# July v. Tinsley

> District Court, N.D. Oklahoma · September 19, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141212

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** September 19, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

GEORGE EMILE JULY, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 22-CV-0393-GKF-CDL
)
SCOTT TINSLEY, Interim Warden,1 )
)
Respondent. )

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner George Emile July petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
to challenge the lawfulness of his custody under the criminal judgment entered against him in
Tulsa County District Court Case No. CF-2013-5818. He claims: (1) he was denied his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to the assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not present
sufficient evidence to support a voluntary intoxication defense and appellate counsel failed to
adequately argue trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in that regard (grounds one and two); and (2) he
was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when the State of Oklahoma
prosecuted him for major crimes he committed in Indian country because he is an Indian (ground
three). Dkts. 1, 6. Respondent opposes the petition. Dkt. 14. Having considered the petition and
supporting brief (Dkts. 1, 6), the response (Dkt. 14), Respondent’s supplemental brief (Dkt. 19),
the state court record (Dkts. 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 14-1 through 14-15, 15-1 through 15-40, and 16), and
applicable law, the Court finds and concludes that the petition shall be denied.

1 July is incarcerated at the Dick Conner Correctional Center, and Scott Tinsley is the
interim warden of that facility. The Court therefore substitutes Scott Tinsley, Interim Warden, in
place of Janet Dowling as party respondent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); Rule 2(a), Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The Clerk of Court shall note on the
record this substitution.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual background
In November 2013, Michelle Ashlock had been dating July since April 2013. Dkt. 15-10
at 97-98.2 On November 9th, Ashlock visited Joseph and Stephanie Green at the Greens’ Tulsa

apartment. Id. at 108; Dkt. 15-9 at 54-56, 116-18. July arrived at the apartment around 10:30
p.m., driving a green car. Dkt. 15-9 at 56-57, 60; Dkt. 15-10 at 111. With him were Quinton
Shaver and Christine Farar-Brown, both of whom had been with July at a house on Trenton Avenue
in Tulsa, waiting for July to help Shaver cash a stolen check and helping July get some
methamphetamine. Dkt. 15-11 at 26-33. July went inside the Greens’ apartment while Shaver
and Farar-Brown stayed in the car. Id. at 33-34. The Greens, July, and Ashlock sat in the Greens’
bedroom talking and getting high. Dkt. 15-9 at 56-57, 133-36; Dkt. 15-10 at 109-10. The Greens
and Ashlock used heroin, methamphetamine, or a mixture of these two drugs at the apartment;
July used methamphetamine, or a mixture of methamphetamine and heroin before he arrived at the
apartment. Dkt. 15-9 at 57, 87-90, 133; Dkt. 15-10 at 109-10, 162.3 At some point, Ashlock left

the apartment and drove her white car to a nearby QuikTrip to get cigarettes. Dkt. 15-10 at 112.
When July realized Ashlock was gone, he asked Joseph if Ashlock had stolen anything from the

2 Unless otherwise noted, the Court’s citations refer to the CM/ECF pagination.
3 Joseph Green testified he ingested a mixture of heroin and methamphetamine, that July
“never touched the heroin,” and that he and July “usually” ingest methamphetamine together, but
he was not sure if July did so that night at the Greens’ apartment. Dkt. 15-9 at 87-90. Stephanie
Green testified that she ingested heroin either earlier in the day or in the evening when she was
talking with Ashlock, and that Ashlock ingested methamphetamine. Id. at 133. Ashlock testified
that the Greens “got high on heroin,” that she asked to use heroin, and that she ultimately did not
use heroin. Dkt. 15-10 at 109-10, 162. Ashlock also testified she used methamphetamine with
July sometime before noon and before she went to the Greens’ apartment. Id. at 164. Farar-Brown
testified that July injected a “shot” of what she believed was “meth and heroin” while she, Shaver,
and July were at the Trenton Avenue house before the trio drove to the Greens’ apartment. Dkt.
15-11 at 30-32, 76-77.
apartment and said he was going to find her. Dkt. 15-9 at 59. According to Farar-Brown, July
returned to the green car with a gun, screaming “where did the bitch go?” Dkt. 15-11 at 34-35.
July drove to QuikTrip and abruptly parked in front of Ashlock’s car, nearly striking it. Id. at 35-
36; Dkt. 15-10 at 113. July got out of the green car, began screaming at Ashlock, opened her car

door, and began hitting her in the head with a gun. Dkt. 15-9 at 36; Dkt. 15-10 at 113-14. July
pushed Ashlock into the passenger seat of the white car, sat down in the driver’s seat, and drove
back to the Greens’ apartment. Dkt. 15-10 at 114-15. Farar-Brown and Shaver followed July to
the apartment in the green car. Id. At some point, July called Joseph, stated he had found Ashlock,
and further stated that he “was going to teach her a lesson.” Dkt. 15-9 at 61. July parked Ashlock’s
white car in the Greens’ driveway, slashed the tires of her car, forced Ashlock into the green car,
and continued hitting her with a gun. Dkt. 15-10 at 115-18. July directed Farar-Brown to drive
the green car to the Trenton Avenue house. Id. at 118; Dkt. 15-11 at 38.
When the foursome arrived at the Trenton Avenue house, July forced Ashlock into the
house at gunpoint and dragged her down the hallway by her hair into a back bedroom where he

repeatedly hit her with the gun and kicked her. Dkt. 15-10 at 119-22; Dkt. 15-11 at 38-39. Shaver
and Farar-Brown sat in the living room, and Farar-Brown could hear July hitting Ashlock. Dkt.
15-11 at 40-42. At some point, July pounded on the door of another bedroom to wake Angel
Proctor. Id. at 42. He told Proctor he had “some toys for her to play with.” Id.; Dkt. 15-10 at 120.
Proctor then joined July in beating Ashlock and cutting or poking her with a knife; July also hit
Ashlock with a liquor bottle until the bottle broke. Dkt. 15-10 at 122-26. July directed Proctor to
escort Shaver and Farar-Brown to the back bedroom, and she complied, leading the couple to the
back bedroom at gunpoint. Id. at 126-28; Dkt. 15-11 at 43. When Shaver and Farar-Brown urged
July and Proctor to stop beating Ashlock, July accused Farar-Brown of being a snitch and struck
Farar-Brown in the eye with a gun or a fist. Dkt. 15-10 at 129-30; Dkt. 15-11 at 44-46. July also
struck Shaver in the face with a gun or a fist. Dkt. 15-10 at 129; Dkt. 15-11 at 47. While Ashlock
and Farar-Brown sat in the corner of the room, they watched as July and Proctor continued to hit
Shaver, stomp on his head, and beat him with a mop handle and a chair leg. Dkt. 15-10 at 130-36;

