# Jean Guillaume v. USA

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · September 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11135692

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** September 10, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** NEW
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

USCA11 Case: 24-13584 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 09/10/2025 Page: 1 of 10

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-13584
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

JEAN FRANTZ GUILLAUME,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS,
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS - SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION,
THOMAS MCGRATH,
in his individual and official capacity,
BENJAMIN WARD,
in his individual and official capacity, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13584
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-23287-MD
____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jean Guillaume, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his amended complaint against the U.S. Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs, U.S. Small Business Administration, and
various officials in both agencies for removing his application as a
service-disabled veteran-owned small business under 38 U.S.C.
§ 8127, with prejudice. First, he argues that his claims are not
barred by sovereign immunity and that the complaint plausibly
states claims on which relief could be granted. Second, he disputes
that various claims in his amended complaint constitute shotgun
pleadings. Finally, he asserts that the district court erred in failing
to review his amended complaint under the liberal pleading stand-
ard afforded to pro se litigants. For the reasons below, we reject
these contentions and affirm the district court’s dismissal of his
amended complaint with prejudice. 1

1 We also conclude that Guillaume abandoned Counts V and VIII and the issue

of whether the district court erred by identifying “Jean Frantz Guillaume” as
the party in interest instead of “Jean Frantz Guillaume DBA Negro American.”
Counts V and VIII are abandoned because Guillaume failed to address the dis-
trict court’s dismissal of those counts on appeal. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw.
Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). Whether the district court
erred by identifying “Jean Frantz Guillaume” as the party in interest is also
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24-13584 Opinion of the Court 3

The facts are known to the parties; we repeat them here only
as necessary to decide the case.
I
We first consider Guillaume’s argument that Counts I and
XII—that the federal government violated his First Amendment
rights and res judicata, and that Guillaume is entitled to a declara-
tory judgment against the federal government—are not barred by
sovereign immunity. “Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in na-
ture,” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994), and we review a dis-
trict court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-Rich-
mond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007). A dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is entered “without prejudice.”
Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229,
1232 (11th Cir. 2008). We agree with Guillaume that the district
court erred in dismissing Counts I and XII with prejudice, but, for
reasons we will explain below, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal
because they fail to state a plausible claim.
We may affirm for “any reason supported by the record,
even if the district court did not rely on that reason.” Wright v. City
of St. Petersburg, Fla., 833 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation
modified). “Specifically, where we determine that a district court
has erroneously dismissed a complaint on a particular ground, but

abandoned because he raises the issue for the first time on appeal. See Sapuppo
v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2014).
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has done so without reaching the merits . . . the dismissal of
the complaint must nevertheless be affirmed if the complaint fails
to state a claim.” Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123,
1137 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). Because we conclude that
Counts I and XII fail to state a claim, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Counts I and XII.
We “review de novo [a] district court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Timson v.
Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2008).
Counts I and XII fail to state a plausible claim on which relief
can be granted. In Count I, Guillaume alleges that the United
States violated his First Amendment right of redress and disre-
garded the principles of res judicata. His First Amendment claim
amounts to a conclusory allegation regarding “a violation of his
First Amendment right of redress against the Defendant, the
United States” that fails to provide enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is facially plausible. First Am. Compl. ¶ 24. Under res
judicata, a claim is barred by a prior suit if: “(1) there is a final judg-
ment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with
them, are identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action is
involved in both cases.” Griswold v. Cnty. of Hillsborough, 598 F.3d
1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2010). Guillaume’s case does not qualify for
res judicata treatment because his introduction of facts pertaining
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24-13584 Opinion of the Court 5

to his prior suits involving “Afily8 Government Solutions” indicates
that the parties in this lawsuit are not identical to those in his prior
suits, and he fails to explain how the cause of action is identical
between the current and prior suits. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22–27.
Count XII fails to state a plausible claim for relief under the
Declaratory Judgment Act. The Declaratory Judgment Act allows
federal courts to issue declaratory judgments “upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Because none of his other
claims entitle him to relief, as we will explain below, Guillaume
does not state a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
II
We next consider whether Counts II–III, VI–VII, and IX–X
state a claim on which relief can be granted. Counts II and III allege
violations of Guillaume’s rights under the Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act; Counts VI and IX allege Bivens violations; Count VII al-
leges a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, and the FCA; and
Count X alleges that the removal of documents from his applica-
tion violated double jeopardy.
Counts II and III do not state a claim on which relief can be
granted because Guillaume is not a federal employee. Both are as-
serted under the Whistleblower Protection Act, which protects fed-
eral employees against agency reprisal for whistleblowing activi-
ties, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), but Guillaume does not allege sufficient
facts showing that he is a federal employee. Though he argues that
his status as a third-party beneficiary provides him with standing to
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13584

