# Doamekpor v. Central State University

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · September 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11138728

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 15, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11138728

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the allegations must demonstrate that each defendant violated a plaintiff’s rights through their own actions

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

Prosper Ketorwokah Doamekpor,

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:25-cv-020

v. Judge Thomas M. Rose

Central State University, et al.,

Defendants.

ENTRY AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
(DOC. 21), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND
(DOC. 28), GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE SUR-REPLY (DOC. 30) AND
TERMINATING CASE

Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc.
21), Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 28), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply.
(Doc. 30.) On January 21, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Prosper Ketorwokah Doamekpor charged
Defendants Central State University, Human Resources Director Pamela Bowman, Acting Dean
and Vice President Morakinyo Kuti, and Cindy Folck with employment discrimination in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §2000e. (Doc. 13.)
Defendants moved to dismiss for reasons that include that Plaintiff’s original complaint is
time barred, (Doc. 21, PageID 421), which it is. Plaintiff’s responses include a Motion to Amend
the Complaint that seeks to recast Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 28.) Because amending the Complaint
as Plaintiff proposes would be futile, the Court must deny the Motion to Amend. (Doc. 28.)
I. Background
Pro se Plaintiff Prosper Ketorwokah Doamekpor was employed by Defendant Central
State University as an Associate Professor and Program Leader (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 1). On May 29,
2024, Doamekpor submitted concerns to Human Resources Director, Defendant Bowman and
the Acting Dean, Defendant Kuti after receiving a low performance evaluation. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 2,

3.). Doamekpor felt the low performance evaluation from his supervisor, Defendant Folck,
stemmed from both Doamekpor and Folck applying for the same position. (Id. ¶ 2; Doc. 1-3).
On August 29, 2023, Doamekpor was placed on administrative leave because of a
pending administrative investigation. (Doc. 1-1 ¶ 5). Doamekpor’s Complaint includes an
attachment of the allegations from the administrative investigation. (Doc. 1-5, PageID 35-38).
The four-page summary of the allegations include multiple alleged performance deficiencies,
alleged violations of the travel policy and alleged misuse of a purchase card. (Id.)
On September 4, 2023, Doamekpor filed charges with both the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission (“OCRC”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Doc.

1-1, PageID 5-20; Doc. 13, PageID 309-324). In the OCRC charge, Doamekpor indicated that
the date of discrimination was August 29, 2023. (Id. PageID 5). OCRC provides a checklist and
asks the charging party to indicate the basis of discrimination. The form provides the following
options: Race, Retaliation, National Origin, Disability, Religion, Ancestry, Sex, Color, Military
Status, and Age. The only basis of discrimination that Doamekpor indicated was “Retaliation.”
(Id.).
According to the Doamekpor’s charge, Defendants’ alleged discriminatory acts occurred
when Folck “had applied for. (sic) wanted to sabotage [Doamekpor’s] chances.” (Id.)

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Doamekpor further alleges that the process of being placed on administrative leave “is a result of
unfounded assumptions and biased perceptions.” (Id. PageID 7).
The EEOC Inquiry form provides additional information. (Doc. 1-1, PageID 15; Doc. 13,
PageID 312). This form lists the reason for Doamekpor’s charge as “Age- I am 40 years of age
or older, National origin and/or ethnicity, Retaliation – I complained to my employer about job

discrimination.” (Id.). The inquiry form repeats the same adverse actions that were described in
the OCRC charge.
According to the form, Doamekpor provided this information to the EEOC during a
phone interview on November 15, 2023. (Id.). The OCRC form that was sent to the EEOC also
indicated that Doamekpor was filing the claim under the Age Discrimination Employment Act.
(Id. PageID 17).
The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on October 3, 2024. (Docs. 1-1, 13,
Complaint ¶ II.A). Doamekpor acknowledged receiving the Notice of Right to Sue on October
12, 2024. (Id. Complaint ¶ II.B). Doamekpor’s Complaint was initially filed on January 21, 2025

without payment of the required fees to institute the case. (See Doc. 12, PageID 304). Upon
payment of the required fees, per order of the Court, the Complaint was filed on May 19, 2025.
(Doc. 12, PageID 304).
On June 20, 2025, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
(Doc. 21) seeking dismissal of all claims. On June 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Memorandum in
Opposition. (Doc. 24). The Court has also reviewed Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental
Authority. (Doc. 25). Defendants then filed their Reply. (Doc. 26). Thereupon, Plaintiff filed his

