# Xi v. The Trustees of Purdue University

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · September 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11135322

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** September 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE

BOWEI XI, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:23-CV-88-PPS
)
THE TRUSTEES OF PURDUE UNVIERSITY, )
)
Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Bowei Xi is a tenured Associate Professor of Statistics at Purdue University who
alleges Purdue denied her application for promotion from associate to full professor
because of her sex, race, and national origin. Xi also alleges Purdue retaliated against
her when she protested the University’s denial of her request for promotion. Purdue
argues Xi’s research record did not justify her promotion to full professor and moves for
summary judgment on Xi’s claims. Based on the record before the Court, Xi has failed to
provide sufficient evidence to support her claims of discrimination or retaliation, and
summary judgment will therefore be granted to Purdue.
Factual Background
Xi failed to comply with Local Rule 56-1(b)(2) in her response to Purdue’s
statement of material facts. Local Rule 56-1(b)(2) requires the party opposing summary
judgment to file a response to the moving party’s statement of material facts that
includes, among other things, “a verbatim restatement of [the moving party’s]
Statement of Material Facts.” N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)(2). Xi’s response to Purdue’s
statement of material facts does not include a verbatim restatement of those facts.
Instead, in her response to Purdue’s statement of material facts, Xi said she “focuse[d]

only on disputed facts that are ‘material’” and “reserves the right to dispute any and all
facts . . . including those facts not specifically disputed herein.” [DE 40 at 1 n.1.] That’s
not how Local Rule 56-1(b)(2) works. In fact, a failure to dispute facts in the manner
dictated by the local rules renders the facts presented by the moving party as
undisputed. See Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218–19 (7th Cir. 2015). That
said, I’ll use Xi’s response to identify any disputed material facts for purposes of

summary judgment.
Purdue has three general categories of faculty: assistant professor (tenure-track),
associate professor (tenured), and full professor (tenured). [DE 44 at ¶5.] Tenured
faculty have a home academic department. [Id. at ¶6.] To seek promotion, a faculty
member must navigate an elaborate and exhaustive multi-level review process. [Id. at

¶7.] Here’s how it works: The first level of review occurs at the department level. [Id. at
¶8.] A Primary Committee chaired by the department head and generally consisting of
all the department’s tenured faculty review the candidate’s promotion packet. [Id.] The
voting members of the Primary Committee, which is usually everyone except the
department head, then vote “yes” or “no” for each candidate. [Id.] From there, the

department head decides whether to accept the recommendation of the Primary
Committee. [Id.]
Candidates who advance to the second level are reviewed by the college-level
Area Committee, which is chaired by the relevant college dean. [Id. at ¶9.] Other
members of the Area Committee include department heads and tenured full professors.
[Id.] The Area Committee votes on each candidate, and the Dean reviews the Area

Committee’s recommendations. [Id.]
Candidates who advance to the third level are reviewed by a university-wide
committee called the Campus Promotions Committee. [Id. at ¶10.] The Provost chairs
the Campus Promotions Committee, and the remaining members are deans, one
tenured full professor from each college, and additional at-large tenured faculty. [Id.] If
the Campus Promotions Committee approves an applicant’s promotion, they are

forwarded to the Provost, who makes a recommendation to the President. [Id. at ¶11.]
Lastly, the President then makes a recommendation to the Board of Trustees for a final
decision. [Id.]
Voting at each level of the promotion process is confidential, and Purdue does
not record individual committee members’ votes. [Id. at ¶7.] If a candidate receives a

negative decision at any level of review, they may submit a request for reconsideration
to the Vice Provost for Faculty Affairs. [Id. at ¶12.] Grounds for reconsideration are
limited to evidence of grossly inadequate consideration of professional competence or
judgments based on erroneous or misinterpreted information. [Id.] The Vice Provost for
Faculty Affair’s decision on reconsideration is final. [Id.]

The Office of the Provost sends a memorandum to faculty at the beginning of
each promotion cycle that includes guidance on Purdue’s procedures for promotion. [Id.
at ¶14.] The Office of the Provost sent the relevant memorandum for the promotion
cycle at issue here on April 29, 2022. [Id.; DE 32-3 at 8–23.]
Candidates for promotion must meet minimum thresholds in three “mission
areas”: discovery, learning, and engagement. [DE 44 at ¶19; DE 32-2 at 59.] Under

