# Francis v. Mouton

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · September 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11136239

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** September 10, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION

CURTIS FRANCIS ET AL CASE NO. 6:21-CV-02052

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

TRENT MOUTON ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE
WHITEHURST

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 36] filed by
Defendants Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (“LCG”) and Officer
Trent Mouton (“Officer Mouton”), Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Police
Officer (collectively, “Defendants”). Curtis Francis (“Francis”) and Markia Morrison
(“Morrison”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed an Opposition1 [Doc. No. 43], and
Defendants filed a Reply [Doc. No. 45].
For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This lawsuit arises from an incident that occurred on July 15, 2020.2 Officer
Mouton, a police officer for LCG, was on patrol the date of the incident.3 Lafayette
Police Department Communications (“LPD Communications”) received information

1 The Plaintiffs’ Opposition, which spans less than two pages, fails to address several of the claims
raised in Defendants’ Motion. In fact, the only claim the Court can clearly identify as being addressed
is Francis’ excessive force claim. To the extent that the Court is able to discern any additional
arguments, it will address them to the best of its ability. However, any claims not specifically
mentioned are deemed waived. See Landmark American Insurance Company v. Esters, No. 2:20-cv-
1263, 2025 WL 1783718 at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 14, 2025).
2 [Doc. No. 1, ¶ 5].
3 [Id.].
about Francis’ location from an anonymous individual, provided through a Crime
Stoppers tip.4 The caller informed LPD Communications that he or she was following
a wanted suspect, specifically Francis.5 The caller asserted that Francis was riding

as a passenger in a white car and gave the license plate tags.6 Moments later, the call
for service was dispatched, with the dispatcher informing officers that Francis was
wanted on two counts of attempted first-degree murder.7 The anonymous caller was
then put in contact with Detective Mike Boutte (“Det. Boutte”), who transmitted the
location of the suspect to officers nearby.8 At that point, officers were notified that
Francis was actually wanted for four counts of attempted first-degree murder and
three counts of assault by drive-by shooting.9 LPD Communications advised officers

that Francis had fled from the vehicle and was running across Pont Des Mouton Road,
a four-lane highway.10 Moments later, officers on the scene reported that shots had
been fired, and that Francis was being held at gunpoint.11 Because Francis was shot,
an ambulance was called.12
On July 15, 2020, Officer Mouton was on his way to Lafayette Police
Department (“LPD”) in his marked unit to retrieve his body camera.13 Since it was

the start of his shift, his body camera was docked at LPD during his days off—a

4 [Doc. No. 46, p. 18].
5 [Id.].
6 [Id.].
7 [Id.].
8 [Id.].
9 [Id.].
10 [Id.].
11 [Id.].
12 [Id.].
13 [Doc. No. 36-5, Exhibit B, Interview of Trent Bouton].
standard practice to allow for footage review.14 While en route to LPD, however,
Mouton was radioed for nearby officers to respond and assist other officers who were
on their way to detain Francis.15 Instead of retrieving his body camera, Officer

Mouton chose to assist the other officers.16 Corporal Segus Jolivette (“Cpl. Jolivette”)
was one of the officers intending to initiate the stop on Francis.17 As the car was
stopping, however, Francis jumped out of the passenger side and fled on foot.18 Cpl.
Jolivette informed other officers via radio that Francis had fled the vehicle and
provided his physical description.19 Officer Mouton, who was in close proximity to
Francis’ location, initiated a foot pursuit. Officer Mouton issued two verbal commands
for him to stop, but both were ignored.20

Officer Mouton then retrieved his taser with his left hand and aimed it at
Francis’ back.21 Francis then entered the driveway of 103 St. Bernadette Drive, with
Officer Mouton approximately seven to ten yards away.22 Officer Mouton deployed
his taser; however, it was without effect.23 Officer Mouton testified that at this point,
he saw Francis “clenching a Glock handgun in his right hand, with Francis swinging
his right hand from his rear to his front as he was turning around to face [him].”24

Officer Mouton dropped the taser from his left hand, raised his firearm, and fired

