# Do v. Blessing Hospital, a Corporation

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · September 19, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141206

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 19, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141206

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that judges act as gatekeepers “to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and reliable.”

## Opinion text

rriday, 17 september, 2UL5 □□ □□□
Clerk, U.S. District Court, IL
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
TANYA SOULE, as Holder of Power of )
Attorney for MARLENE DO, Her Mother, )
a Currently Disabled Adult, and LONG DO, )
Her Husband, )
Plaintiffs, )
)
Vv. ) Case No. 20-cv-1398
)
BLESSING HOSPITAL, a corporation; )
SCOTT HOUGH, M.D.; ISIDOROS )
VARDAROS, M.D.; BRYAN MOORE, M.D.; )
SHAILA O’DEAR, R.N.; JASON LITTLE, )
APRN; KRISTIN HAMPTON, R.N.; )
REBECCA DENNISON, R.N.; AUSTIN )
HAKE, M.D., ANGELO LLANA, M.D.; and)
QUINCY PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS )
CLINIC, S.C. d/b/a QUINCY MEDICAL )
GROUP, )
Defendants. )
OPINION
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Bar the Testimony of Linda Schwieger,
RN, CNLCP, CBIS. (Doc. 205). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is Granted
in part and Denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a medical negligence case filed by Plaintiffs Tanya Soule, as holder of Power
of Attorney for Marlene Do, her mother, a currently disabled adult, and Long Do, her
husband. (Doc. 205 at 1). Plaintiffs allege Defendants were negligent in failing to timely

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diagnose and manage Marelene’s ischemic stroke on December 11, 2019. Defendants
deny they were negligent and deny proximately causing any injury to Marlene.
Defendants Blessing Hospital; Scott Hough, M.D.; Shaila O’Dear, R.N.; Jason
Little, APRN; Kristin Hampton, R.N.; Angelo Llana, M.D.; and Rebecca Dennison, R.N.
move under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to bar Plaintiffs’ expert witness, Linda
Schwieger, RN, CNLCP, CBIS, from testifying because she is not qualified to testify on
future costs derivative of medical coding decisions and her life care plan is unsupported
by medical evidence and fails to account for preexisting injuries. (Doc. 205 at 5-16).
Defendants further note Nurse Schwieger’s testimony has been barred in other cases for
these reasons. In response, Plaintiff claims she is qualified by experience and her life care
plan is supported by medical evidence and the opinions of Marlene’s treating physicians.
Defendants note Plaintiffs’ Rule 26 Disclosure as to Nurse Schwieger and her life
care plan contemplates various items and medical services that Plaintiffs claim Marlene
may need in the future due to the injuries she sustained as a result of her stroke. Nurse
Schwieger also assigned a cost to each of the various items and medical services in the
life care plan. To arrive at her cost estimates for several categories within her life care
plan, Nurse Schwieger independently selected medical codes.
Plaintiffs state Nurse Schwieger is a certified nurse life care planner and certified
brain injury specialist who has spent the last 19 years developing life care plans. (Doc.
217). She is a member of the American Association of Nurse Life Care Planners, where
she spent two years as the National Conference Chairperson, a member of the American

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Association of Legal Nurse Consultants, where she served as President of her chapter,
and a member of the International Association of Rehabilitation Professionals.
Defendants move to exclude Nurse Schwieger’s testimony under Rule 702 and
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Plaintiffs argue Nurse
Schwieger relied on the medical opinions of Dr. Stanley Mathew, a board-certified
physical medicine and rehabilitation physician who has cared for thousands of stroke
patients over the last 15 years, when drafting the life care plan. Dr. Mathew has extensive
expertise in the rehabilitation of stroke patients, working with a multidisciplinary team
including physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech therapies, and medical
psychology recreational therapy. Plaintiffs contend Dr. Mathew’s opinions, along with
Nurse Schwieger’s review of Marlene’s medical records, review of the deposition
testimony of her treating physicians, her nursing assessment of Marlene, and Nurse
Schwieger’s own education, training, and experience, all form the factual basis of her life
care plan. Plaintiffs contend the life care plan is well supported by the evidence in this
case.
II. DISCUSSION
In seeking exclusion, Defendants note Nurse Schwieger conceded through her
discovery deposition that she has no training, education, or experience in medical coding.
Defendants claim this is significant because her cost opinions related to a portion of her
life care plan derive from her independent medical coding decisions. Additionally,
because her opinions are not supported by independent admissible evidence, Nurse
Schwieger’s future cost opinions are irrelevant. Finally, Nurse Schwieger failed to
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account for whether Marlene would have needed the items and services in her life care
plan due to her preexisting conditions.
A. Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme
Court interpreted an earlier version of Rule 702 and explained that it imposes a special
gatekeeping obligation on trial judges with regard to scientific testimony. The district
court’s “gatekeeping obligation ... applies not only to testimony based on scientific
knowledge, but also to testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge.”
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); see also Lees v. Carthage Coll.,
714 F.3d 516, 521 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Daubert analysis applies to all expert testimony
under Rule 702, not just scientific testimony.”). While the scientific or technical evidence
need not have general acceptance, the district court must ensure that the evidence is
relevant and reliable before admitting it. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89; see also United
States v. Truitt, 938 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that judges act as gatekeepers
“to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and reliable.”)