Dkt. 15-11 at 47-54. Eventually, July strangled Shaver with a pair of jeans. Dkt. 15-10 at 131-32;
Dkt. 15-11, at 207-09.
Throughout this time, July and Proctor were drinking whiskey, laughing, kissing, and
taking turns kicking Ashlock and Farar-Brown in the head. Dkt. 15-10 at 122-30; Dkt. 15-11 at
44-54. July would leave the back bedroom periodically because he appeared concerned that
someone was outside, July threatened to kill “all witnesses,” the families of witnesses, and the
police. Dkt. 15-10 at 134; Dkt. 15-11 at 55-59. At some point, July and Proctor shared a marijuana
joint. Dkt. 15-10 at 135. July also staggered around the room and passed out more than once. Id.
at 137-40. When he woke from briefly passing out, he accused Proctor of releasing “the other
three hostages” and Proctor assured him that everyone was still in the bedroom. Id. at 139. July

also appeared to be hallucinating, and Proctor asked Ashlock if July often sees people that are not
there. Id. at 140. Ashlock replied she previously had seen July talk to his dead parents. Id. at 141.
At some point, July passed out next to Shaver, the latter of whom was bleeding profusely and
barely breathing. Dkt. 15-10 at 140; Dkt. 15-11 at 59. When Proctor could not rouse July, she
became frantic. Dkt. 15-10 at 140; Dkt. 15-11 at 60. Ashlock told Proctor that July would kill
everyone if they were there when July woke up. Dkt. 15-10 at 141-42. Proctor then escorted
Ashlock and Farar-Brown to the green car, at gunpoint, and directed Ashlock to drive to
Tahlequah. Dkt. 15-10 at 142-44; Dkt. 15-11 at 60-64. According to Ashlock, Proctor had three
guns in her lap and, “started tripping and getting all weirded out,” and stated she felt “funny.” Dkt.
15-10 at 146. Ashlock saw Proctor “pull[] out what [July] handed to her, which was a needle, with
whatever in it and [Proctor] started freaking out.” Id. When the trio reached Tahlequah, they went
to the home of Proctor’s friend where Proctor searched through duffel bags she had taken from the
Trenton Avenue house, looking for items that she could sell, and went outside to burn “some

phones and stuff.” Dkt. 15-10 at 147-50; Dkt. 15-11 at 60-64; Dkt. 15-37 at 22.
On the morning of November 10th, July called Joseph and asked him to drive to the Trenton
Avenue house. Dkt. 15-9 at 61-62. When Joseph arrived, July told him not to touch anything, led
him to the back bedroom, and showed him Shaver’s body.4 Id. at 63-64. Joseph asked July if
Shaver was dead, and July said, “yes.” Id. at 78. When Joseph asked July if he shot Shaver, July
said, “no, he was beat to death.” Id. at 148. July also told Joseph he “fucked up,” that “things kind
of got out of control,” that there had been some beatings, and that he had passed out after taking a
Xanax. Id. at 65, 79, 94, 109-11. July told Joseph he did not know what happened to Ashlock and
Farar-Brown, but he feared Proctor had taken them away. Id. at 65-67, 111-12, 140-41. July
gathered up his belongings, and Joseph drove July back to the Greens’ apartment. Id. at 65-67.

Joseph and Stephanie later returned to the Trenton Avenue house with July, and Stephanie saw
Shaver’s body in the back bedroom. Id. at 67-70, 97, 121-23.
Later that afternoon, and unbeknownst to July, the Greens called a law enforcement officer
to report that they had seen Shaver’s body at the Trenton Avenue house. Dkt. 15-9 at 73-76, 125-
29, 146-49. A team of law enforcement officers surveilled the Greens’ apartment, the Trenton
Avenue house, and a nearby McDonald’s where July’s white truck was parked. Id. at 150-52. At
the Greens’ apartment, officers watched July load items into a dark-colored truck, followed the

4 Shaver was declared dead around 8:00 p.m. on November 10th and the medical examiner
who performed his autopsy determined that he died from a combination of multiple blunt impact
injuries and asphyxia due to strangulation. Dkt. 15-11 at 227-28.
truck after it left the apartment, and arrested July after a brief vehicle pursuit and foot chase. Id.
at 152-57, 165, 199-214, 217-29. In a search incident to July’s arrest, officers recovered several
items from July’s person, including a handgun and methamphetamine, and found inside his wallet
a handwritten list of cleaning supplies and identification cards belonging to Proctor and Shaver.

Id. at 217-29; Dkt. 15-24 at 1-6; Dkt. 15-10 at 42-46, 216-18; Dkt. 15-33 at 2.
After they learned of July’s arrest, Ashlock and Farar-Brown drove the green car back to
Tulsa, without Proctor, and the two were interviewed the next day by law enforcement officers.
Dkt. 15-10 at 152-57. During a post-arrest interview, July initially denied knowing Proctor,
Ashlock, Shaver, and Farar-Brown; having ever been to the Trenton Avenue house; being in the
truck that was followed and pursued by law enforcement officers; having a gun on him when he
was arrested; and committing any crimes. Dkt. 15-11 at 165-75.5 Eventually, July offered
detectives “multiple stories with different individuals involved in each story”; admitted he had
been dating Ashlock, he knew Proctor, and he had been at the Trenton Avenue house “drinking
and drugging”; and maintained that he was not involved in beating anyone or in killing Shaver.

