# (PC) Smylie v. Plumas County District Attorney Office

> District Court, E.D. California · August 27, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11137786

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** August 27, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 JOHN PATRICK SMYLIE, No. 2:25-cv-2064 DC CSK P
12 Plaintiff, ORDER
13 v.
14 PLUMAS COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, et al.,
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Defendants.
16
17 I. INTRODUCTION
18 Plaintiff is a county prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to
19 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
20 This proceeding was referred to this Court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
21 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
22 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
23 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C.
24 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in
25 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct
26 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and
27 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments
28 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. These
1 payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the
2 amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C.
3 § 1915(b)(2).
4 As discussed below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.
5 II. SCREENING STANDARDS
6 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
7 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
8 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally
9 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
10 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
11 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
12 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
13 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an
14 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
15 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
16 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
17 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
18 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably
19 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at
20 1227.
21 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain
22 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
23 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic
24 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
25 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a
26 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations
27 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555.
28 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the
1 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v.
2 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal
3 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as
4 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the
5 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
6 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
7 III. DISCUSSION
8 Named as defendants are the Plumas County District Attorney’s Office and Plumas
9 County District Attorney David Drury Hollister. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff’s complaint contains
10 three claims for relief and seeks money damages.
11 A. Claim One
12 Plaintiff alleges that on December 16, 2022, plaintiff accepted a plea offer from defendant
13 Hollister for 16 months in prison with no parole and no probation. (Id.) Plaintiff appears to claim
14 that defendant Hollister offered this plea knowing that the California Department of Corrections
15 and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) would not uphold the terms of the plea agreement. (Id. at 3.) Upon
16 release from CDCR custody, plaintiff was forced to report to parole and was placed on GPS
17 monitoring for two years, in violation of the plea agreement. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant
18 Hollister knew that the plea agreement was illegal and tricked plaintiff into entering it. (Id.)
19 Plaintiff also alleges that in October 2024, plaintiff was incarcerated for being under the influence
20 and given an excessive thirty day sentence. (Id.)
21 A state prosecutor is absolutely immune from § 1983 actions “when performing the
22 traditional functions of an advocate.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131(1997). “Prosecutors
23 are entitled to qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, when they perform
24 administrative functions, or ‘investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police
25 officer.’” Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at
26 126)). When determining whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity for
27 their actions, a court should focus on “the nature of the function performed.” Buckley v.
28 Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993). “In applying this approach, [the court] distinguish[es]
1 between acts of advocacy, which are entitled to absolute immunity, and administrative and
2 ‘police-type’ investigative acts which are not. To qualify as advocacy, an act must be ‘intimately
3 associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Patterson v. Van Arsdel, 883 F.3d
4 826, 830 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
5 In claim one, plaintiff alleges that defendant Hollister entered into an unenforceable plea
6 agreement with plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[p]rosecutorial immunity extends to
7 the process of plea bargaining.” Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 1977) (citation
8 omitted); see also Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1492 (10th Cir. 1991) (plea
9 bargaining is “an activity that is absolutely immune from liability due to its intimate association
10 with the judicial process.”); Taylor v Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1981) (extending the
11 doctrine of absolute immunity to prosecutor’s plea bargaining activities). Thus, defendant
12 Hollister has absolute immunity for his conduct related to the plea agreement.
13 In claim one, plaintiff also alleges that in October 2024, plaintiff received an excessive
14 sentence. No defendants are linked to this claim. The Civil Rights Act under which this action
15 was filed provides as follows:
16 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation
17 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .
. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
18 or other proper proceeding for redress.
19 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the
20 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See
21 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
22 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the
23 meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or
24 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
25 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
26 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of
27 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant
28 holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional
1 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);
2 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague
3 and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights
4 violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
5 Plaintiff’s claim regarding the alleged excessive sentence is dismissed because no
6 defendants are linked to this claim. To the extent plaintiff intends to name as a defendant the
7 judge who imposed the alleged excessive sentence, judges are absolutely immune from damages
8 liability for acts which are judicial in nature. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29
9 (1988). Judicial immunity does not extend to acts taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
10 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Because sentencing is judicial in nature, a claim
11 against a judge for imposing an excessive sentence will be dismissed on the grounds that the
12 judge is entitled to absolute immunity.
13 B. Claim Two
14 Plaintiff alleges that on May 16, 2025, while in court, defendant Hollister deliberately
15 made a false statement, claiming that plaintiff had an altercation with plaintiff’s parole agent that
16 resulted in plaintiff’s arrest. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that on April 21, 2025,
17 defendant Hollister falsely told the court that the date of plaintiff’s evaluation ordered by the
18 court was unknown. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that because the evaluation of plaintiff resulted in a
19 diagnosis that defendant Hollister did not like, defendant Hollister questioned the date of the
20 evaluation in order to confuse the judge, which led to multiple hearings and caused plaintiff to be
21 denied diversionary sentencing on June 6, 2025. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “this question” lasted
22 four court dates. (Id.)