Purdue’s system, “discovery” means “a record of scholarly achievement and evidence
of national/international visibility.” [Id. at 60; DE 44 at ¶22.] This includes “a
substantial record of published original research or its equivalent” and “external
funding (where it can be said to reflect the positive, rigorous assessment of peers and
the scholarly promise of the topic), national and/or international reputation (if
appropriate).” [Id.] In addition to these general criteria, colleges and academic

departments may establish more specific criteria that is consistent with Purdue’s
guidelines. [Id. at ¶25; DE 32-2 at 59.] The College of Science and Department of
Statistics both established additional guidelines and instructions for promotion and
tenure. [DE 44 at ¶26; DE 32-2 at 79–101.]
Plaintiff Bowei Xi was born in China. [DE 44 at ¶30.] She began working at

Purdue in 2004 as an Assistant Professor of Statistics. [Id. at ¶31.] Xi applied for but was
denied a promotion to Associate Professor in 2009, but Purdue later promoted her as a
tenured Associate Professor of Statistics in 2011. [Id. at ¶¶32–33.] Xi applied for
promotion to Full Professor of Statistics in 2018 but was denied. [Id. at ¶35.] She again
applied for promotion to Full Professor of Statistics in 2020 but withdrew her

application after the Primary Committee vote. [Id. at ¶36.]
According to the Dean of the College of Science, Purdue previously offered the
Research Refresh Award program to aid faculty who could benefit from dedicated time
to reinvigorate stalled research. [Id. at ¶40; DE 32-2 at 6.] Purdue offered the award for
faculty whose research had not been active or had recently slowed. [Id.] The award
provided grant money and dedicated time away from teaching to focus on research.

[Id.]
Xi applied for the Research Refresh Award in April 2022. [DE 44 at ¶41.] In her
application, she noted difficulties with the pregnancy and premature birth of her son in
July 2020. [DE 32-1 at 166.] Xi took maternity leave for the Fall 2020 semester. [Id.]
According to Xi, “[h]er research progress slowed down due to the unexpected
pregnancy complication and the challenge to find childcare during the [COVID-19]

pandemic.” [Id.] She noted the program “would give a much-needed boost to help her
regain momentum.” [Id.] Purdue awarded Xi the Research Refresh Award for the 2022-
2023 academic year. [DE 44 at ¶43; DE 32-1 at 179.] In his May 19, 2022, email that
informed Xi of her award, Vice Provost for Faculty Affairs Peter J. Hollenbeck wrote Xi
could “benefit from intense focus to advance [her] scholarship and reinvigorate [her]

career.” [Id.]
Xi says she applied for promotion to Full Professor of Statistics in November
2022. [DE 44 at ¶45.] Her application included her background information, details
concerning her work applicable to the three “mission areas” of discovery, learning, and
engagement, as well as letters of recommendation. [Id.; DE 32-1 at 97–163.] At the first

level of review, the Primary Committee consisting of tenured professors within her
department, Xi received a unanimous twelve to zero vote in favor of promotion. [DE 44
at ¶50; DE 32-1 at 164.]
At the second level of review, the Area Committee voted eleven to ten against
Xi’s promotion. [DE 44 at ¶52; DE 32-1 at 164.] The Area Committee wrote that their

“decision focused on the quality of journals and conference proceeding in which [Xi]
was publishing.” [Id.] The Area Committee also cited Xi’s recent selection for the
Research Refresh Award and that she “had no active funding and thus not evident that
her research program was in an upward trajectory.” [Id.] Purdue claims the Area
Committee did not receive or review Xi’s Research Refresh Award application as part of
its decision on Xi’s promotion so did not know the reasons why Xi applied for the

award. [DE 44 at ¶56.] Patrick Wolfe, then the Dean of the College of Science,
participated in the Area Committee’s discussion on Xi’s application but did not vote.
[Id. at ¶¶65–66.] Wolfe then reviewed and approved the Area Committee’s decision to
deny Xi’s promotion. [Id. at ¶65.] In a January 3, 2023, letter the now Interim Dean of the
College of Science Jean Chmielewski memorialized the reasons for the Area

Committee’s denial of her application. [DE 32-3 at 62.] Chmielewski noted that many of
Xi’s publications “were not in tier 1 journals” and pointed to Xi’s “end of research
funding in the coming year necessitating the Research Refresh award” as the bases for
the Area Committee’s decision. [Id.]
At the time of her application for promotion, Xi had funding from the Army

Research Lab that ended in academic year 2024. [DE 44 at ¶¶57, 59.] According to
Purdue, the Area Committee determined the Army Research Lab funding was not
awarded through a competitive grant process. [Id. at ¶58.] Purdue says the Army
Research Lab was Xi’s only active external research funding source when she applied
for promotion in November 2022. [Id. at ¶57.] Xi’s application lists the Army Research
Lab grant as ending on May 14, 2024, and a second source of then active external

funding from the Army Research Office that expired on January 6, 2023. [DE 32-1 at
115.] Xi says her Army Research Lab grant was later extended to 2027, but she does not
contest that her November 2022 application listed the grant as expiring in 2024. [DE 44
at ¶60.]
On January 18, 2023, Xi met with Lucy Flesch, the then-Senior Associate Dean of
the College of Science, and Hao Zhang, a Professor of Statistics, for feedback on the

