# Lee v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (Baker County)

> District Court, M.D. Florida · September 12, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11137659

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** September 12, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11137659

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding a claim is not “fairly presented” to state court when it is “presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered”
- stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”
- finding claims of prosecutorial misconduct were precluded from review in a 9.141 habeas petition

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MICHAEL JEROME LEE,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-822-MMH-MCR

SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
AND FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondents.
_______________________________________

ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner Michael Jerome Lee, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action on July 29, 2022,1 by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1) with a memorandum of law
(Memo; Doc. 1-1).2 In the Petition, Lee challenges three 2018 state court (Baker
County, Florida) judgments of conviction for fleeing to elude – siren and lights
activated with high speed or reckless driving, aggravated assault on a law
enforcement officer, and driving while license revoked habitual traffic offender.
He raises three grounds for relief. See Petition at 6–12; Memo at 15–22.

1 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (mailbox rule).
2 For purposes of reference to pleadings and exhibits, the Court will cite the
document page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic docketing system.
Respondents submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See
Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response; Doc. 7). They also

submitted exhibits. See Docs. 7-1 through 7-21. Lee filed a brief in reply. See
Petitioner’s Reply to Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Reply;
Doc. 8). This action is ripe for review.
II. Relevant Procedural History

On April 6, 2018, the State of Florida charged Lee by amended
information in State v. Lee, No. 02-2017-CF-000446-A (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct.), with
fleeing or attempting to elude – lights and sirens in high speed chase (Count
One), aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer (Count Two), and felony

driving while license revoked habitual offender revocation (Count Three). Doc.
7-1 at 26–27. On April 12, 2018, a jury found Lee guilty of all three counts as
charged. Id. at 71–72. On the same day, the trial court sentenced Lee to the
following consecutive terms of imprisonment: fifteen years as to Count One;3

fifteen years as to Count Two; and five years as to Count Three. Id. at 78–86.
On direct appeal, with the benefit of counsel, Lee filed an initial brief,
arguing that trial counsel was ineffective on the face of the record for failing to
request reckless driving be added as a lesser-included offense of aggravated

assault. Doc. 7-3 at 14–21. The State filed an answer brief, Doc. 7-4, and Lee

3 The trial court further ordered the sentence for Count One run consecutive
to Lee’s sentence imposed in a separate criminal case. Id. at 81.
replied, Doc. 7-5. The First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) issued a
written per curiam opinion affirming Lee’s convictions and sentences on May

16, 2019, and issued the mandate on June 6, 2019. Lee v. State, 272 So. 3d 827
(Fla. 1st DCA 2019); Doc. 7-6 at 2–4. Lee filed a Notice to Invoke Discretionary
Jurisdiction in the Florida Supreme Court, Doc. 7-7 at 2–3, but the Florida
Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction, and denied the petition for

review on September 12, 2019, Doc. 7-8 at 2. Lee v. State, No. SC19-852, 2019
WL 4318430, *1 (Fla. Sept. 12, 2019).
Before the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision, Lee filed a pro se
motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.800(a). Doc. 7-9 at 10–13. The postconviction court denied the
motion on October 30, 2019. Id. at 21–25. The First DCA per curiam affirmed
the postconviction court’s denial without a written opinion on March 19, 2020,
Doc. 7-10 at 3–4, and issued the mandate on April 16, 2020, id. at 2.

While his appeal of the 3.800 denial was pending, Lee filed a motion for
postconviction relief, titled “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” alleging: (1)
his convictions violated double jeopardy; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to call Detective Sharman4 as a witness; (3) trial counsel was ineffective

4 This detective’s last name is spelled in different ways within this Petition as
well as in the state court records, so this Court uses the same spelling as the
postconviction court for ease of reference.
for failing to impeach Sergeant Walker; (4) a Brady5 violation occurred based
on the concealment of Detective Sharman’s testimony; (5) there was newly

discovered evidence in the form of Detective Sharman’s deposition testimony
(Rule 3.850 Motion; Doc. 7-11 at 10–19). The postconviction court construed
the motion as a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850 and summarily denied the motion on March 9, 2020. Id. at 41–48. The