Id. at 165-75, 185-86. Forensic analysis revealed an exceedingly high probability that Shaver’s
blood and DNA were found on the shoes and sweatshirt July was wearing when he was arrested.
Dkt. 15-10 at 239-40, 246, 278-89.
II. Procedural background
Following a trial, a jury found July guilty of murder in the first degree; three counts of
kidnapping; two counts of assault and battery with a deadly weapon; possession of a firearm after
former conviction of a felony; and possession of a controlled dangerous substance. Dkt. 1-3 at 1.

5 July’s videotaped interview was not admitted at trial, but one of the interviewing
detectives testified about statements he made during the interview. Dkt. 15-11 at 165-75, 247-48
The jury recommended life without the possibility of parole on the murder count and life
imprisonment on all other counts. Id. The trial court sentenced July accordingly and ordered all
counts to be served consecutively. Id.
July appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”), raising six claims.

Dkt. 14-1. Relevant to this proceeding, July claimed trial counsel provided constitutionally
deficient representation by failing to present sufficient evidence to support a voluntary intoxication
defense. Dkt. 14-1, at 19-20. He requested an evidentiary hearing to develop this claim. Dkt. 14-
2. The OCCA denied July’s request for an evidentiary hearing, denied relief as to all claims, and
affirmed his convictions and sentences. Dkt. 1-3 at 22. July did not seek further direct review by
filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”). Dkt.
1 at 3. July’s state criminal judgment became final in 2016. Dkt. 1-1 at 6.
July applied for postconviction relief, asserting two claims.6 Dkt. 14-5. First, July claimed
that the State lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him because he is an enrolled member of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation with some degree of Creek blood, and crimes he committed within the

Cherokee Nation Reservation are subject to federal criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (“MCA”). Id. at 11-20. Second, July claimed appellate counsel provided
constitutionally deficient representation by failing to “proffer any evidence to support” the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim July raised on direct appeal. Id. at 21-28. The state
district court denied relief as to both claims, July appealed, and the OCCA affirmed the denial of
postconviction relief. Dkts. 14-11 through 14-14.
July now seeks federal habeas relief, and Respondent urges the Court to deny the petition.
Dkts. 1, 6, 14.

6 July’s state postconviction counsel represents July in this proceeding.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal standards
A federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner if the prisoner shows that he “is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a). But the “prisoner must exhaust available state remedies before presenting his claim to a
federal habeas court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 527 (2017).7
And the way the state court resolves the federal claim determines the scope of federal habeas
review.
If the state court denies the federal claim after a merits adjudication, the prisoner must
make a threshold showing that the state court’s adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that
either (1) is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or (2) is “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). The prisoner
“carries the burden of proof” in satisfying these standards. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181

(2001). When a claim is subject to review under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court must determine (1)
whether clearly established federal law—i.e., “something akin to [an] on-point holding[]” by the
Supreme Court, exists and, if so, (2) whether the prisoner has shown that the state court either (a)
decided the federal claim in a manner that is contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding or (b) applied
that law to the facts of the case in an objectively unreasonable manner. House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d
1010, 1015-19 (10th Cir. 2008). A state court decision is objectively unreasonable only if it “is so

7 A state prisoner generally must file a federal habeas petition within one year of the date
his or her criminal judgment became final, but the limitation period is tolled while a properly filed
application for state postconviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1), (d)(2). Respondent concedes that July exhausted available state remedies and timely
filed the petition. Dkt. 14 at 3.
obviously wrong that its error lies ‘beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Shinn
v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118 (2020) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
Under § 2254(d)(2), a prisoner must show that the state court’s determination of the facts relevant
to the federal claim is objectively unreasonable. House, 527 F.3d at 1015, 1019. But “[t]he

standard for determining whether the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts ‘is a restrictive one.’” Frederick v. Quick, 79 F.4th 1090, 1104 (10th
Cir. 2023) (quoting Grant v. Trammell, 727 F.3d 1006, 1024 (10th Cir. 2013)), cert. denied, 144
S. Ct. 2634 (2024). A federal court “must defer to the state court’s factual determinations so long
as ‘reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question.” Smith v.
Duckworth, 824 F.3d 1233, 1241 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314
(2015)).
If the state court denies the federal claim based on an independent and adequate state
procedural rule, the prisoner has procedurally defaulted that claim for purposes of federal habeas
review. Davila, 582 U.S. at 527; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991), modified on

other grounds by Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). A federal court may not review, much less
grant relief on, a procedurally defaulted claim unless the prisoner first shows either cause for the
procedural default and actual prejudice from the alleged constitutional error or that the federal
court’s failure to review the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Davila, 582
U.S. at 527; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; see also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392-93
(2013) (discussing miscarriage of justice exception); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)
(discussing cause and prejudice).
Even if a prisoner either satisfies § 2254(d)’s preconditions to relief or makes the showings
necessary to overcome the procedural default of a federal claim, the prisoner is not entitled to
federal habeas relief. See Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 134 (2022) (“While AEDPA
announced certain new conditions to relief, it did not guarantee relief upon their satisfaction.”).
Rather, the federal court must review the claim de novo and, if the court finds a constitutional
error, “must assess [its] prejudicial impact . . . under the ‘substantial and injurious effect’ standard

set forth in Brecht [v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)].” Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22
(2007); see Fontenot v. Crow, 4 F.4th 982, 1060-61 (10th Cir. 2021) (noting that federal courts
apply de novo review when federal claims, including procedurally defaulted claims, “were not
decided on the merits” in state court and that under de novo review “state-court factfinding still
receives the benefit of the doubt under § 2254(e)(1)”). Under the Brecht standard, a federal court
will grant habeas relief only if the court “is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error that
affects substantial rights.” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 445 (1995). Ultimately, to obtain
federal habeas relief, the prisoner “must . . . persuade a federal habeas court that ‘law and justice
require’ relief.” Davenport, 596 U.S. at 134 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243).
II. Ineffective assistance of counsel (grounds one and two)

