# Michael Aaland, V. Crst Home Solutions, Llc, Et Ano.

> Court of Appeals of Washington · September 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11138315

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Washington
- **Decided:** September 15, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11138315

## Opinion text

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

MICHAEL AALAND, on his own behalf
and on behalf of other similarly situated No. 86708-3-I
persons,
DIVISION ONE
Appellant,
PUBLISHED OPINION
v.

CRST Home Solutions, LLC, a New
Jersey Limited Liability Company, and
John/Jane Doe, an individual,

Respondent.

COBURN, J. — Michael Aaland received an unsolicited text message from CRST

Home Solutions, LLC (CRST) 1 seeking to recruit him to join a network of independent

contractors who provide delivery and installation services for CRST’s retail and

manufacturing company clients. CRST sent similar text messages to various

Washington cell phone consumers as part of a larger recruitment effort to add

independent contractors to its delivery and installation service network. Aaland brought

a class action against CRST alleging that this unsolicited text message campaign

violated the Commercial Electronic Mail Act (CEMA), chapter 19.190 RCW.

The sole issue on review is whether the trial court erred by deciding as a matter

1
Respondent CRST Home Solutions, LLC is a division of CRST, which maintains
different lines of business. We generally refer to respondent as “CRST” for simplicity.
86708-3-I/2

of law that the text messages sent by CRST do not meet the definition of “commercial”

to be prohibited by CEMA. Because we hold that these text messages fall within the

meaning of “commercial” under the plain language of RCW 19.190.010(3), we reverse

the court’s granting of summary judgment to CRST and remand for entry of summary

judgment in favor of Aaland and the class and for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

FACTS

CRST provides transportation and logistic services by facilitating the delivery and

installation of consumer electronics and appliances for retail and manufacturing

companies. Company clients include, for example, Lowe’s, Home Depot, and Best Buy.

CRST sells delivery and installation services to the companies, who generally pay

CRST per delivery and/or installation. CRST manages a network of independent

contractors, including electricians and other skilled tradespeople, to complete the

deliveries and installations in Washington.

Deidre Kelley testified that as a field recruiter for CRST, she “contact[ed]

potential independent contractors … to potentially come on and complete delivery and

installation work that CRST has with retail clients.” She explained that CRST has

“contracts with retail companies to provide independent contractors who can do the

delivery and installations for them. So to fulfill our contracts with the retailers, we need

to have independent contractors who are interested in doing network, which means we

need to find them.” Kelly testified that she cold calls, emails, or texts potential

independent contractors.

2
86708-3-I/3

CRST representative Noah Kroll-Haeick testified that CRST’s revenue depends

on its ability to maintain contractual relationships with independent contractors to

perform delivery and installation services that CRST sells to retail and manufacturing

company customers. When asked, “What are some … ways that CRST seeks to be

more profitable than its competition?” Kroll-Haeick answered:

By offering a superior product. And by that I mean successful
management of the quality of the work our contractors perform. And what
that boils down to is recruitment of the best contractors in the business as
well as building strong, long-lasting relationships with those contractors.

CRST identifies potential independent contractors to contact by searching for

publicly available information on the internet. For example, recruiters “start[] with a

Google search ‘Appliance installers in Seattle.’” Recruiters would try to determine

through their initial cold contacts with potential independent contractors whether they

were interested or not in partnering with CRST. If interested, the recruiter conducts a

vetting call with the potential contractor to confirm that they are “a strong fit for a

partnership” with CRST, including “figur[ing] out whether the company is incorporated,

whether they have insurance that meets our insurance requirements, that they’re willing

to submit drug screens, and … background checks for all of their technicians that they

intend to send into customers’ homes.” Kroll-Haeick stated this screening process is

CRST’s method of recruiting the best contractors in the business. CRST negotiates

rates with each of its contractors and charges retailer and manufacturer customers a

higher rate than it pays its contractors.