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Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply (Doc. 30) which the Court hereby GRANTS, taking notice
of the tendered sur-reply. (Doc. 30-1).
On July 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 28). Defendants responded in opposition to the Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint. (Doc. 31). Plaintiff filed his Reply. (Doc. 32). The Court has also reviewed Notice of

Supplemental Exhibits in Support of Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (Doc.
33) and Notice of Clarification Regarding Temporal Proximity and Defendant Roles. (Doc. 34).
The matter is ripe for review.
II. Standard of Review
Defendants move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the
Complaint. (Doc. 21.) To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a challenged pleading
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim of relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 66, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A
complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but must provide “more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In addition, federal courts hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe,

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951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir.1991). However, “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se
complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d
16, 19 (1st Cir.1979) (citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court is not required “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff,” as this would “transform the district court
from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest

arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir.1985). Only well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint and
amended complaint are considered on motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir.1997), overruled
on other grounds, Swierkiwica v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); see also Cox v. Hiland, No.
5:13-cv-179, 2014 WL 7150046, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 15, 2014).
III. Analysis
A. Motion to Dismiss
Assuming arguendo that Doamekpor exhausted his administrative remedies relative to

Title VII or the ADEA, Doamekpor’s Complaint is time barred because he did not file it within
ninety days of receiving his Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC. To pursue a cause of action
under Title VII or the ADEA, a Plaintiff must file a lawsuit within ninety days of receiving a
Notice of Right to Sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e). If the Complaint is not
filed within ninety days of when a plaintiff receives a Notice of Right to Sue, the court must
dismiss the complaint. Tate v. United Servs. Assocs., Inc., 75 Fed. App’x 470, 471 (6th Cir.
2003). The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue for Doamekpor’s charge on October 3, 2024.
Doamekpor acknowledged receiving the Notice of Right to Sue on October 12, 2024. Ninety

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days from October 3, 2024 is January 1, 2025; ninety days from October 12, 2024 is January 10,
2025.
Doamekpor filed his initial Complaint on January 21, 2025, one hundred and one days
after receiving the Notice of Right to Sue. Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed. See
Gan v. IBM, 348 F. Supp. 2d 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing pro se plaintiff who filed

103 days after receipt of EEOC right to sue). Thus, this case must be dismissed, unless
Doamekpor’s Motion to Amend the Complaint (Doc. 28) proves not to be futile.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint
The first and third counts of Doamekpor’s proposed amended complaint arise under 42
U.S.C. § 1983:
COUNT I - VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (42 U. S. C. § 1983)

14. Plaintiff was denied meaningful notice or opportunity to be
heard regarding critical employment actions, including removal of
access and withholding of earned compensation.

15. [Central State]’s arbitrary deprivation of Plaintiff s liberty and
property interests, including his right to defend his professional
record and to access personal property, violated his due process
rights.

(Doc. 28-1, PageID 455).

COUNT III - UNLAWFUL TERMINATION UNDER § 1983

18. Plaintiff’s termination was not based on just cause, as found by
the UCRC, and was a pretext for unlawful motives including
discrimination, retaliation, and violation of institutional procedure.

19. Individual Defendants acted under color of state law to effect
this termination without adherence to due process or legal
justification.

(Id.).

