# Edge, Jr. v. Rice Drilling D, LLC

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · September 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11135586

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11135586

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

WILLIAM F. EDGE, et al., :
:
Plaintiffs, : Case No. 2:24-cv-4136
:
v. : Judge Algenon L. Marbley
:
RICE DRILLING D, LLC, et al., : Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston
: Deavers
Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (“Motion”) (ECF No. 24).
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Motion to Sever (ECF No. 8), Supplemental Motion to Sever (ECF No. 52), and
Motion to Stay (ECF No. 25) are DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 12, 2024, Plaintiffs1 filed a complaint in the Belmont County Common Pleas
Court against defendants Rice Drilling D, LLC, Appalachia, LLC and Gulfport Energy
Corporation, XTO Energy Inc., Phillips Exploration, LLC, and Ascent Resources Utica LLC
(“Ascent”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiffs’ claims arise from oil and gas
leases with a reservation clause and seek the following relief against Defendants: “(1) declaratory

1 William F. Edge, Jr., Barbara A. Edge, James A. Shepherd, Becky A. Shepherd, ML Clift, LLC, Harmony Place,
LLC, Victoria L. Dornon, Don L. Fennerty, Angela G. Feenerty, Edward N. Ciroli, Jr., Suzanne Ciroli, The Feisley
Farms Family Limited Partnership, Michelle Pat Freiberg, Richard, David Freiberg Dean Jarrett, Barbara Jarrett,
Larry Jarrett, Edna Jane Jarrett, Robert L. Montag, Jason Palmer, Tonya Palmer, Sandra K. Stephens, Sandra K.
Stephens, executor of the estate of Donald Stephens, Michael L. Skidmore, Sandra L. Skidmore, Clarence B.
Wallace, Kathleen A. Wallace, Frank P. Walthour, III, Carmen L. Walthour, Geraldine West, Geraldine West,
executor of the estate of Donald L. West, PBZ Farm, LLC, Scatterday, LLC, Jeffrey L. Burns, the executor of the
estate of David Burns, Jeffrey L. Burns, Jill R. Carpenter, Jamie K. Callihan, Jodi R. Wells, Jana M. Mankin,
MOAM Minerals International, LLC, MJT Minerals International, LLC, VEM Appalachian Minerals, LLC, and
Roger Pierce
judgment that the subject lease did not convey rights to produce oil and gas from below the base
of the Utica Shale; (2) damages for intentional subsurface trespass; (3) damages for conversion;
and (4) damages for unjust enrichment.” (ECF Nos. 24 at 3; 9).
Defendants were served with the Complaint on October 10, 2024. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2). On
November 6, 2024, Defendants Rice Drilling D, LLC (“Rice”), Gulfport Appalachia, LLC, and

Gulfport Energy Corporation (“collectively “Gulfport”) filed a Notice of Removal to remove this
case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Id.). The Notice, however, indicates that Ascent is a
Defendant that “may be an Ohio citizen” along with some of the Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶¶ 5(e)-(g)). On
the same day, Rice and Gulfport filed a Motion to Sever requesting, inter alia, that this Court sever
and remand claims involving the “dispensable and unnecessary” defendants: Ascent, XTO Energy
Inc., and Phillips Exploration, LLC. (ECF No. 8).
In July of 2025, Defendants Gulfport, XTO Energy, Inc. and Ascent Resources-Utica, LLC
were dismissed from this case with prejudice upon joint motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 21. (ECF Nos. 49; 51).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When determining whether to remand a case, the Court must “determine whether the action
was properly removed in the first place.” Roof v. Bel Brands USA, Inc., 641 F. App'x 492, 495 (6th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Ahearn v. Charter Twp. of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1996)).
This case was removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides that defendants may remove
“any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Original jurisdiction includes federal-question
jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. Clarke v. Pollan, No. 24-3548, 2024 WL 4903806, at *2
(6th Cir. Nov. 27, 2024). “The former requires a cause of action arising under’ federal law. 28
U.S.C. § 1331. The latter requires diverse parties and a claim for over $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1).” Clarke, 2024 WL 4903806, at *2.
Rice and Gulfport maintain that removal is proper based on diversity jurisdiction. (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 5). “When removal is based on diversity grounds,” the question is “whether complete
diversity exist[ed] at the time of removal.” Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 492 (6th

