# McClellan v. Beyond Gravity Inc

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · September 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11135360

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** September 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION

STEPHEN MCCLELLAN,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:23-cv-839-CLM

BEYOND GRAVITY, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The court granted in part and denied in part RUAG’s motion to
dismiss McClellan’s original complaint. (Doc. 14). The court gave
McClellan one chance to amend his complaint to fix highlighted pleading
deficiencies. McClellan filed his amended complaint, and RUAG once
again asks the court to dismiss. (Doc. 24); (doc. 25). For the reasons
explained below, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
RUAG’s motion. This case will proceed to discovery on Count I (Title VII,
religious discrimination) and Count III (intrusion into seclusion).
BACKGROUND
McClellan started working for RUAG (a/k/a Beyond Gravity, Inc.)
in 2019. COVID-19 hit the next year, and RUAG implemented workplace
rules to combat COVID’s effects.
1. COVID-19 Protocols
RUAG is a government contractor and peer of U.S. Space Force and
NASA. RUAG followed industry standards to create COVID-19 protocols.
For instance, RUAG enacted a Masking Policy that required employees to
wear facial coverings at work. RUAG also required employees to be fully
immunized against COVID-19 (the “Vaccine Mandate”) but didn’t require
employees obtain a vaccine from a certain manufacturer.
1
2. Religious Exemption Requests
RUAG employees could apply for religious exemptions and
accommodations under the COVID-19 policies. This lawsuit arose after
RUAG denied both of McClellan’s religious exemption requests from the
Vaccine Mandate and Masking Policy. McClellan filed his first exemption
on November 4, 2021. In it, he said:
I’m writing this request for religious exemption to, and
reasonable accommodation from, all provisions of
presidential Executive Order 14042; which includes the
requirements for mandatory COVID-19 vaccination and
masking . . . It is my sincerely held religious belief that my
God has directed me, through his word and through his
guidance in prayer, not to partake in the medical practices
of vaccination and masking.
While not explained in his 2021 exemption request, McClellan pleads in
his amended complaint that he objected to all forms of the COVID vaccine
because each was the product of research on aborted fetal tissue.
The next day, RUAG HR sent McClellan the following email with
the subject line “Your Religious Exemption Not to Wear a Mask,”
We believe that allowing you the accommodation of not
wearing a mask would create an undue hardship by
impairing workplace safety. We have considered possible
alternative accommodations, including telework and
reassignment . . . We are unable to accommodate your
request not to wear a mask in the plant.
Thirteen days later, McClellan resubmitted the same exemption with a
letter from his pastor explaining McClellan’s objections. Less than two
weeks later, RUAG fired McClellan, citing its inability to accommodate
McClellan’s mask exemption request and its upcoming vaccination policy.

