# RHOADS II v. CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · September 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11140734

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** September 17, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11140734

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “a public employee who is defamed in the course of being terminated or constructively discharged satisfies the ‘stigma-plus’ test even if, as a matter of state law, he lacks a property interest in the job he lost”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ALAN RHOADS,

Plaintiff,
No. 25-cv-04477

v.

OPINION
CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

Alan Gregory Rhoads II
101 Barr Avenue
Linwood, NJ 08221

Pro Se.

John Charles Hegarty
JASINSKI, P.C.
308 South New York Road, Suite B
Galloway, NJ 08205

On behalf of Defendants City of Atlantic City, Andrew Kramer, Thomas Gleghorn, and
Samm D’Amore.

Tracey S. Cosby
134 Evergreen Place, Suite 301
East Orange, NJ 07018

Monika Emara
TRACEY S. CROSBY
134 Evergreen Place, Suite 301
East Orange, NJ 07018

On behalf of Defendant Mayor Marty Small.
O’HEARN, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff Alan Rhoads’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, (ECF No. 10), as well as Defendants City of Atlantic City, Andrew
Kramer, Samm D’Amore, and Thomas Gleghorn (collectively the “Skate Zone Defendants”) and
Defendant Mayor Marty Small’s separate Motions to Dismiss, (ECF Nos. 20, 22), Plaintiff’s pro
se Complaint, (ECF No. 1), for failure to state a claim.1 The Court did not hear oral argument
pursuant to Local Rule 78.1. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED and
Defendants’ Motions are GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint which the Court accepts as true
for purposes of this motion.
Plaintiff Alan Rhoads is the former head coach of Stockton University’s Men’s Ice Hockey
Team. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶ 7). He also engaged in various forms of advocacy relating to the
Skate Zone, a public skating facility operated by the City of Atlantic City. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 48). This
included participating in meetings of the South Jersey Ice & Athletic Center Association
(“SJIAC”), a nonprofit. (Id. at ¶ 16).

1 A pro se plaintiff’s complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Cason v. Middlesex Cnty. Prosecutors’ Off.,
No. 18-2101, 2022 WL 2871195, at *3 (D.N.J. July 21, 2022) (quoting Montgomery v. Pinchak,
294 F.3d 492, 500 (3d Cir. 2002)). Notwithstanding the Court’s liberal interpretation, a complaint
“may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if the allegations set forth by the plaintiff cannot be
construed as supplying facts to support a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Grohs v. Yatauro,
984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013) (citation omitted).
2
On October 24, 2024, Rhoads and several others, including James O’Donnell, Kenneth
Cleveland, and Hugh Turner, were attending a SJIAC meeting at the Skate Zone. (Ex. C, ECF No.
1 at 19–22). Shortly after the meeting began, Defendant Thomas Gleghorn, allegedly an agent or
employee of the City, (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 11), entered the room and said that Defendant D’Amore,
the rink manager, wanted to speak with Rhoads. (Ex. C, ECF No. 1 at 19-22). When Rhoads
attempted to place the call on speaker phone, Gleghorn initially refused and left the room. (Id.).

After D’Amore agreed to speak with Rhoads via speaker phone, Gleghorn returned to the room
shortly afterwards. (Id.).
D’Amore said that Rhoads “was always causing trouble at the rink” and that the SJIAC
could not continue meeting in the room they were in because it was a rented space. (Id.). D’Amore
also threatened to call the police if they did not vacate. (Id.). Rhoads and the others agreed to leave
and continued the meeting in the Skate Zone lobby. (Id.). When attendees asked Gleghorn “what
the issue was” he responded that “the problem was Mr. [Rhoads] and his postings and emails that
were critical of [Gleghorn’s] wife and the rink in general.” (Id.). Gleghorn appeared agitated about
Rhoads “smearing” his wife and yelled at Rhoads in the lobby. (Id.).
Two days later, on October 26, 2023, Rhoads was informed that he was banned from the

Skate Zone. (Id. at ¶ 14). On November 21, 2023, Defendant Kramer, the City’s Public Information
Officer, responding to a press inquiry about Rhoads being banned, stated that Rhoads had “failed
to comply with the Skate Zone’s rules and regulations set forth by the City of Atlantic City,
including holding a recent unauthorized meeting inside the city-owned facility.” (Ex. B, ECF No.