CRST measures recruiter performance by tracking the number of independent

contractors that recruiters successfully onboard or “activate,” which is when an

independent contractor installer “has partnered with [CRST] and is able to begin

3
86708-3-I/4

receiving installation work from [CRST].” CRST incentivizes recruiters with gift cards

based on how many contractors they activate in a month. On the other hand, CRST

considers any recruiter’s failure to meet monthly expectations for activated contractors

as poor performance and provides training as it deems appropriate. A recruiter’s

continued failure to meet monthly activation goals may lead to the recruiter’s

termination.

Additionally, CRST advertises the size of its independent contractor network.

CRST’s website states that it has “300+ delivery partners,” “3,500+ installation

technicians,” “[s]ervices all U.S.,” and “[c]entralized dispatch and call centers.” CRST

markets itself as specializing in arranging deliveries and having a “[n]etwork of over 300

qualified independent carrier partners across 100+ separate locations throughout the

U.S. and Canada,” which “creates a unique value proposition for customers seeking

nationwide coverage.”

As part of its independent contractor recruitment program, CRST sent unsolicited

text messages to various individuals throughout Washington. While working as a

licensed general contractor in April 2022, Aaland received one of these messages from

Kelley, which stated:

Hi,
I’m looking for a licensed plumber that may be interested in doing
residential dishwasher installations for retailers like Lowe’s and Best Buy
in the Seattle area.

If you’d like more information, please respond with your email address
(note: does not add you to any lists) or give me a call at this number.
Thank you!
-Deidre, recruiter for CRST

4
86708-3-I/5

Kroll-Haeick testified that CRST sent Aaland the text “[t]o see if he was interested in

doing business with us.” Kelly testified that all the text messages she sent to potential

contractors in Washington “were for purposes of recruitment.”

Aaland subsequently filed a class action against CRST Home Solutions, LLC in

August alleging that CRST sent commercial electronic text messages to Aaland and

class members’ cell phones in violation of RCW 19.190.060 of CEMA that constituted

per se violations of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW.

In July 2023 Aaland filed an unopposed motion for class certification, which the

trial court granted. The parties filed competing summary judgment motions in January

2024. At that time, the parties agreed that the sole dispositive issue was the legal

question of whether the text messages that CRST sent to Aaland and class members

“promote[d] real property, goods, or services for sale or lease” to qualify as

“commercial” under CEMA. See RCW 19.190.010(3). Each party filed respective

oppositions and replies. The trial court granted CRST’s summary judgment motion,

denied Aaland’s motion for summary judgment, and entered a final judgment dismissing

Aaland’s class action with prejudice. Aaland appeals. 2

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

We review summary judgment orders de novo and engage in the same inquiry as

the trial court. Neighbors v. King County, 15 Wn. App. 2d 71, 80, 479 P.3d 724 (2020);

Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wn.2d 157, 164, 273 P.3d 965 (2012). “We

2
Referenced below, the state attorney general submitted an amicus curiae brief
for consideration in this matter. In addition to its response brief, CRST filed its own
answer to the attorney general’s brief.
5
86708-3-I/6

consider all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Litvack v. Univ. of Wash., 30 Wn. App. 2d 825, 842, 546 P.3d 1068

(2024). Summary judgment is properly granted where the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits do not present genuine

issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Neighbors, 15 Wn. App. 2d at 80; CR 56(c). A material fact is a fact upon which the

outcome of the litigation depends in whole or in part. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards

Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 861, 93 P.3d 108 (2004). The purpose of summary judgment

proceedings is to avoid a useless trial. Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wn.2d

345, 349, 588 P.2d 1346 (1979). Where the material facts are undisputed and no

element of discretion is involved, this court must determine whether applicable legal

principles support the trial court’s ruling. Hatley v. City of Union Gap, 106 Wn. App. 302,

307, 24 P.3d 444 (2001) (citing Hiatt v. Walker Chevrolet Co., 120 Wn.2d 57, 66, 837

P.2d 618 (1992)).

In the present case, the parties agree that the sole dispositive issue before the

trial court was whether the texts messages sent by CRST to Aaland and the class

qualify as “commercial” as defined under CEMA by RCW 19.190.010(3). The scope and

application of RCW 19.190.010(3) is an issue of statutory interpretation, which is a

question of law we review de novo. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146

Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain

meaning. Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283

(2010). A court’s fundamental objective when interpreting statutes “is to ascertain and

carry out the Legislature’s intent, and if the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then

6
86708-3-I/7

the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.”

Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 9-10. We discern plain meaning “‘from the ordinary

meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is

found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’” Lake, 169 Wn.2d at

526 (quoting State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009)). “A statute that

is clear on its face is not subject to judicial construction.” State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472,

480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001). Thus, where a statute’s language is unambiguous based on a

plain language reading, a court’s inquiry ends. State v. Gray, 174 Wn.2d 920, 927, 280

P.3d 1110 (2012).

While a court may look for guidance in the statutory context, it “must not add

words where the legislature has chosen not to include them.” Rest. Dev., Inc. v.

Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wn.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003). “Omissions are deemed to be

exclusions.” Wright v. Lyft, Inc., 189 Wn.2d 718, 727, 406 P.3d 1149 (2017). “‘Statutes

must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no

portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.’” Davis v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Licensing,

137 Wn.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999) (quoting Whatcom County v. City of

Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996)). Importantly, as a consumer

protection statute, we must also construe CEMA liberally in favor of the consumers it

aims to protect. Brown v. Old Navy, LLC, No. 102592-1, slip op. at 7 (Wash. Apr. 17,

2025), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1025921.pdf; Jametsky v. Olsen, 179

Wn.2d 756, 765, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014).

Lastly, we consider a statute ambiguous where it is subject to more than one

reasonable interpretation. Jametsky, 179 Wn.2d at 762. However, the mere fact that

7
86708-3-I/8

different interpretations are conceivable is not sufficient to render a statute ambiguous.

Gray, 174 Wn.2d at 927. Ambiguity must stem from the statute’s language and not from

external considerations that arise separate from the statute itself. Cerrillo v. Esparza,

158 Wn.2d 194, 203-04, 142 P.3d 155 (2006). If a statute is ambiguous, then we

engage in statutory construction and look to legislative history and circumstances

surrounding its enactment to derive legislative intent. Lake, 169 Wn.2d at 527.

CEMA

Because RCW 19.190.010(3) must be read in the context of its larger statutory

scheme, we first turn to the legislative development of CEMA to put .010(3) in context.

See Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 11; Wright, 189 Wn.2d at 724.

CEMA was enacted in 1998 during the Internet’s dial-up era to address an

increasing number of consumer complaints about unwanted commercial electronic mail

(e-mail) messages described as “spam.” Brown, slip op. at 2 (citing LAWS OF 1998, ch.

149, § 1); Wright, 189 Wn.2d at 724 (citing FINAL B. REP. ON SECOND ENGROSSED

SUBSTITUTE H.B. 1888, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005); LAWS OF 1998, ch. 149, § 4

(codified in RCW 19.190.030)). The legislature was particularly concerned about the

rising volume of commercial e-mails and the costs absorbed by consumers by paying

internet providers for the time required to sift through their in-boxes cluttered with

commercial e-mail spam. Brown, slip op. at 2-3 (citing LAWS OF 1998, ch. 149, § 1; FINAL

B. REP. ON ENGROSSED SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2752, at 1, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1998);

S.B. REP. ON ENGROSSED SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2752, at 1, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.

1998)). Under the act, RCW 19.190.020 prohibits sending Washington residents “a

8
86708-3-I/9

commercial electronic mail message” 3 that misrepresents the sender’s identity or

contains any false or misleading information in the subject line. Id. at 3-4, 20.

Since its original enactment, the legislature has amended CEMA three times to

increase the range of prohibited electronic practices. Wright, 189 Wn.2d at 724 (citing

LAWS OF 1999, ch. 289; LAWS OF 2003, ch. 137; LAWS OF 2005, ch. 378).

In 2003 the legislature amended CEMA to respond to the increase in unsolicited

commercial text messages sent to cell phones. Id. (citing LAWS OF 2003, ch. 137, § 1).