Area Committee’s review of her application for promotion. [Id. at ¶67.] Flesch told Xi
the Area Committee interpreted Xi’s receipt of the Research Refresh Award as an
indication Xi’s research had slowed. [Id. at ¶69–70.] Zhang told Xi that applying for the
Research Refresh Award may be interpreted as an admission that an individual has
fallen behind on their research. [Id. at ¶71.] Flesch told Xi the Area Committee had

concerns Xi did not have competitive federal grant funding at the time of her
application for promotion and did not know whether her Army Research Lab funding
was awarded through a competitive process. [Id. at ¶72.] Flesch encouraged Xi to solicit
new letters of recommendation, submit grant applications to appropriate federal
agencies, and encouraged Xi to wait to reapply until 2024. [Id. at ¶76.]

On January 25, 2023, Xi submitted a request for reconsideration of the denial of
her promotion to Hollenbeck (then Purdue’s Vice Provost for Academic Affairs). [Id. at
¶77; DE 32-1 at 200.] Xi said the grounds for her appeal were (1) grossly inadequate
consideration of professional competence, and (2) judgments based on erroneous or
misinterpreted information. [DE 44 at ¶78; DE 32-3 at 25.] In her appeal, Xi listed two
faculty who had received the Research Refresh Award and a subsequent promotion, but

these individuals were not from the Department of Statistics or the College of Science
and did not apply in 2022. [DE 44 at ¶83; DE 32-3 at 28.] Three individuals from the
College of Science, including Xi as a member of the Department of Statistics, received
the Research Refresh Award from 2018 to 2022. [DE 44 at ¶85.] But Xi does not dispute
the two other award recipients from the College of Science either had not gone through
the promotion process since receiving the award or were already a Full Professor. [Id.]

On January 28, 2023, Dennis Lin, who presented Xi’s case to the Area Committee
in his role as head of the Department of Statistics, emailed Hollenbeck. [DE 32-3 at 71–
72.] Lin described the Primary Committee and Area Committee meetings on Xi’s
application, including the Committees’ points of concern and his responses (in defense
of Xi) to those concerns. [Id.] Lin wrote he “personally strongly supported [Xi’s]

promotion case” and “was so disappointed that the Area Committee did not [promote
Xi that he] decided to step down” as head of the Department of Statistics. [Id.]
Purdue says Hollenbeck spoke with Flesch and Chmielewski about the Area
Committee’s deliberations on Xi’s application. [DE 44 at ¶99.] According to Purdue,
Hollenbeck determined the Area Committee had concerns with the lack of

competitiveness for Xi’s funding, her external funding ending soon, her receipt of the
Research Refresh Award, and the lack of clarity of Xi’s role in some of her listed
publications. [Id.] Hollenbeck appears to have taken notes of this conversation on
February 1, 2023. [DE 32-3 at 67.]
Hollenbeck emailed Xi on February 3, 2023, to inform her he was denying her
appeal. [Id. at 74.] Hollenbeck said he assessed three issues: whether the Area

Committee (1) ignored the unanimous vote of the Primary Committee; (2)
misunderstood her publication record; and (3) misunderstood her research funding and
awards. [Id.] Hollenbeck concluded the Area Committee “spent considerable time
reviewing” Xi’s application, and he found no evidence of misunderstood or grossly
inadequate consideration. [Id.] Hollenbeck added “I do think that a few things could
have been presented more clearly [in Xi’s application], including the nature and

duration of your research awards and your exact role in them.” [Id.]
Xi emailed Interim Head of the Department of Statistics Daniel Cziczo on March
8, 2023, to indicate her intention to “re-apply for promotion to full professor in Spring
2023.” [DE 32-6 at 6.] In his response on March 9, Cziczo said he would first like to meet
with Xi during their one-on-one meeting scheduled for April 5. [Id.] Cziczo explained

there were “issues” with reapplying in two consecutive years such as Purdue’s policy
that it does not replace letters of recommendation solicited in the prior year. [Id.] Cziczo
said it would therefore be “extremely difficult” for Xi to re-apply in 2023, but he added
“I would of course be open to discussing what the implications are regarding 2023.”
[Id.]

