# Millsaps v. Iredell County District Attorney's Office

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · August 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11136277

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** August 11, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11136277

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that force used in arresting (and taking to the ground) a driver after a traffic stop was not excessive

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:22-CV-00095-KDB-DCK

GLENN S. MILLSAPS JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

DANNY LILES AND RON
HILLARD,

Defendants.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment
(Doc. Nos. 162, 164). The Court has carefully considered this motion, the parties’ briefs and
exhibits and oral argument on the motion from Plaintiff (appearing pro se) and Defendants’
counsel on August 7, 2025. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will GRANT the motions.
This long running dispute stems from Plaintiff’s arrest in July 2019 for refusing to leave
the Iredell County District Attorney’s (“DA”) office, where he was trying unsuccessfully to
reschedule a hearing on a citation for a seat belt violation. It is important to understand what is and
is not before the Court with respect to the pending motions. The Court well understands that
Plaintiff passionately believes that he should have been allowed to reschedule his hearing without
engaging an attorney and that any policy otherwise is wrong. Relatedly, he believes that he should
not have been told to leave the DA’s office when he tried to reschedule his hearing. However, none
of those issues are now before the Court. Instead, the Court must decide if a reasonable jury could
find the two remaining individual Defendants, Danny Liles and Ron Hillard, liable for their
conduct in connection with his arrest. Because Plaintiff’s own testimony, much of which he
repeated at oral argument, confirms that Liles did not commit assault or battery as a matter of law
and Deputy Hillard had probable cause to arrest him and did not use excessive force in doing so,
the Court finds that the Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Mr. Millsaps’ claims.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” United States v.
8.929 Acres of Land in Arlington Cnty., Virginia, 36 F.4th 240, 252 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a)); see United States, f/u/b Modern Mosaic, LTD v. Turner Construction Co., et al.,
946 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2019). A factual dispute is considered genuine “if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); 8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252. “A fact is material if it might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. (quoting Libertarian Party of Va. v.
Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact through citations to the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits in the record. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986) (when the nonmoving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of [his] claim with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof,” summary judgment is
warranted); United States ex rel. Gugenheim v. Meridian Senior Living, LLC, 36 F.4th 173, 178
(4th Cir. 2022). If the movant satisfies his initial burden to demonstrate “an absence of evidence
to support the nonmoving party’s case,” the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “present specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252 (quoting
Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir.
2015)).
“The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Hixson v. Moran, 1 F.4th 297, 302
(4th Cir. 2021). Rather, the nonmoving party must establish that a material fact is genuinely

disputed by, inter alia, “citing to particular parts of the materials of record” and cannot rely only
on “conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); 8.929 Acres of Land, 36
F.4th at 252 (quoting Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013)). And “a party cannot
create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his
or her own previous sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly contradicts that
party’s earlier sworn deposition) without explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the
disparity.” Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999); see also Tankesley v.
Vidal, No. 1:21-CV-I448, 2023 WL 4273763, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 29, 2023) (“It is … well-settled

within the Fourth Circuit that ‘where a party submits an affidavit that is inconsistent with a
witness’s deposition testimony, the contradictory affidavit is disregarded for purposes of summary
judgment.’”).
Still, summary judgment is not intended to be a substitute for a trial of the facts. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249. In determining if summary judgment is appropriate, “courts must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and refrain from weigh[ing] the
evidence or mak[ing] credibility determinations.” Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). “Summary judgment cannot be granted
merely because the court believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits.”
Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568–69 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 10A
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2728 (3d ed.1998)).
In the end, the relevant inquiry on summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff urges the Court to find there are disputed facts and questions as to the credibility
of the Defendants that preclude summary judgment. However, in considering the pending motions,
the Court has relied only on the facts described below, which is the version of the facts as testified
to by Plaintiff or which cannot be reasonably disputed.
Plaintiff failed to attend his July 17, 2019, scheduled hearing in traffic court for a seatbelt
violation because of a hamstring injury. After missing his court date, Plaintiff attempted to find
out how to reschedule the “call and fail” with the Clerk of Court’s office and the DA’s office, but
was unsuccessful. Although no one from the DA’s office advised Plaintiff that he could come to