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1 at 17–18). Kramer said that this “was not an isolated incident” and that Stockton University
officials previously had to “intervene in a matter” involving Rhoads and the city. (Id. at 18).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on May 16, 2025, bringing equal protection (Count I),
procedural due process (Count II), substantive due process (Count III), and First Amendment
retaliation claims (Count V) against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a defamation claim

against Kramer (Count IV). (ECF No. 1 at 7–10). He then filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction
on July 7, 2025, seeking to restore his access to the Skate Zone. (ECF No. 10). Defendant Small
and the Skate Zone Defendants filed briefs opposing the preliminary injunction on July 21, 2025
(ECF Nos. 18–19) and subsequently filed Motions to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) on July 25, 2025, and August 4, 2025. (ECF Nos. 20, 22). Plaintiff filed a reply
supporting his Motion for Preliminary Injunction on July 28, 2025. (ECF No. 21) and a brief
opposing Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss on August 19, 2025. (ECF No. 25). Defendants filed
reply briefs on their Motions to Dismiss on August 26 and 28, 2025. (ECF Nos. 26–27).
III. JURISDICTION
This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law defamation claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Preliminary Injunction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs the issuance of temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions. FED. R. CIV. P. 65; Vuitton v. White, 945 F.2d 569, 573 (3d Cir. 1991).
4
Preliminary injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy” and “should be granted only in limited
circumstances.” AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426–1427 (3d Cir.
1994) (quoting Frank’s GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir.
1988)). To obtain relief, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) the balance of the equities favors
them; and (4) such relief is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.

7, 20 (2008). Where, as here, Defendants are government entities or officials sued in their official
capacities, the balance of equities and the public interest factors merge. See Nken v. Holder, 556
U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
While courts must balance all four factors, Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443
(3d Cir. 1982), this Circuit has placed significant weight “on the probability of irreparable harm
and the likelihood of success on the merits” factors. FM 103.1, Inc. v. Universal Broad., 929
F. Supp. 187, 193 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186,
197 (3d Cir. 1990)). A court should only issue an injunction “if the plaintiff produces evidence
sufficient to convince the district court that all four factors favor preliminary relief.” AT&T, 42
F.3d at 1427 (citation omitted).

B. Motion to Dismiss
To state a claim, a complaint need only provide a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Although “short and plain,”
this statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up). A “plaintiff’s
5
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
(cleaned up). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a
court must accept the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations and all reasonable inferences drawn

from them as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Evancho v. Fisher,
423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005). Through this lens, the court then conducts a three-step analysis.
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). “First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the court should identify and disregard those allegations
that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Finally, the court must determine
whether “the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible
claim for relief.’” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679). A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has
been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). The court may only
consider the facts alleged in the pleadings, any attached exhibits, and any matters of judicial notice.
S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999).
6
If any other matters outside the pleadings are presented and the court does not exclude them, a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be treated as a summary judgment motion pursuant to Rule 56. FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(d).2
V. DISCUSSION
A. Preliminary Injunction
The Court first finds that Plaintiff cannot show that he will suffer irreparable harm if an

injunction is denied because he has waited more than a year before seeking relief. Here, the events
at issue took place in October 2023, roughly eighteen months before Plaintiff filed his Complaint
in May 2025. (ECF No. 1). Such delay “knocks the bottom out of any claim of immediate and
irreparable harm.” N.J. Staffing All. v. Fais, 751 F. Supp. 3d 419, 424 (D.N.J. 2024) (quoting
Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Lab’ys, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 335, 383–84 (D.N.J. 2002) (denying
preliminary injunction when plaintiffs waited more than a year). Preliminary injunctions are
“generally granted under the theory that there is an urgent need for speedy action to protect the
plaintiffs’ rights.” Lanin v. Borough of Tenafly, 515 F. App’x 114, 117–18 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). Thus, “[d]elay in seeking enforcement of those rights … tends to indicate at least a
reduced need for such drastic, speedy action.” Id. at 118 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court