14 [Id.].
15 [Id.].
16 [Id.].
17 [Id.].
18 [Id.].
19 [Id.].
20 [Id.].
21 [Id.].
22 [Id.].
23 [Id.].
24 [Id.; Doc. No. 36-1, pp. 14–15].
three rounds towards Francis’ back left side.25 Surveillance footage shows that
Francis was running from Officer Mouton with a firearm in his hand.26 Officer
Mouton witnessed the gun drop from Francis’ hand as he collapsed.27 Francis then

complied with commands to put his hands behind his back.28 Soon thereafter, Francis
was provided with first aid treatment until the ambulance arrived on the scene.29
Specifically, officers reassured Francis that he was going to be okay, encouraged him
to breathe, wrapped gauze around his wounds, applied chest seals, and removed his
handcuffs while repeatedly calling for the ambulance to arrive quickly.30
Morrison drove the vehicle that officers stopped based on information
indicating that Francis was inside.31 Video evidence shows that Cpl. Jolivette

witnessed Francis fleeing from the vehicle and chased him with his firearm drawn,
but Francis escaped through a fence.32 Once Francis was out of sight, Cpl. Jolivette,
with his gun still drawn, turned around to the car and instructed Morrison to turn
the car off.33 Morrison complied and informed Cpl. Jolivette that her kids were in the
car.34 Cpl. Jolivette withdrew his gun and asked for her driver’s license.35 At that
point, however, Cpl. Jolivette was radioed that Francis was running across a highway

25 [Id.].
26 [Doc. No. 36-5, Exhibit B, Att. 6, Surveillance Video Capture].
27 [Id.].
28 [Id.].
29 [Doc. No. 36-5, Exhibit B, Att. 18, Segus Body Cam & Segus Jovlivette].
30 [Id.].
31 [Id.].
32 [Id.].
33 [Id.].
34 [Id.].
35 [Id.].
near his location, so he left Morrison and began to run to the scene.36 It is the Court’s
understanding that Morrison and the children walked without restraint to the
location of the incident.37 However, Morrison was brought into the station for a

thirteen-minute interview.38 Morrison was detained for approximately two hours
before being released.39
Plaintiffs sued Defendants under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, false arrest and imprisonment, excessive force, and various negligence
claims under state law.40 On June 24, 2025, Defendants sought Summary Judgment
alleging that all of Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed as they are unfounded as a
matter of law.41 Plaintiffs submitted a brief Opposition, relying solely on Francis’

affidavit.42
The issues have been briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
A court will grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the movant meets their initial burden of
showing no genuine issue of material fact, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving party
to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine

36 [Id.].
37 [Doc. No. 36-5, Exhibit B, Att. 18, Mike Millazzo].
38 [Doc. No. 46, p. 13].
39 [Id.].
40 [Doc. No. 1].
41 [Doc. No. 36].
42 [Doc. No. 42, p. 1].
issue for trial.” Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v. Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d
703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation modified). A fact is “material” when proof of its
existence or nonexistence would affect the lawsuit’s outcome under applicable law in

the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In other words,
“the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 247–48. And a dispute
about a material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact
finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
While courts will “resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving
party,” an actual controversy exists only “when both parties have submitted evidence

of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
But summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is “merely colorable or is
not significantly probative.” Cutting Underwater Tech. USA, Inc. v. Eni U.S.
Operating Co., 671 F.3d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation modified).
Moreover, “a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory
allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” Turner v.

Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation modified).
Courts “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” and “must
resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving
party.” Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr–McGee Oil and Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434
(5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Finally—and importantly—there can be no genuine dispute as to a material
fact when a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof of trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
B. Fifth, Eighth, Fourteenth, and Fourth Amendment Claims
1. Fifth Amendment
Plaintiffs’ Complaint states that Defendants violated their Fifth
Amendment.43 Defendants assert that Plaintiffs do not have a viable cause of action
under the Fifth Amendment because the Fifth Amendment applies only to federal
actors.44 The Opposition offers no law or argument on this matter.