the office to reschedule his hearing, (Doc. No. 163-1, Deposition of Glenn Millsaps, Jr. (“Dep”)
at 38:7-11, 43:23, 70:3-9), on July 19, 2019, Plaintiff went to that office, located in the Hall of
Justice Annex in Statesville, North Carolina, to do so. At the DA’s office, Plaintiff spoke with
Kathleen Burris, the receptionist, who told Plaintiff that he could not reschedule his “call and fail”
at the DA’s office and told him to leave. (Dep. at 45:15-47:4).
After the Clerk of Court’s office and a security guard suggested that Plaintiff should “return
to the DA’s office because that’s where you have to speak to our prosecutor in order to reschedule,”
(Dep. at 54:1-11), he returned to the DA’s office on Wednesday morning, July 24, 2019, despite
having previously been told that they would not reschedule his hearing there. (Dep. at 49:17-24;
50:15-16; 52:6-12, 55:9-57:8). Upon Plaintiff walking into the DA’s office lobby, Ms. Burris told
him that she had been instructed to call the police if he returned. (Dep. at 57:14-21, 132:11-17).
Burris also told him “to leave and go pay the fine or hire an attorney.” (Dep. at 60:20-25, 97:10-
25, 134:25-135:3).
Plaintiff then left the DA’s office and spoke with defendant Danny Liles, a Wilson Security

Company security guard, in the hallway. Plaintiff told Liles that he had come to speak with an
ADA to reschedule his hearing, but that Ms. Burris had told him that he could not reschedule his
“call and fail” at the DA’s office and that she had “instructed [Plaintiff] to leave because [Plaintiff]
was not an attorney, or to pay the fine.” Plaintiff testified that Liles told him: “Well, if you were
told to leave, then you need to leave.” (Dep. at 64:5-67:16; 134:7-136:7; 142:1-12; 156:19-157:3)
According to Plaintiff, he “stood his ground,” reasserted his right to speak with a DA, and told
Liles that “he [Liles] had no reason to tell me to leave.” (Dep. at 135:16-19, 144:8-20). Again,
Liles “demanded” that Plaintiff leave. (Dep. at 141:6-142:12).
Despite Burris and Liles having asked Plaintiff to leave, he did not. (Dep. at 70:15-22).

Believing that being told to leave was “clearly the wrong instruction,” and that “someone telling
me to leave for no apparent reason is not a lawful order,” (Dep. at 93:23-94:1; 154:4-20), Plaintiff
turned from Liles and started to move towards the DA’s office. (Dep. at 264:15-22). As Plaintiff
did so, Liles grabbed him by the arm in an effort to stop him. However, Plaintiff pulled away, told
Liles not to touch him and re-entered the DA’s office. (Dep. at 73:13-74:24, 264:15265:6). Liles
followed Plaintiff into the DA’s office, where he told Plaintiff to leave once more, and threatened
to summon a Sheriff’s Deputy if Plaintiff refused to leave. Plaintiff responded, “Well, then just go
ahead and get a deputy.” (Dep. at 149-20-150:23; 157:24-158:15; 161:13-161:22).
At that point, another Wilson security guard went next door to Courtroom C where traffic
court was being held and asked Deputy Ron Hillard, the courtroom bailiff, to come to the DA’s
office. (Doc. No. 165-3, Affidavit of Ron Hillard (“Hillard Aff.”) at ¶9). Hillard left the courtroom
(temporarily stopping traffic court, which needed a bailiff to proceed), id., and walked to the DA’s
office, where he spoke to Plaintiff. (Hillard Aff., ¶10; Dep. at 160:25-161:11; 163:11-23).