2 In this case, Plaintiff has pleaded additional facts and attached additional exhibits in
multiple filings, including his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (ECF No. 10), his reply in
support of the same, (ECF No. 21), and his brief opposing Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, (ECF
No. 25). Much of the factual assertions contained therein are not found in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Thus, the Court cannot consider these facts for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss.
7
finds that Plaintiff has failed to show irreparable harm, one of the two most important factors in
deciding whether to grant an injunction.
In the alternative, for the reasons discussed below in the context of Defendants’ Motions
to Dismiss, the Court also finds that Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits,
the second critical factor in granting a preliminary injunction.
B. Motions to Dismiss

As a threshold matter, in reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds it difficult to
determine which claims are brought against which Defendants. “Careful pleading in civil rights
cases is not a matter of etiquette or housekeeping; it is necessary to provide defendants with notice
of the claims asserted against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests so that they can
properly frame an answer.” Foulke v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, No. 23-2543, 2024 WL 3568841, at
*12 (D.N.J. July 29, 2024). Thus, a “shotgun” or “group” pleading that “fails to specify which of
the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim
is brought against” is impermissible under Rule 8. Id. at *7 (citation omitted). That is precisely the
case here. For instance, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was “abruptly informed that he was
banned” from the Skate Zone, (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 14), but does not state by whom.3 Thus, while

Plaintiff may be able to state a claim against some Defendants based on the theories he advances,

3 In his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff alleges that he was “informed by a
university official that the Atlantic City Mayor’s office had directed that Plaintiff was no longer
permitted on the Skatezone premises.” (ECF No. 10-1 at 2). However, as explained above, because
this is not pleaded in the Complaint, the Court cannot consider this for purposes of the Motion to
Dismiss.
8
the current Complaint lacks the factual specificity required by Rule 8 to enable the Court to
perform the necessary factual and legal analysis.
The Court also finds that all the claims against Defendants in their official capacities are
duplicative of the claims against Defendant Atlantic City. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165 (1985) (“As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond,
an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”

(citation omitted)). Therefore, the Court will dismiss all the official-capacity claims against
Defendants Small, Kramer, D’Amore, and Gleghorn with prejudice.
1. Claims Against Mayor Small
Defendant Small argues that the Complaint fails to state a claim against him. (See Small
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 20-1 at 6–8). The Court agrees.
To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must plead facts that demonstrate the mayor’s
personal involvement in the alleged violation, which can be shown through “allegations of
personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Here, Plaintiff alleges only that “[u]pon information and belief, [Small]

9
was aware of and approved the retaliatory and discriminatory actions against Plaintiff.” (Compl.,
ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9). This conclusory allegation is insufficient to plausibly state a claim.
Therefore, the Court will grant Defendant Small’s Motion and dismiss all claims against
him without prejudice.
2. Defamation
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s defamation claim is time-barred by New Jersey’s statute

of limitations. (See Small Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 20-1 at 9–11; Skate Zone Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 22-1 at 20.) The Court agrees.4
Under New Jersey law, “[e]very action at law for libel or slander shall be commenced
within 1 year next after the publication of the alleged libel or slander.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-
3. This statute of limitations is strictly construed, and the discovery rule is inapplicable. McGillvary
v. Scutari, No. 23-22605, 2025 WL 417061, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2025).

4 Liberally construing Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint, (ECF No. 1 at 9), the Court assumes that
he intended to bring a defamation claim under New Jersey law and therefore its statute of
limitations applies. To the extent that he seeks to bring a defamation claim under § 1983, that is
addressed below in the context of his procedural due process claim.

10
Here, the alleged defamatory statement was made on November 21, 2023. (Compl, ECF.
No. 1 at ¶ 43). Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on May 16, 2025, well over a year after the alleged
publication. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss Count IV with
prejudice.5
3. Procedural Due Process
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a procedural due process claim in Count

II. “To prevail on a procedural due process claim, a litigant must show (1) that the state deprived
him of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property and (2) that the deprivation occurred without
due process of law.” Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 285 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim fails at the first step because there is no
protected interest implicated as a matter of law.
Plaintiff, relying on Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), alleges that Defendants deprived
him of a “protected liberty interest in his reputation and professional standing by publicly accusing
him of misconduct and banning him from a public facility without prior notice or any opportunity
to be heard.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶ 36–37). As Plaintiff appears to recognize, Davis itself holds
that reputational damage alone cannot form the basis of a procedural due process claim. See 424

U.S. at 712. Instead, a Plaintiff must meet the so-called “stigma-plus” test and plead that the