“The Fifth Amendment applies only to violations of constitutional rights by the
United States or a federal actor.” Ristow v. Hansen, 719 F. App’x. 359, 364 (5th Cir.
2018) (quoting Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2000). See also
Davis v. Negi, No. 10-800, 2012 WL 1015248 at *2 (W.D. La. March 23, 2012) (holding
“[t]he Fifth Amendment provides due process protection for the bodily integrity of
citizens from harm imposed by federal actors”).

Plaintiffs do not claim that any of the officers are federal actors; in fact,
Plaintiffs seemingly concede that the officers are employees of the LPD. Because the
officers are not federal actors, Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendants violated their Fifth
Amendment due process rights cannot survive the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Thus, Defendants’ Motion on the Fifth Amendment claim is GRANTED.

43 [Doc. No. 1, p. 2].
44 [Doc. No. 36-1, p. 20].
2. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment (Medical Needs)
Paragraph one of Plaintiffs’ Complaint cites to the Eighth Amendment, which
“protects against cruel and unusual punishment.”45 Plaintiffs only other reference to

the Eighth Amendment is found in paragraph 12 and claims the Plaintiffs “were
deprived of their rights secured by the Eighth Amendment subjecting the Plaintiffs
to excessive force and unlawful arrest; and acting with deliberate indifference to
Plaintiffs’ needs.”46
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs fail to properly plead
allegations that they were subject to cruel and unusual punishment and denied
medical treatment/care as a pretrial detainee and/or convicted prisoner. The

Complaint merely cites the Eighth Amendment but lacks any facts to support the
viability of the claim. In any event, “[u]nder the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, detainees have a constitutional right to safe conditions of confinement
and adequate medical care. Convicts, on the other hand, are guaranteed safe
conditions and adequate medical care pursuant to the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.” Wiltz v. Neustrom, No. 13-2644, 2014

WL 250337 at *2 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2014); see Jacobs v. W. Feliciana Sheriff's Dep't,
228 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Unlike convicted prisoners, whose rights to
constitutional essentials like medical care and safety are guaranteed by the Eight[h]
Amendment, pretrial detainees look to the procedural and substantive due process
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure provision of these same basic

45 [Doc. No. 1, ¶ 1].
46 [Id. at ¶ 12].
needs” (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). Regarding medical care claims,
both detainees and convicts, in order to establish a constitutional violation, must
show that the offending state officials acted with deliberate indifference to their

serious medical needs. Estate of Bonilla by and through Bonilla v. Orange County,
Tex., 982 F.2d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2020).
In this case, Francis was not convicted of the offense for which he was being
sought after. Thus, the case arises under the Fourteenth Amendment—pretrial
detainee. At any rate, deliberate indifference means that: (1) the prison officials were
aware of facts from which an inference of substantial risk of serious harm could be
drawn; (2) the officials actually drew that inference; and (3) the officials' response

indicated that they subjectively intended that harm occur. Thompson v. Upshur
County, Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 458–59 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, “... the failure to alleviate a
significant risk that [the official] should have perceived, but did not is insufficient to
show deliberate indifference.” Domino v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 239
F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). Moreover, “deliberate indifference cannot be inferred
merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Thompson, 245 F.3d at 459. “Deliberate indifference encompasses only
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”
McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Stewart v.
Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1999). “A showing of deliberate indifference
requires the prisoner to submit evidence that prison officials ‘refused to treat him,
ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any
similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical
needs.’” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Domino, 239
F.3d at 756). The standard for establishing deliberate indifference is exceedingly

high. Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985)).
With respect to the claims of deliberate indifference to medical care, the facts
presented in Defendants’ Motion and accompanying exhibits indicate that Francis
received prompt medical attention while awaiting the arrival of the ambulance.
Previously, the Fifth Circuit held that an officer plausibly violated clearly established
law where he “stood by for six minutes without performing any medical care or calling
for medical backup, aware that he had shot [the decedent] several times and

witnessed him crash into a tree, and after he had radioed for police backup for
himself.” Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 746 (5th Cir. 2023).
In contrast, the evidence shows that by the time the ambulance arrived,
Francis’ leg had already been wrapped with gauze, an ace bandage had been applied,
and chest seals had been placed on his upper back.47 Review of body camera footage
shows that Defendants consistently instructed Francis to breathe and remained with

him, providing care from the time of the injury until the ambulance took over.48 And
Plaintiffs do not contest anything to the contrary in their Opposition. Accordingly, to
the extent Plaintiffs make a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs or
treatment under the Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment, the Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED.