According to Plaintiff, Hillard asked him: “Are you an attorney?”; “Were you told to leave last
week?”; “What was your missed appearance?”; “Were you told to leave?” (Dep. at 166:7-18).
Plaintiff stated both in his deposition and at oral argument that he told Hillard that he had been
asked to leave the DA’s office, arguing that: “I have a right to represent myself.” ; “I’m here to
reschedule.”; “I was told to come back.”; “You have not witnessed any crime.” (Dep. at 166:20-
23).
Hillard then asked Plaintiff to leave and told Plaintiff that if he did not leave, Plaintiff
would be “placed under arrest.” (Dep. at 166:24-167:11; 168:20-24; 169:10-15; 171:4-7; 274:15-
275:17; Hillard Aff., at ¶11). Plaintiff made no movement to leave nor took any action that

suggested he intended to comply with Hillard’s order. (Dep. at 172:13-25; 299:24-25). Instead,
Plaintiff told Hillard that Hillard had not seen or witnessed anything for which Hillard could arrest
him. (Dep. at 167:24-168:3, 276:5-16, 282:4-19) (“So Deputy Hillard could not tell me to leave
legally.”). At that point, Hillard told Plaintiff that he was under arrest and ordered Plaintiff to step
out of the DA’s lobby and into the hallway, to turn around, and to place his hands behind his back.
(Dep. at 173:22-174:5; Hillard Aff., at ¶11). Hillard then handcuffed Plaintiff. (Dep. at 183:4-9,
229:17-21, 230:5-9; Hillard Aff., at ¶15).
Plaintiff told Hillard that the handcuffs were put on incorrectly and were too tight on his
wrists. (Dep. 174:7-9, 186:18-187:2, Ex.3, p.3; Hillard Aff., at ¶12). At the time Hillard arrested
Plaintiff and handcuffed him, Hillard was the sole law enforcement officer in the building. (Hillard
Aff., at ¶¶6, 12). Hillard testifies that he did not loosen the handcuffs at that time due to officer
safety concerns because he feared that unlocking the handcuffs in order to loosen them could place
him, alone and without backup, at a tactical disadvantage. (Hillard Aff., at ¶12). Instead, Hillard
advised Plaintiff that other officers would soon arrive to take custody of him. (Hillard Aff., at ¶16).

Hillard radioed his supervisor and requested support in handling Plaintiff. (Hillard Aff., at ¶16).
Hillard did not double lock the handcuffs, again because he anticipated that other officers would
soon arrive to take control over Plaintiff. (Hillard Aff., at ¶15).
Within a few minutes, four other court Bailiffs arrived at the Hall of Justice Annex and
took custody of Plaintiff. (Dep. at 175:24-176:5; Hillard Aff., at ¶¶18-19). Plaintiff told these
arriving Bailiffs that the handcuffs were put on wrong, that they were too tight, and that they were
not double locked. (Dep. at 176:10-15, 187:3-6). One of the other Bailiffs adjusted the handcuffs,
but did not double-lock the handcuffs or adjust them to Plaintiff’s satisfaction. (Dep. at 180:25-
181:15, 181:23-182:9, 187:9-14, 192:17-20). However, there is no dispute that at that point a

different deputy had taken charge of the Plaintiff. (See Doc. No. 75 at 69; Hillard Aff., at ¶19).
Bailiffs other than Hillard, escorted Plaintiff out of the Hall of Justice Annex, while Hillard
followed behind them carrying Plaintiff’s briefcase. (Dep. at 187:20-189:15; Doc. No. 75 at 69;
Hillard Aff., at ¶21). He was then taken to a Statesville Police Department patrol car. (Dep. at
197:25-199:21). Plaintiff testified that he pleaded with the other Bailiffs to double-lock the
handcuffs, but that they did not do so. (Dep. at 201:12-202:2). Ultimately, after Plaintiff began
“kicking and screaming,” Dep. at 203:2-11), the other Bailiffs removed him from the patrol car,
re-adjusted the handcuffs and double-locked them, and placed him back into the patrol car. (Dep.
at 203:2-15, 204:22-205:2; Doc. No. 75 at 69). After the other Bailiffs placed Plaintiff into Officer
Johnson’s patrol car, Hillard went back inside the Hall of Justice Annex to resume his duties as
the traffic court bailiff. (Hillard Aff, at ¶24).
While sitting in the patrol car, Plaintiff told the officer that the handcuffs were still on
wrong (despite their having been adjusted at least twice by officers other than Hillard). The officer
“didn’t do anything,” and instead told Plaintiff to wait until they got to the jail at which point he