July claims he received constitutionally deficient legal representation at the trial and
appellate levels. Dkt. 1 at 5, 7; Dkt. 6 at 15-24. He contends trial counsel was ineffective for
failing “to call an expert witness on methamphetamine intoxication or psychosis, exacerbated by
alcohol use.” Id. at 17-24. July acknowledges that appellate counsel raised this claim on direct
appeal, but he contends appellate counsel was ineffective for failing adequately present this claim
and proffer evidence to support it. Id.
A. Clearly established federal law
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . .
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. Amend. 6. The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as
providing a criminal defendant with the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“It has long been recognized that the right to counsel
is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-44

(1963) (reaffirming that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). Typically, a defendant alleging
constitutionally deficient representation must show: (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) “that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
In framing this as a two-part inquiry, the Strickland Court did “not establish mechanical
rules.” Id. at 696. Rather, the Strickland Court emphasized that while the two-part inquiry “should
guide” courts adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, “the ultimate focus of inquiry

must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.” Id. The
Strickland Court also recognized that courts may adjudicate these claims without addressing both
components of the two-part inquiry, stating,
there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach
the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if
the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court need not
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The
object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.
Id. at 697.
Strickland’s analytical framework also informs a court’s adjudication of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claims alleging deficiencies in appellate briefing. Smith v. Robbins,
528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). Ordinarily, a court evaluating whether appellate counsel performed
deficiently either by omitting or failing to adequately present an issue must “look to the merits of

the omitted issue.” Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Neill v.
Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1057 (10th Cir. 2001)). And, in this context, an appellant must establish
prejudice by “show[ing] a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unreasonable failure
to file a merits brief, he would have prevailed on his appeal.” Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285.
B. Additional facts and OCCA decisions
1. Trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness
Evidence presented at trial established that July ingested methamphetamine, possibly
mixed with heroin, alcohol, and Xanax before and during the commission of the crimes for which
he was convicted. See supra, background section I. Trial counsel requested an instruction on the
defense of voluntary intoxication, citing this evidence and evidence that July experienced

hallucinations and passed out at the Trenton Avenue house, but the trial court declined to give the
instruction. Dkt. 15-11 at 125, 129-32, 276-84; Dkt. 15-12 at 14-18. Under Oklahoma law, a
defendant asserting a voluntary intoxication defense must show: (1) the defendant was intoxicated
and (2) the defendant “was ‘so utterly intoxicated, that his mental powers [were] overcome,
rendering it impossible for [him] to form the specific criminal intent . . . element of the crime.’”
Cuesta-Rodriguez v. State, 247 P.3d 1192, 1195 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011) (alterations and emphasis
in original) (quoting Simpson v. State, 230 P.3d 888, 899 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010)). In declining
to give the instruction, the trial court reasoned:
The evidence that was presented was that [July] was drinking, that there
were pills present, but that there was no evidence that he took the pills. There was
no evidence that . . . his intoxication reached a level that he was so utterly
intoxicated[] that his mental powers were overcome rendering it impossible for him
to form specific criminal intent.
In fact, as I reviewed the testimony, there was not evidence of his level of
intoxication. Albeit, there was testimony that the defendant staggered and hit a wall
and woke up and passed out again. There’s no evidence that that was subsequent
or promulgated because of any injection of any intoxicant liquor or drugs.
In fact, the testimony was clear from two items. It is that it appeared he
knew exactly what he was doing when he was doing it with respect to the
description of the assaults and the batteries that were testified to on the deceased.
Dkt. 15-12 at 16-17.
On direct appeal, July argued that Oklahoma law appears to “require” expert witness
testimony to support a voluntary intoxication defense and that it was unreasonable for trial counsel
not to call an expert witness who could testify about methamphetamine intoxication or psychosis
exacerbated by alcohol use. Dkt. 14-1 at 19-25. July moved for an evidentiary hearing on this
claim and, to support that request, submitted (1) the curriculum vitae of William H. Yarborough,
M.D., and (2) and an affidavit from appellate counsel. Dkt. 14-2. Appellate counsel stated in his
affidavit that: (1) he previously had retained Dr. Yarborough as an expert witness in a different
case to testify about methamphetamine psychosis; (2) he lacked funds to retain Dr. Yarborough to
interview July or review his case; (3) if granted an evidentiary hearing, he likely could “secure
funds” to retain Dr. Yarborough who, in turn, might agree testify at the hearing; and (4) he believed
that Dr. Yarborough “would be able to at least testify that the drug and alcohol intake of George
July would have had an effect on his ability to form the specific intent to commit a crime in this
case.” Id. at 27-28.
The OCCA denied July’s request for an evidentiary hearing and denied his claim that trial
counsel was ineffective. Dkt. 14-4 at 9-13. The OCCA acknowledged that state law imposes a
“high standard” for raising a voluntary intoxication defense and requires more than evidence of
“mere consumption” of alcohol or drugs or “conflicting evidence of a defendant’s level of
intoxication,” but the OCCA rejected July’s argument that state law requires a defendant to present
an expert witness to support that defense. Id. at 9-10. Addressing July’s application for an
evidentiary hearing and considering the affidavits he submitted, the OCCA found that July did not