Cir. 1999)). Complete diversity arises “when ‘all parties on one side of the litigation are of a
different citizenship from all parties on the other side of the litigation.’ ” Id. at 495–
96 (quoting SHR Ltd. P'ship v. Braun, 888 F.2d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 1989)).
The parties seeking removal bear the burden of establishing the right to do so. Mays v. City
of Flint, Mich., 871 F.3d 437, 442 (6th Cir. 2017). Moreover, any doubt as to whether remand is
appropriate must be “resolved in favor of remand.” Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544,
550 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 864-65 (3d Cir. 1996)).
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
While Rice and Gulfport sought removal based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S. §

1332, Plaintiff moves to remand, arguing that: (1) Ascent is an Ohio Citizen, thus, defeating
diversity jurisdiction; (2) the Defendants are necessary parties; and (3) there has been no fraudulent
joinder. (ECF No. 24 at 5, 10).
Rice has filed a supplemental motion in support of the motion to sever and in opposition
to Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. (ECF No. 52). In the supplemental motion, Rice argues that this
Court effectively severed and dismissed the purported non-diverse Defendants from this case when
this Court granted the joint motion to dismiss. On that basis, Rice urges this Court to retain
jurisdiction and deny Plaintiffs’ motion for remand. (Id.). Rice cites no authority in support of this
request.
Where removal is sought on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the controlling inquiry is
whether complete diversity of citizenship existed among the parties at the time the notice of
removal was filed. Coyne, 183 F.3d at 492. Indeed, a plaintiff who fails to object to removal may
be deemed to have waived any challenge once a jurisdictional defect is cured and a federal court
enters judgment. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 73 (1996). Plaintiffs, however, made no

such waiver here. Plaintiffs’ motion for remand remains pending, and thus, the validity of any
eventual final judgment could be undermined if removal was improper from the outset. The Sixth
Circuit has outlined the consequences of improper removal in light of later developments in
jurisdiction:
(1) if the plaintiff did not move to remand to state court, the judgment stands (Grubbs [v.
Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699 (1972)]; (2) even if the plaintiff moved to remand,
the judgment will stand so long as considerations of finality and economy are compelling
(particularly where a diversity case proceeds to summary judgment or trial, as in
Caterpillar); but (3) the judgment might not stand if the plaintiff moves to remand and
those finality and economy considerations are less significant (such as in a federal-question
case that is dismissed before summary judgment, as in Waste Control [Specialists LLC v.
Envirocare of Texas, Inc., 199 F.3d 781 (5th Cir.2000))—even if the plaintiff amended the
complaint to state a federal claim. This all assumes, of course that jurisdiction exists at the
time of judgment; if not, the judgment must be vacated. Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 75–76,
117 S.Ct. 467.
Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 327 (6th Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, this Court must determine whether removal was proper at the time the notice of
removal was filed.
Here, Rice and Gulfport concede that Ascent is an Ohio citizen but oppose remand,
contending that the properly joined Defendants are citizens of different states from Plaintiffs and
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (ECF No. 30 at 6). The parties do not dispute that the
amount in controversy exceeds this threshold. (ECF Nos. 24; 37). The parties also agree that
Ascent is an Ohio citizen.
As such, this Court will turn to Rice and Gulfport’s argument that removal was proper
because: (1) the claims against Ascent should be severed and remanded based on the grounds that
Ascent is an unnecessary and dispensable party; and (2) Ascent was fraudulently joined. (ECF No.
30 at 6, 9).
A. Whether Ascent is an Unnecessary and Dispensable Party.

