# Cymbler v. New York State

> District Court, E.D. New York · September 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11135602

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11135602

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding standing where plaintiffs who paid a fee challenged the city statute establishing the fee as unconstitutional

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------- X
:
CAROL S. CYMBLER, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, :
Plaintiff, :
: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
– against – ORDER
:

24-CV-2792 (AMD) (SIL)
NEW YORK STATE, NASSAU COUNTY, :
NASSAU COUNTY TRAFFIC AND PARKING
:
VIOLATIONS AGENCY, VERRA MOBILITY
CORPORATION, AMERICAN TRAFFIC :
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
:
Defendants.
:
--------------------------------------------------------------- X

A NN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:

The plaintiff brought this action on behalf of herself and other class members against

New York State, Nassau County, Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency

(“NCTPVA”), Verra Mobility Corporation and Americ an Traffic Solutions, Inc.1 She claims
that the defendants violated the United States and New York constitutions by installing and

operating red light cameras in Nassau County. The plaintiff also brings claims for fraud,

invasion of privacy, unjust enrichment, abuse of process, concert of action and racketeering.

Nassau County and NCTPVA (the “Nassau defendants” ) move to dismiss the complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for lack of standing, failure to state a claim and because

NCTPVA is not a suable entity. Verra Mobility Corporation and American Traffic Solutions,

Inc. (the “corporate defendants”) move to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil

1 The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims against New York State. (ECF No. 31.) Although she did
not specify which claims she was withdrawing, the Court construes her filing to dismiss the First,
Second, Third and Fourth causes of action, which challenge the constitutionality of a New York State
statute, VTL § 1111-b.
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. For the reasons
that follow, the Court grants the defendants’ motions to dismiss the federal claims and declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claims.
BACKGROUND2
I. Statutory Background
In 2009, New York amended the Vehicle and Traffic Law (“VTL”) to add VTL § 1111-b,

which authorized counties, including Nassau County, to install and operate “traffic-control signal
photo violation-monitoring devices” — red light cameras — at intersections throughout the
county.3 (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 20–21.) VTL § 1111-b(a)(1) “authorized and empowered” Nassau
County “to adopt and amend a local law or ordinance establishing” a red light camera program.
(Id. ¶ 22.) To implement the program, the Nassau County legislature passed Local Law 12-2009
on May 18, 2008, which became effective on June 18, 2009, and added Title 72 to the
Miscellaneous Laws of Nassau County. (Id.) Title 72 § 1(a) provides that the Department of
Public Works “shall be authorized to install traffic-control signal photo violation-monitoring

2 The Court considers the complaint and the parties’ briefing. The Court also takes judicial notice of the
Nassau defendants’ exhibits A and B, which are resolutions and ordinances passed by the Nassau
County Legislature. (ECF Nos. 36-3, 36-4.) See Lewis v. Livingston Cnty. Ctr. for Nursing & Rehab.,
30 F. Supp. 3d 196, 203 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (taking judicial notice of county resolution). However, the
Court does not consider the corporate defendants’ exhibit A, which is a transcript of the plaintiff’s
January 31, 2023 hearing before the NCTPVA. (ECF No. 35-3.) See Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67
(2d Cir. 2004) (the “paraphrasing of certain events” at a hearing does not incorporate the hearing
transcripts by reference into a complaint), abrogated on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223 (2009). The Court also considers documents from other cases: exhibits A and B, which the plaintiff
submitted with her opposition to the corporate defendants’ motion (ECF Nos. 38-2, 38-3), and exhibits
A–D, which she submitted with her opposition to the Nassau defendants’ motion (ECF Nos. 39-2, 39-3,
39-4, 39-5). See Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[C]ourts routinely
take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts . . . to establish the fact of such litigation and
related filings.”). The Court does not consider plaintiff’s exhibit E, which is not mentioned in the
complaint or incorporated by reference. (ECF No. 39-6.) Id. at 773.
3 VTL § 1111-b was supposed to expire in December 2014, but the state extended the expiration date.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 21.) At first, the legislature authorized red light cameras for 50 intersections, and then for
100 intersections. (Id. ¶ 21 n.5.)
devices and to operate such devices at no more than fifty intersections within and under the
jurisdiction of the County at one time.” (Id. ¶ 25.)
Under VTL § 1111-b(a)(1), Nassau County was to install and operate the red light
cameras. (Id. ¶ 26.) Similarly, Title 72 placed responsibility for the installation and operation of

red light cameras on the county’s Department of Public Works. (Id. ¶ 27.) According to the
plaintiff, neither VTL § 1111-b(a)(1) nor Title 72 explicitly or implicitly authorized the county
or the Department of Public Works to contract out the installation or operation to any other
agencies or third-party vendors. (Id. ¶¶ 26–27.) The plaintiff alleges that Nassau County
“intentionally ignored the limitations contained in the explicit statutory authorizations set forth in
VTL § 1111-b(a)(1) and Title 72,” because the Department of Public Works’ only involvement
with the program was to assist in selecting locations for the installation of these cameras. (Id.
¶¶ 28–29.) Instead, the plaintiff says, the NCTPVA “involved itself with the installation and
operation of the red light cameras in Nassau County” by contracting with the corporate
defendants to rent the red light cameras. (Id. ¶¶ 30–31.) The plaintiff maintains that the

contracts violated VTL § 1111-b(a)(1) and Title 72, because they provided that the corporate
defendants were responsible for installing, operating, and maintaining the red light cameras. (Id.
¶ 32.)
When a red light camera captures a driver violating red light laws, NCTPVA mails the
registered owner of the vehicle a notice of liability, which includes a fine. (Id. ¶ 33; see also
ECF No. 1-1 at 2.) The owner can pay the fine in four different ways: (1) in person at
NCTPVA’s office, (2) by mail with a check or money order made out to Nassau County and sent
to Nassau County (not NCTPVA), (3) calling a call center run by the corporate defendants, or (4)
paying the corporate defendants electronically through a commercial website. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 35.)
An owner who wants to contest the violation can request a hearing by completing a form
attached to the violation notice and mailing it to Nassau County, not NCTPVA. (Id. ¶ 36; see
also ECF No. 1-1 at 3.) A hearing is then scheduled before an officer employed by Nassau
County and NCTPVA. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 36.) If the officer upholds the violation, the driver pays

