# Rogers v. Anderson

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · September 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11136281

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** September 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

WILLIE ROGERS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-CV-1006-CCB

NIKOLOS ANDERSON, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
On December 19, 2023, Plaintiff Willie Rogers, proceeding pro se, filed an
amended complaint against six defendants, Indiana State Police Superintendent
Douglas Carter, and Troopers Nikolos Anderson and Matthew Henson (the “State
Defendants”), as well as LaGrange County, LaGrange County Sheriff Tracy Harker, and
LaGrange County Clerk Kimberly Johnson (the “LaGrange County Defendants”).1
Rogers brings several claims against the State Defendants and LaGrange County
Defendants based on allegations of excessive force, false arrest, and imprisonment.
On January 10, 2025, the State Defendants and the LaGrange County Defendants
separately moved for summary judgment. (ECF 46, ECF 50). In compliance with N.D.
Ind. Local Rule 56-1(a)(4), both the State Defendants and the LaGrange County
Defendants filed and served the requisite Notice to Pro Se Litigant informing Rogers

1 Rogers also alleged a Fifth Amendment due process claim against a seventh defendant, Cindy Llera. On
January 3, 2024, the Court, under a previous presider, dismissed without prejudice Mr. Roger’s claim
against Llera. (ECF 6).
that a summary judgment motion has been filed against him, that if he does not agree
with the facts in the motion that he must submit evidence to dispute those facts, that he

has a right to file a response to the motion and that he may request for additional time
to respond before the deadline, and attaching copies of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and Local Rule
5-1. (ECF 49, 54). Rogers did not respond to either the State Defendants’ or LaGrange
County Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Rogers also did not request an
extension of the response deadlines. Both motions are now ripe for ruling. Based on the
applicable law, facts, and arguments, the State Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment (ECF 50) and the LaGrange County Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (ECF 46) are granted.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
The following facts are not in dispute. On September 20, 2021, the LaGrange
Circuit Court in cause no. 44C01-2109-CM-000388 issued a warrant for Rogers’ arrest.2

On October 7, 2021, the LaGrange Circuit Court entered an order recalling the warrant.
On March 14, 2022 at approximately 7:48 a.m., Indiana State Police Trooper
Nikolos Anderson conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by Rogers for a speeding
violation. (ECF 51-1 at 1). Trooper Henson arrived a few minutes later. (ECF 51-2 at 1).
Trooper Anderson ran Rogers’ information through the Indiana State Police System and

was alerted that there was an arrest warrant for Rogers. (ECF 51-1 at 1). Trooper
Anderson contacted dispatch and confirmed there was an arrest warrant for Rogers.

2 The Court may take judicial notice of actions by other courts. Daniel v. Cook Cnty., 833 F.3d 728, 742 (7th
Cir. 2016).
(Id.) Trooper Anderson and Trooper Hansen then arrested Rogers and checked his
person. (Id.) During the search and arrest, Rogers indicated to Troopers Anderson and

Henson his belief that the arrest warrant was invalid. (ECF 51-1 at 2; ECF 51-2 at 1).
Trooper Anderson then asked dispatch again to confirm if there was a warrant for
Rogers’ arrest. (ECF 51-1 at 2.) Dispatch contacted LaGrange County, and confirmed
that there was an arrest warrant. (Id.) Trooper Henson then assisted in escorting Rogers
to the passenger seat of Trooper Anderson’s vehicle, and Trooper Anderson drove
Rogers to the LaGrange County jail. (Id.) Trooper Henson then left the scene at

approximately 8:21 a.m. (ECF 51-2 at 2). Upon arrival and before booking, Trooper
Anderson asked LaGrange County staff to confirm that the warrant for Rogers’ arrest
was valid. (ECF 51-1 at 2). Jail staff conducted a search and notified Trooper Anderson
that the arrest warrant was quashed and no longer valid. (Id.) Trooper Anderson then
escorted Rogers back to his vehicle, and dropped Rogers off at approximately 9:24 a.m.