As a result, RCW 19.190.060(1) of CEMA precludes the initiation or facilitation of

unsolicited commercial text messaging to Washington residents. LAWS OF 2003, ch. 137,

§ 3(1). The legislature recognized:

[T]he number of unsolicited commercial text messages sent to cellular
telephones and pagers is increasing. This practice is raising serious
concerns on the part of cellular telephone and pager subscribers. These
unsolicited messages often result in costs to the cellular telephone and
pager subscribers in that they pay for use when a message is received
through their devices. The limited memory of these devices can be
exhausted by unwanted text messages resulting in the inability to receive
necessary and expected messages. The legislature inten[ds] to limit the
practice of sending unsolicited commercial text messages to cellular
telephone or pager numbers in Washington.

LAWS OF 2003, ch. 137, § 1.

Specifically, RCW 19.190.060 provides that:

No person conducting business in the state may initiate or assist in the
transmission of an electronic commercial text message to a telephone
number assigned to a Washington resident for cellular telephone or pager
service.

3
A prohibited “commercial electronic mail message” under CEMA is “an
electronic mail message sent for the purpose of promoting real property, goods, or
services for sale or lease.” RCW 19.190.010(2).
9
86708-3-I/10

RCW 19.190.060(1). 4 Our state Supreme Court has observed that CEMA’s unsolicited

commercial text message prohibition “reflects lawmaker’s intent to limit the practice of

sending any unsolicited commercial text messages because they cause injury to

consumers by using limited data and memory of mobile devices and interrupting receipt

of necessary and expected messages.” Wright, 189 Wn.2d at 731 (citing RCW

19.190.060).

Violations of CEMA’s text message and e-mail prohibitions are per se violations

of the CPA. 5 See id. at 728-32; Brown, slip op. at 4, 14; see RCW 19.190.030(1), .060,

.040, .100.

Commercial Electronic Text Message

CEMA defines a “commercial electronic text message” as:

an electronic text message[6] sent to promote real property, goods, or
services for sale or lease.

RCW 19.190.010(3).

The parties do not cite any Washington appellate decisions, and we are aware of

none, that have addressed the scope of RCW 19.190.010(3). As a matter of first

4
CEMA is generally not violated where a “message is transmitted at the direction
of a person offering cellular telephone or pager service to the person’s existing
subscriber at no cost to the subscriber” or where a person who has “clearly and
affirmatively consented in advance to receive these text messages.” RCW
19.190.070(1).
5
The CPA prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive trade
or commerce acts. RCW 19.86.020. Per se CPA violations are based on the legislature’s
acknowledgement that certain conduct is definitively against the public interest. Brown,
slip op. at 14; see also Br. of Amicus Curiae Att’y Gen. of State of Wash. at 6 (citing
Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 162 Wn.2d 59, 79, 170
P.3d 10 (2007)).
6
The statute defines “electronic text message” as “a text message sent to a
cellular telephone or pager equipped with short message service or any similar
capability, whether the message is initiated as a short message service message or as
an electronic mail message.” RCW 19.190.010(6).
10
86708-3-I/11

impression, Aaland asks this court to adopt a broad application of subsection (3) that

does not require a text message to be an unsolicited attempt to sell property, goods, or

services directly to the message recipient. Aaland argues that subsection (3)

encompasses, in part, the promotion of services that are for sale to anyone. In applying

subsection (3) to this record, he avers that the subject text messages promoted CRST’s

services sold to retail and manufacturer clients.

CRST concedes that subsection (3) does not require that the text messages

“attempt to sell goods or services specifically to the message recipient.” However,

CRST argues that its text messages were not attempts to sell anything to anyone but

instead were sent to recruit contractors to fulfill existing orders from its company clients.

CRST claims that because it was neither charging contractors for its recruitment efforts

nor attempting to facilitate a transaction by sending the text messages, the messages

cannot be said to be promoting a service “for sale.”

The attorney general, 7 as amicus curiae, urges this court to adopt Aaland’s

interpretation of subsection (3). Br. of Amicus Curiae Att’y Gen. of State of Wash. at 8

n.1.