2
3. Lawsuit
McClellan sued RUAG for a swath of federal and state-law alleged
violations. The court dismissed all claims with prejudice except for
McClellan’s Title VII claim and two state-law claims. (Doc. 14). The court
dismissed McClellan’s Title VII’s claim without prejudice and gave him a
chance to replead to establish federal jurisdiction. (Id.).
STANDARD
Because this is a Rule 12 motion, the court accepts the allegations
in McClellan’s complaint as true and construes them in the light most
favorable to McClellan. Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 697 F.3d 1267, 1275
(11th Cir. 2012). The ultimate question is whether all of McClellan’s
allegations, when accepted as true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement
of relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). If the facts as
pleaded could entitle McClellan to relief, then the court must deny
Defendant’s motion to dismiss. If, however, the court accepts all of
McClellan’s pleaded facts as true, and McClellan still would not be
entitled to relief, then the court must grant the motion.
ANALYSIS
The court must first determine whether McClellan plausibly alleges
a Title VII violation and thus gives this court federal question jurisdiction.
If he does, the court must then determine whether McClellan plausibly
alleges his state-law claims.
Count I: Title VII (religious discrimination)
To establish religious discrimination under Title VII, McClellan
must plausibly allege “that (1) his sincere and bona fide religious belief
conflicted with an employment requirement, and (2) his employer took
adverse employment action against him because of his inability to comply
with the employment requirement or because of the employer’s perceived
need for his reasonable accommodation.” Bailey v. Metro Ambulance
Servs., Inc., 992 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2021).
3
In its previous opinion, the court dismissed McClellan’s Title VII
claim for two reasons: (1) McClellan limited his vaccine objections to
mRNA vaccines, and RUAG’s policy allowed McClellan to take other forms
of the vaccine, and (2) McClellan did not mention masks in Count 1, so
RUAG’s mask policy could not be the basis for a viable claim. (Doc. 18, pp.
12-13). McClellan has re-pleaded Count 1 to address both deficiencies, and
as explained below, his amended Count 1 is sufficient to survive Rule 12.
a. Vaccine Mandate
As mentioned, 1n his original complaint, McClellan pleaded that he
“holds sincere religious beliefs that preclude him from receiving the
mRNA COVID-19 vaccine.” (Doc. 1, § 87). In his amended complaint,
McClellan expands his religious objection to all COVID vaccines:
The named Plaintiff holds sincere religious beliefs that
preclude him from receiving the mRNA COVID-19 vaccine
or alternative COVID-19 vaccines due to the use of aborted
fetal cell tissue in the research and creation of said vaccines.
(Doc. 24, § 91). This across-the-board objection to vaccination reflects the
language in McClellan’s exemption request:

Basis af feligious Exemption
It is my sincerely held religious belief that my God has directed me, through his word and through his
fuidance im prayer, not to partake in the medical practices of vaccination and masking. | have held this
sincere belief for the better part of my life. Past mon-adherence to this sincere belief [primarily on the
basis of fear) does not diminish or dismiss the sincerity of this belief. Though attestation and evidence
of religious justification for said sincerity need not be provided | still wish to share a sample of basis of
my beliefs:

And if you read RUAG’s termination letter in the light most favorable to
McClellan, RUAG understood McClellan’s exemption request to seek an
exemption from all permitted COVID vaccines, not just mRNA vaccines:

Dear Matt,

on eran enaeensi eieearcligious exemplion from both the RUAG Space
(Gittsastony Vaccination Poteyreqiremen! the requirement to wear a mask in the workplace
we ure denying your request for exempticn.
RUAG complains that McClellan changed his tune during the
pleading stage—i.e., he went from objecting to mRNA vaccines to all
vaccines. But that complaint is properly left to discovery, not Rule 12
motions. Reading the operative complaint in a light most favorable to
McClellan, McClellan pleads the same religious objection that he put in
his exemption request, and that’s what counts. Rule 12 is not the vehicle
to challenge the scope or sincerity of McClellan’s religious belief.
RUAG’s argument that Rule 12 dismissal is also warranted because
its vaccine policy did not cause McClellan’s termination (masking did) is
also best left to discovery and Rule 56 motions or trial. McClellan pleads
that RUAG failed to accommodate his request not to vaccinate and that
his request not to vaccinate altered the conditions of his employment.
(Doc. 24, 9 94-96). And RUAG’s termination letter, when read in a light
most favorable to McClellan, can be interpreted to say that RUAG was
firing—or as RUAG put it, “accept[ing] your voluntary resignation”’—
because McClellan told RUAG that he would not accept a vaccine:

We also considered other opiions and unfortunately we have no work frort home posithons thal are
vavean! and that you are qualified for, and we have no positions in any other facility that would not
similarly require you to wear a mask if unvaccinated,

mandatory vaccination palicy, we accent! Your VOlUINLary Pesieralion elects e tod iy you ant y
of work will be togay, MOVER Rr ey ed □□ et ey re ee ee
9021. which will also then provide company paid medical benefit coverage for you through the
end of December 2071

In short, McClellan has pleaded enough facts that, if proved true, could
establish that RUAG fired McClellan because of his sincere religious belief
against receiving a COVID vaccination.