23 Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for “making false or defamatory statements in
24 judicial proceedings[.]” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 (1991). Thus, defendant Hollister is
25 entitled to absolute immunity for plaintiff’s claim alleging that defendant Hollister made false
26 statements to the court regarding the date of plaintiff’s evaluation and that plaintiff had an
27 altercation with his parole agent.
28 ///
1 C. Claim Three
2 Plaintiff alleges that on May 16, 2025, defendant Hollister twice maliciously called
3 plaintiff a “290” in court.1 (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that plaintiff’s public defender had
4 informed the court that plaintiff was mistreated in custody because defendant Hollister called
5 plaintiff a “290” in court in November 2022. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that on May 30, 2025,
6 Sergeant Gott arrived at the courthouse stating that a tip was made that someone was going to act
7 out. (Id.) Defendant Hollister made taunting remarks toward plaintiff, stating that plaintiff was a
8 danger to others because of suicidal attempts. (Id.) Defendant Hollister said, “where he got the
9 worst of it,” when discussing an altercation between plaintiff and another person that resulted in
10 plaintiff getting staples in the back of his head. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that on June 6, 2025,
11 defendant Hollister also taunted plaintiff in court. (Id.)
12 To the extent plaintiff alleges that defendant Hollister made false or defamatory
13 statements against plaintiff in court, defendant Hollister is entitled to absolute immunity. See
14 Burns, 500 U.S. at 490. In claim three, plaintiff also appears to challenge statements made by
15 defendant Hollister in court regarding plaintiff that were true, i.e., that plaintiff was required to
16 register as a sex offender, that plaintiff had attempted suicide and that plaintiff suffered injuries
17 during an altercation. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for their
18 conduct in “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case” insofar as that conduct is
19 “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
20 509 U.S. 259, 270 (1993) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)). Defendant
21 Hollister’s alleged comments regarding plaintiff that were true were made during the judicial
22 phase of the criminal process in that they were made during court proceedings. For this reason,
23 defendant Hollister is entitled to absolute immunity for making these alleged comments.
24 D. Defendant Plumas County District Attorney’s Office
25 The complaint contains no allegations against defendant Plumas County District
26 Attorney’s Office. For this reason, the claims against defendant Plumas County District
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1 In referring to “290,” plaintiff appears to refer to California Penal Code § 290, the California
28 Sex Offender Registration Act.
1 Attorney’s Office are dismissed with leave to amend. Assuming that the Plumas County District
2 Attorney’s Office is properly subject to suit under section 1983, akin to a municipality, “[i]t is
3 well established that ‘a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
4 tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
5 superior theory.’” Aguaristi v. County of Merced, 2019 WL 330908, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25,
6 2019) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Generally, to establish
7 municipal liability, the plaintiff must show that a constitutional right was violated, the
8 municipality had a policy, that policy was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s constitutional
9 rights, and the policy was “the moving force” behind the constitutional violation. See Oviatt By
10 and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing City of Canton v.
11 Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)). If plaintiff files an amended complaint naming Plumas
12 County District Attorney’s Office as a defendant, plaintiff shall address the legal standards set
13 forth above.
14 IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
15 In an abundance of caution, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. An
16 amended complaint should not include the claims against defendant Hollister for which this Court
17 found above that defendant Hollister was entitled to absolute immunity. If plaintiff files an
18 amended complaint, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to
19 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended
20 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists
21 because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ramirez
22 v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an ‘amended complaint
23 supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” (internal citation
24 omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any
25 function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim
26 and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
27 V. CONCLUSION
28 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
] 1. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.
2 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff
3 || is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
4 | § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the
5 || Plumas County Sheriff filed concurrently herewith.
6 3. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.
7 4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached
8 | Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:
9 a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and
10 b. An original of the Amended Complaint.
11 | Plaintiffs amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the
12 || Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must
13 || also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.”
14 | Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of
15 || this action.
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17 | Dated: August 27, 2025 A aA
i Aan Spe |
CHI SOO KIM
19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JOHN PATRICK SMYLIE, No. 2:25-cv-2064 DC CSK P
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Plaintiff,
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v. NOTICE OF AMENDMENT
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PLUMAS COUNTY DISTRICT
14 ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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Plaintiff submits the following document in compliance with the court’s order
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filed on ______________ (date).
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Amended Complaint
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(Check this box if submitting an Amended Complaint)
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DATED:
23 ________________________________
Plaintiff
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11137786. Public record. Not legal advice.