sue the United States for breach of contract, he has not alleged suf-
ficient facts to establish standing.
Counts VI and IX fail to provide sufficient facts to plausibly
state Bivens violations. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court recognized an implied pri-
vate action for damages against federal officers alleged to have vio-
lated a citizen’s constitutional rights. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
Count VI fails to state a plausible Bivens violation under the First
Amendment because the Supreme Court has been cautious about
expanding Bivens to new contexts and has consistently rejected the
application of Bivens to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Bush v. Lu-
cas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663 n.4
(2012) (“We have never held that Bivens extends to First Amend-
ment claims.”).
Count IX alleges a Bivens violation against McGrath, Perkins,
and Ward for “unreasonably seiz[ing]” four documents to review
his eligibility for a government contracting program, First Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 104–18, but Bivens actions cannot be brought against
federal officers in their official capacities. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69–71 (2001).
Count VII fails to state a claim on which relief could be
granted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, or the False Claims Act.
Section 1985 provides plaintiffs with a remedy against conspiracies
to interfere with their civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Section 1986
is a derivative claim under § 1985 and, where there is no underlying
conspiracy to support a § 1985 claim, the derivative § 1986 claim
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must also fail. Park v. City of Atlanta, 120 F.3d 1157, 1159–60 (11th
Cir. 1997); 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Guillaume alleges a repetitive and con-
fusing list of actions by McGrath, Ward, Titus, and Perkins; he fails
to state a claim under § 1985 or § 1986 because his list comprises
conclusory statements that assume the defendants had conspired
with each other without providing facts that plausibly state such a
claim.
Count VII also fails to state a claim under the False Claims
Act because Guillaume’s allegations do not assert any specific
fraudulent claim with particularity. A claim under the FCA “must
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mis-
take.” Hopper v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir.
2009). A claim has sufficient particularity if it “sets forth facts as to
time, place, and substance of the defendant’s alleged fraud, specifi-
cally the details of the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent acts, when
they occurred, and who engaged in them.” Id. (citation modified).
Count X fails state a claim under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause applies only to criminal pun-
ishments, and it provides that no “person [shall] be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S.
Const. amend. V; Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98–99 (1997).
A civil penalty can qualify as a criminal punishment only if it is “so
punitive either in purpose or effect” that it is transformed into a
“criminal penalty.” Cole v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 F.3d 803, 806 (11th
Cir. 1998). Guillaume’s allegation that documents he had submit-
ted for his application to the Veterans First Contracting Program
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13584

were removed is not a criminal punishment—or sufficiently puni-
tive to transform into a criminal penalty—and is therefore unre-
lated to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
III
We next consider the district court’s determination that
Counts IV and XI constitute shotgun pleadings. “We review a dis-
missal on Rule 8 shotgun pleading grounds for an abuse of discre-
tion.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir.
2018). The abuse-of-discretion standard requires us to “affirm un-
less we find that the district court has made a clear error of judg-
ment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” United States v. Fra-
zier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004).
A shotgun pleading is a complaint that fails “to give the de-
fendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the
grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation modi-
fied). Shotgun pleadings “waste scarce judicial resources, inexora-
bly broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court
dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the courts.” Vibe
Micro, Inc., 878 F.3d at 1295 (citation modified). One category of
shotgun pleading “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple de-
fendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsi-
ble for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the
claim is brought against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. But a com-
plaint is not a shotgun pleading if it “can be fairly read to aver that
all defendants are responsible for the alleged conduct.” Kyle K. v.
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24-13584 Opinion of the Court 9

Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2000). If a court identifies
that a complaint is a shotgun complaint, it generally must give the
litigant one chance to replead, with instructions on the deficiencies.
Vibe Micro, Inc., 878 F.3d at 1296–97.
The district court didn’t abuse its discretion in dismissing
Counts IV and XI as shotgun pleadings. Count IV is a shotgun
pleading because it failed to specify which defendants were liable
for the alleged wrongdoing, which in turn fails to give the defend-
ants adequate notice of the claims against them. Weiland, 792 F.3d
at 1323. Count XI is a shotgun pleading because, even though Guil-
laume identified particular defendants, he failed to identify which
defendants are responsible for which claims, and his allegations in
this claim alternately target “Defendant” and “Defendants,” creat-
ing confusion as to whom he intended to sue for each claim.
Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. Furthermore, the district court had pro-
vided Guillaume with instructions on the deficiencies of his initial
complaint, but he failed to cure the deficiencies when given the op-
portunity to amend.
IV
We next consider whether the district court failed to con-
strue Guillaume’s complaint liberally under the liberal pleading
standards afforded to pro se litigants. When “a more carefully
drafted complaint might state a claim, a [pro se] plaintiff must be
given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district
court dismisses the action with prejudice.” Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation modified).
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But a court needn’t grant leave to amend when doing so would be
futile. Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1091 (11th Cir.
2021).
We conclude that the district court construed Guillaume’s
complaint liberally, as it referenced the liberal pleading standards
for pro se plaintiffs four times in its dismissal order. Because Guil-
laume has already had two bites at the apple, further opportunities
to amend are unlikely to uncover plausible claims upon which re-
lief can be granted. Thus, granting him another chance to amend
his complaint would be futile, and dismissal with prejudice is ap-
propriate.
* * *
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Guil-
laume’s first amended complaint with prejudice.
AFFIRMED.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11135692. Public record. Not legal advice.