Rice and Gulfport argue that although Ascent is an Ohio citizen, the claims against it should
be severed and remanded because Ascent is an unnecessary and dispensable party, and the case
should proceed without it. (ECF No. 30 at 6). Rice and Gulfport rely on Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 19 and 21 to support the request to sever Ascent. Pursuant to Rule 19:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive
the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing
parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the
interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. Moreover, under Rule 21, this Court may “on just terms, add or drop a party.
The court may also sever any claim against a party.”
As explained by the Sixth Circuit, the option to “drop” a party or “Sever” a claim have
significantly different legal consequences. Kitchen v. Heyns, 802 F.3d 873, 874–75 (6th Cir. 2015).
When claims are severed, it results in the creation of two distinct and independent actions, each
proceeding separately for purposes of final judgment and appeal. Id. Courts treat severed claims
as if they had been filed as separate lawsuits from the beginning. Id. In contrast, dropping parties
maintains the integrity of the original lawsuit as the court dismisses the dropped defendants
without prejudice, allowing the plaintiff to pursue a separate action against them based on the same
claims. Id.
Courts have found that Rule 21 “permits a district court to retain diversity jurisdiction over
a case by dropping a nondiverse party if that party’s presence in the action is not required under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, that is, the party to be dropped must not be a necessary party.”
Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. City of White House, Tenn., 36 F.3d 540, 545 (6th Cir. 1994). Courts
have similarly applied this principle to sever claims as a means of resolving jurisdictional defects
in removed cases. See, e.g., Joseph v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872 (N.D. Ohio 2009),
as amended (May 27, 2009) (finding the defendant “correctly assert[ed] that under Rule 21 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [the court] can retain jurisdiction by severing claims against
nondiverse dispensable defendants.”); W. Env't Corp. of Ohio v. Hardy Diagnostics, No. 1:21-
CV-194, 2022 WL 682665, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2022) (“[S]ome courts have severed claims
against nondiverse dispensable defendants to remedy jurisdictional problems in a removed case.”);

Willacy v. Marotta, No. 1:14 CV 1858, 2014 WL 7338770, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2014)
(“Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court can retain jurisdiction by severing
claims against non-diverse dispensable defendants.”)
To support the request that this Court retain jurisdiction by severing claims against Ascent,
Rice and Gulfport cite four cases: Schickel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2008 WL 11381369, at *1
(N.D. Ohio July 25, 2008); DeGidio v. Centocor, Inc., 2009 WL 1867676, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June
29, 2009), as amended (July 8, 2009); Joseph v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872 (N.D.
Ohio 2009); and In re Davol, Inc./C.R. Bard, Inc., Polypropylene Hernia Mesh Prods. Liab. Litig.,
2023 WL 3972499, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 13, 2023). Each case, however, is materially
distinguishable from the case sub judice.
In Schickel, the court dropped a fictitious defendant to preserve diversity jurisdiction,
which is a circumstance far removed from the sever-and-remand request presented here. Schickel
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2008 WL 11381369, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2008). In DeGidio, the

court severed and remanded claims in a case against “drug company defendants” and “healthcare
defendants.” 2009 WL 1867676, at *2. The plaintiff asserted claims against the drug company
based on theories of products liability, fraud, civil conspiracy, and commercial bribery. Id. at *1.
In contrast, the healthcare defendants faced allegations of medical malpractice. Id. The court held
that the healthcare defendants were not necessary parties in the resolution of the claims against the
drug company defendants, as the claims involved different legal standards and factual allegations.
Id. at 3. Similarly, in Joseph, the court severed claims against the “healthcare defendants” accused
of medical negligence from those against a defendant facing product liability allegations. 614 F.
Supp. 2d at 872. The court found that the healthcare defendants were not necessary parties because

a resolution of the claims against them would not necessarily resolve the plaintiffs’ claims against
the manufacturer defendant. Id. The court in Davol followed the same reasoning. 2023 WL
3972499, at *2.
Unlike the foregoing, Rice and Gulfport are not peripheral parties facing claims distinct
from those against Ascent. Rather, they are jointly named defendants in claims alleging that the
diverse and nondiverse defendants engaged in a joint venture giving rise to the claims, including
trespass, unjust enrichment, conversion, and declaratory judgment. (ECF No. 8-1). The sever and
remand sought here would not simply separate unrelated claims against unrelated defendants.
Instead, it would fragment a case where the parties are alleged to be joint tortfeasors. Severance
under such circumstances is not appropriate.
This distinction is critical and further emphasized when applying Rules 19 and 21. To
determine whether to invoke Rules 19 and 21 to drop a party or sever claims, courts have adopted
a two-step process. See Joseph, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 872. The first step is to assess whether, under