“show . . . by clear and convincing evidence there is a strong possibility trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to utilize or identify the complained-of evidence.” Id. at 10. The OCCA
cited the trial court’s factual findings related to July’s request for a voluntary intoxication
instruction and reasoned:
In light of the trial court’s finding that [July] did not present a prima facie
case of intoxication, [July’s] failure to present any evidence in his motion to remand
for evidentiary hearing concerning a diagnosable mental illness or any evidence of
the substances and their amounts consumed by [July] at the time of the crime so as
to render him utterly intoxicated and his mental powers were overcome rendering
it impossible for him to form the specific criminal intent element of the crime[,]
and the admitted inability to know what Dr. Yarborough would testify to regarding
[July’s] intent to commit the charged crimes dooms [July’s] request for an
evidentiary hearing. The information contained in the motion fails to present clear
and convincing evidence that there is a strong possibility trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate and present further evidence in support of a
voluntary intoxication claim. Having thoroughly reviewed [July’s] application and
affidavit, we conclude that [July] is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id. at 11-12. The OCCA then stated, “Regarding the claim of ineffectiveness raised in the appellate
brief, [July] has not shown trial counsel to be ineffective under the more rigorous federal standard
set forth in Strickland for ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 12.
2. Appellate counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness
On postconviction appeal, July acknowledged that appellate counsel claimed trial counsel
was ineffective for not hiring an expert witness or otherwise presenting a viable voluntary
intoxication defense, but July argued that appellate counsel failed to present available evidence to
support that claim. Dkt. 14-5 at 21-28. To support this argument, July submitted excerpts from
police reports, highlighting witness descriptions of his use of controlled substances and alcohol
and his behavior on November 9, 2013; his own affidavit and an affidavit from his ex-wife, both
signed in 2017, describing his abuse of controlled substances in the months leading up to
November 2013 and his ex-wife’s discussions with trial counsel about the possibility of hiring an

expert witness; and an affidavit from Terese Hall, a licensed psychologist and board-certified
forensic psychologist, who reviewed certain case materials, and opined that expert testimony about
the effects of substance abuse “could have been helpful to the jury,” that an expert “could have
assessed the possibility of a substance-induced psychotic disorder,” and that “there is a reasonable
possibility that Mr. July could have been unable to form criminal intent because of the effects of
methamphetamine and other substance ingestion on his mental processes, resulting in severe
intoxication or drug-induced psychosis.” Id. at 117-46.
Applying Strickland, the state district court denied relief. Dkt. 14-11 at 7-10. It reasoned,
in part, that the affidavits from July and his ex-wife discussed July’s “purported drug use and its
effects prior to the date of the offenses,” but did not “address the date of the offense itself,” or

“provide evidence of the substances and their amounts consumed by [July] at the time of the
crime.” Dkt. 14-11 at 10. Considering “the evidence presented by [July] in support of his
application for post-conviction relief,” the state district court found no “reasonable probability that
had [July’s] appellate counsel presented the evidence [July] claims counsel should have presented,
the result of [July’s] appeal would have been different.” Id.
On postconviction appeal, the OCCA identified Strickland as providing the controlling
legal principles to evaluate July’s claim and denied relief, reasoning:
[July] claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an
intoxication defense and, in turn, appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
assert trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. According to [July], prior counsel should
have introduced evidence of his drug use and its effects on his behavior in support
of an intoxication defense. However, the District Court found that even if the
information referenced by [July in his application for postconviction relief] had
been presented, nothing would have changed. The District Court’s conclusion is
not an abuse of discretion. It follows that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion when it rejected [July’s] claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. See Logan, 2013 OK CR 2, ¶ 11, 293 P.3d at 975 (“An assertion of
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel based upon the failure to raise a meritless claim
(or meritless claims) can be summarily rejected.”).
Dkt. 14-14 at 3-4.
C. Analysis and conclusion
Respondent contends § 2254(d) bars relief as to both ineffective assistance of counsel
claims because July has not shown that the OCCA’s adjudication of those claims resulted in
decisions, either on direct or postconviction appeal, that are objectively unreasonable. Dkt. 14 at
12, 20-31. The Court agrees.
Because the OCCA applied Strickland in rejecting both ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, July must show that the OCCA’s adjudication of his claims resulted in decisions that either
(1) involve an unreasonable application of Strickland’s legal principles to the facts of his case or
(2) are based on an unreasonable determination of the facts presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000) (explaining that “a run-of-the-mill state-
court decision applying the correct legal rule from our cases to the facts of a prisoner’s case would
not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ clause”). On federal habeas review,
“[e]stablishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is .
. . difficult” because “[t]he standards created by ‘and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential and
when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (cleaned up). And
because Strickland provides a general rule for state courts to apply, “the range of reasonable
applications is substantial.” Id.
July barely references the standards that guide this Court’s review of his claims and makes
no discernible effort to satisfy them. Dkt. 6 at 15-24. Instead, he discusses Strickland, reasserts
the arguments he presented in his application for postconviction relief, and appears to ask this
Court to review one or both of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. Id. at 16-22.

But the question for this Court is not whether either of his attorneys performed so deficiently as to
prejudice the outcome of his trial and appeal; rather, the question for this Court is whether the
OCCA had any reasonable basis to reject his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Richter, 562
U.S. at 105.
July has not shown that the OCCA’s decisions are “so obviously wrong” that no fairminded
jurists would agree with them. Kayer, 592 U.S. at 118. To the extent July mentions the OCCA’s
decisions, he appears to contend both are objectively unreasonable because: (1) the OCCA “denied
relief and an evidentiary hearing on the basis that appellate counsel failed to present evidence to
support it”; (2) the state district court effectively disregarded the evidence July marshaled to
support his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim; and (3) on postconviction appeal, the

OCCA “did not engage in any analysis of the evidence presented by July, nor the opinion of Dr.
Hall, but held simply and conclusory that the state district court decision [denying postconviction
relief] was not an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 23-24. In his closing sentence, July asserts that “[t]he
opinions of the OCCA both on direct appeal and in denying post-conviction relief are objective
unreasonable and July is entitled to habeas relief.” Id. at 24.
None of these contentions is persuasive. First, July’s “broad, conclusory statement” that
the OCCA’s decisions “are objective unreasonable” is “insufficient to carry [his] burden” to show
that § 2254(d) does not bar relief. Meek v. Martin, 74 F.4th 1223, 1267 (10th Cir. 2023). Second,
it is not clear from July’s brief, which largely focuses on evidence marshaled for postconviction
proceedings, why it was objectively unreasonable for the OCCA to reject the ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claim raised on direct appeal after considering the trial record and appellate
counsel’s speculations about what testimony Dr. Yarborough might offer if he were hired to testify
at an evidentiary hearing. Dkt. 6 at 16-24. Moreover, July’s argument that appellate counsel did