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Under § 1983, a Plaintiff can pursue a claim against “[e]very person who” causes the
Plaintiff deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court
has held that “neither the State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under
§ 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). As a public institution, Central
State is an arm of the state. Ohio Rev. Code § 3345.011. Thus, Central State is not a person subject

to suit under § 1983. See McKenna v. Bowling Green State Univ., 568 Fed. App’x 450, 456 (6th
Cir. 2014).
In addition to not qualifying as a person under § 1983, as an arm of the state Defendant
Central State is immune under the Eleventh Amendment. McKenna, 568 Fed. App’x at 457; see
also, Fisher v. Kent State Univ., 459 Fed. Appx. 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2012); Dehen v. Ohio State
Univ., No. 2:23-cv-517, 2023 WL 4842706, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 5, 2023).
The officials who work for Central State also have immunity when sued in their official
capacity because this is the same as suing an official’s office, which, in turn, is the same as suing
the State itself. Qui v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 803 Fed App’x 831, 838 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Will

v. Mich. Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58. 71 (1989)). Doamekpor’s claims against the Individual
Defendants in their official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Doamekpor’s request for injunctive relief does not make his claims against the individual
defendants viable. There is one exception to sovereign immunity of state officials and that is when
a plaintiff is seeking an injunction to address an ongoing violation of federal law or prospective
relief. Mikel v. Quin, 58 F.4th 252, 256 (6th Cir. 2023); Carnes v. Ohio Dep’t of Tax’n, No. 23-
3694, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21593, at *3 (6th Cir. May 24, 2024). In his prayer for relief,
Doamekpor requests that the Court “[d]eclare that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s federal rights.”

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This type of declaration is not sufficient to provide this court jurisdiction because it does not seek
an order addressing Defendants’ prospective conduct.
The gravamen of Doamekpor’s lawsuit was the termination of his employment. His
proposed Amended Complaint does not seek reinstatement. (Doc. 28-1). Doamekpor did request
reinstatement in his initial complaint (Doc. 1-1); however, he does not seek this remedy in the

proposed Amended Complaint. (Doc. 28-1). As his proposed Amended Complaint only seeks
monetary damages for past conduct, it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment as to the Individual
Defendants in their official capacity.
Finally, the individual defendants have qualified immunity to the extent they are being sued
in their personal capacity. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil
damages in actions brought under § 1983, so long as their conduct did not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Allegations against individual defendants must
include allegations of the individual’s own unconstitutional behavior. See Shah v. Univ. of Toledo,

No. 21-4153, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 16602, at *8 (6th Cir. June 15, 2022).
When a defendant raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden of showing a
defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir.
2015). To defeat a qualified immunity challenge of a complaint, the Plaintiff is “obliged to plead
facts that viewed in the light most favorable to him, make out a violation of a constitutional right.”
Johnson, 790 F.3d at 653 (noting that the allegations must demonstrate that each defendant
violated a plaintiff’s rights through their own actions).
Doamekpor’s counter argument on qualified immunity is terse: “[Central State]’s

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invocation of qualified immunity is premature and inappropriate at this stage.” (Doc. 32, PageID
495). Doamekpor does not describe any conduct taken by any of the Individual Defendants other
than conclusory allegations. The proposed Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations
beyond generalizations. (See Doc. 28-1).
Courts should resolve whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as early in

litigation as possible. Johnson v. Mosely, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Qualified immunity
is not a defense against liability, but against suit itself”) (citation omitted). A claim against a
government official that is not sufficiently pleaded should be resolved prior to discovery. Id.
Doamekpor has not identified any wrongdoing on the part of any of the individual defendants that
suggests they should be subjected to a lawsuit.
The Second Count of the proposed Amended Complaint suffers from the same deficiency
as the original Complaint:
COUNT II - RETALIATION UNDER TITLE VII

16. Plaintiff reported discrimination and unfair evaluation practices
and subsequently faced escalating administrative scrutiny and
eventual termination.

17. Defendants’ adverse actions were in retaliation for Plaintiffs
protected conduct and violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.