First DCA per curiam affirmed the postconviction court’s denial without a
written opinion on November 6, 2020, Doc. 7-12 at 3–4, and issued the mandate
on December 4, 2020, id. at 2.
On April 16, 2020,6 Lee filed a motion for leave to file supplemental Rule

3.850 claims (Supplemental 3.850 Motion; Doc. 7-13 at 13–22). Lee raised the
three supplemental claims, alleging counsel was ineffective for: (1) misadvising
Lee to proceed to trial rather than accept the State’s ten-year plea offer; (2)
inducing Lee to proceed to trial by indicating she would argue that his

sentences should run concurrent to his forthcoming federal sentence; and (3)
failing to properly advise Lee of the facts and evidence in the case by
withholding certain discovery exhibits. Id. The postconviction court granted
Lee’s request to proceed on the supplemental claims, ordered an evidentiary

5 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
6 In this Motion, Lee stated that he had originally submitted the supplemental
claims in an August 2019 filing; however, the postconviction court determined such
motion was not filed at that time. See Doc. 7-13 at 23, n. 1.
hearing on all three supplemental grounds, and appointed counsel to represent
Lee in those proceedings. Id. at 23–26. At the evidentiary hearing, Lee made a

request to withdraw all claims. Id. at 109. After the postconviction court denied
the request, Lee exhibited disruptive courtroom behavior. Id. at 110–15. His
conduct led the postconviction court to find that Lee made the voluntary
decision to be absent from the proceedings and to order Lee be removed from

the courtroom. Id. at 114–15. The postconviction court offered Lee
opportunities to rejoin the proceedings, but Lee continued his refusal to
participate. Id. at 140, 155. On October 1, 2020, following the evidentiary
hearing, the postconviction court entered a final order denying all relief. Id. at

64–70. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the postconviction court’s denial
without a written opinion on September 10, 2021, Doc. 7-17 at 3–4, and issued
the mandate on November 29, 2021, id. at 2.
On November 2, 2021, Lee filed a pro se “Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus [Cum Causa – Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel]” in the First
DCA (State Habeas Petition; Doc. 7-18 at 2–36). Lee raised six grounds,
alleging lack of trial court jurisdiction, trial court error, prosecutorial
misconduct, his convictions violated the ex post facto clause and double

jeopardy, and he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. On
January 19, 2022, the First DCA dismissed the petition without written
opinion. Doc. 7-19 at 2–3.
After the filing of this Petition, Lee filed a “Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Premised [on a] Violation of the Due Process Clause” with the trial

court on November 11, 2022. Doc. 7-20 at 13–22. On December 7, 2022, the
postconviction court treated the petition as a motion for postconviction relief
and denied the motion as untimely and procedurally barred and, alternatively,
found his claims to be without merit. Id. at 28–30. The First DCA per curiam

affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of relief without written opinion on
December 12, 2023. Lee v. State, 378 So. 3d 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023)
(unpublished table opinion).
III. One-Year Limitations Period

This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
IV. Evidentiary Hearing
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to

establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to
grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a
hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,

which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834
F.3d 1299, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the
applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district
court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474.

The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the
Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Lee’s] claim[s] without
further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir.
2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.
2016), abrogation recognized on other grounds by Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t
of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2023). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to
ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error
correction.’” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)). As such,

federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “greatly circumscribed
and highly deferential.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hill v.
Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court

decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec’y,
Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need
not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court’s

decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s adjudication on the merits is
unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has
instructed:

[T]he federal court should “look through” the
unexplained decision to the last related state-court
decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It
should then presume that the unexplained decision
adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted
by showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most likely relied on
different grounds than the lower state court’s reasoned decision, such as
persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court
or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 125–26, 132.
If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d) bars
relitigation of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97–98.
The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to
§ 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As
explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000),
§ 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a
“contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable application”
clause. The “contrary to” clause allows for relief only
“if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to
that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of
law or if the state court decides a case differently than
[the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523
(plurality opinion). The “unreasonable application”
clause allows for relief only “if the state court identifies
the correct governing legal principle from [the
Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous factual
determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal
courts to grant relief only if the state court’s denial of
the petitioner’s claim “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §
2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1),
which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the
state court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing
evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.
Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord Brumfield v.
Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192
L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise
relationship” may be, “‘a state-court factual
determination is not unreasonable merely because the
federal habeas court would have reached a different
conclusion in the first instance.’” Titlow, 571 U.S. at --
-, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290,
301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).

Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential
review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the
state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an
examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”).
Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for
prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Titlow, 571 U.S.

at 19. “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a state court
blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in existing law’
and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility fairminded
jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at

102–03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult” one to meet. Richter, 562
U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner’s claims were adjudicated
on the merits in the state courts, they must be evaluated under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d).

B. Exhaustion/Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a
§ 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court
remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly
present[]” every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court,

either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,
351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state
prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established

appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state
prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
“‘“opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged
violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d
865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To
provide the State with the necessary “opportunity,”
the prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each
appropriate state court (including a state supreme
court with powers of discretionary review), thereby
alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.
Duncan, supra, at 365–366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O’Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144
L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies
results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas
review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of
procedural default as follows:

Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality
of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided
by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments
are accorded the finality and respect necessary to
preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our
system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine
of procedural default, under which a federal court will
not review the merits of claims, including
constitutional claims, that a state court declined to
hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state
procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman,[7] supra, at 747–
748, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Sykes,[8] supra, at 84–85, 97 S.
Ct. 2497. A state court’s invocation of a procedural
rule to deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal
review of the claims if, among other requisites, the
state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate
to support the judgment and the rule is firmly
established and consistently followed. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. --, --, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127–
1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558
U.S. --, --, 130 S. Ct. 612, 617–618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417
(2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted
claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A
prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted
claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice
from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S.,
at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults may be
excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim has been
procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a state

7 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
8 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the
default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d

1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). In order for a petitioner to establish cause,
the procedural default “must result from some
objective factor external to the defense that prevented
[him] from raising the claim and which cannot be
fairly attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v.
Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639).[9]
Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner] must show
that “the errors at trial actually and substantially
disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied
fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1261 (quoting Carrier,
477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may
receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the
petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the
continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would
result. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice,
there remains yet another avenue for him to receive
consideration on the merits of his procedurally
defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence
of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This

9 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
exception is exceedingly narrow in scope,” however,
and requires proof of actual innocence, not just legal
innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171
(11th Cir. 2001).

Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that
it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’
of the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.
2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally, “‘[t]o be
credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not
presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in most cases,
allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily rejected. Schlup, 513
U.S. at 324.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective
assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per
curiam) (first citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); and then
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
To establish deficient performance, a person
challenging a conviction must show that “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” [Strickland,] 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.
Ct. 2052. A court considering a claim of ineffective
assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that
counsel’s representation was within the “wide range”
of reasonable professional assistance. Id., at 689, 104
S. Ct. 2052. The challenger’s burden is to show “that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.

With respect to prejudice, a challenger must
demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
It is not enough “to show that the errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”
Id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Counsel’s errors must be
“so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052.

Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “the absence of
any iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test
before the other.” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Since both prongs of the two-part
Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a
court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the
prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243,
1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we
expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
697.
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are governed by the
same standards applied to trial counsel under Strickland. See Tuomi v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 980 F.3d 787, 795 (11th Cir. 2020); Philmore v. McNeil, 575
F.3d 1251, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009). The Eleventh Circuit has instructed:
In assessing an appellate attorney’s performance, we
are mindful that “the Sixth Amendment does not
require appellate advocates to raise every non-
frivolous issue.” Id. at 1130–31.10 Rather, an effective
attorney will weed out weaker arguments, even
though they may have merit. See id. at 1131. In order
to establish prejudice, we must first review the merits
of the omitted claim. See id. at 1132. Counsel’s
performance will be deemed prejudicial if we find that
“the neglected claim would have a reasonable
probability of success on appeal.” Id.

Philmore, 575 F.3d at 1264–65.
A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great
deference.
“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is
a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at ---, 131 S.
Ct. at 788. But “[e]stablishing that a state court’s
application of Strickland was unreasonable under §
2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created
by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly
deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review
is doubly so.” Id. (citations and quotation marks
omitted). “The question is not whether a federal court
believes the state court’s determination under the
Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable — a substantially
higher threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.