47 [Doc. No. 36-5, Ex. B, Segus Body Cam].
48 [Id.].
3. Fourteenth Amendment- Excessive Force
The Court observes that, “all claims that law enforcement officers have used
excessive force ... in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a

free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.” Tyson v. Sabine, 42
F.4th 508, 515 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Therefore, “a due process claim is viable only when the alleged misconduct is not
susceptible to proper analysis under the Fourth Amendment.” Estate of Parker v.
Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Safety, 140 F.4th 226, 244 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Because the parties herein seemingly do not
dispute that a seizure occurred, the Fourth Amendment governs, thereby foreclosing

Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim. Id.; see also Lewis
v. Huval, No. 16-1280, 2020 WL 2544811, at *10 (W.D. La. May 4, 2020), R&R
adopted, 2020 WL 2551032 (W.D. La. May 19, 2020) (plaintiff’s claim is governed by
the Fourth Amendment; therefore, his substantive due process claim fails as a matter
of law).
Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs assert an excessive force claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
However, Plaintiff’s excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment will be
discussed below.
4. Fourth Amendment
Francis contends that no evidence presented by Defendants shows that he
pointed a gun at Officer Mouton to establish a reasonable fear of safety.49 Francis also
states in his affidavit that he was “surrendering” when he was shot.50 Defendants

assert that, to the latter, Francis pled guilty to the amended charge of resisting an
officer.51 In any event, Defendants state that there is ample evidence that Officer
Mouton’s actions were “objectively reasonable and Francis’ assertions to the contrary
are irrelevant to the Court’s analysis, do not establish a genuine issue of material fact
for trial, and/or not supported by the evidence.”52
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be
secure ... against unreasonable ... seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. To state a Fourth

Amendment excessive-force claim, a plaintiff must show two things: (1) a seizure
occurred; and (2) the force used was unreasonable. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S.
593, 599 (1989). A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “when there is a governmental
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (quoting Brower, 489 U.S. at 596–97). Because
Officer Mouton shot Francis, a seizure occurred, and this Court proceeds to consider

whether the use of force was reasonable.
An officer's use of force is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the
plaintiff shows: “(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force
that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly

49 [Doc. No. 42-2].
50 [Id].
51 [Doc. No. 36-10, p. 35].
52 [Doc. No. 36-1, p. 39].
unreasonable.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(quoting Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005)). There is no dispute
that Francis was shot near his back left side. Thus, Francis plainly satisfies the injury

element. The Court, therefore, focuses on the second and third elements, which
“collapse into a single objective-reasonableness inquiry.” Estate of Parker, 140 F.4th
at 239 (quoting Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 2018)).
In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court provided the following factors to
assess whether the force used was reasonable: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue,”
(2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others,” and (3) “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest

by flight.” 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). “This analysis considers factors such as the time
officers had to make decisions, whether the force used is ‘measured and ascending’ in
accordance with the suspect's aggression, whether the suspect signaled that he was
armed, and whether he moved toward or away from law enforcement.” Estate of
Parker, 140 F.4th at 239. Reasonableness is assessed from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