not offer sufficient evidence to establish trial counsel’s ineffectiveness directly undermines any
argument July might be making that the OCCA unreasonably rejected his admittedly unsupported
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Third, the record belies July’s contention that the
state district court ignored the evidence he presented in his state postconviction proceeding to
establish appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness. Rather, the state district court considered that
evidence and carefully explained why it did not support a finding that appellate counsel’s allegedly
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of July’s appeal. Dkt. 14-11 at 7-10. Fourth, to the
extent July critiques the OCCA’s postconviction decision based on the absence of specific
references to the evidence that the state court had already carefully considered or the absence of
“serious legal analysis” of his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, July’s criticisms

do not come close to showing that the OCCA unreasonably applied Strickland or unreasonably
determined the facts relevant to his claims. Critically, the Constitution does not require state courts
to show their work in anticipation of federal habeas review. See e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 568
U.S. 289, 300 (2013) (noting that “federal courts have no authority to impose mandatory opinion-
writing standards on state courts”); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739 (“[W]e have no power to tell state
courts how they must write their opinions.”). Even when “a state court’s decision is
unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing
there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. July has
not met that burden.
On the record presented, the Court finds and concludes that July has not met his initial
burden to show that the OCCA’s decisions on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims are
objectively unreasonable, much less his ultimate burden to show that law and justice require this
Court to grant federal habeas relief on those claims. The Court therefore denies the petition as to

the claims asserted in grounds one and two.
III. Indian country jurisdiction (ground three)
July claims the State did not have jurisdiction to prosecute him because he is an enrolled
member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation with some degree of Indian blood and crimes he
committed within the Cherokee Nation Reservation are enumerated in the MCA and thus subject
to federal criminal jurisdiction. Dkt. 1 at 8; Dkt. 6 at 25-29.
A. Clearly established federal law
Under the MCA, only the federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute certain crimes,
including murder, kidnapping and felony assault, that are committed by Indians within “Indian
country.” 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a); see McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894, 932 (2020) (“[T]he MCA

applies to Oklahoma according to its usual terms: Only the federal government, not the State, may
prosecute Indians for major crimes committed in Indian country.”); id. at 934 (“When Congress
adopted the MCA, it broke many treaty promises that had once allowed tribes like the Creeks to
try their own members. But, in return, Congress allowed only the federal government, not the
States, to try tribal members for major crimes.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (defining “Indian
country”); United States v. Hatley, ___ F.4th ___, 2025 WL 2553109, at * 7 (10th Cir. Sept. 5,
2025) (quoting the plain language of the MCA and stating Ҥ 1153 confers exclusive federal
jurisdiction over ‘[a]ny Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or
other person’ any of the offenses enumerated in the statute” (emphasis in original)).
Because the relevant federal statutes do not define the term “Indian,” federal courts apply
a two-part test to determine if a criminal defendant is Indian. That test requires a court to “make
factual findings that the defendant ‘(1) has some Indian blood; and (2) is recognized as an Indian
by a tribe or by the federal government.’” United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th

Cir. 2001) (quoting Scrivner v. Tansy, 68 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 1995)). In Hatley, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (“Tenth Circuit”) held, as a matter of first impression
in this circuit, that, “when proving a defendant’s Indian status, the government can only satisfy the
second prong of the Prentiss II test by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
recognized as an Indian at the time of the charged offense.” Hatley, 2025 WL 2553109, at *8;
accord United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “the
government must prove that the defendant was an Indian at the time of the offense with which the
defendant is charged” to establish Indian status for purposes of federal prosecution under the
MCA).
In this circuit, “[t]he issue of whether the state court properly exercised jurisdiction” over

an Indian who committed major crimes in Indian country is “an important federal constitutional
question” and the “[a]bsence of jurisdiction in the convicting court is . . . a basis for federal habeas
corpus relief cognizable under the due process clause.” Yellowbear v. Wyo. Atty. Gen., 525 F.3d
921, 924 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Supreme Court precedent).8

8 Respondent urges the Court to deny relief on July’s Indian country jurisdiction claim, in
part, because: (1) “no Supreme Court law clearly establishes that federal prosecutorial authority
under the MCA . . . is exclusive of state authority” and (2) “no Supreme Court law clearly
establishes that a state prosecution in violation of the MCA . . . is redressable on habeas review.”
Dkt. 14 at 39-63. Based on the Court’s foregoing discussion of clearly established federal law, the
Court rejects these arguments.
A. Additional facts and OCCA decision
July raised his Indian country jurisdiction claim in his 2017 application for postconviction
relief. In support of this claim, July cited the MCA, Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984), and
Murphy v. Royal, 866 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2017), amended and superseded on denial of

reh’g by 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Murphy I”), aff'd sub nom. Sharp v. Murphy, 591 U.S.
977 (2020) (“Murphy II”). Dkt. 14-5, at 11-20. In Murphy I, the Tenth Circuit considered a habeas
petitioner’s challenge to the State’s allegedly improper exercise of criminal jurisdiction in Indian
country that the petitioner first raised in state court through a second postconviction appeal. 875
F.3d at 907-09. Applying Bartlett, the Tenth Circuit held that because Congress has not
disestablished the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation, the land within the boundaries of that
reservation is “Indian country” for purposes of the MCA. Murphy I, 875 F.3d at 966.9 In his
application for postconviction relief, July asked the state district court to apply Bartlett’s
framework to determine whether Congress had disestablished the Cherokee Nation Reservation
and July attached several exhibits (e.g., maps and treaties) to aid the state district court in

performing that task. Dkt. 14-5 at 11-20, 32-35, 40-92. July also attached exhibits showing that
he has a degree of Indian blood and is an enrolled member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. Id.
at 36-39. In March 2018, the State moved to abate July’s state postconviction proceeding until the
matter in Murphy I was “settled.” Dkt. 14-6 at 1.
In July 2020, the Supreme Court issued decisions in McGirt and Murphy II. In McGirt, an
Oklahoma prisoner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the OCCA’s