10 Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 1991).
111, 123, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009)
(quotation marks omitted). If there is “any reasonable
argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s
deferential standard,” then a federal court may not
disturb a state-court decision denying the claim.
Richter, 562 U.S. at ---, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). In other words, “[i]n addition to the
deference to counsel’s performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds
another layer of deference—this one to a state court’s decision—when we are
considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a state court’s
decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). As such,
“[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
A. Ground One

Lee alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a pretrial
motion to suppress or pursue evidence and testimony at trial to show the
officers conducted an illegal stop and arrest. Petition at 6–8; Memo at 30–32.
Specifically, Lee states the officers involved in his arrest made inconsistent
statements in their depositions, trial testimony, and violation of probation
hearing testimony, which he asserts show they provided false testimony “to
justify an illegal stop and arrest” in order to search his vehicle for drugs.
Petition at 6, 8; Memo at 30.
Respondents assert Lee failed to exhaust this claim. Response at 17–21.
First, Respondents state Lee admitted to this failure when he checked the box

“no” on page 8 of his Petition when asked whether he raised the issue in a
postconviction motion. Id. at 17. Respondents further assert that the matter is
procedurally defaulted because Lee could not now return to raise the claim in
another successive Rule 3.850 motion, and that Lee has not demonstrated

cause and prejudice or actual innocence to excuse the default. Id. at 17–21. In
Reply, Lee states that he agrees with the Respondents’ position that he did not
raise this ground previously and could not now do so but asks that the Court
overlook the procedural bar citing to Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and

arguing that his lack of postconviction counsel constitutes cause and prejudice
to overcome this default. Reply at 2–6.
Initially, the Court notes that in his Petition, Lee states that he raised
this claim as Issue Three of his Rule 3.850 Motion. Petition at 6. However, as

Issue Three of that motion, Lee raised a claim of newly discovered evidence. In
Issue Two of the Rule 3.850 Motion, while Lee did allege counsel was
ineffective for failing to present evidence of inconsistent statements11 by
Crews, Walker, and Sharman for impeachment purposes, see Doc. 7-11 at 16–

11 In the Petition, Lee highlights some similar inconsistencies discussed in his
Rule 3.850 Motion, but each motion also raises distinct inconsistencies not raised in
the other. See Rule 3.850 Motion at 11–13, 16–17.
17, this is different from the issue he currently raises in the Petition. Here he
alleges evidence of the inconsistent statements should have been presented to

the court in a motion to suppress or at trial for the purposes of showing an
illegal stop. But, Lee did not challenge the legality of the underlying traffic
stop nor did he argue trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress in
his Rule 3.850 Motion. The issue raised by Lee in his Rule 3.850 Motion, thus,

did not “fairly present” the claim he raises in the Petition to allow for state
court adjudication. See Green v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 28 F.4th 1089, 1135 (11th
Cir. 2022) (“The exhaustion requirement applies not only to broad legal
theories of relief, but also to the specific assertions of fact that might support

relief. Presentation of a claim under the same general legal umbrella but with
entirely different factual underpinnings [also] does not constitute fair
presentation of the … claim.” (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)).

In Lee’s Memorandum, he seems to suggest that he raised this claim as
part of his Supplemental 3.850 Motion and corresponding appeal, but that
postconviction counsel failed to accurately present the claim. Memo at 15–18.
But, in his Supplemental 3.850 Motion, Lee did not argue counsel should have

filed a motion to suppress or used the officers’ alleged inconsistencies at trial
to show the underlying traffic stop was illegal. See Doc. 7-13 at 13–22.
Accordingly, the Court agrees with both parties’ final position that this issue
was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See Response at 17–18; Reply at
2. Moreover, because any future attempt to exhaust this claim would now be