5 Generally, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and cannot be the basis for
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). However, courts in this Circuit recognize an exception when “the
time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within
the statute of limitations” and the bar is thus “apparent on the face of the complaint.” E.g., Schmidt
v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014). That is the case here.
11
defamation “occurs in the course of or is accompanied by a change or extinguishment of a right or
status guaranteed by state law or the Constitution.” Clark v. Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d
Cir. 1989) (citing Davis, 424 U.S. at 701–12). Liberally construing his pro se Complaint, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has articulated two potential state law or Constitutional rights: 1) access to the
Skate Zone and 2) his employment at Stockton University.6 (Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶ 36–37).
The Court first finds that Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in accessing

the Skate Zone under New Jersey law or the Constitution. In doing so, the Court is particularly
persuaded by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Brown v. City of Mich. City, 462 F.3d 720 (7th Cir.
2006), which rejected a “stigma plus” procedural due process claim from a plaintiff who was
banned from accessing city parks, and the Second Circuit’s decision in Williams v. Town of
Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), which also considered a procedural due process claim
over access to municipal facilities.7 The Seventh Circuit held in Brown there that there was no
unconditional right of access to the parks under state law in part because state law granted
discretion to the Park Board to “set conditions on the public’s entry to city parks and to regulate

6 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Stockton University is a public university.

7 Indeed, several courts, including some in this Circuit, have reached similar conclusions
regarding access to public property. See Zomerfeld v. Kingston Twp. Police, No. 22-00237, 2023
WL 2657637, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2023), R&R adopted, 2023 WL 2652245 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27,
2023) (citing Warkevicz v. Berwick Area Sch. Dist., No. 15-01922, 2016 WL 3753108, at *4 (M.D.
Pa. July 14, 2016) in rejecting a procedural due process claim over a ban from municipal property);
see also Peterson v. City of N. St. Paul, No. 21-458, 2021 WL 5235092, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 10,
2021) (collecting decisions of other Circuits finding no protected interest in accessing public
buildings).

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the behavior required of its visitors.” 462 F.3d at 731. Similarly, here, New Jersey law empowers
all municipalities to “make, amend, repeal and enforce ordinances” to “[m]anage, regulate and
control the finances and property, real and personal, of the municipality,” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-
1, and other ordinances they “may deem necessary and proper for the good government, order and
protection of persons and property, and for the preservation of the public health, safety and welfare
of the municipality and its inhabitants.” Id. § 40:48-2. The broad powers granted to municipalities

to regulate their property in the public interest belies any unconditional state-law right of access to
city property, including the Skate Zone.
In Williams, the Second Circuit considered a procedural due process claim by a plaintiff
who was banned from a town community center. 535 F.3d at 73–74. While the court acknowledged
that there was a fundamental right to travel within a state, it held that this right did not create an
additional right to access any property within a state. See id. at 75. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s
“expulsion and temporary exclusion from the Center did not deprive him of a liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 76. The Court finds
the same is true here with Plaintiff’s access to the Skate Zone.
Turning to Plaintiff’s employment, the Supreme Court did recognize in Davis that

defamation by the government “in the course of the termination of employment” could be
actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 424 U.S. at 710; see also Hill v. Borough of
Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 238 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that “a public employee who is defamed in
the course of being terminated or constructively discharged satisfies the ‘stigma-plus’ test even if,
as a matter of state law, he lacks a property interest in the job he lost”). But the Court agrees with
13
Defendants that Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts that show any connection between the alleged
defamation and his termination from Stockton University. (See Skate Zone Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF No. 22-1, at 17–18).
Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss Count II without prejudice.
4. Substantive Due Process
To bring a substantive due process claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must show “(1) the

particular interest at issue is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) the government’s
deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience.” Connection Training Servs. v. City
of Philadelphia, 358 F. App’x 315, 319 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Importantly, “not all
property interests worthy of procedural due process protection are protected by the concept of
substantive due process.” Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted). Thus, while termination from public employment can give rise to a procedural due
process claim, it cannot sustain a substantive due process one. See Judge v. Shikellamy Sch. Dist.,
135 F. Supp. 3d 284, 295–96 (M.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d, 905 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Nicholas,
227 F.3d at 143).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his “recognized liberty interest in accessing

public facilities and participating in civic life.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶ 41). For the reasons
explained above, the Court finds there is no protected liberty interest in accessing public facilities
under the Fourteenth Amendment. And, even if Plaintiff were to allege a connection to his
termination from public employment, that is similarly unprotected by substantive due process.