9 The Tenth Circuit stayed issuance of the mandate in Murphy I for 90 days or until the
deadline passed for filing a petition for writ of certiorari. The respondent in that case filed a
petition for writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted that petition in May 2018. Royal v.
Murphy, 584 U.S. 992 (2018).
decision denying his application for postconviction relief. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct.
659 (2019) (granting petition for writ of certiorari). Like the habeas petitioner in Murphy I, the
prisoner in McGirt claimed that because he is an Indian, the federal government should have
prosecuted him for major crimes he committed within the boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek)

Nation Reservation. McGirt, 591 U.S. at 898 ; Murphy I, 875 F.3d at 928. The question presented
in McGirt was whether the land promised to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation through treaties signed
by the United States in 1832 and 1833 “remains an Indian reservation for purposes of federal
criminal law.” 591 U.S. at 897. The McGirt Court held that because Congress did not disestablish
the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation the land within the boundaries of that reservation is
“Indian country,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), and, as a result, the federal government has
exclusive jurisdiction, under the MCA, to prosecute certain crimes committed by Indians within
those boundaries. McGirt, 591 U.S. at 913, 933-34. Relying on its decision in McGirt, the
Supreme Court in Murphy II summarily affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision in Murphy I. Murphy
II, 591 U.S. at 978. The McGirt Court recognized that its decision might “risk[] upsetting some

convictions” because Oklahoma had been prosecuting Indians for crimes committed in Indian
country since statehood, despite the “plain terms” of the MCA. 591 U.S. at 924-34. But the
McGirt Court reasoned that “[o]ther defendants who do try to challenge their state convictions
may face significant procedural obstacles, thanks to well-known state and federal limitations on
postconviction review in criminal proceedings.” Id. at 932-33.
After the Supreme Court issued its decision in McGirt, July moved the state district court
for an order directing the State to respond to his 2017 application for postconviction relief, and the
matter was fully briefed in April 2021. Dkt. 14-7; Dkt. 14-11 at 1. Nearly one year later, the state
district court denied July’s application. Dkt. 1-1. The state district court found that July became
an enrolled citizen of the Muscogee Creek Nation in November 2005, that he has a significant
degree of Creek Blood, and that he committed his crimes within the Muscogee Creek Nation
Reservation and/or the Cherokee Nation Reservation.10 Id. at 3. Nonetheless, the state district
court denied relief based on the OCCA’s decision in State ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace, 497 P.3d 686

(Okla. Crim. App. 2021). Id. at 5-7. In Wallace, the OCCA “exercise[ed] [its] independent state
law authority to interpret the remedial scope of the state post-conviction statutes” and held that the
McGirt Court “announced a new rule of criminal procedure” and that the McGirt decision does
not “apply retroactively in a state post-conviction proceeding to void a final conviction.” Wallace,
497 P.3d at 688-89, 694. The state district court reasoned that Wallace precluded relief because
July’s conviction became final in 2016. Dkt. 1-1 at 6-7. July appealed, and the OCCA likewise
relied on Wallace to affirm the denial of postconviction relief. Dkt. 1-2 at 2-3. The OCCA
declined July’s “invitation to revisit [its] holding in” Wallace. Id. at 3.11

10 While July’s application for postconviction relief was pending, the OCCA held in a
different case that the Cherokee Nation Reservation is Indian country, as defined in § 1151(a).
Hogner v. State, 500 P.3d 629, 635 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021), overruled in part on other grounds
by Deo v. Parish, 541 P.3d 833 (Okla. Crim. App. 2023).
11 When the state courts adjudicated July’s claim, neither state court suggested that he
waived it by failing to raise it at the trial court level or on direct appeal. See Dkts. 1-1, 1-2. At
that time, Oklahoma law provided that “subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be
raised at any time” and state courts generally treated McGirt-based claims as implicating subject
matter jurisdiction. See Deo v. Parish, 541 P.3d 833, 835-38 (Okla. Crim. App. 2023). In Deo,
however, the OCCA concluded that “subject matter jurisdiction considers the type of controversy
before the district court, not the parties, territory, or sovereigns at issue.” Id. at 838. The OCCA
stated that it was “no longer convinced that Congress has preempted Oklahoma State Courts’
subject matter jurisdiction” and that it had “become[] clear that Congress has chosen to exercise
its authority over a particular territory (Indian Country) and over a particular people (Indians), not
a type of controversy, at most preempting Oklahoma’s territorial and personal jurisdiction over
Indians in Indian Country.” Id. at 837. See also, City of Tulsa v. O’Brien, ___ P.3d ___, 2024 WL
5001684 (Okla. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2024) (describing Deo as holding “that Indian country
jurisdictional claims do not implicate Oklahoma district courts’ subject matter jurisdiction, but
rather personal and territorial jurisdiction”).
C. Analysis and conclusion
Respondent urges the Court to deny relief on this claim, in part, because the OCCA’s
decision is based on an independent and adequate state procedural rule, namely the Wallace rule,
and July has not made the showings necessary to overcome the procedural default of this claim.
Dkt. 14 at 63-92.12 The Court agrees.

As previously discussed, when a state court denies a federal claim based on an independent
and adequate state procedural rule, the prisoner has procedurally defaulted that claim for purposes
of federal habeas review. Davila, 582 U.S. at 527; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. When “the state
pleads the affirmative defense of an independent and adequate state procedural bar, the burden to
place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner.” Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1217 (10th Cir.
1999). A state procedural rule is adequate if the rule is “firmly established and regularly followed.”
Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60 (2009) (quoting Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002)). And
a state procedural rule is independent if the rule relies on state law, rather than federal law.
Simpson v. Carpenter, 912 F.3d 542, 571 (10th Cir. 2018). “[A]t a minimum,” the petitioner must

come forward with “specific allegations . . . as to the inadequacy of the state procedure” and “[t]he
scope of the state’s burden of proof thereafter will be measured by the specific claims of
inadequacy put forth by the petitioner.” Id.
July did not file a reply brief to respond to Respondent’s argument that the Wallace rule
provides an independent and adequate state law ground to support the OCCA’s rejection of his
Indian country jurisdiction claim. However, in his brief, July presents several arguments regarding