NCTPVA directly, at its office. (Id. ¶ 37.) If the officer dismisses the notice, the owner still has
to pay NCTPVA fees, which are imposed by Nassau County. (Id. ¶ 38.)
II. Factual Background
The plaintiff concedes that she violated the red light law. (Id. ¶ 39.) At about 12:20 p.m.
on June 15, 2022, she ran the red light at Old Country Road and South Oyster Bay Road. (Id.
¶¶ 41–42.) The red light camera, which was installed, operated and maintained by the corporate
defendants pursuant to contracts with Nassau County and NCTPVA (id. ¶ 43), captured the
violation in video and still images. (Id. ¶ 40.) 27 days later, the plaintiff received a notice of
liability dated July 1, 2022.4 (Id. ¶¶ 39, 44.) The notice stated that the plaintiff owed $150,
which included $50 in fines, a $45 “Driver Responsibility Fee” and a $55 “Public Safety Fee.”
(Id. ¶ 45.) According to the notice, the plaintiff could pay the $150, as described above, or

challenge the ticket and request a hearing by August 23, 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 46–51.)
The plaintiff completed the hearing form and mailed it to Nassau County. (Id. ¶ 52.) She
received a response, dated August 9, 2022, advising her that the hearing would take place on
January 31, 2023. (Id. ¶ 53.) On that day, the plaintiff and her lawyer5 appeared for the hearing
at the NCTPVA offices; a Nassau County and NCTPVA attorney appeared for the county, and
an officer from Nassau County and NCTPVA presided. (Id. ¶ 54.) Nassau County and

4 The ticket number was 1692202357250. (Id. ¶ 39.)
5 Counsel in this action also represented the plaintiff at the hearing.
NCTPVA presented evidence, including the red light camera photographs and video recording,
and a certificate by an NCTPVA technician. (Id. ¶ 55.) The plaintiff now objects to the
admission of the photographs and video recording, because of the “unconstitutionality of the
enacting statutes.” (Id. ¶ 56.) Even if the statutes were constitutional, the plaintiff argues, the

red light camera was “unauthorized and illegal” because it “was not installed or operated in
compliance with the state and county statutes.” (Id. ¶ 57.) The plaintiff also alleges that the
camera’s certificate “failed to meet the statutory requirements for admission as it conflicts with
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” (Id. ¶ 58.)6
The hearing officer ruled against the plaintiff and upheld the citation. (Id. ¶ 60.) The
plaintiff paid the entire $150 fine by credit card at the NCTPVA offices. (Id. ¶ 61.) She did not
appeal the officer’s decision. (See ECF No. 35-1 at 6.)
III. Procedural History
On April 15, 2024, the plaintiff brought this action on behalf of herself and similarly
situated drivers. She alleges the following causes of action:7
• VTL § 1111-b violates the federal and New York constitutions, because it
imposes liability only on motor vehicle drivers, not on bicyclists. (Id. ¶¶ 71–97.)
• Allowing a sworn affidavit as “evidence of the accusations made against Notice
recipients” “create[s] a new exception to the generally applicable rules on
hearsay.” (Id. ¶¶ 98–111.)

6 According to the plaintiff, Nassau County and NCTPVA “allowed their own inadmissible (and illegal
and unlawfully obtained) evidence” to be admitted, because their attorney offered the evidence and the
officer presiding over the hearing worked for them. (Id. ¶ 60.)
7 The complaint lists three proposed classes, two of which include sub-classes. (Id. ¶ 63.) The “Ticketed
Class” includes drivers who have received notices of liability, based on photographs and videos, since
2009. (Id.) The “Paying Class” includes people in the ticketed class who paid the fines. (Id.) This
class is divided into three subclasses: those who did not dispute the notice (the “Non-disputing
Subclass”), those who paid the fines after disputing the notice and appearing at a hearing (the
“Disputing Subclass”), and those who disputed the notice and prevailed, but had to pay fees (the “Fee
Only Subclass”). (Id.) The “RICO Class” includes people who suffered financial injuries and is divided
into two subclasses: those who were injured more than four years before this action (the “Older
Subclass”) and those were injured within four years of this action (the “Newer Subclass”). (Id.)
• Nassau County improperly gave the NCTPVA authority to issue notices of
liability, “exceed[ing] the authorization limitations” established in General
Municipal Law § 370-a(1), which provides that the “sole purpose of NCTPVA is
‘to administer and dispose of traffic and parking infractions.’” (Id. ¶¶ 112–24.)
• Title 72 “denies due process” because the NCTPVA prepares the notices of
liability and adjudicates the challenges to the notices, “eliminat[ing] any concept
of a fair tribunal.” (Id. ¶¶ 125–45.)
• The red light camera program fees are illegal taxes that violate the federal and
New York state constitutions; the “Driver Responsibility Fee” is the same
regardless of the actual administrative costs (id. ¶¶ 146–62), and the “Public
Safety Fee” is not applied in “all matters involving traffic safety” (id. ¶¶ 163–80).
• The “Public Safety Fee” exceeds the maximum penalty allowed by state law. (Id.
¶¶ 181–90.)
• Photographic and video evidence should not be admitted at NCTPVA hearings
(id. ¶¶ 320–56), and “live witnesses” should have to testify (id. ¶¶ 519–40).
• The defendants violated due process and denied equal protection under the state
and federal constitutions. (Id. ¶¶ 541–49.)
• The “red light camera Notices and red light camera hearings” are treated as
“quasi-civil and quasi-criminal hybrids;” thus, “due process requirements
pertaining to criminal proceedings” — including the Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses — “must apply.” (Id. ¶¶ 550–73.)
• The contracts between the Nassau defendants and the corporate defendants were
fraudulent, because only the Nassau County Department of Public Works was
legally authorized to install and operate the red light cameras. The defendants
committed “fraud” by issuing the notices of liability based on the evidence from
the cameras. (Id. ¶¶ 191–249.)
• The defendants invaded the plaintiff’s privacy, because the corporate defendants
did not have private investigator licenses, which were required because the
corporate defendants were “hired to obtain evidence of a crime committed against
the state.” (Id. ¶¶ 250–70.)
• The defendants used the license plate and registration information from the
photographs and video recordings to obtain confidential information about the
plaintiff in violation of the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721,
2722, and 2724. (Id. ¶¶ 273–97.)
In addition, the plaintiff claims:
• Unjust enrichment based on the payments from drivers who were issued notices
of liability (id. ¶¶ 298–319; 357–94);
• Abuse of process because Nassau County and NCTPVA “turn[ed] ‘a blind eye’”
to the supposedly illegal process (id. ¶¶ 395–431);
• Concert of action (id. ¶¶ 432–72);
• Fraud and abuse of process in connection Nassau County’s certifications about
the red light camera program to the New York state and federal governments (id.
¶¶ 473–518);
• Causes of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (id. ¶¶ 574–693).
The plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, an injunction prohibiting Nassau County and NCTPVA from
contracting with the corporate defendants, disgorgement of money collected by the red light
program, as well as compensatory, punitive and treble damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment
interest and attorneys’ fees. (Id. at 115–116.)8
The defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 12(c). They argue that the plaintiff does not have Article III
standing, did not exhaust administrative remedies and fails to state federal or state causes of
action. The Nassau defendants argue that NCTPVA is not a suable entity, and in any event, that
the law permits them to contract with the corporate defendants in connection with the red light
camera program.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v.
United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). “If plaintiffs lack Article III standing, a court