14
Thus, his claim fails at the first step of the analysis and the Court need not consider whether the
alleged deprivation shocks the conscience.
Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss Count III with prejudice.
5. Equal Protection
To prevail on his equal protection claim, Plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant treated
him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there

was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Hill, 455 F.3d at 239. “Persons are similarly
situated under the Equal Protection Clause when they are alike in all relevant aspects.” Startzell v.
City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that “others who participated in comparable planning meetings or
advocacy” at the Skate Zone “were not banned, disciplined, or defamed,” while he was. (Compl.,
ECF. No. 1 at ¶ 31). Defendants counter by arguing that Plaintiff’s behavior was different from
that of the other attendees. (Skate Zone Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 22-1 at 11–12.) At
bottom, this is a factual dispute over whether Plaintiff was similarly situated to the other attendees
that ordinarily would preclude dismissal at this stage.

However, as noted above, Plaintiff’s Complaint is unclear as to which Defendants are
responsible for the alleged violation. The Complaint does not allege who made, or even
communicated, the decision to ban Plaintiff from the Skate Zone or plead facts that indicate that
Defendants conspired with each other. Thus, while Plaintiff may theoretically be able to plead

15
facts that state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, as currently pleaded, the Complaint fails
to do so.
Therefore, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss Count I without prejudice.
6. First Amendment Retaliation
To bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff “must show (1) that they
engaged in a protected activity, (2) that defendants’ retaliatory action was sufficient to deter a

person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her rights, and (3) that there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the retaliatory action.” Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v.
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he engaged in protected activity under the First Amendment,
“including public criticism of the City’s management of the Skatezone, a widely supported public
petition, civic engagement through a nonprofit, communication with local and state officials, and
media advocacy on matters of public concern.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶ 48). He alleges that,
because of this activity, he was banned from the facility. (Id. at ¶¶ 50–51). Liberally construing
his pro se Complaint, the Court finds that this is sufficient to satisfy the first two elements of a
First Amendment retaliation claim.

Finally, to “establish the requisite causal connection a plaintiff usually must prove either
(1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly
retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.”
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267. Alternatively, a plaintiff “must show that from the evidence gleaned

16
from the record as a whole the trier of the fact should infer causation.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to show temporal proximity or a
pattern of antagonism. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 22-1 at 10–11). But Plaintiff has attached
to his Complaint purported statements of other attendees of the October 2023 SJIAC meeting at
the Skate Zone that precipitated his ban, including one from Kenneth Cleveland, who states that

Defendant Gleghorn was “asked what the issue was” and “responded that the problem was
[Plaintiff] Rhodes and his postings and emails that were critical of his wife and the rink in general.”
(Compl., ECF No. 1 at 21) (emphasis added). Another statement from James O’Donnell states that
Defendant D’Amore said that Rhoads “was always causing trouble at the rink.” (Id. at 20). These
statements might show evidence of retaliatory animus and therefore a causal connection between
his protected activity (criticism of the rink) and his ban from the rink.8
However, as with the equal protection claim, the Complaint does not allege which
Defendant took the alleged retaliatory action. Although these statements might be evidence of
causation, the Complaint does not allege that Gleghorn or D’Amore was the decisionmaker.

8 While these statements were not made under oath and are unsigned, the Court accepts them
as true for purposes of this motion. See Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d
100, 105 (3d Cir. 2018) (“In determining whether [the plaintiff’s] claim is plausible, we consider
not only her complaint, but also the exhibits she attached to it … .”)

17
Indeed, no decisionmaker is identified. Thus, no causal connection between the retaliatory action
and Plaintiff's protected activity can be drawn from the Complaint and this claim must also fail.
Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss Count V without prejudice.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (ECF No. 10), is
DENIED. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 20, 22) are GRANTED. Counts III and IV
of Plaintiff's Complaint, (ECF No. 1), and all official-capacity claims against Defendants Small,
Kramer, D’Amore, and Gleghorn are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Counts I, II, and V are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

CHRISTINE P. O’HEARN-
United States District Judge

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11140734. Public record. Not legal advice.