12 Alternatively, Respondent contends that § 2254(d) bars relief to the extent it states a
cognizable habeas claim, and that this claim would fail on de novo review because it is barred by
the non-retroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Dkt. 14 at 92-133. Because
the Court agrees that this claim is procedurally barred, the Court declines to address these
alternative arguments.
the Wallace rule. Generally, July “objects to the holding of Wallace and its application to his case,
and views it as wrongly decided and in direct conflict with McGirt.” Dkt. 6 at 26. More
specifically, he contends “the OCCA is incorrect as a matter of federal law that McGirt announced
a new rule of criminal procedure” because, in July’s view, McGirt announced “a substantive rule

of criminal law.” Id. at 27 (emphasis in original). He further contends that because “Jimcy McGirt
has received the benefit of the McGirt ruling,” he should receive that same benefit to avoid being
“singled out arbitrarily in violation of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause.” Id. Next, he contends imprisoning him, and other Native Americans, “when
the State has no lawful power to do so violates . . . substantive Due Process.” Id. He also contends
“there is no rational or legal principle that says that Wallace itself must be applied retroactively”
and emphasizes that the state district court did not rule on his 2017 application for postconviction
relief until 2022. Id. at 27-28. Lastly, July contends the OCCA “has no authority to deem a
decision of the Supreme Court retroactive or not” because “[t]hat power is left to the Supreme
Court itself under the principles of retroactivity outlined in” Teague. Id. at 28-29.

Though not well developed, July’s arguments appear to ask this Court to consider whether
the OCCA wrongly decided Wallace. But that question is not before this Court in this habeas
action. Because the OCCA rejected July’s Indian country jurisdiction claim based on a procedural
rule, without reaching the merits, the only questions for this Court are (1) whether the Wallace rule
is independent of federal law; (2) whether the OCCA regularly follows it in denying postconviction
relief; and (3) if so, whether July has shown that he can overcome the procedural default of this
claim. July’s arguments do not fairly address any of these questions. In contrast, Respondent
shows that the OCCA has applied the Wallace rule in more than 350 cases since Wallace was
decided. Dkt. 14 at 73; Dkts. 14-19, 14-20. On this record, the Court finds that the Wallace rule
is adequate because it is “firmly established and regularly followed.” Beard, 558 U.S. at 60. The
Court further finds that the Wallace rule is independent of federal law. True, the OCCA discussed
federal law, including Teague, in reaching its decision that it would not retroactively apply McGirt
to in state postconviction proceedings, but the OCCA also clearly expressed that its ultimate

decision on that issue rests on independent state law grounds. Wallace, 497 P.3d at 688-89, 694.
Under Supreme Court precedent, that clear expression is sufficient to establish that the Wallace
rule is “independent” of federal law. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (“If a
state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other
jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the
federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the
result that the court has reached.”); Simpson, 912 F.3d at 571.13 In sum, the Court finds that the
OCCA applied an independent and adequate state procedural rule to deny postconviction relief on
July’s Indian country jurisdiction claim, resulting in a procedural default of this claim.
To obtain habeas review of this claim, July first must show either cause for the procedural

default and actual prejudice from the alleged constitutional error or that this Court’s failure to
review the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Davila, 582 U.S. at 527;
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. July neither acknowledges the procedural default of this claim nor
attempts to show that he can overcome the procedural default. Instead, July’s arguments focus on

13 At least two federal district judges in Oklahoma, including the undersigned, previously
have concluded that the OCCA’s Wallace rule is an independent and adequate procedural rule that,
when applied to a federal claim challenging the state’s allegedly improper exercise of criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country, results in a procedural default of that federal claim. See Patterson
v. Harpe, No. 18-CV-0153-GKF-JFJ, 2025 WL 1908975, at *16 (N.D. Okla. July 10, 2025) (slip
copy); Dkt. 19-1, Fitzer v. Hamilton, No. CIV-18-283-RAW-GLJ (E.D. Okla. Jan. 2, 2025)
(unpublished). While neither case is binding on this Court, the Court finds the reasoning in
Patterson and Fitzer persuasive.
the merits of his Indian country jurisdiction claim and assert that the OCCA wrongly decided
Wallace. Dkt. 6 at 25-29.14
Because July procedurally defaulted the Indian country jurisdiction claim and has not
shown any basis for this Court to excuse the procedural default, the Court denies the petition as to

ground three.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that July has not made the necessary showings to obtain federal
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court therefore denies the petition as to all three
grounds for relief raised therein. However, because the Court concludes that reasonable jurists
could debate whether claim three states a substantial constitutional claim and could debate the
Court’s determination that relief on that claim is barred by an adequate and independent state
procedural rule, the Court grants a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the rule
announced by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in State ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace, 497
P.3d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021), is an independent and adequate state procedural rule that bars

relief as to Patterson’s claim that he was denied due process when the State of Oklahoma exercised
criminal jurisdiction to prosecute him for crimes he committed in Indian country. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

14 As previously stated, July did not file an optional reply brief to respond to any arguments
Respondent raised in the response. Further, after the Court granted Respondent’s motion file a
supplemental brief addressing the Fitzer decision, see supra n.13, and provided July the
opportunity to also file a supplemental brief addressing the Fitzer decision, July did not file a
supplemental brief.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1. the Clerk of Court shall note on the record the substitution of Scott Tinsley, Interim
Warden, in place of Janet Dowling as party respondent;
2. the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. 1) is denied;
3. a certificate of appealability is granted on the following issue: whether the rule
announced by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in State ex rel. Matloff v.
Wallace, 497 P.3d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021), is an independent and adequate state
procedural rule that bars relief as to July’s claim that he was denied due process when
the State of Oklahoma exercised criminal jurisdiction to prosecute him for crimes he
committed in Indian country; and
4. aseparate judgment shall be entered in this matter.
DATED this 19th day of September, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

28

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141212. Public record. Not legal advice.