Rule 19(a), the party is necessary for just adjudication. If the party is necessary, the second step is
to determine if the party is indispensable under Rule 19(b). Id.
1. Necessary
With respect to the first step, a party is necessary under Rule 19(a) if: “(1) complete relief
cannot be given to existing parties in his absence; (2) disposition in his absence may impair his
ability to protect his interest in the controversy; or (3) his absence would expose existing parties
to substantial risk of double or inconsistent obligations.” Safeco Ins. Co.,, 36 F.3d at 546 (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1), (2)(i)-(ii)).
Here, Ascent is a necessary party. Plaintiffs allege that Ascent was a joint venturer with

Rice and Gulfport in drilling the wells at issue. (ECF No. 24 at 6–7). These claims in connection
with the wells include trespass, unjust enrichment, conversion, and declaratory judgment. (ECF
No. 8-1). Rice and Gulfport concede that the claims against Ascent are in connection with the
wells but emphasize that there is a small number of wells related to Ascent and a small number of
Plaintiffs asserting claims against Ascent. (ECF No. 30 at 2, 7). The limited number of claims,
however, does not negate the legal and factual interdependence of the claims. (ECF No. 37 at 3).
A decision concerning the joint venture and related liabilities would directly impact Ascent’s
interests. Rice and Gulfport argue otherwise, explaining that the court has ruled, twice, that a
defendant would not be bound by any such judgment and can protect its interests through
independent litigation, once in TERA II, LLC v. Rice Drilling D, LLC, 679 F. Supp. 3d 620, 638–
39 (S.D. Ohio 2023); and again in J&R Passmore, LLC v. Rice Drilling D, LLC, No. 2:18-CV-
01587, 2023 WL 2667749, at *19 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2023). In Tera II and Passmore, the court
simply declined to apply issue preclusion. Even if this meant that Ascent would not be bound by
any judgment in this case, this case would nonetheless set precedent that will directly impact

Ascent’s interests given the same factual and legal arguments involved in the claims.
As opposed to the claims in the precedent referenced by Rice and Gulfport, Ascent’s
interest in the litigation cannot be so easily disentangled. Severing the claims would risk impairing
Ascent’s ability to defend its interests, given that all claims sought to be severed are based on
alleged joint and several liability. That fact distinguishes this matter from the cases cited by Rice
and Gulfport where courts severed claims against the nondiverse healthcare defendants facing
legally and factually distinct claims from the diverse defendants. Here, Ascent is a necessary party
to the claims asserted against it and the diverse defendants.
2. Indispensable

Because the party is necessary, this Court proceeds to “determine whether or not the party
is indispensable. Relevant factors to consider include if: (1) a judgment rendered in the party’s
absence would prejudice the available party; (2) such prejudice could be lessened or avoided; (3)
a judgment rendered in the party’s absence would be adequate; and (4) the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for non-joinder.” H.R. ex rel. Reuter v. Medtronic, Inc., 996 F.
Supp. 2d 671, 682 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (citing Soberay Mach. & Equip. Co., 181 F.3d at 764). Given
the joint and several liability asserted and Ascent’s role in the alleged venture, this Court finds that
Ascent is an indispensable party.
3. Severance
This analysis, however, changes when looking at Rice and Gulfport’s ultimate request: to
sever any claim involving the non-diverse party. Indeed, Rice and Gulfport argue that there is no
need for Ascent to be involved in a case litigating claims that Plaintiffs did not assert against
Ascent. (ECF No. 30 at 9). They assert that, even if Ascent was a joint venturer as to the wells in