futile, it is procedurally defaulted.
As to whether the Court should excuse the procedural default, the
Eleventh Circuit has explained the holding of Martinez as follows:
In Martinez, the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated a
narrow exception to the general rule that the lack of
an attorney or attorney error in state post-conviction
proceedings does not establish cause to excuse the
procedural default of a substantive claim. 566 U.S. at
8, 13-14, 132 S.Ct. at 1315, 1318. The Supreme Court,
however, set strict parameters on the application of
this exception. It applies only where (1) state law
requires a prisoner to raise ineffective-trial-counsel
claims during an initial collateral proceeding and
precludes those claims during direct appeal; (2) the
prisoner failed to properly raise ineffective-trial-
counsel claims during the initial collateral proceeding;
(3) the prisoner either did not have counsel or his
counsel was ineffective during those initial state
collateral proceedings; and (4) failing to excuse the
prisoner’s procedural default would result in the loss
of a “substantial” ineffective-trial-counsel claim. Id. at
14, 132 S.Ct. at 1318; see also Arthur v. Thomas, 739
F.3d 611, 629 (11th Cir. 2014) (setting forth the
Martinez requirements).

Lambrix v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 851 F.3d 1158, 1164 (11th Cir. 2017). A
claim is substantial if the petitioner demonstrates it “has some merit.”
Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14.
Here, considering the record, the Court finds Lee has not shown that his
underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim is substantial. An
automobile stop is “reasonable” to justify even a temporary detention where
officers “have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996). The inconsistencies Lee
raises primarily involve the initial sighting of Lee running a red light coming
out of the apartment complex. However, in addition to the law enforcement
officers’ testimony, eyewitness Regina Watts, testified she had to make

defensive maneuvers when Lee ran a stop sign while being pursued by the
police SUV with its lights on. Doc. 7-2 at 72–74, 75. Watts’ testimony alone
supports the officers’ accounts of that portion of the pursuit and supports a
finding that the officers had probable cause to stop Lee for the traffic infraction

of failing to make a complete stop at a stop sign as well as the charge of fleeing
or attempting to elude – lights and sirens in high speed chase. Fla. Stat. §§
316.1935(3)(a), 316.123 (2017). There was also evidence that it was Defendant
driving the vehicle during the contested episode while his license was revoked.

See Docs. 7-1 at 36–43; 7-2 at 31–32, 39, 48. Those facts justified an arrest for
Felony Driving While License Revoked under section 322.34(5), Florida
Statutes, and no inconsistencies from the officers nor Lee’s own assertions
contradict those facts.

Moreover, whether the officers’ intentions were to stop Lee to search his
vehicle for drugs is of no consequence because the actual motivations of the
individual officers involved in a stop do not affect the constitutional
reasonableness of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. Whren, 517 U.S.
at 813; United States v. Harrelson, 465 F. App’x 866, 868 (11th Cir. 2012);12

Hilton v. State, 961 So. 2d 284, 294 (Fla. 2007). Accordingly, a motion to
suppress would not have been granted and there is no reasonable probability
the result of the proceedings would have been different had counsel argued the
stop or arrest were illegal on this basis. As such, the Court finds that this

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not “substantial”; and Lee’s failure to
exhaust is not excused under Martinez. Lee is not entitled to federal habeas
relief on this claim.
B. Ground Two

Lee alleges trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to reject a
favorable ten-year plea offer “under assurances” that counsel would
successfully challenge the legality of Lee’s arrest and impeach the officers’
testimony. Petition at 9–10; Memo at 19–20. Lee states he raised this claim in

Issue One of his Rule 3.850 Motion and in his “postconviction appeal.” Petition
at 9. He further asserts his attempt to raise this claim during state proceedings

12 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);
see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
was thwarted by postconviction counsel’s refusal to meet with Lee and
counsel’s unpreparedness for the evidentiary hearing. Id.

Respondents contend the claim is unexhausted and procedurally barred.
Response at 22–26. Specifically, they argue that while Lee previously alleged
counsel was ineffective for misadvising him and causing him to reject the ten-
year plea offer, the claim in the Petition is unexhausted as the misadvice Lee

identified in his state proceedings was related to potential sentencing
implications rather than his defense and likelihood of success at trial. Id. at
22–24. Respondents further argue that the Martinez exception to procedural
default is inapplicable here where Lee voluntarily withdrew his participation

in the state proceedings and refused to assist postconviction counsel. Id. at 24–
26. In his Reply, Lee acknowledges that the claim he raised in the state courts
was not the same claim he raises in his Petition, but contends the claim was
not “out of bounds.” Reply at 6–7. Alternatively, Lee argues that if the Court