(ECF 51-3 at 1).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Matshushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
To determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court must
review the record, construing all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d
278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). The court must not “sift through the evidence, pondering the
nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst
Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). The court does not have to conduct research or
develop arguments for parties either. Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir.
2011); see also United States v. Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044, 1059 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Perfunctory,

undeveloped arguments without discussion or citation to pertinent legal authority are
waived.”).
“To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party cannot rest
on the mere allegations or denials contained in his pleadings, but must present
sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear

the burden at trial.” Robin v. Espo Eng’g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc.,
834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). “Summary judgment is not a dress rehearsal or practice
run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what
evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.”

Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted);
see also Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010).
III. ANALYSIS
a. The State Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 51)
i. Rogers’ claims against the State Defendants in their official
capacity

The State Defendants first argue that all of Rogers’ claims against the State
Defendants in their official capacities are barred under the Eleventh Amendment.
The State Defendants are employees of the Indiana State Police Department, and
the Indiana State Police Department is an agency of the State of Indiana. See Endres v.
Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The Indiana State Police, as a unit of
state government, is not a ‘person’ as § 1983 uses that term and therefore is not
amenable to a suit for damages under that statute.”). The Eleventh Amendment

“usually bars actions in federal court against a state, state agencies, or state officials
acting in their official capacities.” Peirick v. Indiana Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis
Athletics Dept., 510 F.3d 681, 695 (7th Cir. 2007). There are three exceptions to Eleventh
Amendment immunity:
First, a state may waive immunity by consenting to suit in federal court; second,
Congress may abrogate the state's immunity through a valid exercise of its
powers; third, under the Ex parte Young doctrine, a plaintiff may file “suit[ ]
against state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations
of federal law....”

Id. (citing Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir.1997)). None of these
exceptions apply here. Indiana has not consented to this lawsuit. Congress did not
abrogate the States’ immunity by enacting Section 1983. Joseph v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. Sys., 432 F.3d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 2005). Rogers is only seeking a declaration that the
State Defendants’ conduct is unconstitutional, and monetary damages. (ECF 3 at 10-11).
Rogers does not request a prospective injunction or present any evidence to suggest that
the State Defendants are committing ongoing violations of federal law. All of Rogers’

allegations relate to a past violation of federal law—his arrest following the execution of
an invalid warrant. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars Rogers’ claims against
the State Defendants’ in their official capacities, and the State Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to those claims is granted.
ii. Rogers’ excessive force claims against Troopers Henson and
Anderson

Next, the State Defendants argue that summary judgment is proper as to Rogers’
excessive force claims against Troopers Henson and Anderson (Count 6) because there
is no genuine issue of material fact that Troopers Henson and Anderson acted
reasonably when they arrested Rogers.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the police officer used excessive
force. Rice v. Burks, 999 F.2d 1172, 1175 (7th Cir. 1993). Excessive force claims under §
1983 are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” standard.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). “This inquiry requires an examination of the
‘totality of the circumstances to determine whether the intrusion on the citizen's Fourth
Amendment interests was justified by the countervailing government[al] interests at

stake.’” Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Jacobs v.
City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 773 (7th Cir.2000)). “The nature and extent of the force that
may reasonably be used to effectuate an arrest depends on the specific circumstances of
the arrest.” Id. This inquiry is done from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. An
arresting officer also “has the right to use some degree of physical force or threat of
force to effectuate the arrest.” Id.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the State Defendants point to
Exhibit D, which the State Defendants manually filed. (ECF 55). In the State Defendants’
notice of manual filing, they state that the manual filing contains a CD/DVD of “videos
relating to Defendant’s Exhibit D to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.” (Id.)
In moving for summary judgment on Rogers’ excessive force claim, the State
Defendants reference Exhibit D in their brief in arguing that Rogers gave no indication

that he was in pain or complaint about the handcuffs. However, Exhibit D that was
manually submitted by the State Defendants contains a 12-minute video that is time
stamped October 12, 2021 at 08:49 PM—several months before Roger’s arrest the
morning of March 14, 2022—and shows what appears to be several uniformed officers
congregating in a hallway. (ECF 55). There is no audio. The video appears to be an

inadvertent filing because it does not show anyone being arrested or in handcuffs.
But even without the State Defendants’ purported video of Rogers’ arrest, Rogers
presents no evidence to support his allegation that Troopers Henson and Anderson
used excessive force when they handcuffed and escorted him to the police car. Trooper
Anderson states in his affidavit that, after he contacted dispatch and confirmed there

was an arrest warrant for Rogers, he “approached the vehicle with Trooper Matthew
Henson and restrained Mr. Rogers with handcuffs and checked his person,” that
“Trooper Henson then assisted in escorting Mr. Rogers to the passenger seat of my
vehicle,” and then “Mr. Rogers was allowed to call an unidentified individual,
presumably his relative, to explain his situation” and that, after calling dispatch again to
confirm the arrest warrant was valid, Trooper Anderson “drove Mr. Rogers to