b. Mask Policy
The court reaches the same conclusion about masks. In his amended
complaint, McClellan added the following paragraph to Count I:
The named Plaintiff holds sincere religious beliefs that
preclude him from covering his face with a mask due to his
belief that it dishonors God to cover his face.
(Doc. 24, p. 24). As already shown, McClellan’s exemption request
mentioned masking:
Basis of Religious Exemption
It is my sincerely held religious belief that my God has directed me, through his word and through his
guidance in prayer, not to partake in the medical practices of vaccination and masking. | have held this
sincere belief for the better part of my life. Past non-adherence to this sincere belief (primarily on the
basis of fear) does not diminish or dismiss the sincerity of this belief. Though attestation and evidence
of religious justification for said sincerity need not be provided | still wish to share a sample of basis of
my beliefs:

And RUAG’s emails and termination letter, when read in a light most
favorable to McClellan, are evidence that RUAG acted against McClellan
because he sought a mask-free accommodation:

We are unable to accommodate your request not to wear a mask in the plant. As you know, we take seriously
our protection of our workforce and will continue to do 50 a5 long as COVID-19 remains a threat.

We cannot accommodate your request not to wear a mask at work, Because employees in a *
facility work closely together. the risk of transmission of COVID-19 among employees is8 .
cerious and realistic threat. Masking is a proven way to significantly reduce that threat. ‘You will
not be allowed to remain in the workplace without wearing a mask.
We also considered other options and unfortunately we have no work from home positions that are
. , “tad fam ¢ .» have ne itions in any other facility thal would not
vacant and that you are qualified for, and we have no positions in arty
similarly require you to wear a mask if unvaccinated.

In short, McClellan plausibly alleges that his sincere religious belief
against facial coverings rendered him unable to comply with RUAG’s
Mask Policy. McClellan also plausibly alleges that RUAG fired him
because it couldn’t accommodate his request to work without a mask.