which it owns an interest, that reasoning does not apply to the claims involving wells in which
Ascent does not own an interest. (ECF No. 30 at 10). As such, Rice and Gulfport request that this
Court retain jurisdiction over the claims that do not involve Ascent. This request mirrors the
procedural posture in W. Env't Corp. of Ohio v. Hardy Diagnostics, No. 1:21-CV-194, 2022 WL
682665, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2022), where the court declined to sever claims.
In Hardy Diagnostics, the court remanded the case after it found no basis for severance
under Rule 21 and declined to apply the Rule 19 analysis. 2022 WL 682665, at *3. The plaintiff
brought foreclosure and breach of contract claims. The court noted that other courts have applied
Rules 19 and 21 to sever “claims against nondiverse dispensable defendants to remedy

jurisdictional problems in a removed case” and the defendants’ argument for remand “focuses its
attention on Rule 19, arguing that the [nondiverse defendants] are necessary for the foreclosure
claim of action but not necessary for the breach of contract claims.” Id. at *2-*3. Based on this
posture, the nondiverse defendants could only be dropped if the foreclosure claim was severed
under Rule 21. As such, the court began and ended its analysis with Rule 21 after finding that it
could “discern no legally recognized reason for severance. Moreover, it is a long-established
principle in the federal judiciary that ‘joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly
encouraged.’” Id. (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)).
Similarly here, this Court finds no legally recognized reason for severance. Like the
defendants’ request in Hardy Diagnostics, Rice and Gulfport’s request would require this Court to
sever claims before dropping the nondiverse parties. Factors to consider for severance include: (1)
whether claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence; (2) whether claims present some
common question of law or fact; (3) whether settlement of claims or judicial economy would be

facilitated; (4) whether prejudice would be avoided if severance were granted; and (5) whether
different witnesses and documentary proof are required for separate claims. H.R. ex rel. Reuter v.
Medtronic, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 2d 671, 682 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
Here, the factors regarding whether claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence
and present some common question of law or fact weigh heavily against severance. Plaintiffs each
entered into an oil and gas lease with Defendants and the lease contains the identical Reservation
Clause at issue. Rice and Gulfport argue that each of the claims will turn largely on individualized
intent concerning each separate lease, so the claims are distinct and separate transactions. (ECF
No. 26 at 9). Rice and Gulfport rely heavily on the finding in Passmore, 2023 WL 2667749, where

this Court found that there are two main issues in that case that will require individualized inquiry:
the intent of the contracting parties; and establishing the individualized elements of the three tort
claims alleged. 2023 WL 2667749, at *19. There, however, the question was whether “the court
finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Indeed, this Court
observed that “[d]efendants’ liability ultimately turns on questions of common law, and while
central to step one of the legal analyses, the contract interpretation question cannot be said to
predominate over the individualized inquiries required to resolve the actual, alleged injury to
Plaintiffs.” 2023 WL 2667749, at *20. The analysis under Rule 21, however, does not turn on
predominance.
Further, judicial economy favors resolving these matters together and the documentary
proof and witnesses will inevitably have some overlap across claims. (ECF Nos. 26 at 9; 37 at 6).
The only prejudice Rice and Gulfport claim would be avoided is prejudice resulting from a “de

facto class action which the Court has already rejected in Passmore.” This is not sufficient to
justify this Court creating federal jurisdiction. As explained above, any doubt as to whether remand
is appropriate must be “resolved in favor of remand.” Eastman, 438 F.3d at 550 (quoting Brown,
75 F.3d at 864-65).
Accordingly, this Court finds that Ascent is both a necessary and indispensable party under
Rule 19, and that severance under Rule 21 is neither appropriate nor warranted. The attempt to
sever and remand claims against a non-diverse but necessary party in order to retain jurisdiction
over the remaining claims is improper.
B. Whether Ascent Was Fraudulently Misjoined