(Doc. 28-1, PageID 456)
Title VII timelines dictate that a plaintiff has ninety days to file a lawsuit after receiving
notice from the EEOC of the plaintiff’s right to sue. 42 USC 2000e-5(f)(1). Courts strictly enforce
this 90-day statutory limit; Gibson v. Clossman Catering, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-263, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49115, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2020). Although Doamekpor’s proposed Amended

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Complaint (Doc. 28-1) does not state when he received the Notice of Right to Sue, Doamekpor’s
Complaint states that the notice was issued October 3, 2024. (Doc. 1-1). Doamekpor alleges he
received it on October 12, 2024. (Doc. 1). Accordingly, Doamekpor’s Complaint was filed after
the ninety-day deadline stated in his notice.
Doamekpor’s failure to plead the date Doamekpor received the Notice of Right to Sue or

when it was issued does not change that Doamekpor’s Title VII cause of action is untimely.
Doamekpor is not entitled to equitable tolling. Courts may consider tolling the statutory deadline
if a Plaintiff demonstrates that they did not have notice of a deadline. See Jones v. Natural
Essentials, 740 Fed. App’x 489, 493 (6th Cir. 2018). In this instance, even if Doamekpor received
notice on October 12, 2024, he did not file within ninety days of when he received notice.
As there are no facts suggesting Doamekpor did not receive notice, he is not entitled to toll
the statutory deadline to file a claim. Additionally, Doamekpor has not included any allegations
that constitute retaliation. Doamekpor’s proposed Amended Complaint states that Doamekpor
“reported discrimination and unfair evaluation practices and subsequently faced escalating

administrative security and eventual termination.” Doamekpor’s lack of allegations supporting the
generalized statement that he complained about discrimination does not meet his burden to
withstand a motion to dismiss. See Qiu v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 803 Fed. App’x 883, 841 (6th Cir.
2020) (Court affirmed dismissal of retaliation claim because plaintiff made no allegation about
how adverse action was related to plaintiff’s request for a hearing); Wei Qui v. Bd. of Educ. Of
Bowling Green Indep. Sch., 24-5368, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32587, at *4-5 (6th Cir. Dec. 23,
2024) (noting plaintiff “alleged—in conclusory fashion—that the Board discriminated against her”
but plaintiff provided “no facts supporting this conclusory allegation.”). Doamekpor’s proposed

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amendments to his Title VII cause of action do not change the untimeliness of the claim and do
not provide any allegations beyond conclusions and generalizations. Therefore, the Court cannot
grant Doamekpor leave to amend his Complaint to include the retaliation claim.
In Count IV and Count V of his proposed Amended Complaint, Doamekpor attempts to
plead contractual and tort causes of actions:

COUNT IV - FAILURE TO PAY EARNED COMPENSATION

20. [Central State] failed to pay Plaintiff approximately $54, 800 in
allocated salary from two federal grants, despite signed budgets and
performance documentation.

21. Plaintiff was denied records to confirm or dispute this
compensation shortfall, resulting in further financial and
reputational harm.

COUNT V - CONVERSION & DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY

22. Defendants unlawfully seized and retained Plaintiffs personal
and professional property without inventory or lawful procedure.

23. [Central State] has failed to return academic materials, external
drives, and equipment despite repeated documented requests.

(Doc. 28-1, PageID 457).

This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider state law claims against Defendants.
The United States Constitution bars federal court jurisdiction over pendent state law claims
against non-consenting states or state officials, regardless of the remedy sought by a plaintiff.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120-21 (1983). Carnes v. Ohio Dep’t
of Tax’n, No. 23-3694, 2024 U.S. App LEXIS 21593, *3 (6th Cir. May 24, 2024). As this Court
lacks jurisdiction over Doamekpor’s proposed state law claims, the Court cannot permit
Doamekpor to amend his initial Complaint by adding these claims.

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IV. Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Sur-Reply (Doc. 28) and
Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply (Doc. 30-1, 30-2, and 30-3) is DEEMED FILED. Because Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to state a claim and because any claim is barred, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 21.) Because any amendment would be futile, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. (Docs. 28.) The Court thus DISMISSES Plaintiff’s
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Clerk is ORDERED to TERMINATE this case on the dockets of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division at Dayton.
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Monday, September 15, 2025.

s/Thomas M. Rose
________________________________
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11138728. Public record. Not legal advice.