8 On May 20, 2024, Nassau County and NCTPVA answered the complaint and filed cross claims against
New York State, Verra Mobility Corporation and American Traffic Solutions for common law
contribution and indemnification, and against Verra Mobility Corporation and American Traffic
Solutions for contractual indemnification. (ECF No. 8.) On July 5, 2024, Nassau County and NCTPVA
voluntarily dismissed their cross claims against New York State. (ECF No. 24.) On July 31, 2024, the
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims against New York State. (ECF No. 31.) On August 29, 2024,
Nassau County and NCTPVA withdrew their cross claims against the corporate defendants. (ECF No.
34.)
has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear their claim.” Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health &
Welfare Fund v. Merck–Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005). “A
plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that it exists.” Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113. However, “[b]ecause ‘standing is

challenged on the basis of the pleadings, [the court must] accept as true all material allegations of
the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.’” MacIssac v.
Town of Poughkeepsie, 770 F.Supp.2d 587, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Connecticut v.
Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2002)).
To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed
factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or a

‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). Pleadings are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hayden v.
Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010).
The plaintiff argues that the Nassau defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion should be denied as
premature and not converted into a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and that the Court should deny motion
in any event. (ECF No. 39 at 8–11.) “The standard for granting a Rule 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings is identical to that for granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to
state a claim.” Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 301 (2d Cir. 2021)
(quoting Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2020)). Accordingly, the Court
construes the Nassau defendants’ motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Ezra v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 784 F. App’x 48, 49 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding that the district court property
considered the defendant’s untimely 12(c) motion); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1368 (3d ed.) (“Because of the similarity between the Rule 12(c) and Rule

12(b) standards, courts typically will construe a premature Rule 12(c) motions as if it were
brought under Rule 12(b) and a late Rule 12(b) motion . . . as if it were brought under Rule
12(c).”).
DISCUSSION
I. Article III Standing
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must “show that the conduct of which he
complains has caused him to suffer an ‘injury in fact’ that a favorable judgment will
redress.” Palmieri v. Town of Babylon, No. 01-CV-1399, 2006 WL 1155162, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 6, 2006), aff’d, 277 F. App’x. 72 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The defendants argue
that the plaintiff’s “interest in avoiding the consequences of running a red light does not confer
Article III standing.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 10; see also ECF No. 36-1 at 8–10.) The defendants rely
on Bell v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., in which the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs, who paid fines

after red light cameras caught them running red lights, did not have standing to bring a
negligence per se claim against American Traffic Solutions, which installed and operated the
cameras. 371 F. App’x 488, 492 (5th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff responds that Bell is different
because the plaintiffs sued for negligence under Texas law and claimed that they would not have
been caught if ATS had not installed and operated the cameras. (ECF No 39 at 11–12.)
a. Injury
The plaintiff cites the following as sources of her injuries: the allegedly unconstitutional
red light statutes, the allegedly invalid contracts between the Nassau and corporate defendants
and denial of due process in connection with her challenge to the citation. The Bell plaintiffs, on
the other hand, based their claims on a Texas statute prohibiting “investigations compan[ies]”
from operating without a license; they also claimed that “their violations would not have been
discovered were it not for [American Traffic Solutions].” Bell, 371 F. App’x at 490. Courts

have routinely found that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of state and
county statutes and regulations, including those related to fees. See, e.g., Kwong v. Bloomberg,
876 F. Supp. 2d 246, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding standing
where plaintiffs who paid a fee challenged the city statute establishing the fee as
unconstitutional); New York State Firearms Ass’n v. James, No. 23-CV-6524, 2024 WL
1932050, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. May 2, 2024) (finding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge fees
associated with background checks imposed by state statute). The plaintiff’s injury is therefore
more than simply an “interest in evading the law.” Bell, 371 F. App’x at 490.
The corporate defendants’ reliance on Palmieri v. Town of Babylon, (ECF No. 35-1 at
11), is also misplaced. Palmieri ignored a rental permit law and rented his property without the