That same day, Cziczo emailed Xi’s faculty mentors and reiterated “we are likely
not able to run a case two consecutive years due to the shelf life of letters from last
year.” [Id. at 11.] Cziczo added: “this is a University rule so not one we can change.”
[Id.] Mark Daniel Ward, Professor of Statistics, responded he told Xi “we would be
willing to work with her to re-apply in two years if she wanted to try” and that it was
“not possible to apply for two years.” [Id. at 10.] Cziczo responded: “it is good to know

we’re giving her a consistent message, especially since it is a sensitive case . . . . we
should assume the case can not move forward in 2023 but will in 2024.” [Id. at 9.]
Purdue says Cziczo met with Xi on April 5, 2023, for her annual review and
reiterated the risk of re-applying with the same letters of recommendation in 2023 due
to the 24-month lifecycle of those letters. [DE 44 at ¶115.] Xi testified Cziczo told her he
would “give up” if he was in her position, but Cziczo and Purdue dispute this

allegation. [Id. at ¶120.] Cziczo said he told Xi they would discuss her case at the next
Statistics Primary Committee meeting to solicit their recommendation on whether she
should re-apply in 2023 or 2024. [Id. at ¶121.] Purdue says the Primary Committee
recommended Xi wait to re-apply until 2024. [Id.] Xi testified she next asked to be
considered for promotion to full professor in the spring of 2024. [Id. at ¶130.]

Xi filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission on April 17, 2023. [DE 32-1 at 94–95.] Xi alleged discrimination based on
her race, sex, national origin, and age. [Id.] But Xi did not check the box for retaliation.
[Id.] Xi brought this lawsuit on October 19, 2023. [DE 1.] During a telephonic hearing on
February 4, 2025, Xi moved for dismissal of her age discrimination claim and a separate

race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. [DE 28.]
Standard of Review
Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a
party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its

version of the events.” Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted). On a motion for summary judgment, all facts and reasonable inferences are
construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Waukegan Potawatomi
Casino, LLC v. City of Waukegan, 128 F.4th 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2025).
Discussion
Xi alleges Purdue discriminated against her on the basis or her race, national

origin, and sex. She also claims to have been retaliated against for lodging complaints of
discrimination. I’ll take up the discrimination claims first before turning to the
retaliation claim.
I. Race, National Origin, and Sex Discrimination Claims (Counts II, III, & IV)
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or to otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of that
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Barbera v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 906
F.3d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 2018); 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). To survive summary judgment on
her Title VII discrimination claims, Xi must present evidence that “would permit a

reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or
other proscribed factor caused the adverse employment action.” Barbera, 906 F.3d at 628
(quoting Milligan-Grimstad v. Stanley, 877 F.3d 705, 710 (7th Cir. 2017)).
Evaluating discrimination claims using the framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) remains an efficient way to organize, present,

and assess evidence related to claims of discrimination. But it’s not the only way to
analyze a discrimination case. As the Seventh Circuit explained in Ortiz v. Werner
Enters., Inc., courts may take a holistic approach and simply view all the evidence, direct
and circumstantial, place it into a pile, and ask whether a reasonable juror could
conclude based on all the evidence that discrimination was afoot. 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th
Cir. 2016). In a recent concurrence, Justice Thomas suggested the same thing. Ames v.

Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 313–19 (2025) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Nevertheless, the Parties in this case have hewed closely to the McDonnell Douglas
framework, so I will do so as well.
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must make a prima facie case by showing
(1) they are members of a protected class; (2) performed reasonably on the job in accord

with their employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) were subjected to an adverse
employment action despite their reasonable performance; and (4) similarly situated
employees outside of the protected class were treated more favorably by the employer.
David v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 225 (7th Cir. 2017). If the
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the defendant must articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, at which point the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff to present evidence that the employer’s explanation is pretextual. Id.
As alluded to in Ortiz and by Justice Thomas in his Ames concurrence, there is no
magic to this test; it is merely one way of culling the relevant evidence needed to
demonstrate whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that an employer engaged
in an adverse employment action based on the plaintiff’s protected status. Johnson v.

Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2018). Just as the Parties have
in their briefing, I will consider Xi’s race, national origin, and sex discrimination claims
jointly given the same framework and similar analysis for these claims.
Purdue concedes that Xi satisfies the first, third, and fourth elements of the
McDonnell Douglas test. [DE 30 at 10.] Purdue argues Xi has not met the second element
of this test because she cannot establish that she was qualified for promotion to full

professor. Xi argues Purdue’s proffered reasons for denying her promotion are a pretext
for unlawful discrimination. This is the opposite side of the same coin. Indeed, the
Seventh Circuit recognizes that analysis of the second element in the McDonnell Douglas
framework—satisfactory job performance—and pretext are “inextricably intertwined.”
Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 814 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Denisi v.

Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 99 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1996) (same). So, courts may
“proceed directly to the issue of pretext” given the second element of the McDonnell
Douglas framework and considerations of pretext focus on essentially the same inquiry
and evidence. See Vanasco v. Nat’l-Louis Univ., 137 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 1998); Vichio v.
US Foods, Inc., 88 F.4th 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2023). Because the bulk of the Parties’

arguments focus on Xi’s allegation of pretext, that is where I will focus as well.
Before diving into consideration of Purdue’s proffered reasons for denying Xi’s
promotion, I must establish a few more ground rules. The first concerns the definition
of pretext: it is “a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action” and “not just faulty
reasoning or mistaken judgment.” Barnes v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 946 F.3d 384, 389–90
(7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “Thus, when an institution proffers as reasons for [the

adverse employment action] deficiencies in a plaintiff’s scholarship, teaching, or service,
the court is not concerned with whether plaintiff’s scholarship, teaching, or service were
in fact deficient; only with whether the defendant institution honestly believed they
were deficient[.]” Schneider v. Northwestern Univ., 925 F.Supp. 1347, 1369 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
Second, as alluded to above, I am mindful of the unique context of Title VII
employment discrimination cases in the context of university decisions concerning

tenure and promotion. In that regard, the Seventh Circuit has long recognized “the
nuanced nature of tenure decisions and our corresponding reticence to second-guess
the expert decisions of faculty committees.” Haynes v. Ind. Univ., 902 F.3d 724, 734 (7th
Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted). And “although the legal standard is the same
whether the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case is a salesman or a scientist,

practical considerations make a challenge to the denial of tenure . . . an uphill fight—
notably the absence of fixed, objective criteria for tenure at that level.” Blasdel v.
Northwestern Univ., 687 F.3d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 2012).
Xi is quick to point out that she is already tenured. From this, she implies that the
cases just cited are somehow less relevant to her situation because this is not a denial of

tenure case. True enough. But the decision to grant tenure and the decision to promote a
tenured professor from associate to full professor are surely close cousins to one
another, at the very least. This is because the same subjective factors used to decide who
will get a promotion from associate professor to full professor at Purdue apply to the
considerations used to grant or deny tenure. So, cases like Blasdel remain highly
instructive.

With this background, let’s dive into whether Purdue’s stated reasons for
denying Xi’ promotion were phony excuses to mask its actual discriminatory motive.
Purdue says the Area Committee declined to promote Xi because, at the time she
applied, she lacked competitive federal grant funding, her only active external funding
expired the following year, she had recently been awarded the Research Refresh
Award, and they had concerns with the quality of her publications and the conferences

she attended. Xi argues these stated reasons fly in the face of her unanimous
departmental support, strong external reviews, active federal funding, and she argues
Purdue’s reliance on her receipt of the Research Refresh Award is contradictory and
unsupported by the record.
The Research Refresh Award lies at the heart of this dispute. Before we get there,

though, I will analyze Xi’s other alleged evidence of pretext. Xi argues the Area
Committee’s comments on her research are not credible and ignore her strong
institutional and external support. [DE 36 at 9.] As evidence, Xi points to the unanimous
Primary Committee vote to advance her promotion application and selectively quotes
her letters of support, including a comment that “Purdue would be foolish not to grant

this promotion.” [DE 32-1 at 164, 136.] Xi argues these factors demonstrate Purdue’s
proffered concern with her research is so incredible that it is “unworthy of credence.”
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 852 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Xi’s argument is self-defeating. This is because even if I were to assume that
Purdue was substantively wrong in its decision making (as Xi contends), that wouldn’t

be proof of pretext. At most, all that Xi has provided is circumstantial evidence that
Purdue’s evaluation of her research may have been inaccurate or unfair, but she
provides no evidence that Purdue did not honestly believe she lacked the research
prowess to merit promotion. As has been stated many times by the Seventh Circuit, “[i]t
is not the court’s concern that an employer may be wrong about its employee’s
performance, or may be too hard on its employee. Rather, the only question is whether

the employer’s proffered reason was pretextual, meaning that it was a lie.” Id. (citation
omitted).
There is simply no evidence in the record that Purdue’s stated reason for denying
Xi’s promotion was a lie. The Area Committee noted that “discussion focused on the
quality of journals and conference proceedings in which she was publishing” and

determined Xi “had no active funding.” [DE 32-1 at 164.] Indeed, Xi’s application listed
her Army Research Lab grant as ending on May 14, 2024, and a second grant from the
Army Research Office that expired on January 6, 2023. [Id. at 115.] In her deposition, Xi
acknowledged that she considered “only one, [the] Army Research Lab” grant to be
active at the time of her application. [Id. at 26–27.]