finds the claim unexhausted, the Court should excuse the procedural default
based on Martinez. Id. at 7–8.
In Lee’s Supplemental 3.850 Motion, he alleged counsel was ineffective
for misadvising him to proceed to trial rather than accepting the State’s ten-

year plea offer based on counsel’s alleged assurances that “the court could not
impose a sentence greater than ten years of prison” whether he pled or was
convicted after a trial and that Lee “would be able to have his ten year[] prison
sentence run co[n]current to that of his pending federal indictment.” Doc. 7-13
at 17–20. He further asserted that he was misadvised by counsel to reject the

plea offer because counsel did not share a discovery exhibit with him. Id. at
20–21. Lee does not mention the impeachment of any witness nor challenging
the legality of his stop and arrest in these claims. As the claims fall under “the
same general legal umbrella but with entirely different factual

underpinnings,” the current issue was not fairly presented to the state court
and remains unexhausted. See Green, 28 F.4th at 1135. Any future attempt to
raise this ineffective assistance of counsel claim would be untimely, successive,
and thus futile. For these reasons, the claim is procedurally defaulted.

As to Lee’s alternative request, the Court does not find Lee has shown
Martinez to be applicable. While Lee asserts this claim was not raised due to
postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness, the Court is not convinced. Lee
himself did not raise the claim in his Rule 3.850 Motion or Supplemental 3.850

Motion. See Docs. 7-11 at 10–19; 7-13 at 13–22. Moreover, Lee was granted an
evidentiary hearing with the assistance of postconviction counsel on all
grounds of his Supplemental 3.850 Motion. Doc. 7-13 at 23–26. Despite the
opportunity to present his claims to the postconviction court with the

assistance of counsel, Lee attempted to withdraw his Supplemental 3.850
Motion and refused to participate in the proceedings. The postconviction court
gave Lee multiple opportunities to participate in the postconviction
proceedings, but Lee refused. The Court will not excuse the procedural default
based on the alleged ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel to raise a

claim where Lee not only refused to participate in presenting the claim at the
evidentiary hearing but also requested to withdraw all claims.
The Court further finds Lee has not shown his underlying ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is substantial. At the evidentiary hearing, counsel

testified regarding her conversations with Lee regarding the State’s plea offer.
Her testimony, which the postconviction court found to be credible, established
that she never advised Lee to reject the State’s plea offer, but rather that Lee
simply would not entertain the idea of a plea offer because he was focused on

the prospect of filing a motion to suppress. Doc. 7-13 at 125–29. Counsel stated,
“with the facts of this case, [she] would never have told Mr. Lee to go to trial.”
Id. at 135. Counsel further stated that even after gaining access to all the
evidence, she did not feel she had a valid basis to file a motion to suppress. Id.

at 128–29. She testified that “although there were repeated conversations
about the fact that pretextual stops are okay as long as there’s an underlying
violation of the traffic code, Mr. Lee continued to focus on those particular
issues related to the stop and whether there should be motions that should be

filed.” Id. at 132. Counsel elaborated, stating:
Mr. Lee had issues with his stop the whole time,
and I continued to tell him that under my
understanding of the case law, that pretextual stops
are valid as long as there is a violation of the criminal
traffic code. And in his situation, the officers knew
him, had seen him, knew he didn’t have a driver’s
license, relayed that information to a marked unit who
stopped him, and actually didn’t initiate the stop until
he ran red lights and ran people off the road and all of
those sorts of things.

Mr. Lee’s issue was that there were no drugs or
gun found in his car and, therefore, the stop shouldn’t
have been valid. And that’s true, there weren’t any
drugs or gun found in his car, but there were clear
violations of the traffic code based on the testimony,
and I did not feel that it was appropriate to file those
motions to suppress.