To determine the scope of RCW 19.190.010(3), we first look to the plain

language of the provision. See Lake, 169 Wn.2d at 526. Subsection (3) plainly provides

two elements for a text message to be subject to CEMA regulation: (1) that the

message is sent to “promote” some form of real property, good, or service and (2) that

such real property, good, or service is for sale or lease.

7
We note that the attorney general is charged with the administration of
enforcement of Washington’s consumer protection laws, including CEMA. Gold Seal
Chinchillas, Inc. v. State, 69 Wn.2d 828, 833, 420 P.2d 698 (1966); Brown, slip op. at 4.
11
86708-3-I/12

CEMA does not provide a definition for “promote.” Accordingly, we give the word

its ordinary meaning. State v. Valdiglesias LaValle, 2 Wn.3d 310, 319, 535 P.3d 856

(2023). We may employ extrinsic aids to interpret statutory language, including turning

to standard dictionaries to ascertain plain and ordinary meaning. Id.; Garrison v. Wash.

State Nursing Bd., 87 Wn.2d 195, 196, 550 P.2d 7 (1976).

The dictionary definition of “promote” encompasses three different categories of

definitions that indicate that the meaning of the word depends on the context in which it

is used. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/promote (last visited August 26, 2025). Two of the categories

are not particularly helpful in a commercial or business communication context. 8 See

Valdiglesias LaValle, 2 Wn.3d at 319 (stating that to determine which view the

legislature took in applying a certain definition, a court must read the word “in the

context of the whole statute, ‘not in isolation or subject to all possible meanings found in

a dictionary’”) (quoting State v. Lilyblad, 163 Wn.2d 1, 9, 177 P.3d 686 (2008)).

The third category is contextually appropriate to a commercial communication

situation and defines “promote” as “a: to contribute to the growth or prosperity of:

FURTHER … b: to help bring (something, such as an enterprise) into being: LAUNCH[,

or] c: to present (merchandise) for buyer acceptance through advertising, publicity, or

discounting.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, supra.

8
That is, to positionally achieve an advancement or change in rank or grade. See
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, supra (“a: to advance in station, rank, or honor:
RAISE[,] b: to change (a pawn) into a piece in chess by moving to the eighth rank[,] c: to
advance (a student) from one grade to the next higher grade”). Or the slang definition of
“to get possession of by doubtful means or by ingenuity.” Id.
12
86708-3-I/13

Though these definitions cover a broad range of applications, there is nothing in

the statute to suggest that the legislature intended to further limit the meaning of

“promote.” To do so would require this court to read additional words into the statute,

which courts must not do. Rest. Dev., Inc., 150 Wn.2d at 682 (“[A] court must not add

words where the legislature has chosen not to include them.”). Broad language does not

render a statute ambiguous or unclear. See Brown, slip op. at 16. Indeed, engaging in a

plain language interpretation, our state Supreme Court recently refused to unilaterally

add limiting language to CEMA’s e-mail prohibition. Id. at 10-11 (discussing RCW

19.190.020(1)(b)).

The plain language of RCW 19.190.010(3) thus conflicts with CRST’s assertion

that a text message must be sent to facilitate a sale of real property, goods, or service

to be prohibited under CEMA. To limit the definition of a commercial text message in

this way disregards the broad meaning of “promote,” which this court must assume the

legislature used with particularity and intention. See State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723,

727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003) (stating that courts must “assume the legislature ‘means

exactly what it says’”) (quoting Davis, 137 Wn.2d at 964). We must therefore give effect

to the broad reach of “promote” in interpreting the scope of RCW 19.190.010(3). See

Davis, 137 Wn.2d at 963 (“‘Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the

language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.’”)

(quoting Whatcom County, 128 Wn.2d at 546).

We agree with CRST to the extent that the facilitation of a sale is a conceivable

application of “promote.” See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, supra (including

“c: to present (merchandise) for buyer acceptance through advertising, publicity, or

13
86708-3-I/14

discounting”). However, the legislature’s plain use of “promote” does not lose its broad

meaning 9 and/or become ambiguous merely because an interpretation is conceivable.