LaGrange County jail.” (ECF 51-1 at 1-2). Trooper Henson’s affidavit similarly states
that Trooper Anderson “restrained Mr. Rogers with handcuffs and checked his person,”
that Trooper Henson “assisted in escorting Mr. Rogers to the passenger seat of Trooper
Anderson’s vehicle” and that Mr. Rogers was allowed to make a phone call. (ECF 51-2
at 1-2). Rogers presents no evidence that the force used in effecting his arrest was
objectively unreasonable to support his excessive force claim. Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese

Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Summary judgment is not a dress rehearsal or
practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show
what evidence, it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the
events.”); see also Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[I]n the
absence of any evidence of specific wrongdoing, [plaintiff]’s excessive force claim is

speculative and fails to raise any material issue of fact for trial.”). Accordingly, there is
no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Troopers Henson or Anderson used
excessive force when they arrested Rogers, and so they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
iii. False arrest and imprisonment claims against the State
Defendants

Rogers brings claims under § 1983 for unlawful arrest, detention, and
imprisonment against all defendants, including the State Defendants. (Counts 7 and 8).
Rogers alleges that the State Defendants unlawfully arrested him on a warrant
that had been previously quashed. Probable cause “is an absolute defense to a false
arrest claim.” Pryor v. Corrigan, 124 F.4th 475, 486 (7th Cir. 2024). “[A] police officer
cannot be held liable for false arrest if the officer believed in good faith that the arrest

was made with probable cause and that such belief was reasonable.” Brown v. City of
Fort Wayne, 752 F. Supp. 2d 925, 256 (N.D. Ind. 2010). “The probable cause balance
favors the government when an arrest is executed pursuant to a warrant.” Johnson v.
Myers, 53 F.4th 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 2022).
The State Defendants present an affidavit from Trooper Anderson where he
states that on March 14, 2022 at approximately 7:45 a.m., he conducted a traffic stop on

a vehicle driven by Rogers for a speeding violation. (ECF 51-1 at 1). Trooper Anderson
ran the driver through the Indiana State Police system and was alerted that there was
an arrest warrant for Rogers. (Id.) Trooper Anderson contacted dispatch and confirmed
that there was an arrest warrant for Rogers. (Id.) Trooper Anderson then approached
the vehicle with Trooper Henson and restrained Rogers with handcuffs and checked his

person. (Id.) During the search and arrest, Rogers indicated to Trooper Anderson that he
believed that his arrest warrant was not valid, and so Trooper Anderson asked dispatch
to confirm once more if there was a warrant for Roger’s arrest. (Id. at 2). Dispatch
contacted LaGrange County and confirmed that there was an arrest warrant, and so
Trooper Henson assisted in escorting Rogers to the passenger seat of Trooper

Anderson’s vehicle. (Id.) Trooper Anderson then drove Rogers to the LaGrange County
jail. (Id.) Upon arrival, Trooper Anderson asked LaGrange County staff to confirm that
the arrest warrant was valid before booking. (Id.) Jail staff conducted a search and
notified Trooper Anderson that the arrest warrant had been quashed and was no longer
valid. (Id.) Trooper Anderson then states he escorted Rogers back to his vehicle and
dropped him off at approximately 9:24 a.m. (Id.)