Id. at 143. Moreover, while many of the inconsistencies Lee highlights in his
Petition surround the ability of the officers to have witnessed him driving
through the red light, counsel stated she did not believe that discrediting the
officers on their account of Lee running of the red light would have undermined
the validity of the stop.13 Id. at 144–45. Considering the case law under Whren
and counsel’s credible testimony that she would never have advised Lee to
reject the plea offer, that she believed there was no legal basis to support any
motion to suppress, and that she counseled Lee on the lack of merit for any

13 Though the overall issue was discrediting the officers’ account of Lee running
the red light, the question raised to counsel centered on whether investigating and
taking photographs from the officers’ vantage point, which hypothetically could have
shown a “problem with actually seeing part of the road,” would have eliminated the
justification for the stop in this matter. See Doc. 7-13 at 143–45. Counsel explained
it would not have done so because an officer saw Lee, who did not have a valid license,
get into the car and drive it, and another officer saw him enter the wrong lane of
traffic. Id.
motion to suppress on this basis, Lee has not shown this claim to be
“substantial.” Because the claim is unexhausted and the procedural default is

not excused under Martinez, Lee is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this
claim.
C. Ground Three
Lee alleges the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by making

improper argument during its closing argument. Petition at 12; Memo at 21–
22. Specifically, Lee claims the prosecutor’s comment that the jury should
“convict the Defendant of the highest crimes” charged and disregard the lesser
included offenses14 was an incorrect statement of the law and conflicted with

the court’s instructions. Id. Lee states that the comment “was so harmful it
fundamentally tainted the juror’s pardoning powers,” caused the jury to render
a more severe verdict than it would have absent the comment, and deprived
Lee of a fair trial. Id. Lee asserts he exhausted this issue “through direct

appeal” and raised it as the fifth issue in his State Habeas Petition. Petition at
12.
Respondents contend Lee has not presented a federal question
cognizable for federal habeas review. Response at 27. Respondents further

assert that the issue was not exhausted, stating Lee never raised any issue of

14 See Doc. 7-2 at 166.
“state error” in his direct appeal and that the issue was not exhausted through
his State Habeas Petition due to the First DCA’s dismissal, rather than

adjudication, of the State Habeas Petition. Id. at 27–30. According to
Respondents, because any attempt to raise this issue now in a state habeas
petition would be untimely, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Id. at 30.
Respondents also argue that Lee has not shown cause or prejudice to overcome

the procedural bar and that Martinez is inapplicable. Id. Alternatively,
Respondents argue this ground fails on the merits. Id. at 31–33.
In response to Respondents’ argument that his claim does not present a
constitutional issue, Lee states that his claim is “clearly one of Ineffective

Assistance of Appellate Counsel under [Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure]
9.141(c) which is reviewed as a violation of the U.S. [C]onstitution’s Due
Process clause.” Reply at 9. Additionally, Lee contends the State’s argument
that the First DCA dismissed the petition without reaching the merits is

unreasonable since he believes the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claims were clearly asserted and are properly raised in such petitions.
Lee did not raise the claim he asserts here in his direct appeal. See Doc.
7-3. While Lee did raise this claim in Ground Five of his State Habeas Petition,

the court dismissed that petition and did not address the merits. See Docs. 7-
18; 7-19. To the extent Lee contends that he “clearly” raised a claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his State Habeas Petition, that is
not the claim he presents in his Petition. Rather, his claim in the Petition is
that his trial was impacted by the prosecutor’s improper closing argument. He

makes no mention of appellate counsel within Ground Three of his Petition or
Memorandum, see Petition at 12; Memo at 21–22. While Lee may have
presented the prosecutorial misconduct claim in his State Habeas Petition, it
was not cognizable as such within that petition. See McAffee v. State, 925 So.

2d 1069, 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (finding claims of prosecutorial misconduct
were precluded from review in a 9.141 habeas petition); Gerome v. State, 368
So. 3d 38, 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“However, [petitioner] is precluded from
raising these issues in a petition for writ of habeas corpus; prosecutorial

misconduct allegations should be raised on direct appeal or via a 3.850
proceeding.”). Accordingly, the prosecutorial misconduct claim is unexhausted.
See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351 (finding a claim is not “fairly presented” to state
court when it is “presented for the first and only time in a procedural context

in which its merits will not be considered”).
More importantly, Florida has a two-year limitations period for filing a
state habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, running from the date the petitioner’s judgment and sentence becomes