See Brown, slip op. at 8. Rather, if “persons of ordinary intelligence can understand

what the [law] proscribes, notwithstanding some possible areas of disagreement, the

[law] is sufficiently definite.” City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 179, 795

P.2d 693 (1990). We will otherwise not find ambiguity based on considerations that do

not arise from the statutory language. Cerrillo, 158 Wn.2d at 203-04; Brown, slip op. at

16-17.

The plain language of subsection (3) only otherwise limits a text message

sender’s promotion of real property, goods, or services by specifying that such property,

goods, or services must be “for sale or lease.” Thus, under RCW 19.190.010(3), a text

message promotes a business’ services where it aims to contribute to the growth or

prosperity of said business. 10

Here, CRST sent the text messages at issue to recruit the message recipients to

join its network of independent contractors that CRST relies on to provide delivery and

installation services that it sells to retailer and manufacturer clients. CRST markets the

size and geographic reach of its independent contractor network and assesses its

9
Because CRST provides no substantive argument to support its assertion that a
broad interpretation of subsection (3) is likely unconstitutional, we do not address it. See
King County Dep’t of Adult & Juv. Det. v. Parmelee, 162 Wn. App. 337, 353, 254 P.3d
927 (2011); RAP 10.3(a)(6).
10
The parties do not dispute that CRST is a business that sells delivery
installation and services. See Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral arg., Aaland v. CRST Home
Solutions, LLC, No. 86708-3-I (June 12, 2025), at 9 min., 07 sec. through 10 min., 16
sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network,
https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-2025061174/. Therefore, the precise
scope of “for sale or lease” under RCW 19.190.010(3) or “business” under RCW
19.190.060 is not at issue here.
14
86708-3-I/15

competitive advantage based on its ability to recruit quality contractors, including

assessing recruiters’ performance based on the number of contractors that they

onboard. The record thus establishes that CRST sent text messages to Aaland and

class members to recruit contractors to contribute to its continued commercial success

and growth. Accordingly, we hold that CRST’s text communication falls within the scope

of a “commercial electronic text message” as defined by the plain and unambiguous

language of RCW 19.190.010(3).

Because subsection (3) is not ambiguous, we need not review legislative history

to determine the legislature’s intent. See Brown, slip op. at 17. The legislative intent

underlying subsection (3) is demonstrated by the provision’s plain meaning.

Citing RCW 19.86.920, 11 CRST asserts that courts should be guided by federal

court decisions when interpreting issues related to CPA violations. At the same time

CRST concedes 12 that federal courts’ interpretations of state laws are merely

persuasive and not binding. See id. at 5; see also Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 176 Wn.2d

771, 787, 295 P.3d 1179 (2013) (“Although we have been guided by federal

interpretations, Washington has developed its own jurisprudence regarding application

of Washington’s CPA.”).

11
RCW 19.86.920 states in relevant part:
The legislature hereby declares that the purpose of this act is to
complement the body of federal law governing restraints of trade, unfair
competition and unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent acts or practices in order to
protect the public and foster fair and honest competition. It is the intent of the
legislature that, in construing this act, the courts be guided by final decisions of
the federal courts and final orders of the federal trade commission interpreting
the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters.
12
Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral arg., supra, at 15 min., 11 sec. through 15 min., 25
sec.
15
86708-3-I/16

CRST devotes a large portion of its response brief to a discussion of various

federal court decisions to support its argument that a text message must be sent to

facilitate a sale. We are not persuaded.

First, as CRST conceded at oral argument, 13 none of the federal decisions that

CRST cites that address CEMA’s prohibition against unsolicited commercial text

messages engage in a plain language interpretation of the definition of a commercial

text message under RCW 19.190.010(3). 14

Second, we decline CRST’s invitation to rely on as persuasive authority federal

cases that address issues specific to the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act

(TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227, and the Washington Automatic Dialing and Announcing

Device Act (WADAD), chapter 80.36 RCW. Again, the federal decisions that CRST

proffers to establish that CEMA and TCPA or WADAD are substantially similar statutes

do not engage in a comparative analysis of the two statutes’ relevant plain language. 15