necessary permit. Palmieri, 2006 WL 1155162, at *6. The Honorable Sterling Johnson held that
Palmieri did not have standing, and that his “failure to comply with the law by obtaining a permit
undermines any claim he has that the Rental Permit Law as enforced violated due process with
regard to his Property.” Id. Judge Johnson observed that Palmieri “could not have suffered the
alleged injury of being deprived due process . . . upon the statute’s enactment” because he did
not buy the property until years after the town enacted the statute. Id. at *5. Here, on the other
hand, the plaintiff does not base her due process claims on a statute that she ignored; rather, she
alleges that she was denied due process because the methods to challenge the hearing officer’s
finding were deficient.
Leder v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 211 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 630 F. App’x 61
(2d Cir. 2015) provides the appropriate analogy. In that case, Leder ran a red light, got a ticket
and sued the same defendants the plaintiff is suing in this case. Id. at 216. Leder did not contest
the ticket and paid the fine, but claimed the defendants violated due process because they

reduced the yellow light times, forcing drivers to run red lights, in order to generate revenue. Id.
at 217. The Honorable Arthur Spatt rejected the defendants’ standing claim, because Leder’s
“allegation that she paid a fine of $65.00 as a result of the Defendants’ actions, although for a
small amount, satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement.” Id. at 221. Like Leder, the plaintiff in
this case alleges “that she paid a fine . . . as a result of the Defendants’ actions . . . [which]
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement.” Id.
a. Causation
The defendants also argue that the plaintiff’s “own allegations confirm that her alleged
‘harm’ is not ‘fairly traceable’ to” their conduct, because she “does not challenge that she
violated the law.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 11; see also ECF No. 36-1 at 10–11.) The corporate
defendants argue that, like in Palmieri, “it was Plaintiff’s traffic infraction — her failure to
comply with the VTL — that caused her alleged injury, not the red-light camera system that

recorded her unlawful act.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 11.) Judge Spatt rejected this argument when the
defendants made it in Leder. See Leder, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 221. “Article III causation does not
require that a plaintiff demonstrate that her injury was directly caused by the Defendant’s
actions; rather, she merely needs to show that her injury was ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s
conduct.” Id. (quoting Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 2013)). The plaintiff’s
claim — that the defendants caused her injuries by establishing and operating the red light
program — is sufficient at this stage of the litigation to show causation. Id.; see also Toretto v.
Donnelley Fin. Sols., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 3d 464, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“[I]ndirectness is not
necessarily fatal to standing, because the fairly traceable standard is lower than that of proximate
cause.” (citation omitted)).
b. Redressability
The Court also considers the question of redressability, even though the defendants have
not raised it. See In re Univ. Urology Data Sec. Incident Litig., No. 23-CV-6484, 2025 WL
1002355, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (“While Defendants advance no argument on

traceability or redressability, the Court considers these prongs sua sponte.”). The plaintiff seeks
declaratory relief, an injunction prohibiting the Nassau defendants from contracting with the
corporate defendants, disgorgement of profits from the red light camera program and damages.
(ECF No. 1 at 115–116.) “A plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of
relief sought.” MacIssac, 770 F.Supp.2d at 593 (citation omitted).
The plaintiff seeks damages for economic injuries she sustained because of the
defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Accordingly, awarding damages for the fines the
plaintiff paid will redress her injury. See Leder, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 222. However, as Judge Spatt
found in Leder, “the Plaintiff’s request for [injunctive] relief appears less plausible.” Id. “In
seeking prospective relief like an injunction, ‘a plaintiff must show that he can reasonably expect

to encounter the same injury again in the future — otherwise there is no remedial benefit that he
can derive from such judicial decree.’” Id. (quoting MacIssac, 770 F.Supp.2d at 593). The
plaintiff does not allege that she will be cited for running red lights if the Court does not grant
her injunctive relief. Even if she runs a red light and gets a ticket, that “chance is too
speculative to confer Article III standing on the Plaintiff’s claim for a permanent injunction.”
Id.; see also Worthy v. City of Phenix City, Alabama, 930 F.3d 1206, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“Appellants lack standing to bring their claims for injunctive relief [related to a red-light-camera
ordinance] because they have not sufficiently alleged a threat of future harm.”). Accordingly,
the plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are dismissed for lack of standing.
II. Failure to Exhaust and Preclusion
The defendants argue that the plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies.
According to the corporate defendants, the plaintiff’s “failure to raise the arguments contained in
her Complaint during her hearing before the NCTPVA bars her from now raising them here.”

(ECF No. 35-1 at 12.) They say that is so that even if the hearing was a judicial rather than
administrative proceeding, as the plaintiff claims. (ECF No. 40 at 8–9.) The Nassau defendants
argue that the plaintiff should be “estop[ped] . . . from now bringing the present action” because
she chose “to pay the fine instead of pursuing an appeal of her hearing.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 11.)
The plaintiff responds that exhaustion is not required, and that even if it is, she exhausted
administrative remedies by having a hearing. (ECF No. 38 at 14–17.)9
The plaintiff brings constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not require
exhaustion. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1982) (“[T]his
Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983.”);
see also Knutson v. Vill. of Lakemoor, No. 18-CV-1804, 2018 WL 10509387, at *8 n.12 (N.D.

Ill. Dec. 4, 2018), aff’d, 932 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2019) (exhaustion was not required where
plaintiff challenged red light camera ordinance); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell,
221 F.3d 376, 382 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000) (“For purposes of constitutional standing, there is no
requirement that a plaintiff challenging the facial validity of a state statute first raise its claim in
state court.”).