would adjust the handcuffs. (Dep. at 203:17-205:7). At the jail, the officer removed the handcuffs,
put them back on Plaintiff, and double-locked them. (Dep. at 205:8-17). Plaintiff was then taken
before Magistrate Mike Nethken, to whom Plaintiff explained his version of the events that had
transpired. (Dep. at 208:17-213:25). Magistrate Nethken issued a Magistrate’s Order charging
Plaintiff with second degree trespassing in the DA’s office. (Dep. at 218:2-219:10) and then
released him on the condition that he have “No contact with the DA’s office. No contact with
Iredell County DA by telephone.” (Dep. at 219:11-221:23).
After going home and sleeping, Plaintiff states he noticed a blood stain on the cuff of his
left shirt sleeve, with an approximate overall area the size of a dime. (Dep. at 227:16-229:9).

Plaintiff also states that there was some bruising to his wrists. (Dep. at 230:18-20). Plaintiff admits
he does not know when any breaking of the skin happened – whether it was when he sat down in
the patrol car or before then. (Dep. at 229:11-230:16). Plaintiff did not take any photographs or
otherwise document any bruising or bleeding of his wrist(s) and has not sought any medical
attention or care for any injury he claims he sustained on July 24, 2019. (Dep. at 230:21-231:15,
234:2-236:18, 239:18-244:12).
Plaintiff, represented by counsel, was tried and convicted of second-degree trespassing in
Iredell County Criminal District Court in a bench trial held on November 15, 2019. Plaintiff
appealed his conviction to Iredell County Criminal Superior Court, where he was re-tried in June
2021, which resulted in a hung jury. In his third trial, he was acquitted by the jury. In both of his
jury trials, he made motions to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence. In both cases, the
presiding Judge denied his motions to dismiss and allowed the case to go the jury. (Dep. at 224:3-
227:2).
Plaintiff filed this case in July 2022 and an Amended Complaint in October 2022. The

Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims, except for those remaining against the Defendants here,
in March 2024. Doc. No. 82. In February 2025, Plaintiff filed a second Amended Complaint only
against Liles and Hillard. Doc. No. 122. Against Liles, Plaintiff asserts a single claim for Assault
under North Carolina law. Plaintiff’s three claims against Deputy Hillard include: False Arrest
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and North Carolina Law, First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Violation of First and Fourteenth Amendments) and Excessive Force under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment Violation). Id. In May 2025, Liles and Hillard filed their
Motions for Summary Judgment, which have been fully briefed, including a rebuttal and surreply
by Plaintiff. On August 7, 2025, the Court held an oral argument at which Plaintiff appeared and

represented himself and the Defendants were represented by counsel. The motions are ripe for the
Court’s ruling.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Claims Against Mr. Liles
Plaintiff’s lone cause of action against Liles alleges that Liles assaulted Plaintiff under
North Carolina law when Liles “grabbed his arm” as Plaintiff was going back to the DA’s office
(after being told to leave by both Burris and Liles). As described in Hensley v. Suttles, 167 F. Supp.
3d 753, 764 (W.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Hensley on behalf of N. Carolina v. Price, 876 F.3d
573 (4th Cir. 2017), North Carolina looks to the common law for the definition of the intentional
tort of assault:
North Carolina follows common law principles governing assault and battery. An
assault is an offer to show violence to another without striking him, and a battery
is the carrying of the threat into effect by the infliction of a blow. The interest
protected by the action for battery is freedom from intentional and unpermitted
contact with one's person; the interest protected by the action for assault is freedom
from apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with one’s person.