Such superficial treatment cannot supplant a Washington court’s plain language

13
Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral arg., supra, at 15 min., 26 sec. through 15 min., 54
sec.
14
See Dawson v. Porch.com, No. 2:20-CV-00604-RSL, 2024 WL 4765159, at
*10 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2024) (court order); Walker-Schaut v. Lido Labs Holding Co.,
No. C23-5944 BHS, 2024 WL 2702007, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. May 24, 2024) (court order)
(citing Bottoms v. Block, Inc., No. 23-1969 MJP, 2024 WL 1931690, at *6 (W.D. Wash.,
May 2, 2024) (court order)); Barton v. Walmart Inc., No. 23-5063 DGE-RJB, 2024 WL
1533579, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 9, 2024) (court order); Moore v. Robinhood Financial
LLC, No. 2:21-CV-01571-BJR, 2022 WL 3082969, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 3, 2022)
(court order); Wick v. Twilio Inc., No. C16-00914RSL, 2017 WL 2964855, at *5 (W.D.
Wash. July 12, 2017) (court order); Wright v. Lyft, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-00421 MJP, 2016
WL 7971290, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 15, 2016) (court order); Gragg v. Orange Cab Co.,
No. C12-0576 RSL, 2013 WL 195466, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2013) (court order);
Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
15
See Wick, 2017 WL 2964855, at *5 (citing, e.g., Gragg, 2013 WL 195466, at
*3-4, 4 n.4); Walker-Schaut, 2024 WL 2702007, at *2-3.
16
86708-3-I/17

interpretation of Washington law. 16 See Young v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 196

Wn.2d 310, 319, 472 P.3d 990 (2020) (“[W]hen Washington law is different from its

federal counterpart, we give effect to Washington law.”).

Finally, we observe that CRST’s attempted comparison 17 of CEMA’s language to

WADAD is not persuasive. The relevant provision of WADAD prohibits the use of auto

dialers “for purposes of commercial solicitation,” RCW 80.36.400(2), defined as “the

unsolicited initiation of a telephone communication made for the purpose of encouraging

a person to purchase property, goods, or services, or wrongfully obtaining anything of

value.” RCW 80.36.400(1)(c) (emphasis added).

WADAD was enacted before CEMA and thus was in place when the legislature

amended CEMA in 2003 to add the prohibition against unsolicited commercial text

messages under RCW 19.190.060. See LAWS OF 1986, ch. 281, § 2 (WADAD); LAWS OF

1998, ch. 149, § 1 (CEMA), LAWS OF 2003, ch. 137, § 1 (amendment). Because we

16
For this same reason, the federal decisions that CRST cites that solely analyze
issues under the TCPA are unpersuasive. See Reardon v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 115
F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1093-97 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Risher v. Adecco Inc., No. 19-CV-05602-
RS, 2020 WL 13505422, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2020) (court order); Jeffrey Katz
Chiropractic, Inc. v. Tivity Health Support, LLC, No. 18-CV-05400-RS, 2019 WL
7822518, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2019) (court order); True Health Chiropractic Inc. v.
McKesson Corp., No. 13 -CV-02219-HSG, 2022 WL 1239346, at *2, 4-5 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
27, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-15710, 2023 WL 7015279 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2023) (court order),
rev’d and remanded on other grounds sub nom. McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v.
McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146, 145 S. Ct. 2006, 222 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2025); Physicians
Healthsource, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., No. SACV14-00001JVS(ADSx), 2020 WL 5260650,
at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2020) (court order); Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC,
No. 6:12-CV-1459-ORL-36KRS, 2013 WL 6865772, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2013)
(court order); Friedman v. Torchmark Corp., No. 12-CV-2837-IEG (BGS), 2013 WL
4102201 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013) (court order); Lutz App. Svcs., Inc. v. Curry, 859 F.
Supp. 180, 181-82 (E.D. Pa. 1994); see also Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 705 F.3d
913, 919 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that WADAD is substantially similar to TCPA).
17
In support, CRST cites Gragg, 2013 WL 195466, at *4, wherein the federal
district court concluded that “despite the differences in word choice,” CEMA and WADAD
“regulate communications that promote or encourage commercial transactions.”
17
86708-3-I/18

presume that the legislature enacts laws with full knowledge of existing laws, Thurston