Under these standards, this Court concludes that it was objectively reasonable
for Officer Mouton to use lethal force on Francis. Beginning with the first Graham
factor, Officer Mouton was pursuing Francis because he was a fugitive with active
warrants for violent felonies—including four counts of attempted first-degree murder
and three counts of assault by drive-by shooting. Both offenses are grave and violent
and this factor weighs in favor of Officer Mouton. Second—“and most critical in a
deadly force case”53—Francis posed a clear and immediate threat to the safety of
officers and the surrounding public. Francis repeatedly refused to obey lawful
commands. Upon recognizing that officers would intercept the vehicle he was inside

of, Francis proceeded to flee on foot, traversing privacy shrubs, passing through a
residential neighborhood, and running across a four-lane highway. This act of fleeing
on foot through a populated area and across a highway posed a significant safety risk
to the residents within the neighborhood and cars passing through. Francis could
have, in seconds, turned the weapon on residents or passing vehicles. Upon
commencement of the foot pursuit, Francis again refused to comply with lawful
commands issued by Officer Mouton. Officer Mouton possessed a reasonable belief

that Francis was armed, as evidenced by Officer Mouton’s prior knowledge of Francis’
characteristics and that Cpl. Segus witnessed Francis jump out of the car with a
firearm just moments before. Moreover, surveillance pictures clearly show that
Francis was holding a firearm and Francis’ argument that he never pointed the gun
at Officer Mouton fails. The Fifth Circuit has never “required officers to wait until a
defendant turns toward them, with weapon in hand, before applying deadly force to

ensure their safety.” Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272, 279, n.6 (5th
Cir. 2016). By the same token, “ … an officer cannot escape liability any time he
claims he saw a gun.” Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2023).

53 Estate of Parker, 140 F.4th at 240 (citing Singleton v. Casanova, No. 22-50327, 2024 WL 2891900,
at *12 n.17 (“When an officer uses deadly force, the second Graham factor is ‘generally the most
important.’” (quotations omitted))).
Nevertheless, after employing less intrusive measures, including the
deployment of a taser, Francis began to turn toward Officer Mouton while holding
the firearm the moment Officer Mouton discharged his firearm. It is undisputed that

Francis was not directly pointing his firearm at Officer Mouton at the moment of
discharge; however, this fact alone does not, on its face, invalidate the claims related
to this point. See Ratliff v. Aransas Cty., 948 F.3d 281, 288–89 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding
that the Court accepts that the gun’s direction is disputed, but that fact is not
material here. After Ratliff ignored repeated commands to disarm, the deputies had
ample reason to fear for their safety.) Third, it is undisputed that Francis was actively
evading arrest—fleeing from law enforcement and refusing to stop upon lawful

command. Thus, all factors weigh in Officer Mouton’s favor that his use of force was
reasonable.
Outside the Graham factors, though, the Supreme Court also considers
whether Officer Mouton “created the danger necessitating deadly force.” Barnes v.
Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1358, 1360 (2025). In this case, Francis initiated the danger by
refusing to comply with a lawful order to stop and by possessing a firearm while

fleeing. His actions directly led to the circumstances that prompted Officer Mouton
to use deadly force. Further, courts look to how quickly the officer resorts to force, and
how close they are to the threat when doing so. Estate of Parker, 140 F.4th at 241.
Here, Officer Mouton’s use of lethal force was not the first means of resistance.
Initially, before Officer Mouton arrived on the scene, body camera footage shows that
Francis fled from Cpl. Jolivette without stopping. Officer Mouton, being the closest
unit, engaged in pursuit. When verbal commands failed to gain compliance, Officer
Mouton deployed his taser, but it was also ineffective in stopping Francis. It was only
when Francis closed the distance to within ten feet and began turning towards him

with a firearm in hand did Officer Mouton resort to using deadly force.
Considering all the above and that the Court is rightly hesitant to “second-
guess[] a police officer’s assessment, made on the scene, of the danger presented by a
particular situation” from the calm remove of chambers, Estate of Parker, 140 F.4th
at 239 (quoting Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 333 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up), the
Court believes that Officer Mouton’s use of force was objectively reasonable.
Therefore, Defendants’ Motion seeking to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force

under the Fourth Amendment is GRANTED.
At any rate, even assuming a constitutional violation, Officer Mouton is
entitled to qualified immunity. To overcome the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity, a plaintiff must show that the government official violated clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity

shields from civil liability “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “To negate a defense of
qualified immunity and avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff need not present
‘absolute proof,’ but must offer more than ‘mere allegations.’” Ontiveros v. City of
Rosenburg, 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d
494, 499 (5th Cir. 1991)). “[W]hile plaintiffs need not identify ‘a case directly on point’
in order to show the law was clearly established, they must provide ‘authority at a
sufficiently high level of specificity’ to put law enforcement officers on notice that such
conduct ‘is definitively unlawful.’” Estate of Parker, 140 F.4th at 242 (quoting Vincent

v. City of Sulphur, 805 F.3d 543, 547 (5th Cir. 2015). A right is clearly established if,
in light of preexisting law, the unlawfulness of an action would be apparent to a
reasonable officer. Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 846 (5th Cir. 2009).
The question is whether, under the law in effect when Officer Mouton shot
Francis, no reasonable officer could have believed that using deadly force was lawful
when a suspect ignored commands to stop and show his hands, moved his hands out
of view, and appeared to have a weapon. In Salazar-Limon, 826 F.3d at 279, the Fifth

Circuit upheld the qualified immunity defense, finding that it was not unreasonable
for an officer in the defendant’s position to interpret Salazar’s behavior—which
involved resistance, intoxication, failure to comply with commands, and reaching
toward his waistband—as posing an immediate threat to the officer’s safety.54
Francis’ behavior closely resembled that of Salazar. He disregarded multiple
commands to cease his actions and, upon recognizing the failure of Officer Mouton’s

taser, turned toward the officer while armed. This is further substantiated by the
assertion that Francis retained possession of the firearm at the time he was shot.
Because this Court has determined that Officer Mouton’s actions satisfied the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, and because the Plaintiff has offered

54 The Fifth Circuit added, “[f]urthermore, … in the context of this case, it is immaterial whether
Salazar turned left, right, or at all before being shot. Specifically, we have never required officers to
wait until a defendant turns toward them, with weapon in hand, before applying deadly force to ensure
their safety.” Salazar-Limon, 826 F.3d at 279, n.6. (5th Cir. 2016).
neither legal authority nor any allegations to challenge Officer Mouton’s qualified
immunity defense, Defendants’ Motion regarding qualified immunity is GRANTED.
C. Monell Claim(s)

Although not entirely clear, the Court presumes that, as stated in the
Complaint, Plaintiffs are also asserting a Monell claim against LCG. “[M]unicipal
liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official
policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or
custom.” Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). “‘[I]t is well established that there
must be an underlying constitutional violation for there to be a claim under Monell.’”

Landry v. Laborde-Lahoz, 852 F. App’x 123, 127 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Taite v. City
of Fort Worth Texas, 681 F. App’x 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017)). But no constitutional
violation took place here. Supra II(B). Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs assert
a Monell claim, it fails due to the absence of an underlying constitutional violation.
D. Probable Cause, False Imprisonment, and Arrest Claims
In the Complaint, Morrison states that LPD and Officer Doe unlawfully

arrested her without probable cause and falsely imprisoned her for approximately
two hours.55 Defendants contend that Officer Doe has been dismissed and LCG, as
the only named defendant pertaining to this matter, should be dismissed as well
because there is no Monell proof of unlawful policy, custom, or practice.56
Alternatively, Defendants contend that even if Morrison’s detention is considered a

55 [Doc. No. 1, ¶ 5].
56 [Doc. No. 36-1, p. 26].
de facto arrest under the Fourth Amendment, the officers had probable cause to
detain her for questioning because Morrison was the driver of the car that had been
involved in a drive-by shooting weeks earlier, and the car that Francis was riding in

during the pursuit. Alternatively, Defendants argue that at the time of the stop, the
car—driven by Morrison and occupied by Francis, along with his drugs and firearm—
also carried young children. In rebuttal, Morrison fails to address Defendants’
arguments regarding dismissal of her claims.
Defendants are correct that Officer Doe has been dismissed, and the deadline
to join other parties or file a motion for leave to amend was November 29, 2024.57
Defendants are also correct that Morrison offers no argument or evidence as to her

claims in the Opposition brief. Plaintiffs provide a sentence in the statement of
contested facts that Morrison was restrained to suppress the transparency of a police
force involved shooting. Nowhere, however, in the short brief does Morrison offer an
argument or evidence as to this alleged fact. The failure to raise an argument in
opposition to summary judgment on this claim equates to waiver. Landmark
American Insurance Company v. Esters, No. 2:20-cv-1263, 2025 WL 1783718 at *3