final following direct review. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(d)(5). As Lee’s judgment
and sentence became final when the Florida Supreme Court declined
jurisdiction on September 12, 2019 (see Doc. 7-8), his petition for habeas review
of any alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claim was untimely when filed
on November 12, 2021 (see Doc. 7-18). Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude

the State Habeas Petition was dismissed as untimely. See Rogers v. Sec’y,
Dep’t of Corr., 829 F. App’x 437, 442 (11th Cir. 2020) (stating that where there
is an unexplained decision “the nature of the disposition (‘dismissed’ rather
than ‘denied’) and surrounding circumstances … [may] indicate[] that the basis

was procedural default.” (quoting Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802
(1991))). Accordingly, this claim is procedurally defaulted.
Lee has not shown cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural default.
Moreover, although Lee does not assert the Martinez exception for this claim,15

the Court notes Martinez does not apply to claims of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. Luciano v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
701 F. App’x 792, 794 (11th Cir. 2017) (“We have repeatedly underscored
Martinez’s narrow scope, and emphasized that Martinez applies only to

excusing a procedural default of ineffective-trial-counsel claims.” (citing
Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 940, 945 (11th Cir. 2014))).
Even if this Court were to construe Lee’s present claim as one of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and find it exhausted, Lee’s claim

would fail on the merits. In Florida, attorneys are permitted wide latitude in

15 Lee only replied that the claim was exhausted and meritorious. See Reply at
8–11.
closing arguments. Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1998). Counsel
may draw logical inferences and advance all legitimate arguments. Thomas v.

State, 748 So. 2d 970, 984 (Fla. 1999). Claims of allegedly improper comment
for which trial counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection will be
waived for review on appeal unless the unobjected to comments rise to the level
of fundamental error. Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 898–99 (Fla. 2000).

Fundamental error is error that “reaches down into the validity of the trial
itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without
the assistance of the alleged error.” Id. at 899 (citation omitted).
Here, Lee’s trial counsel did not object to the comment by the State. Doc.

7-2 at 166, 167.16 Accordingly, appellate counsel would have had to show the
comment rose to the level of fundamental error to be successful on appeal. The
comment in question was a reiteration of the trial court’s forthcoming
instruction pursuant to Florida Standard Jury Instruction 3.12: “You may find

the Defendant guilty as charged in the information or guilty of such lesser
included crime as the evidence may justify or not guilty. If you return a verdict
of guilty, it should be for the highest offense which has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” See Doc. 7-2 at 185–86. Moreover, the comment came after

16 While Lee’s trial counsel did object at the end of the State’s rebuttal closing
argument, he objected only to the State showing the jurors a verdict form filled out
by the State, not any comment made by the State in argument.
the State had gone through the evidence at trial to highlight why it believed
the evidence showed Lee should be found guilty of the charged offenses, rather

than the lesser included offenses. Id. at 145–49, 166. This comment which
mirrored a standard Florida jury instruction and was based off the evidence
presented, and reasonable inferences therefrom, cannot be said to constitute
error, let alone fundamental error. Thus, any suggestion that appellate counsel

was ineffective for failing to raise this issue is meritless. See Brown v. United
States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1335 (11th Cir. 2013) (“It is . . . crystal clear that there
can be no showing of actual prejudice from an appellate attorney’s failure to
raise a meritless claim.”). Lee is therefore not entitled to federal habeas relief

on this claim.
VII. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

If Lee seeks issuance of a certificate of appealability, the undersigned
opines that a certificate of appealability is not warranted. The Court should
issue a certificate of appealability only if the petitioner makes “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make
this substantial showing, Lee “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would
find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were
‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,’” Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4

(1983)).
Where a district court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on
the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find
the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.

See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. However, when the district court has rejected a
claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show that “jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial
of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. Upon
consideration of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of
appealability.
Therefore, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment denying the Petition

and dismissing this case with prejudice.
3. If Lee appeals the denial of the Petition, the Court denies a
certificate of appealability. Because the Court has determined that a certificate
of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending
motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed
in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.
4, The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and terminate

any pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 11th day of
September, 2025.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD
United States District Judge

JaxP-12
C: Michael Jerome Lee, #866560
Counsel of Record

34

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11137659. Public record. Not legal advice.