Rice and Gulfport further request that this Court sever Ascent on the ground that Ascent
was fraudulently misjoined. (ECF No. 30 at 9-11). Under the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder, “a
plaintiff attempts to defeat removal by misjoining the unrelated claims of non-diverse party
plaintiffs against a defendant, or . . . by misjoining unrelated claims of a plaintiff against non-
diverse party defendants.” Geffen v. General Electric Co., 575 F.Supp.2d 865, 869–72 (N.D.Ohio
2008). As courts have explained, “[s]imilar to fraudulent joinder, ‘[t]he purpose of the [fraudulent
misjoinder] doctrine is to sever improperly joined claims against non-diverse defendants and
remand those claims to state court, while retaining diversity jurisdiction over the properly-joined
claims against the diverse defendants.’” Gipe v. Medtronic, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 3d 687, 697 (W.D.
Ky. 2019). (quoting Estate of Owens v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., No. 12-111-DLB, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189836, at *10 (E.D. Ky. June 17, 2013)).
The Sixth Circuit, however, has not adopted the fraudulent-misjoinder doctrine. See Kent
State Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 512 F. App'x 485, 491 n.1 (6th Cir. 2013). In the
absence of binding precedent, numerous courts within the Sixth Circuit have declined to apply the

doctrine. For example, in Geffen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 865, 871 (N.D. Ohio 2008),
the court declined application of the doctrine, emphasizing the lack of authority, conflicting case
law, and the unsettled nature of the doctrine. The court also noted the many unanswered questions
in the doctrine’s application including whether to apply the doctrine, whether it requires egregious
misjoinder or some other level of bad faith, whether to apply state or federal joinder law, and
whether a federal court should be deciding issues of state joinder law in the first instance.
Other courts have expressed similar hesitation in applying the fraudulent misjoinder
doctrine. Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC v. Alveranga, No. 1:20-CV-00990, 2020 WL 6685304, at *5–6
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2020) (“[D]istrict courts in the Sixth Circuit have generally rejected the

fraudulent misjoinder doctrine.”); Handshoe v. DePuy Synthes Sales, Inc., No. 7:19-CV-6-REW,
2019 WL 4039623, at *2–3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 27, 2019) (quoting Bird v. Carteret Mortg. Corp., No.
2:06-CV-588, 2007 WL 894841, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2007)) (“[J]urisdictional presumptions
and binding rules of statutory construction, as well as the complexities of fraudulent misjoinder
and its relative lack of necessity, support the conclusion that the doctrine is ‘neither wise nor
warranted’ . . .Consequently, the Court declines to apply fraudulent misjoinder6 as a means of
disregarding the lack of complete diversity.”).
In light of the absence of controlling Sixth Circuit authority and the consistent reluctance
of district courts within this Circuit to adopt the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine, this Court declines
to apply it here. Consequently, because complete diversity is lacking, the Court finds that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, and remand is appropriate.
C. Whether the Removal Was Frivolous
Plaintiffs contend that Rice and Gulfport’s removal was a meritless effort to manufacture
diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 24 at 12). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “[a]n order remanding

the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees,
incurred as a result of the removal. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447. Nonetheless, “[a]bsent unusual
circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party
lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively
reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141
(2005).
This Court finds that Rice and Gulfport did not lack an objectively reasonable basis for
removal. Rice and Gulfport’s argument was based, at least in part, on the doctrine of fraudulent
misjoinder—an area of law that remains unsettled within the Sixth Circuit and has, at times, been

recognized by other courts. See, e.g., Geffen, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 869 (“The fraudulent misjoinder
doctrine was first articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d
1353, 1360 (11th Cir.1996)” and “[n]otably, only one other Court of Appeals—the Fifth Circuit—
has adopted the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine, see In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 309 F.3d 296
(5th Cir.2002) . . . .”).
Accordingly, because Rice and Gulfport advanced a colorable—though ultimately
unsuccessful—argument in support of removal, the request for attorneys fees is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees is DENIED and this case is REMANDED to the Belmont
County Common Pleas Court. Accordingly, the pending Motion to Sever (ECF No. 8),
Supplemental Motion to Sever (ECF No. 52), and Motion to Stay (ECF No. 25) are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
AE Ve lals
DATED: September 9, 2025 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11135586. Public record. Not legal advice.