Rogers presents no evidence that either Trooper Anderson or Trooper Henson
did not act in good faith or that they acted unreasonably when they arrested Rogers.
There is no evidence that Trooper Anderson or Trooper Henson knew or had reason to
know that the warrant was invalid. Rather, the evidence shows that Troopers Anderson
and Henson believed in good faith that there was probable cause to arrest Rogers.
Troopers Anderson and Hansen reasonably believed that the arrest warrant was valid

because Trooper Anderson confirmed with dispatch twice that the arrest warrant was
valid. See Johnson v. Myers, 53 F.4th 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he court’s inquiry is
limited to what the officer knew at the time of the arrest and not what has been gained
from hindsight. This knowledge is assessed from the perspective of an objectively
reasonable police officer.”). Once Troopers Anderson and Hansen learned at the jail that

the arrest warrant was invalid, the evidence shows they acted prudently in releasing
Rogers. Because Rogers has not shown the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Troopers Anderson and Hansen acted in good faith belief that the arrest
of Rogers was made with probable cause, or that such belief was reasonable, Troopers
Anderson and Hansen are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Rogers’ false

arrest and imprisonment claims.
For that reason, Rogers’ claim that Trooper Anderson unlawfully searched him
based on an invalid warrant also fails. 3 It is a “bright-line rule that police are entitled to

search the persons and possessions of everyone arrested on probable cause, with or
without any reason to suspect that the person is armed or carrying contraband.” United
States v. Jackson, 377 F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 2004). As stated, the Court finds that Trooper
Anderson acted in good faith in believing that there was probable cause to arrest
Rogers, and that such belief was objectively reasonable, and so Trooper Anderson was
permitted to search Roger’s person as a search incident to a lawful arrest. See id.

Finally, Rogers alleges that his false arrest and imprisonment claim is asserted
against all defendants, including Superintendent Carter. The doctrine of respondeat
superior does not apply to § 1983 actions. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 739 (7th
Cir. 2001). Thus, individual liability under § 1983 requires “personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional deprivation.” Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir.

2017). A defendant “will be deemed to have sufficient personal responsibility if he
directed the conduct causing the constitutional violation, or if it occurred with his
knowledge or consent.” Sanville, 266 F.3d at 740.
There is no evidence that Superintendent Carter had any personal involvement
with the arrest or detention, that he directed Rogers’ arrest or detention, or that he knew

about the arrest or detention. There is also no evidence that Superintendent Carter had

3 Rogers does not allege that Trooper Henson searched him, only Trooper Anderson. See ECF 3 at 6
(“Defendant Anderson unlawfully searched, seized, and arrested Plaintiff on a warrant that was
quashed[.]”).
any personal involvement with the issuance or quashing of the invalid warrant.
Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Superintendent Carter was

personally involved in any alleged constitutional deprivation. Accordingly,
Superintendent Carter is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Rogers’ false
arrest and imprisonment claims under § 1983.
iv. Failure to intervene claim against Trooper Henson

Rogers also alleges a failure to intervene claim under § 1983 against Trooper
Henson (Count 2). An officer may be liable under § 1983, even as a bystander, if the
officer “(1) had reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or
committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to
prevent the act from occurring.” Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 472 (7th Cir.2009). “A
realistic opportunity to intervene may exist if an officer could have called for a backup,
called for help, or at least cautioned [the officer] to stop.” Stewardson v. Biggs, 43 F.4th

732, 736 (7th Cir. 2022).
For reasons already stated, Rogers has failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue
of material fact exists as to his excessive force claim and to his unlawful arrest and
detention claim. Rogers has also not argued or presented evidence of the use of
excessive force or of a constitutional violation for which Trooper Henson failed to

intervene. Accordingly, the State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to
Rogers’ failure to intervene claim against Trooper Henson (Count 3) is granted.
v. Failure to train and supervise claim against Superintendent
Carter

Rogers also asserts a claim under § 1983 for failure to properly train and
supervise against Superintendent Carter in his individual capacity and official capacity
(Count 2). Because the Court already determined that Rogers’ official capacity claims
against Superintendent Carter are dismissed, the Court only addresses the claim against
Superintendent Carter in his individual capacity.
Rogers alleges that Superintendent Carter failed to properly train and supervise
Troopers Anderson and Henson “to make [a]n inquiry into the validity of that warrant
when there was sufficient reason to believe that the warrant was invalid.” (ECF 3 at 9).
As stated, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983, and so