(quoting Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 445, 276 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1981)). The elements of
assault, therefore, are: (1) intent, (2) offer of injury, (3) reasonable apprehension, (4) apparent
ability, and (5) imminent threat of injury. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 101 N.C.App. 529, 533, 400 S.E.2d
472, 475 (1991) aff’d, 331 N.C. 743, 417 S.E.2d 447 (1992). “The gist of an action for assault is
apprehension of harmful or offensive contact.” Morrow v. Kings Department Stores, Inc., 57 N.C.
App. 13, 19, 290 S.E.2d 732, 736, disc. review denied, 306 N.C. 385, 294 S.E.2d 210 (1982). “The
display of force or menace of violence must be such to cause the reasonable apprehension of
immediate bodily harm.” Dickens, 302 N.C. at 445, 276 S.E.2d at 331 (emphasis in original,
citation and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff’s testimony and admissions during oral argument make clear that he was not
fearful of imminent injury from Liles. Instead, he says that he was upset at Liles’ touching and
forcefully told Liles not to touch him, but did not fear physical harm. Rather, he was “pained in
my head” by feeling that he was being told to leave a place where he believed he had a right to be.
While the Court does not minimize the sincerity of Plaintiff’s feelings, he was not “placed in
apprehension of harmful or offensive contact” and did not suffer an “assault” under North Carolina
law.1 Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment for Liles on Plaintiff’s claim.
B. Claims Against Deputy Hillard
1. Probable Cause
The core requirement of all of Plaintiff’s claims against Deputy Hillard is that he establish

that Hillard violated the constitution in effecting his arrest. And he did not. As found by the
independent state court magistrate and two North Carolina Superior Court judges, Deputy Hillard
had probable cause (or the even higher standard that a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt with respect to the trial judges) to cite Plaintiff for second degree trespassing. In the absence
of a wrongful arrest and lacking any causative evidence of “excessive force” against Hillard (even
though Plaintiff unfortunately says he was injured by the use of handcuffs by multiple officers),
Plaintiff’s claims fail both on the merits and are bared by Hillard’s qualified immunity. Therefore,
Hillard is entitled to summary judgment.
In order to bring a claim for unlawful arrest, under either federal or state law, a plaintiff

must allege that the arrest was made without probable cause. See Miller v. Prince George’s Cty.,
MD, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007); Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C. App. 209, 213 (1988). Probable
cause requires the Court to review the totality of the circumstances and “is informed by the
‘contours of the offense’ at issue.” See Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 318 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting

1 Moreover, at the time of the incident, Liles was working as a private security guard who was
governed by North Carolina’s Private Protection Services Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 74C-1 et al. The
Act authorizes licensed security guards to protect “patrons and persons lawfully authorized to be
on the premises” such as the employees of the DA’s office in this instance. While the Court need
not and does not decide the full scope of the authority of a private security guard with respect to
allegations of assault or battery, Liles’ limited conduct alleged here appears to be consistent with
the authority granted by the statute (which allowing an action for common law assault based on
the same conduct would undermine).
Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 291 (4th Cir. 2001)). In North Carolina, the elements of
second-degree trespass are met when a person:
without authorization…enters or remains on any of the following: (1) On premises
of another after the person has been notified not to enter or remain there by the
owner, by a person in charge of the premises, by a lawful occupant, or by another
authorized person. (2) On premises that are posted, in a manner reasonably likely
to come to the attention of intruders, with notice not to enter the premises. (3) On
the curtilage of a dwelling of another between the hours of midnight and 6:00 A.M.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-159.13.
Probable cause exists if the “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are
sufficient to warrant a prudent person ... in the circumstances shown, [to conclude] that the suspect
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31, 37 (1979). “The validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually
committed a crime; the mere fact that the suspect is later acquitted of the offense for which he is
arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest.” Id. at 36.
“In assessing the existence of probable cause, courts examine the totality of the
circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest.” Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 434
(4th Cir. 1996). “Probable cause requires more than ‘bare suspicion,’ but requires less than
evidence necessary to convict.” Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 1998). Also,
reasonable law enforcement officers need not “resolve every doubt about a suspect’s guilt before
probable cause is established.” Torchinsky v. Siwinsky, 942 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1991). Probable
cause is a “commonsense, nontechnical” concept that deals “with the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
While Plaintiff’s third trial resulted in an acquittal, the Court finds that it cannot be
reasonably disputed that Plaintiff’s arrest was supported by probable cause. Plaintiff acknowledges
that he told Deputy Hillard that he had been told to leave the DA’s office and then remained there
after Hillard notified him that he had to leave. Indeed, Hillard informed Plaintiff that he would be
arrested if he did not leave and Plaintiff still chose not to comply with the request. Therefore,
Hillard had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for second degree trespassing. See District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (probable cause “requires only a probability or

substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity. Probable cause is
not a high bar.”).
Further, the finding of probable cause by the magistrate judge and later the trial judges
dooms Plaintiff’s claims. “Once a pretrial seizure has been rendered reasonable by virtue of a
probable cause determination by a neutral and detached magistrate, the continuing pretrial seizure
of a criminal defendant . . . is reasonable.” Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 435–36 (4th Cir.1996).
“A magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing
courts,” and should not be disturbed if “sufficient information [was] presented to the magistrate to
allow that official to determine probable cause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)

(citation modified). As long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause for the arrest existed, “the Fourth Amendment requires no more.” Id.; United States v.
Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1996). There is no dispute that an officer explained the grounds
for Plaintiff’s arrest to the magistrate (and that Plaintiff took the occasion to make comments in
his defense). Thus, the magistrate’s finding of probable cause further establishes that Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.2 Accordingly, Deputy Hillard is entitled to summary

2 Of course, the conclusion of two trial court judges that the charges against Plaintiff could go to
the jury (that is, that there was enough evidence that a reasonable jury could find him guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt) is even stronger evidence that the arrest satisfied the much lower standard of
“probable cause.”
judgment on all of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims to the extent they depend on his allegations of
a false arrest.
2. Qualified Immunity
Also, even if the Court had found that Hillard lacked probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest
(which he did not), it would find that Hillard has qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claims. When, as here, a law enforcement officer is sued in his individual capacity, he is “entitled
to invoke qualified immunity, which is ... immunity from suit itself.” Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d
153, 158 (4th Cir. 2013). “Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional
violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions
were lawful.” Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 214 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Henry v. Purnell,
652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011)). The doctrine balances two important values—“the need to hold
public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

The Fourth Circuit has stated:
The basic rules of § 1983 [qualified] immunity are well known. Underlying the doctrine is
a desire to avoid overdeterrence of energetic law enforcement by subjecting governmental
actors to a high risk of liability. The concerns behind the immunity defense are especially
salient in the context of street-level police work, which frequently requires quick and
decisive action in the face of volatile and changing circumstances. The law thus shields
police officers from civil liability unless the officer reasonably should have known that his
actions violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
In carrying out the qualified immunity analysis, a court’s “first task is to identify the
specific right that the plaintiff asserts was infringed by the challenged conduct.” Winfield v. Bass,
106 F.3d 525, 530 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The court then engages in a two-step inquiry, asking
“whether a constitutional violation occurred” and “whether the right violated was clearly
established” at the time of the official’s conduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231; Melgar ex rel. Melgar
v. Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2010). Courts have discretion to take these steps in either
order. Id.