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In acting as a gatekeeper, district courts must evaluate: “(1) the proffered expert's
qualifications; (2) the reliability of the expert’s methodology; and (3) the relevance of the
expert's testimony.” Kirk v. Clark Equip. Co., 991 F.3d 865, 872 (7th Cir. 2021). To be
relevant, expert testimony must “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Courts consider the reliability of an expert’s
opinion by making “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.” Anderson v. Raymond Corp., 61 F Ath 505,
509 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93). Some factors to consider
include: “(1) whether the particular scientific theory can be and has been tested; (2)
whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or
potential rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique’s operation; and (5) whether the technique has achieved general acceptance
in the relevant scientific or expert community.” Id. at 509 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Rule 702 requires a flexible inquiry and recognizes that the accuracy of proposed
expert testimony can be explored adequately via the normal adversarial process of
“vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction
on the burden of proof.” Lees, 714 F.3d at 526 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596). It is “the
soundness and care with which the expert arrived at her opinion” that is the focus of
the inquiry and not “the ultimate correctness of the expert’s conclusions.” Anderson, 61
F.4th at 510.
B. Qualifications to Testify on Future Costs Using Medical Coding Decisions
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Defendants claim Nurse Schwieger is not qualified to testify on future costs
derivative of medical coding decisions in large part because she has no training,
education, or experience in making medical code decisions. Her experience only involves
reviewing medical records and medical invoices for the past 20 years. Defendants
contend that, despite Nurse Schwieger’s lack of training, education, or experience in the
world of medical coding, she selected the second highest code and cost available for every
physician service in Marlene’s life care plan.
Plaintiffs contend that, while she is not a certified professional coder, her
experience qualifies her an expert in the field. While she had no experience coding when
working as a nurse, Schwieger has reviewed medical codes throughout her decades of
experience in determining her opinions regarding life care planning and she uses medical
codes in conjunction with drafting her opinions on life care issues and costs.
Defendants note Nurse Schwieger also selected medical codes for “ER Visits for
Falls/Fractures to Stroke Symptoms” and associated “Hospital Admission for Further
Stroke Assessment 2.5-6.6 days” and “Post-Hospitalization Inpatient Rehabilitation
Program x2 wks.” Nurse Schwieger speculated that Marlene will go to the Emergency
Department secondary to a fall once a year for the remainder of her life, will be
hospitalized at least three times for 2.5 to 6.6 days, and will require post-hospitalization
inpatient rehabilitation. As for the resulting costs, Nurse Schwieger selected the medical
codes she believes might be selected for each of those hospitalizations. She acknowledged
Marlene had never been hospitalized for a fall and thus had no reference point for
medical costs resulting from falls.
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Defendants state that, even though Nurse Schwieger could have selected several
different medical codes for the various items included in her life care plan, she selected
the highest or second highest medical code for the item and service contained therein.
Defendants contend Nurse Schwieger lacked the qualifications to select the appropriate
medical code relating to cost for medical services she speculates Marlene may need in the
future—such as those relating to hospital visits for stroke assessment and _post-
hospitalization inpatient rehabilitation. The same type of process was used by Nurse
Schwieger in selecting medical codes for services Marlene may need such as physical
therapy, occupational therapy, and speech language pathology therapy.
Nurse Schwieger testified she does not always pick the highest or second highest
level of code. The inquiry is very individualized based on the information about the
patient. Nurse Schwieger testified she selected the second highest code based on what
she knows about Marlene and her issues.
Defendants contend Nurse Schwieger’s life care plan opinion associated with (1)
Physician Care; (2) Diagnostics; and (3) Physical, Occupational, and Speech-Language
Therapies should be excluded because, based on the complexity of medical coding and
given that she has not been trained or educated on how to select an appropriate medical
code, she is not qualified under Daubert to render such opinions.
Plaintiffs assert Defendants’ arguments concerning Nurse Schwieger’s
qualifications to review medical codes and opine on life care planning and future costs
based on those codes are better suited for cross-examination rather than as a basis for