Superintendent Carter must be personally responsible for the deprivation of a
constitutional right. Sanville, 266 F.3d at 740; see also Matthews v. City of E. St. Louis, 675
F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012) (“To show personal involvement, the supervisor must
“know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for
fear of what they might see.”). “[A] supervisor may be liable for deliberate, reckless

indifference to the misconduct of subordinates.” Sanville, 266 F.3d at 740.
There is no evidence that Superintendent Carter acted with deliberate, reckless
indifference to any conduct of Troopers Anderson and Henson, or evidence that
Superintendent Carter failed to properly train Troopers Anderson and Henson. Rather,
the evidence shows that Troopers Anderson and Henson inquired several times as to

whether the warrant was valid. Because Rogers fails to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact as to his failure to properly train and supervise under §
1983 claim against Superintendent Carter, the State Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as to that claim (Count 2) is granted.
vi. State law claims against the State Defendants
Next, the State Defendants argue that summary judgment is proper to the extent
Rogers asserts any claims arising under state law, arguing that there is no private right
of action for monetary damages under the Indiana Constitution, and there is no genuine
issue of material fact that Rogers failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

The Court agrees with the State Defendants that Rogers cannot bring a claim
under the Indiana Constitution because Rogers only requests monetary damages, and
there is no express or implied right of action for monetary damages under the Indiana
Constitution. Smith v. Ind. Dept. of Correction, 871 N.E.2d 975, 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
To the extent Rogers’ claims arise under state law, Rogers was required under

Indiana Code § 34-13-3-6 to file an administrative claim with the Indiana State Police or
the Office of the Indiana Attorney General for any tort claim within 270 days after the
loss occurred. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-6. Failure to comply with the statutory notice
requirement is fatal to a plaintiff’s tort claim against government entities and public
employees. Daugherty v. Dearborn Co., 827 N.E.2d 34, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

The State Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact that
Rogers did not give notice to the Indiana State Police or the Office of the Indiana
Attorney General of any tort claim. In support, the State Defendants present an affidavit
from Michael Ward, director of investigations for the Indiana Office of Attorney
General, stating that a search of the Office’s records revealed that Rogers did not file a
Notice of Tort Claim. (ECF 51-5). The State Defendants also present an affidavit from

Jeffrey Pitts, a senior attorney for the Office of the Superintendent for the Indiana State
Police, stating that their office does not have a record of a Notice of Tort Claim from
Rogers. (ECF 51-4).
Even if Rogers was not aware of any loss that occurred until the date he filed his
amended complaint on December 19, 2023, he needed to file an administrative claim 270
days from that date, or September 14, 2024. Rogers presents no evidence of filing the

requisite claim with the Indiana State Police or the Office of the Indiana Attorney
General by that deadline, or otherwise argue the deadline is tolled. Accordingly, to the
extent Rogers asserts any tort claims arising under state law, those claims are dismissed.
vii. Conspiracy claim against the State Defendants
Rogers also alleges that the State Defendants conspired to deprive him of his

constitutional rights (Count 4). “To establish conspiracy liability in a § 1983 claim, the
plaintiff must show that (1) the individuals reached an agreement to deprive him of his
constitutional rights, and (2) overt acts in furtherance actually deprived him of those
rights.” Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2015).
Rogers has not presented any evidence or argument that the State Defendants

deprived him of his constitutional rights, or of any agreement between the State
Defendants with any of the other defendants in this case. Accordingly, Rogers’
conspiracy claim also fails.
viii. Qualified immunity
Finally, the State Defendants argue, that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
“Public officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity in §

1983 actions if their conduct ‘could reasonably have been thought consistent with the
rights they are alleged to have violated.’” Lauer v. Dahlberg, 717 F. Supp. 612, 613 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038 (1987). Whether qualified
immunity applies is dependent upon the “objective legal reasonableness of the official's
action.” Id.

The Court finds that the State Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on Rogers’ claims because Trooper Anderson and Henson had an objectively
reasonable belief that the warrant was valid based on the two calls to dispatch during
the traffic stop in which dispatch informed Troopers Anderson and Henson that there
was an active warrant for Rogers’ arrest. See Lauer, 717 F. Supp at 613 (defendant “is

entitled to rely upon the information he receives over the police radio”). Accordingly,
the State Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to all of Roger’s § 1983
claims.
b. The LaGrange County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
i. Claims against LaGrange County arising from alleged failure to
supervise and train Sheriff Harker and Clerk Johnson