(W.D. La. Feb. 14, 2025); Fletcher v. Whittington, No. 18-cv-1153, 2022 WL 3643513
at *10 (W.D. La. Aug. 23, 2022); Indep. Coca–Cola Employees' Union of Lake Charles,
No. 1060 v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co. United, Inc., 114 F. App’x 137, 143–44 (5th Cir.
2004) (unpublished) (holding that a party’s failure to raise an argument in opposition
to summary judgment waived the argument). Moreover, “[r]ule 56 does not impose

57 [Doc. Nos. 29, 33].
upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to
support a party's opposition to summary judgment.” Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co.
of Connecticut, 465 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ragas v. Tennessee Gas

Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted).
Because Morrison fails to present any evidence or offer a substantive argument
in Opposition to the Motion, she has not met her burden to demonstrate a genuine
issue of material fact. Thus, Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants is
GRANTED as to Morrison’s claims.
E. Louisiana State Law Claims
Plaintiffs assert state law claims of excessive force pursuant to Louisiana

Constitution, Article 1 § 20, assault, battery, “police negligence,” failure to train or
“otherwise act to ensure” that officers “acted appropriately,” and negligent hiring,
supervision, and retention.58
1. Excessive force, assault, and battery
In Jones v. City of Shreveport, No. 17-0298, 2018 WL 4088789 at * 11 (W.D. La.
Aug. 24, 2018), this Court held that “[i]t is well settled that Louisiana employs the

same standards in analyzing claims of excessive force as federal law, namely, whether
the officer's actions were “reasonable” under the circumstances. See Reneau of City of
New Orleans, No. 03-1410, 2004 WL 1497711, *4 (E.D. La. July 2, 2004), overruled
on other grounds, (citing Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969, 973 (La. 1977));
Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So.2d 318, 323 (La. 1994).

58 [Doc. 1, ¶¶12–29].
Therefore, because the Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Francis’ excessive force claim, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment is also GRANTED as to Francis’ state law excessive force claims.

Furthermore, assault and battery claims under Louisiana law involve similar
elements to excessive force claims. See Penn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office,
843 So.2d 1157, 1161 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (excessive force elements); Caudle v. Betts,
512 So.2d 389 (La. 1987) (assault and battery elements). Because these claims are
similar to the excessive force claim, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as
to Francis’ assault and battery claims against Officer Mouton is GRANTED.
2. Statutory immunity for Plaintiffs’ negligence claims

Defendants assert that they are entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to
La. R.S. 2793.11, which became effective April 29, 2024. It states in part:
I. As used in this Section:
(1) “Discretionary function” means any action or conduct of
a peace officer, acting within the course and scope of his
law enforcement duties, that includes exercising judgment
in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the state
including but not limited to arresting or attempting to
arrest persons or carrying out any other duties or
obligations imposed upon a peace officer in this state.

(2) “Peace officer” shall include all individuals as defined in
R.S. 40:2402(3) and R.S. 14:112.4(B)(2).

(3) “Public entity” means the state or a political subdivision
of the state that employs or appoints any peace officer as
defined in this Subsection.

II. A civil claim for damages against a peace officer or public
entity that employs or appoints a peace officer shall be prohibited
in any of the following circumstances:
(1) The conduct or actions of the peace officer arise out of
the performance of any discretionary function within
the course and scope of the peace officer’s law
enforcement duties.

(2) The success of the claim necessarily implies the
invalidity of a criminal conviction or sentence, unless
the conviction or sentence has been invalidated through
appropriate legal proceedings.

III. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section shall not apply
to any of the following:

(1) Any act or omission of a peace officer which constitutes
criminal, fraudulent, or intentional misconduct

As articulated throughout this Ruling, the Court concludes that Officer
Mouton’s conduct was objectively reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.
His actions cannot be characterized as criminal, fraudulent, or intentionally
wrongful. Officer Mouton faced a situation in which he reasonably feared for both his
safety and the safety of others present. Prior to discharging his firearm, he made
efforts to employ less-lethal options—such as the deployment of a taser—in an
attempt to gain compliance from Francis. The escalation to deadly force came only
after these alternatives proved ineffective, which exhibits a measured and cautious
approach rather than intentional misconduct.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is
GRANTED.
3. Negligent hiring, supervision, and retention
Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts state law claims for negligent hiring, supervision,
and retention.59 Defendants argue that the state law claims as set out in the
Complaint must be dismissed because they implicate Louisiana’s discretionary

immunity statute.60
Louisiana Revised Statue § 9:2798.1 provides that:
Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their
officers or employees based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform their
policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are
within the course and scope of their lawful powers and
duties.

The provision, however, does not apply (1) to acts or omissions which are not
reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the
policymaking or discretionary power exists; or (2) to acts or omissions which
constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless,
or flagrant misconduct. La. R.S. 9:2798.1(C). Courts routinely dismiss claims of
negligent hiring, training, and supervision against the state and its officials based on
discretionary immunity, reasoning that the decisions made by state officials to hire,
train, and supervise are discretionary – not operational – in nature. See, e.g., Roberts
v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 296 (5th Cir. 2005); Skinner v. Ard, No. 19-66,
2021 WL 388830, at *13 (M.D. La. Feb. 3, 2021).
Notably, Plaintiffs have not alleged in their Complaint any applicable laws or
regulations that require law enforcement agencies to supervise and train their

59 [Doc. No. 1, ¶ 26–29].
60 [Doc. No. 36-1, p. 55].
officers in a specific manner. Nor do Plaintiffs attempt to remedy this deficiency by
arguing for such in their Opposition. In any event, Louisiana case law establishes
that hiring, supervision, and training is a discretionary act. Smith v. Lafayette Parish

Sheriff's Dep't, 874 So. 2d 863, 868 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2004) (sheriff's "hiring/retention
policy was a discretionary act" for purposes of immunity under La. Rev. Stat.
9:2798.1); Hoffpauir v. Columbia Cas. Co., No.12-403, 2013 WL 5934699, at *12-13
(M.D. La. Nov. 5, 2013) (“[T]he hiring, training, and supervision policy of the
Livingston Parish Sheriff's Department is a discretionary function.”); Skinner, 519 F.
Supp. 3d at 321 (sheriff's “duties to train, supervise, and hire are not prescribed by
law or regulation, and these duties are grounded in policy considerations.”)

Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish that any exception to La. R.S.
9:2798.1 is applicable. As asserted by Defendants, the pleadings contain no
allegations regarding prior instances of Officer Mouton employing lethal force.
Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to provide specific factual support demonstrating any
deficiencies by LCG in training, supervision, or hiring practices. Even if Officer
Mouton was negligent, the Court cannot say that this conduct was intentional,

malicious, reckless, or anything else that would fall within La. R.S. 9:2798.1(C)(2).
Without more, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that LCG is not entitled to
immunity under La. R.S. 9:2798.1 for their claims of negligent hiring, supervision,
and retention.
Thus, Defendants’ Motion on these issues is GRANTED.
4. Vicarious liability
Plaintiffs seemingly make a claim against LCG based on vicarious liability.®!
Defendants argue that there is no basis for liability against any LCG employee
because Officer Doe was dismissed, Officer Mouton used objectively reasonable force
against Francis, and Morrison’s detention was based on probable cause.®2 The Court
agrees.
For the reasons stated throughout this Ruling, Defendants’ Motion regarding
Plaintiffs state law vicarious liability claims is GRANTED.
HiIl. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion [Doc. No. 36] is GRANTED, in its
entirety, and all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 10th day of September, 2025.

lag +,
Terry A. Doughty ) □
U (ted States District Jadgt

681 [Doc. No. 1, § 28].
62 [Doc. No. 36-1, p. 57].
25

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11136239. Public record. Not legal advice.