9 The plaintiff also challenges the defendants’ description of the hearing. (ECF No. 38 at 17–18.)
Nor does claim preclusion apply. In Section 1983 cases, “a federal court must give to a
state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of
the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Knutson, 2018 WL 10509387, at *7 (quoting
Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)).10 Under New York Law,

“[r]es judicata, or claim preclusion, is invoked to prevent a party . . . from relitigating a
previously litigated action” and applies “to all issues and theories of recovery applicable to the
cause of action, whether or not they were actually litigated.” Hirschfeld v. Hogan, 18 Misc. 3d
531, 534 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). Therefore, “once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all
other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based
on different theories or even if seeking a different remedy.” Id.
While conceding that “a number of issues raised in the complaint were not put forth
before NCTPVA,” the plaintiff argues that “the presiding judicial hearing officer did not have
the authority to rule on those issues.” (ECF No. 38 at 18.) Claim preclusion “contemplates that
the parties had a ‘full and fair’ opportunity to litigate the initial determination.” People v. Evans,

94 N.Y.2d 499, 501 (2000). The plaintiff could not have litigated her claims at the hearing
because they are not defenses under VTL § 1111-b.11 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims are not
precluded. See also Knutson, 2018 WL 10509387, at *8 (preclusion was not available where the

10 The corporate defendants cite Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009), where plaintiffs
challenged the city’s red light camera program. (ECF No. 40 at 9.) The Seventh Circuit observed that
the city “might well have had a good argument that claim preclusion bars this litigation” but the city did
not advance “this affirmative defense.” Idris, 552 F.3d at 565. In Knutson, another challenge to a red
light camera program, the district court acknowledged that Idris “mention[s], in dicta, that claim
preclusion may be an available affirmative defense to claims against city ordinances,” but found that
the plaintiffs were not precluded from bringing suit even though they did not raise their arguments in
the administrative hearing. 2018 WL 10509387, at *7–8.
11 VTL § 1111-b has two defenses — that the car was reported stolen before the violation, VTL § 1111-
b(i), and that the red light camera was malfunctioning at the time of the alleged violations, VTL
§ 1111-b(o).
plaintiffs were “prevented from challenging allegedly unlawful notices or administrative hearing
procedures” and where “a hearing officer would not have been able to grant the relief [the
plaintiffs’ sought] under their limited powers”).
III. NCTPVA
The Nassau defendants argue that NCTPVA is a non-suable entity because it “is merely
an administrative arm of the municipality of Nassau County” and does not have its own legal

identity. (ECF No. 36-1 at 11–12 (quoting Davis v. Nassau Cnty., No. 06-CV-4762, 2011 WL
5401663, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2011).) According to the defendants, the “legal reality of
NCTPVA being legally identical to NASSAU has severe substantive ramifications” for the
plaintiff’s complaint, because she alleges that Nassau County improperly authorized or
empowered NCTPVA. (Id. at 12.) They argue that because NCTPVA is a non-suable entity,
“the many causes of action premised upon the mistaken argument that NASSAU improperly
enlarged NCTPVA’s authority and/or powers [are] null[].” (Id.) The plaintiff responds that
Davis, which Judge Spatt also decided, does not apply because the motion for summary
judgment was unopposed, and Judge Spatt did not consider NCTPVA’s history. (ECF No. 39 at
17–18.) The plaintiff asserts that the “statute and legislative history” show that NCTPVA is “not

an administrative arm of Nassau but a branch of the District Court,” and that NCTPVA’s website
includes disclaimers about Nassau County and NCTPVA that undermine the defendants’ claim
that NCTPVA cannot be sued. (Id. at 18–20.)
Judge Spatt observed that “under New York law, ‘departments that are merely
administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the
municipality, and therefore cannot … be sued.’” Davis, 2011 WL 5401663, at *3 (quoting
Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95, 99 n.3 (2d Cir. 2008)). Judge Spatt found that “[t]here is no
doubt that the Nassau County Traffic & Parking Violations Agency is merely an administrative
arm of the municipality of Nassau County,” and granted summary judgment for Nassau County.
Id. The Court agrees with that sound logic. See also Nassau County Administrative Code § 24-
1.1 (“[T]here shall be a department of the Nassau County government known as the Nassau
County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, which shall operate under the control and

direction of the County Executive.”). The plaintiff’s claims against NCTPVA are dismissed
because it does “not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and, therefore,
cannot be sued.” Davis, 2011 WL 5401663, at *3; see also Polite v. Town of Clarkstown, 60 F.
Supp. 2d 214, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[M]unicipal departments in this State . . . are not amenable
to suit, and no claims can lie directly against them.”).
IV. Failure to State a Claim
The defendants ask the Court to dismiss all of the plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a
claim. (ECF No. 35-1 at 13–21; ECF No. 36-1 at 14–22.) The Court addresses each claim in
turn.12
a. Due Process
Four of the plaintiff’s claims are federal due process claims against the Nassau
defendants. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 125–35 (Sixth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 320–41 (Nineteenth Cause of
Action); ¶¶ 541–44 (Thirty-Third Cause of Action); ¶¶ 550–73 (Thirty-Fifth Cause of Action).)13

The basis for her claims is that NCTPVA issues the notices of liability and adjudicates
challenges to the notices, and that evidence from the red light cameras — photographs and
videos — are admissible at NCTPVA hearings, as are sworn affidavits in lieu of witnesses.