Rogers alleges that LaGrange County failed to train Sheriff Harker and Clerk
Johnson “in entering quash and recalled order.” (ECF3 at 8). However, under Indiana
law, a county does not have any control over the acts of the sheriff. Delk v. Bd. of Com’rs
of Delaware Co., 503 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). Accordingly, LaGrange County
does not have authority over the sheriff and their deputies, so LaGrange County is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Rogers’ claims arising from a failure to

supervise and train Sheriff Harker. See Est. of Drayton v. Nelson, 53 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir.
1994).
As to Clerk Johnson, the LaGrange County Defendants present an affidavit from
Kevin Myers, a member of the Board of Commissions of the County of LaGrange,
affirming that the Board of Commissioners4 has no supervision or management of Clerk
Johnson, or of the day-to-day operations of the LaGrange County Clerk’s Office. (ECF

46-1 at 1). Rogers has presented no evidence to support his failure-to-train Clerk
Johnson claim against LaGrange County, therefore LaGrange County is also entitled to
judgment as a matter of law as to that claim.
For these same reasons, Rogers’ claims again LaGrange County under a
respondeat superior theory (count 9) is also dismissed because Rogers has presented no

evidence to show that LaGrange County supervised or controlled Sheriff Harker or
Clerk Johnson. To the extent Rogers’ respondeat superior claim is brought under § 1983,
that claim also fails because respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983. Sanville, 266
F.3d at 740; see also Matthews v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012).
c. Claims against Sheriff Harker and Clerk Johnson in their individual
capacities

The LaGrange County Defendants also move for summary judgment as to
Rogers’ Section 1983 claims against Sheriff Harker and Clerk Johnson in their individual

4 “The county is known in law only by its board of commissioners, and acts, as a county, through its
board.” Bd. of Comm'rs v. Wild, 37 Ind. App. 32, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1905).
capacities, arguing that neither had any personal involvement with the warrant recall
error.

As stated in the Court’s discussion of the State Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, individual liability under § 1983 requires “personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional deprivation.” Colbert, 851 F.3d at 657 (7th Cir. 2017). An
individual has personal involvement if they directed the conduct causing the
constitutional violation, or if the conduct occurred with their knowledge or consent.
Sanville, 266 F.3d at 740.

In support of the LaGrange County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
they present an affidavit from Sheriff Harker. Sheriff Harker states that the LaGrange
County Sheriff’s Office updates warrant information based upon orders it receives, and
that the Sheriff’s office received no notice of a recall of the warrant for Rogers that was
issued in September 2021 in cause no. 44C01-2109-CM-000388, that a review of the court

order recalling the September 20221 warrant shows it was distributed to Plaintiff’s
counsel and the LaGrange County Prosecutor’s Office, that Rogers was not in the
custody of the LaGrange County Sheriff’s office deputies when he was arrested on
March 14, 2022, and that Rogers was never booked into the LaGrange County Jail on
March 14, 2022. (ECF 46-3 at 1-2). As to Clerk Johnson, the State Defendants present an

affidavit from Johnson where she states that neither she nor the LaGrange County
Clerk’s Office has responsibility for the issuance of warrant recalls, that the issuance of
warrant recalls is the responsibility of the court where the criminal case is pending, and
that neither she nor the LaGrange County Clerk’s Office issued any warrant recall or
had responsibility for the recall of warrant for Rogers in relation to cause no. 44C01-
2109-CM-000388.

Rogers presents no evidence or argument in support of his claim against Sheriff
Harker or Clerk Johnson for personal involvement in any constitutional deprivation.
Accordingly, Sheriff Harker and Clerk Johnson in their individual capacities are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law as to Rogers’ § 1983 claims.
d. Monell claim against the LaGrange County Defendants
Rogers also asserts a Monell claim against LaGrange County, as well as Sheriff

Harker and Clerk Johnson in their official capacities. Actions against individual
defendants in their official capacities are treated as suits brought against the
government entity itself. Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff
can sue local governments under Section 1983 when an official policy of that local
government inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is allegedly responsible.

