Towing may not release Boudreaux’s car from impoundment until

proof of insurance has been presented to the Department of Public Safety
and all penalties, fees, and fines have been paid. Boudreaux alleges no facts
to conclude that he has complied with these requirements. Accordingly, his
claims against Gary’s Towing lack any basis in law. Boudreaux’s claims

against Gary’s Towing are therefore frivolous and this Court sua sponte
orders their dismissal.
F. Leave to Amend
Ordinarily, “a court should grant a pro se party every reasonable

opportunity to amend.” Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 503 n.36 (5th Cir. 2011)
(cleaned up). However, the Fifth Circuit has explained that “plaintiffs cannot
be allowed to continue to amend or supplement their pleadings until they
stumble upon a formula that carries them over the threshold.” Jacquez v.
Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1986). Boudreaux has already

amended his complaint once. Despite this, his claims still fail. Now
Boudreaux seeks to amend his complaint and plead entirely different factual
allegations. The Court will not permit this. Moreover, the Court finds it
highly unlikely that an amended complaint based on Boudreaux’s original

version of the events underlying his suit would “carr[y] [him] over the
threshold.” Jacquez, 801 F.2d at 792. Allowing Boudreaux to amend his
complaint would thus be futile. The Court therefore denies plaintiff’s motion

for leave to amend.
G. Remaining Motions
Having found that Boudreaux’s complaint must be dismissed with
prejudice because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

and is frivolous, the Court concludes that all other pending motions are
moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ second motion
to dismiss4 and DENIES plaintiff's motion for leave to amend.‘5 The Court
additionally DENIES as MOOT defendants first motion to dismiss,'®
DENIES as moot plaintiffs motion for reconsideration,!7 DENIES as MOOT
plaintiffs motion for return of property,'8 and DENIES as MOOT plaintiffs
motion seeking to challenge NOPD’s jurisdiction over him.19
The Court DISMISSES plaintiff's claims WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 19th day of September, 2025.
dernk Varner
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14 R. Doc. 24.
15 R. Doc. 28.
16 R. Doc. 20.
17 R. Doc. 13.
18 R. Doc. 17.
19 R. Doc. 23.
16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141415. Public record. Not legal advice.