excluding her testimony. Nurse Schwieger reviewed Mrs. Do’s medical records and bills,
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created a chronology, conducted a video nursing assessment, and consulted with Dr.
Stanley Mathew in drafting the life care plan.
Given the nature and complexity of medical coding and the fact that Nurse
Schwieger has no training, education, or experience in selecting medical codes for a
patient, the Court concludes Nurse Schwieger lacks the requisite specialized knowledge
under Rule 702 to select medical codes. Significantly, Nurse Schwieger did not base the
medical codes she selected on codes that had previously been selected by healthcare
providers. Instead, she independently selected medical codes that she believes may be
selected by Marlene’s future healthcare providers. Her decision as to the appropriate
code was “based on the complexity of what I know about [Marlene] and her issues.”
However, Nurse Schwieger admitted she is not qualified to make medical diagnoses and
must rely upon decisions made by Marlene’s treating physicians.
Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to the extent it seeks the exclusion
of Nurse Schwieger’s life care plan opinions premised upon her medical coding
selections: (1) Physician Care, (2) Diagnostics, and (3) Physical, Occupational, and
Speech-Language Therapies.
C. Medical Evidence in Support of Life Care Plan
Defendants next contend Nurse Schwieger’s life care plan is unsupported by
medical evidence and fails to account for preexisting injuries. Specifically, she failed to
collaborate with a physician for most of the opinions and did not account for Marlene’s
preexisting conditions in developing her life care plan. In preparing the life care plan,
Nurse Schwieger reviewed Marlene’s medical records and reviewed the deposition
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testimony of two of Marlene’s providers, Dr. Dillon, her neurologist, and Dr. Bowen, her
former primary care physician. Nurse Schwieger also spoke to Plaintiff's retained expert,
Dr. Stanley Mathew. She also conducted a video nursing assessment of Marlene but did
not communicate with any of Marlene’s treating providers.
Defendants’ reliance on Hopey v. Spear, 2016 WL 9665159 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2016),
wherein Judge Bruce barred some of Nurse Schwieger’s proposed expert testimony
because it was not supported by a medical provider, is misplaced because unlike in this
case, she did not collaborate with a medical doctor in Hopey. Id. at *3-6; see also Eliason v.
Superior Refining Co., LLC, 2021 WL 4820252, at *6-7( W.D. Wi. Oct. 15, 2021) (limiting
Schwieger’s testimony to opinions supported by physician recommendations or medical
needs).
While Defendants are critical of the extent of Dr. Mathew’s review of the life care
plan and the fact that she did not talk to any treating providers, Dr. Mathew testified that
he spent many more hours than one 30-minute phone conversation with Nurse
Schwieger reviewing the life care plan. While he generally agreed with the opinions
contained therein, Dr. Mathew also testified that he recommended certain additions
which were added to the life care plan for Marlene. Nurse Schwieger also reviewed
Marlene’s medical records and the deposition testimony of two of her medical providers.
Based on Nurse Schwieger’s qualifications and the role of Dr. Mathew, the Court
concludes that the information is sufficiently reliable and relevant to assist the factfinder.
Defendants further note Nurse Schwieger was aware that, prior to her December
2019 stroke, Marlene had a debilitating condition known as rheumatoid arthritis, which
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resulted in her being on social security disability for two decades. Marlene’s treating
rheumatologist testified that her condition would cause her difficulties completing all of
her activities of daily living. Defendants contend Nurse Schwieger and Dr. Mathew failed
to consider Marlene’s preexisting condition. Dr. Mathew testified that, regardless of the
stroke but due to the rheumatoid arthritis, Marlene may have required some assistance
particularly as she aged. He speculated it may not be until much later that she would
need assistance like a home health aide. Although Plaintiffs appear not to have disclosed
any physicians to differentiate which items and services in Nurse Schwieger’s life care
plan would have been needed if Marlene had not suffered a stroke, Dr. Mathew’s
testimony touches on the issue. Thus, the Court declines to bar Nurse Schwieger’s
testimony as to the life care plans. Of course, Defendants may explore what they believe
to be any weaknesses with the testimony on cross-examination, in addition to objecting
to any opinions offered without a proper evidentiary basis.
Il. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion to Bar the Testimony of Linda
Schwieger, RN, CNLCP, CBIS (Doc. 205) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as
provided in this Order.
ENTER: September 19, 2025

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS
NIT ATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11141206. Public record. Not legal advice.