Xi indeed submitted documentation in her January 23, 2023, appeal that showed
her Army Research Lab grant had been extended to October 6, 2027, but she did not
submit this information with her initial application. [DE 37-2 at 71.] It is undisputed that
the extension to 2027 of Xi’s sole source of external funding was not before the Area
Committee, and she provides no evidence that Purdue’s concerns with the criteria and
competitiveness for her receipt of money from that source was insincere. The mere fact

that Xi received a unanimous vote from the Primary Committee of her peers in the
Department of Statistics does not somehow make the Area Committee’s decision
dishonest nor does it insulate her from the remaining levels in Purdue’s promotion
process.
The Parties’ discussion of Xi’s research credentials focuses on her receipt of the
Research Refresh Award and the Area Committee’s analysis of the same. There are

several components to Xi’s allegations concerning the Area Committee’s treatment of
this Award. Xi says she applied for the Research Refresh Award because of a high-risk
pregnancy at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. [DE 36 at 12.] It follows, according
to Xi, that viewing her receipt of this Award negatively is evidence of sex
discrimination. Xi also makes much of her allegation that Purdue never told her that the

Award could be treated negatively in the promotion process. [Id. at 13.] Finally, Xi
alludes to inconsistent treatment of recipients of the Research Refresh Award.
There is no question the Area Committee heavily relied on Xi’s receipt of the
Research Refresh Award to deny her promotion. Xi’s application for the Award
includes several references that her “research progress slowed down due to the

unexpected pregnancy complication and the challenge to find childcare during the
pandemic.” [DE 32-1 at 166.] She added the Award “would give her a much-needed
boost to help her regain momentum.” [Id.] But Xi acknowledged in her deposition that
she had no knowledge whether the Area Committee ever reviewed her application for
the Award when considering her request for promotion. [Id. at 24–25.] The evidence
suggests the Area Committee did not. Xi’s application for promotion noted her receipt

of the Research Refresh Award, [id. at 99], but she did not elaborate on why she applied
for (or may have received) the Award. Purdue also points to the testimony of Lucy
Flesch and Peter Wolfe, both of whom attended but did not vote in the Area Committee
meeting on Xi’s promotion. Flesch and Wolfe both claim the Area Committee did not
receive or review Xi’s application for the Research Refresh Award. [DE 32-2 at 8, ¶33;
DE 32-5 at 2, ¶6.] Xi has put forth no evidence that the Area Committee was even aware

of her pregnancy nor the reasons she applied for the Award, much less that they relied
on those reasons to make their decision.
Xi’s claim of selective interpretation of the Award is similarly unsupported by
the record. Xi admitted that in her January 18, 2023, meeting with Flesch and Hao
Zhang concerning the Area Committee’s review of her application for promotion, both

Flesch and Zhang told her receipt of the Research Refresh Award may be interpreted as
falling behind on one’s research funding. [DE 32-1 at 54–55.] Though Xi says she was
not aware of this possibility when she applied for the Award, she points to no evidence
of inconsistent treatment of the Award by Purdue in the promotion process. Xi does not
dispute Purdue’s statement that the other two individuals from the College of Science

who received the Research Refresh Award from 2018 to 2022 did not subsequently go
through the promotion process to full professor. [DE 44 at ¶85.] Xi provides no evidence
of inconsistent treatment through this comparison of dissimilar situations.
The Research Refresh Program policy for 2022 – 2023 that Xi includes in her
response describes the program as geared towards professors “who would benefit from

intense focus to advance their scholarship and reinvigorate their careers.” [DE 37-2 at
16.] In fact, Xi herself admitted on her application for the Award that she needed
assistance to “reinvigorate” her research. [DE 32-1 at 165.] Xi’s claim that Purdue has
identified no formal guidance that instructs reviewers to view the Award as indicative
of problems securing research funding does nothing to suggest Purdue’s reliance on her
receipt of the Award was a lie or insincere. In short, Xi’s disagreement with Purdue’s

treatment of her receipt of the Research Refresh Award does not prove pretext.
Lin’s December 1, 2022, email announcing his resignation as Department Head
for the Department of Statistics likewise does not provide a whiff of pretext evidence. In
his email to Wolfe, Lin said he “failed” Xi and wrote “I am shame [sic] to be a
department Head who is not able to promote our faculty.” [DE 39-1 at 1.] Of note, he

voices his opinion that “a similar (or even worse) case from another department went
through.” [Id.] This all sounds to me like nothing more than a sincere disagreement, not
pretext.
Xi also argues Purdue’s promotion of Anindya Bhadra provides evidence of
pretext because he is a similarly situated employee who was treated more favorably.1

Recall that Purdue concedes Bhadra is similarly situated for purposes of Xi’s prima facie

1 Xi also points to Raghu Pasupathy as a comparator, but I quickly dispense of this argument. Purdue promoted
Pasupathy during a different promotion cycle that included different reviewers. See Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
219 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz, 834 F.3d 760 (noting that when “different
decision-makers are involved, two decisions are rarely similarly situated in all relevant respects.”) (citation omitted).
case. [DE 30 at 10.] But whether there is a similarly situated comparator is also relevant
to the pretext analysis. See Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 892 (7th Cir.