12 The plaintiff did not bring federal claims against the corporate defendants. (ECF No. 38 at 19–24.)
13 As noted above, the plaintiff withdrew her claims against New York state, including the third and
fourth causes of action challenging the constitutionality of the statute. (ECF No. 31.)
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause states that no person shall “be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;” the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause “mirrors this language.” Marvin v. Peldunas, No. 21-1824-CV, 2022 WL 2125851, at *1
(2d Cir. June 14, 2022). “Due process protection has two components, a substantive due process

component and a procedural due process component.” Avramenkov v. I.N.S., 99 F. Supp. 2d 210,
215 (D. Conn. 2000). “The substantive due process component precludes the government from
engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ or interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). “The
procedural due process component precludes the government from depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property in an unfair manner.” Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)).
i. Substantive Due Process
A plaintiff making a substantive due process claim must sufficiently allege “(1) a ‘valid
property interest’ or ‘fundamental right’; and (2) that the defendant infringed on that right by
conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ or suggests a ‘gross abuse of governmental authority.’”
Leder, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 223 (quoting Sloup v. Loeffler, No. 5–CV–1766, 2008 WL 3978208, at

*10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008)). “To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must show that the
government decision it challenges ‘was arbitrary or irrational or motivated by bad faith.’” Dubin
v. Cnty. of Nassau, 277 F. Supp. 3d 366, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889
F.2d 435, 439 (2d Cir. 1989)). Notably, “the scope of rights afforded by the Due Process clause
is extremely limited.” Leder, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 223.
“Not all property rights are entitled to the protections of substantive due process,” which
protects only “those interests that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, i.e., those rights
that are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”
Id. at 223–24 (citations omitted); see also Venghaus v. City of Hartford, No. 06–CV-1452, 2012
WL 1050014, at *8 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012) (“The protections of substantive due process have
for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right
to bodily integrity.”). The property interest that the plaintiff alleges is her “financial liability” for

the red light violation — a $150 fee. (See ECF No. 1 ¶ 45.) But “courts have repeatedly found
that the substantive Due Process clause does not protect plaintiffs from modest fines.” Leder, 81
F. Supp. 3d at 224. Nor does the challenged conduct — issuing and adjudicating notices of
liability and permitting certain evidence at an NCTPVA hearing — “shock[] the conscience” or
constitute a “gross abuse of governmental authority.” Id. at 223.
ii. Procedural Due Process
A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 procedural due process claim “must allege both the
existence of a protected liberty or property interest, and that he or she was deprived of that
interest without being afforded sufficient process.” Foskey v. Corp. State of New York, No. 22-
CV-2546, 2022 WL 3228271, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2022). Procedural due process requires,
at a minimum, that the state afford people “some kind of hearing” before depriving them of a
liberty or property interest. Id. (quoting DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003)).

In “evaluating the adequacy of a challenged procedure,” courts balance the following factors:
“(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Dubin, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 388–89 (quoting Nat’l Org. for
Women v. Pataki, 261 F.3d 156, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2001)).
New York courts have determined that VTL § 1111-b’s red light camera program is civil,
not criminal. See Krieger v. City of Rochester, 978 N.Y.S.2d 588, 598–99 (Sup. Ct. 2013)
(“[T]he statutory scheme demonstrates an unequivocal intent to create a civil enforcement
mechanism, not a criminal one.”); id. at 599 (collecting cases).14 Accordingly, the adjudication

procedure “require[s] a lower level of due process protections.” Id. at 600. As explained above,
the $150 fee that the plaintiff paid for violating the red light law is not a protected property
interest. On the other hand, the government has an interest in enforcing traffic laws, and “the
Legislature went to great lengths to design the red light program to be a minimal invasion into
privacy by prohibiting photographs of the ‘driver, the passengers, or the contents of the
vehicle.’” Krieger, 978 N.Y.S.2d at 601 (quoting VTL § 1111–b(a)(2)). In any case, “adequate
procedures exist[] to safeguard plaintiffs’ property rights.” Dubin, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 389. The
notice of liability “provides sufficient detail of the allegations . . . as amplified by an opportunity
to view the video of the alleged infraction via the internet, and the matter is set for a hearing at
which time the owner is given a chance to contest the alleged infraction.” Krieger, 978 N.Y.S.2d

at 601 (quoting VTL § 1111-b(g)). The plaintiff took advantage of this procedure and contested
her notice of liability at a hearing. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 52–54.) A vehicle owner can also “appeal any
guilt adjudication to an Examiner Panel at the Bureau,” Krieger, 978 N.Y.S.2d at 602; the
plaintiff did not avail herself of this opportunity. “The fact that a [NCTPVA] technician inspects
the red light camera footage and issues a sworn or affirmed certificate, and another [NCTPVA]

14 The plaintiff alleges that the “red light camera Notices and red light camera hearings [are] quasi-civil
and quasi-criminal hybrids” because the notices of liability provide that failure to respond will result in
a “default conviction.” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 557–60.) But the statute “expressly states that a finding of
liability ‘shall not be deemed a conviction.’” Krieger, 978 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (quoting VTL § 1111-b(f)).
Moreover, VTL § 1111-b “does not allow for a conviction exposing the offender to potential jail time,”
and “the alleged infraction is heard by an administrative body and not a criminal court.” Id.
employee conducts the hearings, does not condemn the red light camera program.” 15 Id.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s due process claims are dismissed.
b. Equal Protection
Two of the plaintiff’s claims are for federal equal protection violations. (See ECF No. 1
¶¶ 163–72 (Tenth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 545–49 (Thirty-Fourth Cause of Action)).16 According
to the plaintiff, VTL § 1111-b treats motor vehicle owners differently than bicycle owners, the