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under Section
1983, a local government may be liable for monetary damages if the plaintiff can show
that the unconstitutional act complained of is caused by: “(1) an official policy adopted
and promulgated by its officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that, although
not officially authorized, is widespread and well settled; or (3) an official with final

policy-making authority.” Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th
Cir. 2010).
For a Monell claim, a plaintiff must show that the unconstitutional act
complained of was caused by an official policy, a practice, or custom that is widespread
and well settled, or an official with policy making authority. Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303.
Rogers has failed to present any evidence that he was subjected to any unconstitutional

treatment during his arrest and detainment. There is no evidence that the LaGrange
County Defendants arrested or unlawfully detained Rogers. Nor has Rogers presented
any evidence of a custom or policy that resulted in the warrant recall error. Rather,
Rogers’ claims all arise from his individualized experience—his arrest following the
execution of an invalid warrant—without evidence of constitutional violations
experienced by anyone else. That is insufficient to support a Monell claim. Dean v.

Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 240 (7th Cir. 2021) (the Seventh Circuit has
“repeatedly rejected Monell claims that rest on the plaintiff's individualized experience
without evidence of other constitutional violations.”).
In rare circumstances, it is possible for a single violation to suffice for “failure-to-
train” liability, as is alleged here, “where a violation occurs and the plaintiff asserts a

recurring, obvious risk.” Flores v. City of S. Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2021). “To
establish single-incident liability, a plaintiff must prove that municipal policymakers
know that its employees will confront a given situation and not train for it, and the need
for training must be obvious without consideration of prior violations.” Id. at 734-35
(internal citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that the single-

incident theory is reserved only for narrow circumstances “when a municipality fails to
train its employees, who ‘have no knowledge at all of the constitutional limits’ that
govern their conduct in situations they are certain to encounter.” Id. at 735 (quoting
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 64 (2011)). “Only where a failure to train reflects a
“deliberate” or “conscious” choice by a municipality . . . can a city be liable for such a
failure under § 1983.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).

Rogers has not presented any evidence that the policymakers knew that its
employees would confront a given situation and not train for it here. Flores, 997 F.3d at
731. Rogers’ Monell claim thus fails and the LaGrange County Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is granted as to the Monell claim against LaGrange County and
Sheriff Harker and Clerk Johnson in their official capacities.
e. Conspiracy claim against the LaGrange County Defendants

Rogers also asserts a conspiracy claim against all defendants, including the
LaGrange County Defendants, under § 1983 (Count 4). “To establish conspiracy liability
in a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) the individuals reached an agreement
to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and (2) overt acts in furtherance actually
deprived him of those rights.” Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2015).

Rogers presents no evidence to support a § 1983 conspiracy claim. There is no
evidence that any of the LaGrange County Defendants reached an agreement to deprive
Rogers of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, summary judgment is proper as to
Rogers’ conspiracy claim against the LaGrange County Defendants.
f. State law claims against the LaGrange County Defendants

Like the State Defendants, the LaGrange County Defendants move for summary
judgment to the extent Rogers asserts any state law claims because the LaGrange
County Defendants did not receive the requisite notice under Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8.
Under Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8, a plaintiff is required to file a notice against the
political subdivision involved for any tort claim within 180 days after the loss occurs.

Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8. A political subdivision includes a county. Ind. Code § 34-6-2.1-
155. Failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement is fatal to a plaintiff’s tort
claim against government entities and public employees. Daugherty v. Dearborn Co., 827
N.E.2d 34, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The plaintiff has the burden to prove compliance
with the notice requirement. Brown v. Alexander, 876 N.E.2d 376, 384 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007).

The LaGrange County Defendants argue that any state law claim against them is
barred because Rogers did not file the requisite notice. Assuming that Rogers suffered a
loss the date that he filed the amended complaint on December 19, 2023, the latest that
Rogers was required to file the notice was June 16, 2024. Rogers has not presented any
evidence to show that he filed the notice required under Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8 within

the 180-day statutory requirement. Accordingly, the LaGrange County Defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law to the extent Rogers asserts any state law claims
arising from his alleged unlawful arrest and detention based on the invalid warrant.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, because Rogers has failed to show the existence

of a genuine issue of material fact as to any of his claims against the State Defendants
and the LaGrange County Defendants, the State Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (ECF 50) and the LaGrange County Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (ECF 46) are GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor
of Defendants Douglas Carter, Nikolos Anderson, Matthew Henson, LaGrange County,
Tracy Harker, and Kimberly Johnson.

SO ORDERED on September 9, 2025.

/s/Cristal C. Brisco
CRISTAL C. BRISCO, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11136281. Public record. Not legal advice.