2001) (“A showing that similarly situated employees belonging to a different racial
group received more favorable treatment can also serve as evidence that the employer’s
proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse job action was a pretext
for racial discrimination.”) (citation omitted). Purdue has, of course, not conceded
anything with respect to Bhadra’s status as similarly situated to Xi for pretext purposes.
Plaintiffs may demonstrate discrimination by pointing to differential treatment

of a “similarly-situated employee who was not in the protected class.” Little v. Ill. Dep’t
of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit has cautioned against
too rigid an application of this analysis. It is a “flexible” analysis that considers “all
relevant factors, the number of which depends on the context of the case.” Humphries v.
CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Common factors

include whether the individuals had the same supervisor, were subject to the same
standards, engaged in similar conduct, and lacked differentiating or mitigating
circumstances that distinguished their conduct. Id. But at bottom, the analysis focuses
on “eliminat[ing] confounding variables” and deciding whether “there are enough
common features between the individuals to allow a meaningful comparison[.]” Id.

Let’s first consider whether Bhadra is in fact similarly situated to Xi. Xi says
Purdue promoted Bhadra to full professor in December 2022. [DE 37-2 at 73.] Xi claims
Bhadra had fewer publications, less external research funding, and supervised fewer
graduate mentees than herself. [DE 36 at 13.] For example, Bhadra received five total
grants since 2018 while Xi received eleven total grants since 2011. [DE 37-2 at 73–74.]
Bhadra has supervised four students since his prior promotion while Xi has supervised

twelve. [Id. at 75–76.] There are two key problems with Xi’s one to one comparison of
credentials. First, as noted above, courts reviewing Title VII claims are not tasked with
subjective analysis of professors’ credentials, scholarship, and mentorship. We are ill
equipped for that task. See Hatcher v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 829 F.3d 531, 541 (7th Cir.
2016) (“[S]cholars are in the best position to make the highly subjective judgments
reviewing scholarship and tenure”), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz, 834 F.3d 760 (7th

Cir. 2016).
Moreover, “differences in qualifications between job candidates, on their own,
cannot be evidence of discrimination unless those differences are so favorable to the
plaintiff that there can be no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial judgment
that the plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the position at issue.” Id. Xi has not

presented evidence to meet this bar. For example, part of the difference in Xi’s and
Bhadra’s total number of grants, supervisees, and publications can be explained by the
fact that Xi has been an associate professor seven years longer than Bhadra. [DE 37-2 at
73.] And the Seventh Circuit has specifically cautioned against strict comparison of the
quality versus quantity of academics’ publications and other achievements. See Blasdel,

687 F.3d at 816 (“If A publishes an excellent academic paper every five years on
average, is she better or worse than B, who publishes a good but not excellent paper on
average every six months, so that at the end of five years he has published 10 papers
and she only 1?.”)
Purdue points out important differences in Bhadra’s promotion process that
suggest he is not, in fact, a proper comparator. Above all else, Bhadra did not receive

the Research Refresh Award. [DE 36 at 13.] Bhadra’s Nomination for Promotion Form
36 reflects the Area Committee weighed his funding from NSF and NIH and “strong
publication record in tier 1 journals.” [DE 32-2 at 105.] More importantly, another key
differentiator was Bhadra’s receipt of an offer from North Carolina State University to
enter as a full professor. Bhadra used this offer as leverage to get a full professorship
from Purdue. Indeed, there are emails in the record where Bhadra requests a formal

counteroffer at the “full professor level” in light of his offer for a full professorship from
NC State. [DE 39-2 at 8.] In response, Purdue said it would put Bhadra’s promotion “on
an appropriately aggressive track.” [Id. at 7.] Xi believes this email thread raises
suspicion that Purdue may have sped up its consideration of Bhadra’s promotion.
Perhaps it did. But I’m at a loss to see how that shows discrimination against Xi

especially because Xi did not have a similar offer from a rival university.
In sum, Xi has not presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue on
whether Purdue’s promotion of Bhadra suggests its decision to not promote Xi was
pretextual. For that reason and the others discussed above, summary judgment must
therefore be granted on the Xi’s discrimination claims.