Public Safety Fee treats red light camera violations differently than parking infractions, and
people who are caught by red light cameras are denied the “right to confront their accuser.”
“In order to establish an equal protection claim, the plaintiff must show that: (1) [s]he
was selectively treated compared with others similarly situated; and (2) the selective treatment
was based on impermissible considerations, such as membership in a suspect class, intent to
inhibit or punish the exercise of a constitutional right, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure.”
Margiotta v. Kaye, 283 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). As for the first requirement,
“[e]qual protection challenges to government classifications generally are concerned with
distinctions based on an ‘identifiable group.’” Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-CV-1289, 2009 WL
3055322, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). In Akbar, also a challenge to red light cameras, the

court found that a plaintiff’s equal protection classifications — drivers in the downtown area
versus drivers in other areas — were “problematic,” because “the constituent members of the
two groups constantly are in flux.” Id. The same is true in this case. The groups of people who

15 The Krieger court identified additional safeguards for vehicle owners. “At the hearing, the owner can
have the assistance of an attorney if desired, can subpoena witnesses and records, and is not restrained
by the traditional rules of evidence . . . . The hearing also provides the owner with the ability to pursue
the defense that the red light camera was malfunctioning . . . . The owner’s guilt must be shown by
‘substantial evidence.’” 978 N.Y.S.2d at 602 (quoting VTL § 1111-b(n), VTL § 240(2)(b), (c) & (d)).
16 The plaintiff argues that the Nassau defendants cannot defend equal protection challenges to a New
York statute’s constitutionality (ECF No. 39 at 24), but that argument is moot because she withdrew
her constitutional claims about the statute, which includes the first and second causes of action.
own cars, ride bikes, commit parking violations and run red lights are constantly changing. Nor
has the plaintiff alleged that these classifications are “based on impermissible considerations,
such as membership in a suspect class, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of a constitutional
right, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure.” Margiotta, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 864.

Because “the alleged unequal treatment implicates neither a ‘fundamental right’ nor is
based on a suspect or quasi-suspect distinction such as race, religion, or alienage, the Court must
apply a ‘rational basis review’ to the statutory distinction.” Id. (quoting Lamson v. Blumenthal,
75 F. App’x. 811, 812 (2d Cir. 2003)). A legislative classification subject to rational basis
review “must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for classification;” “[t]he actual motivations of
the enacting governmental body are irrelevant.” Id. (citations omitted). The burden is on the
plaintiff to negate “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification.” Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)
(citation omitted). The plaintiff has not come close to meeting this burden, nor does she attempt

to do so. The plaintiff claims only that the red light camera program “constitutes an
impermissible selective treatment,” without addressing whether the program serves a legitimate
governmental purpose. (See, e.g., ECF No. 39 at 25–26.) In any event, there is a rational basis
for the red light camera program. For example, it is rational to conclude that car drivers who run
red lights pose a greater danger to public safety than bicycle riders who run red lights or than
drivers who violate parking regulations. The equal protection claims are dismissed.
c. Takings Clause
The plaintiff brings a federal Takings Clause claim. She alleges that the “Driver
Responsibility Fee” is an illegally imposed tax, not an administrative fee, because the defendants
impose it regardless of whether the driver has a hearing. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 146–54 (Eighth
Cause of Action).) The defendants argue that courts have upheld the fee, citing Dubin, 277 F.
Supp. 3d at 393, and Guthart v. Nassau Cnty., No. 604271-2016, 2022 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 42415
(Sup Ct. Nassau County 2022). (ECF No. 35-1 at 17; ECF No. 36-1 at 17–18.) The plaintiff
responds that the claims in those cases are different. (ECF No. 39 at 26.)17

“To plead a taking under the Fifth (or Fourteenth) Amendment, a plaintiff must allege
that (1) plaintiff possessed a valid property interest; (2) there was a taking of that property
interest under color of state law; and (3) the taking was without just compensation.” Dubin, 277
F. Supp. 3d at 394. In McCarthy v. City of Cleveland, 626 F.3d 280 (6th Cir. 2010), the court
distinguished between takings of “a sum of money from a specific fund” — which is an improper
taking — and a taking that “merely impose an obligation on a party to pay money on the
happening of a contingency” — which is not an improper taking. Id. at 284. Because the Driver
Responsibility Fee is not a seizure of funds from the plaintiff’s bank account, but a fee that a
driver must pay for violating the red light laws, the fee is not an improper taking.
d. The Drivers Privacy Protection Act

The plaintiff brings two causes of action for invasion of privacy under the Drivers
Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721, 2724. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 250–82 (Fifteenth
Cause of Action); ¶¶ 283–97 (Sixteenth Cause of Action).) First, she maintains that the Nassau
defendants did not ensure that the corporate defendants were qualified; she claims that the
corporate defendants did not have a private investigative license, which New York law requires
for “any person or entity hired to obtain evidence of a crime committed against the state.” Her
second claim is that the Nassau and the corporate defendants invaded her privacy by getting
vehicle owner information from the Department of Motor Vehicles. As support for this

17 Dubin may no longer be good law after Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 588 U.S. 180 (2019).
proposition, the plaintiff cites the supposed “illegality” of the contracts between the Nassau and
corporate defendants, as well as the “illegal” photographs and recordings that showed the
plaintiff running the red light; the plaintiff says that the Nassau defendants violated 18 U.S.C. §
2722(a) when they used this evidence to get confidential information about vehicle owners.

These conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. The plaintiff claims that
New York requires a private investigator license in this context, but does not identify the law that
establishes this requirement, other than to cite “New York State law.” (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 262–
63.) Nor does the plaintiff explain how the photographs and videos from the red light cameras
are “evidence of a crime.” As explained above, the red light camera program is civil in nature.
See Krieger, 978 N.Y.S.2d at 598–99 (“[T]he statutory scheme demonstrates an unequivocal
intent to create a civil enforcement mechanism, not a criminal one.”).
The plaintiff claims that the defendants violated the DPPA by getting vehicle owner
information from the Department of Motor Vehicles. The plaintiff cites the supposed “illegality”
of the contracts between the Nassau and corporate defendants, as well as the “illegal”

photographs and recordings that showed the plaintiff running the red light; the plaintiff says that
the Nassau defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a) when they used this evidence to get
confidential information about vehicle owners. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 274–78.)18
The DPPA provides a cause of action against “[a] person who knowingly obtains,
discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted
under this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a). “Permissible use” includes (1) “use by any
government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its
functions, or any private person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal, State, or local agency in

18 The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants are liable for damages pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(1),
reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 2724(b)(3) and equitable relief pursuant to § 2724(b)(4).
carrying out its functions,” § 2721(b)(1); (2) “use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or
driver safety,” § 2721(b)(2); and (3) “use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative,
or arbitral proceeding in any Federal, State, or local court or agency,” § 2721(b)(4). The plaintiff
does not address the permissible purposes in § 2721 or the caselaw that discusses permissible use

under the DPPA. See, e.g., King v. Creed, No. 14-CV-0165, 2017 WL 11712225, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2017) (under the DPPA, “disclosure of such information is permitted for use
‘by any governmental agency’ or by ‘any private person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal,
State or local agency in carrying out its functions’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1))); id. (“The
DPPA also allows states to divulge drivers’ personal information . . . in connection with court,
agency, or self-regulatory body proceedings.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4))). The invasion
of privacy claims based on the DPPA are dismissed.
e. Racketeering
Finally, the plaintiff brings claims for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (See id. ¶¶ 574–670 (Thirty-Sixth Cause of

Action); ¶¶ 671–93 (Thirty-Seventh Cause of Action).) “To state a plausible RICO claim, a
plaintiff must allege: (1) that the defendant (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3)
constituting a ‘pattern’ (4) of ‘racketeering activity’ (5) directly or indirectly invests in, or
maintains an interest in, or participates in (6) an ‘enterprise’ (7) the activities of which affect
interstate or foreign commerce.” Foskey, 2022 WL 3228271, at *6 (quoting Williams v. Affinion
Grp., LLC, 889 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2018)). Because “the core of a RICO civil conspiracy
is an agreement to commit predicate [RICO] acts, such a complaint, at the very least, must allege
specifically such an agreement.” Id. (quoting Wolhendler v. Goldberg, No. 19-CV-457, 2020
WL 5658790, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2020) (cleaned up)). A RICO conspiracy claim will
therefore “be dismissed where the plaintiff alleges no facts to show specifically that the
defendants had any meeting of the minds in the alleged violations.” Wolhendler, 2020 WL
5658790, at *2 (citation omitted).
Foskey involved a similar RICO claim about Nassau County’s red light camera program.

The court rejected the claim because “[u]nder no possible interpretation of the facts has Plaintiff
plausibly alleged any predicate acts, much less a pattern of RICO activity, nor does he
sufficiently allege the existence of a RICO enterprise that affects interstate or foreign
commerce.” 2022 WL 3228271, at *6. That is true here, as well. The only agreement the
plaintiff alleges is the contract between the Nassau and corporate defendants to operate and
install the red light cameras. A contract to perform services is not a “meeting of the minds” to
“commit RICO predicate acts.” Wolhendler, 2020 WL 5658790, at *2. The racketeering claims
are dismissed.
V. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Remaining State Law Claims
“[A] district court ‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ if it ‘has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455
F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). The Court dismisses all the

federal claims over which it has original jurisdiction, and it declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state law claims alleging violations of the New York
State constitution (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 112–24 (Fifth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 136–45 (Seventh Cause of
Action); ¶¶ 155–62 (Ninth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 173–80 (Eleventh Cause of Action); ¶¶ 181–90
(Twelfth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 342–56 (Twentieth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 519–32 (Thirty-First
Cause of Action); ¶¶ 533–40 (Thirty-Second Cause of Action)), fraud (id. ¶¶ 191–213
(Thirteenth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 214–49 (Fourteenth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 473–89 (Twenty-
Eighth Cause of Action)), unjust enrichment (id. ¶¶ 298–309 (Seventeenth Cause of Action); ¶¶
310–319 (Eighteenth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 357–70 (Twenty-First Cause of Action); ¶¶ 371–81
(Twenty-Second Cause of Action); ¶¶ 382–94 (Twenty-Third Cause of Action)), abuse of
process (id. ¶¶ 395–415 (Twenty-Fourth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 416–31 (Twenty-Fifth Cause of
Action); ¶¶ 490–503 (Twenty-Ninth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 504–18 (Thirtieth Cause of Action)),

and concert of action (id. ¶¶ 432–50 (Twenty-Sixth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 451–72 (Twenty-
Seventh Cause of Action)).19 See Kolari, 455 F.3d at 123 (“Plaintiffs’ federal-law claims were
eliminated on a motion to dismiss, prior to the investment of significant judicial resources, and
we can discern no extraordinary inconvenience or inequity occasioned by permitting the claims
to be refiled in state court where they will be afforded a surer-footed reading of applicable law.”
(citation omitted)).
CONCLUSION
The defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted. The Clerk of Court is respectfully
directed to enter judgment and close this action.

SO ORDERED.
_ _ s_/_A_n_n__ M__. _D_o_n__n_e_ll_y_________
ANN M. DONNELLY
United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September 9, 2025

19 The plaintiff’s Thirty-Eighth Cause of Action is a claim for attorneys’ fees, but a “claim for attorney’s
fees and costs is not actually a separate cause of action” but a potential form of relief. Reliance
Commc’ns LLC v. Retail Stores Ventures, Inc., No. 12-CV-2067, 2013 WL 4039378, at *1 n.3
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013); see also Jaffe v. Capital One Bank, No. 09-CV-4106, 2010 WL 691639, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) (dismissing claim for attorneys’ fees because it is “not [a] claim[] upon
which relief may be granted” but a “potential form[] of relief,” and therefore “cannot stand as [a]
separate cause[] of action”).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11135602. Public record. Not legal advice.