—
For these reasons, the court DENIES RUAG’s motion to dismiss
Count 1 in all respects. McClellan may proceed to discovery on both a
vaccine and mask theory.
Because the court finds that McClellan pleads a viable federal claim
in Count I, it has supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims
McClellan pleads in Counts II and III. The court reviews them below.
Count II: Negligence / Gross Negligence
RUAG asks the court to dismiss Count II, and in response,
McClellan “concede[s] that the negligence and gross negligence claims
should be dismissed.” (Doc. 29, p. 31). The court therefore GRANTS
RUAG’s motion to dismiss Count II.
Count III: Invasion of Privacy
Alabama recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy and has adopted
the Restatement (Second) of Torts articulation. See Phillips v. Smalley
Maint. Services Inc., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala 1983). “It is generally accepted
that invasion of privacy consists of four limited and distinct wrongs: (1)
intruding into the plaintiff’s physical solitude or seclusion; (2) giving
publicity to private information about the plaintiff that violates ordinary
decency; (3) putting the plaintiff in a false, but not necessarily defamatory,
position in the public eye; or (4) appropriating some element of the
plaintiff’s personality for a commercial use.” Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So.
2d 700, 701 (Ala. 1997). McClellan pleads the first two theories. The court
reviews them separately below.
A. Intrusion into seclusion
A defendant invades the plaintiff’s privacy by “wrongful intrusion”
when he “intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns,” and he
is liable for that intrusion if the intrusion “would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.” Id. at 702 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
7
652B (1977)). Wrongful intrusion can include “investigation into the
plaintiff’s private concerns, such as opening private mail or examining a
private bank account.” Id. “There must be something in the nature of
prying or intrusion and the intrusion must be something which would be
offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person. The thing into which
there is intrusion or prying must be, and be entitled to be, private.” Hogin
v. Cottingham, 533 So. 2d 525, 531 (Ala. 1988) (internal citations omitted).
According to McClellan,
[f]rom September 2021 until termination, Plaintiff believes
Defendant was monitoring his private technological data or
communications to identify who remained unvaccinated so
Defendant could bring him into compliance with
Defendant’s COVID-19 Vaccination Mandate through
punitive actions. Plaintiff believed Defendant’s managers
eavesdropped on his conversations, surveilled him for
weeks, and accessed and/or monitored his private health
information.
(Doc. 24, p. 22). Accepting McClellan’s facts as true, the court finds
McClellan plausibly pleaded wrongful intrusion. Eavesdropping and
surveilling are actions generally associated with wrongful intrusion. See
Fuller, 706 So. 2d at 702 (finding no wrongful intrusion because “Johnston
did not allege that the defendants entered his home, searched through his
private papers, wiretapped his telephone, or eavesdropped on his
conversations. Johnston did not allege that the defendants obtained
private records concerning his affairs. Johnston failed to present any
evidence that Fuller's conduct in gathering the information was abrupt,
offensive, and objectionable.”). And McClellan pleaded that his
vaccination status was private—i.e., McClellan did not freely share that
information with coworkers or the public. (Doc. 24, p. 22); Fuller, 706 So.
2d at 702 (quoting Nadar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 568–69
(1970)) (“Information about the plaintiff which was already known to
others could hardly be regarded as private to the plaintiff. Presumably,
8
the plaintiff had previously revealed the information to such other
persons, and he would necessarily assume the risk that a friend or
acquaintance in whom he had confided might breach the confidence.”). A
reasonable person could deem it highly offensive to surveil an employee
to access his private medical information without his consent.
As a result, the court DENIES RUAG’s motion to dismiss Count III
on McClellan’s wrongful intrusion theory.
B. Publicity of private information
McClellan also claims that RUAG invaded his privacy by giving
publicity to his medical information, specifically his vaccination status.
(Doc. 24, p. 25–26). This theory of invasion of privacy occurs when a
tortfeasor “gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another . . . if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(D).
Publicity “means that the matter is made public, by communicating
it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. The
difference [between publicity and publication] is not one of the means of
communication, which may be oral, written or by any other means. It is
one of a communication that reaches or is sure to reach, the public.” Id.,
cmt. a; Fuller, 706 So. 2d at 703.
McClellan fails to plausibly allege that RUAG gave publicity to his
medical information. Though not specifically alleged in Count III,
McClellan’s publicity claim appears to be based on RUAG:
managers fail[ing] to safeguard Plaintiff’s and others’
confidential medical information because Defendant’s
managers had compiled a comprehensive report of who was
unvaccinated and vaccinated and freely disseminate[d] this
information.
. . .
9
Throughout Fall 2021 until Plaintiffs’ termination,
Defendant’s vaccinated workforce was collecting
confidential medical information of their employees,
disseminating the obtained information to multiple other
employees without Plaintiffs’ consent or knowledge, and for
those unvaccinated employees who were identified as
dissenters.
(Doc. 24, p. 21–22). Though McClellan does allege that RUAG
disseminated his private medical information, he fails to explain who
specifically RUAG shared his information with or the number of people
that RUAG made aware of his information. (Id.). McClellan also never
claims RUAG announced his information to the public at large. (Id.);
Fuller, 706 So. 2d at 703 (“Martin did not broadcast over the radio the
information obtained about Johnston, he did not print it in a newspaper,
and he did not tell it to a large number of people.”).
Even if RUAG informed “multiple other employees” of McClellan’s
unvaccinated status, that audience wouldn’t be large enough to meet the
state-law definition of “publicity.” So McClellan fails to allege that RUAG
gave publicity to his unvaccinated status.
—
To sum up, McClellan can proceed with Count III only on the theory
that RUAG wrongfully intruded into his private affairs / information.
McClellan cannot proceed on a publicity theory.

10
CONCLUSION
The court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART RUAG’s
motion to dismiss. McClellan may proceed to discovery on his Title VII
claim and his wrongful intrusion theory of invasion of privacy. All other
claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DONE and ORDERED on September 9, 2025.
Li gl Hy □
COREY MAZE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11135360. Public record. Not legal advice.