As discussed above, the Court finds that a constitutional violation did not occur so it need
only further address the second alternate question. A right is “clearly established” if “the contours
of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). The inquiry into whether a right is clearly established must “be undertaken
in light of the specific context of the case” and “not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 195 (2001).
It is not required, however, that a court previously found the specific conduct at issue to
have violated an individual’s rights. The unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct need only be

manifestly apparent from broader applications of the constitutional premise in question. Put
differently, a right may be clearly established if a general constitutional rule already identified in
the decisional law applies with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question. E.W. by &
through T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 185 (4th Cir. 2018); A.G. v. Fattaleh, No.
520CV00165KDBDCK, 2022 WL 2758607, at *8–9 (W.D.N.C. July 14, 2022).
With respect to his claims of false arrest, Plaintiff has not offered nor has the Court found
any authority that would clearly establish that a reasonable officer would have known that there
was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under the facts alleged. To the contrary, as discussed
above, there is no dispute that Hillard had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under the
circumstances. Therefore, Hillard is entitled to summary judgement based on qualified immunity
for Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims based on “false arrest.”
3. Excessive Force
Plaintiff’s final claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges that Deputy Hillard used excessive
force in effecting his arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment

prohibits police officers from using force that is “excessive” or not “reasonable” in the course of
making an arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); E.W. by and through T.W. v.
Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 179 (4th Cir. 2018). Whether an officer has used excessive force to effect
an arrest is based on “objective reasonableness,” taking into account “the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396,
399.
Objective reasonableness means that the focus is not on the officer’s subjective intent. Even
“[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively

reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable
use of force constitutional.” Id. at 397; see also Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022).
However, “[i]n questioning the split-second decisions of police officers, [the Court] must avoid
hindsight bias and try to place ourselves in the heat of the moment.” Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233. Thus,
to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims can proceed, the Court must ask whether the officers’ use
of force was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,
viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, without regard to the officers’ underlying intent
or motivation. Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 214 (4th Cir. 2022). The Court must focus on
“the totality of the circumstances” based on the “information available to the Officers ‘immediately
prior to and at the very moment [they used force to arrest the Plaintiff].’ ” Id.
First, in considering the circumstances here, the Supreme Court has stated that “[i]f an
officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal
offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). In Atwater, the arrestee committed a seat
belt violation punishable only by a fine. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for such a minor violation. Id.; see Pegg v.
Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112, 118 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that force used in arresting (and taking
to the ground) a driver after a traffic stop was not excessive).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegation of “excessive force” reflects his complaint that his handcuffs
were too tight, which ultimately resulted in an injury to his wrists. Although the Court does not
question the sincerity of the alleged injury, after having carefully reviewed the full record, the
Court finds that a reasonable jury could not conclude that Hillard handcuffed Plaintiff using

“excessive force.” Rather, he did so in a normal, standard way, even though Plaintiff soon
complained that the cuffs were too tight. Not long after Plaintiff was initially handcuffed by
Hillard, he was turned over to the custody of other law enforcement officers, who in turn readjusted
Plaintiff’s handcuffs at least twice, but never to his satisfaction. Indeed, Plaintiff is unable to say
when in the course of his detention he suffered the injury to his wrists (thus any finding of liability
against Hillard personally could only be based on speculation). So, the Court concludes that no
jury could reasonably find that Hillard’s conduct was objectively unreasonable.
Moreover, as discussed above in connection with Plaintiff’s false arrest claims, Hillard is
entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiff’s claims based on excessive force. Plaintiff has
suggested no authority which “clearly establishes” that Hillard’s conduct was excessive nor has he
presented evidence that could reasonably support a finding that Hillard acted with malice against
Plaintiff. See Jetton v. Caldwell County Board of Education, 2007 WL 3015252 (N.C. App. August
7, 2007) (‘While Defendants may not have always acted in a professional manner, or treated
Plaintiff with patience, respect, or kindness, there is no evidence they intended to hurt Plaintiff.
Any alleged harm resulting to Plaintiff from Defendants’ allegedly improper conduct was simply
a collateral consequence”). Therefore, Hillard did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment in arresting the Plaintiff and/or is entitled to qualified immunity, and Summary
Judgment will be granted to Hillard on Plaintiff's claims.
IV. ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. Nos. 162, 164) are
GRANTED;
2. The remaining pending motions in this matter are denied as moot; and
3. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.
SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.

Signed: August 11, 2025

Kenneth D. Bell
United States District Judge woe

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11136277. Public record. Not legal advice.