County v. Gorton, 85 Wn.2d 133, 138, 530 P.2d 309 (1975), we conclude that the

legislature’s use of “promote” rather than “encourage” in its definition of a prohibited

“commercial electronic text message” under RCW 19.190.010(3) was intentional and

that the words have different meanings. See State v. Flores, 164 Wn.2d 1, 14, 186 P.3d

1038 (2008) (“[W]hen the legislature uses different words in statutes relating to a similar

subject matter, it intends different meanings.”). Therefore, CRST’s cited federal

decisions that are specific to a “commercial solicitation” under WADAD are not helpful in

considering claims brought under the plain language of RCW 19.190.010(3). 18

In sum, we hold that CEMA plainly defines commercial text messages under

RCW 19.190.010(3) as encompassing text messages sent to further the growth or

prosperity of a business. We conclude that the text messages sent by CRST to recruit

independent contractors to contribute to the growth and financial success of its delivery

and installation service network constitute commercial text messages within the scope

of CEMA’s prohibition. See RCW 19.190.060. Therefore, the trial court erred by granting

summary judgment to CRST.

Though the reversal of a trial court’s order granting summary judgment to one

party does not mean that the other party’s motion for summary judgment must be

granted, this can be an appropriate remedy where the two motions take diametrically

18
See Spafford v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223-24
(W.D. Wash. 2006); Hartman v. United Bank Card, Inc., No. C11-1753JLR, 2013 WL
12120424, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2013) (court order); Kalmbach v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n
of Am., No. Cl7-399-RSM, 2017 WL 3172836, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 26, 2017) (court
order); Chesbro, 705 F.3d at 919.
18
86708-3-I/19

opposite positions on the dispositive legal issue and raise no issues of fact. Spahi v.

Hughes-Nw., Inc., 107 Wn. App. 763, 776-77, 27 P.3d 1233 (2001).

In this case, the material facts have been fully developed and are not in dispute.

The parties agreed and filed competing summary judgment motions below on the sole

dispositive legal question of whether the text messages that CRST sent to Aaland and

the class are “commercial” as defined under CEMA to violate RCW 19.190.060. See

RCW 19.190.010(3). We thus reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment

to CRST and remand for the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of Aaland

and the class, notwithstanding the need for proceedings to further address the amount

of damages. 19

Attorney Fees

Aaland contends that he is entitled to attorney fees and costs under RCW

19.86.090 of the CPA at the trial court level and on appeal. RAP 18.1 authorizes a party

to request reasonable attorney fees on appeal if an applicable law grants the party the

right to recover. Under RCW 19.86.090, a party who prevails under the CPA is entitled

to attorney fees and costs, which may apply to appeals. Mora v. MacGilvary, 19 Wn.

App. 2d 260, 279, 495 P.3d 850 (2021). Because CRST violated CEMA’s prohibition

against unsolicited text messages and, in turn, the CPA, we award attorney fees on

appeal. See Wright, 189 Wn.2d at 728-32; Brown, slip op. at 14; RCW 19.190.060,

.040, .100. On remand, the trial court should determine the amount of fees and

expenses reasonably incurred in this appeal.

19
Under CEMA’s liquidated damages provision RCW 19.190.040, “[d]amages to
the recipient of a … commercial electronic text message sent in violation of this chapter
are five hundred dollars, or actual damages, whichever is greater.” RCW 19.190.040(1);
see Wright, 189 Wn.2d at 729, 731 (discussing RCW 19.190.040).
19
86708-3-I/20

CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment to CRST and

dismissing Aaland’s class action with prejudice. We remand for the trial court to enter

summary judgment in favor of Aaland and the class and to hold further proceedings to

determine the amount of damages and to award reasonable attorney fees at the trial

court level and on appeal.

WE CONCUR:

20

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11138315. Public record. Not legal advice.