II. Retaliation Claim (Count V)
Xi also alleges Purdue retaliated against her by refusing to permit her to re-apply
for promotion to full professor “within a reasonable time.” [DE 1 at ¶49.] Under Title
VII, it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee because he or she
opposes an employment practice proscribed by Title VII or because he or she
participates in an investigation or proceeding under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a);

Jokich v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 42 F.4th 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2022). To survive summary
judgment on her retaliation claim, Xi must provide evidence that (1) she engaged in
activity protected by Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3)
there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
Id.
Purdue argues Xi fails to prove each element of her Title VII retaliation claim, but

it also argues the Court need not reach the issue because Xi failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies. Generally, “a Title VII plaintiff cannot bring claims in a
lawsuit that were not included in her EEOC charge.” Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31
F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994); Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1099–1100 (7th Cir.
2013) (“[P]laintiffs may pursue only those claims that could reasonably be expected to

grow out of the administrative charges.”). But a plaintiff may bring claims in a lawsuit
if they are “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of
such allegations.” Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500 (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has
clarified that the claim and the administrative charge must “at minimum, describe the
same conduct and implicate the same individuals.” Reynolds, 737 F.3d at 1100 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).
It is a close call whether Xi exhausted her administrative remedies. On the one
hand, Xi explicitly chose not to check the retaliation box in her Charge of Discrimination
form. [DE 32-1 at 94.] But on the other hand, reasonable minds could conclude that her
retaliation claim is inter-woven with her claims of discrimination. Because Xi’s
retaliation claim fails on the merits, I will simply note that Purdue has preserved the

exhaustion argument and proceed to the substance of the retaliation claim.
Xi’s theory of her case fails to create a triable issue on whether she engaged in
Title VII protected activity. Xi must demonstrate she took “some step in opposition to a
form of discrimination that [Title VII] prohibits.” O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657
F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2011). Xi need not show that the practice she opposed in fact
violated Title VII, but her opposition to the practice at issue “must be based on a good-

faith and reasonable belief that [she] is opposing unlawful conduct.” Id. Xi argues her
submission of a written internal appeal challenging the denial of her promotion to Full
Professor was protected activity. But while “filing an official complaint with an
employer may constitute statutorily protected conduct under Title VII, the complaint
must indicate the discrimination occurred because of sex, race, national origin, or some

other protected class.” Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2006).
For starters, Xi’s appeal of her application for promotion contains no mention of
discrimination based on race or national origin. Xi has therefore presented no evidence
that she filed her appeal on a belief she was opposing unlawful conduct based on these
protected characteristics. Xi’s appeal does, contrary to Purdue’s insistence otherwise,

make several references to her sex. For example, she notes she applied for the Research
Refresh Award because of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on her “as a female
faculty member with two young children.” [DE 32-1 at 185.] She also argued the Area
Committee provided inadequate consideration of her qualifications as compared to a
male faculty member “who lacked the same family obligations during the pandemic.”
[Id.]

Xi’s argument that her appeal was protected activity fails to support an inference
that she opposed discrimination on the basis of her sex. Xi did not have to “use the
magic words sex or gender discrimination . . . [but] she has to at least say something to
indicate her gender is at issue.” Sitar v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir.
2003) (internal quotation makrs and citation omitted). Xi’s first reference to being a
“female faculty member with two young children”, [DE 32-1 at 185], describes why she

applied for the Research Refresh Award. It does not indicate that she believes Purdue
discriminated against her because of her sex. Moreover, the substance of her
comparison to her two male colleagues focused not on their sex but on the number of
students supervised, publications, and research grants. [See id. at 186–97.]
It is true that Xi’s appeal noted that her colleagues were male and “lacked the

same family obligations during the pandemic.” [Id. at 185.] But these allegations are tied
to caregiver status, which is not on its own a protected characteristic. See Boyd v.
Advanced Physicians, Case No. 22-CV-7012, 2024 WL 1363421, at *5 n.4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,
2024) (noting “the plain language of Title VII does not prohibit discrimination solely
based upon caregiving responsibility or family responsibilities.”). Even to allege

retaliation under a so called “plus” claim, which Xi does not allege, Xi still “must allege
discrimination, harassment, or retaliation based on a protected characteristic plus
familial status and not familial status alone.” Id. Xi has failed to present such evidence.
In fact, after thoroughly reviewing Xi’s briefing, I cannot find any substantive response
to Purdue’s claim that she did not engage in protected activity.

Even if we assume Xi engaged in protected activity, there is no evidence that she
suffered a materially adverse action. The standard for a materially adverse action in the
context of a Title VII retaliation claim is “easier to satisfy than the comparable standard
for Title VII discrimination claims[.]” Lesiv v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 39 F.4th 903, 912 (7th Cir.
2022); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (“Title VII’s
substantive provision and its antiretaliation provision are not coterminous.”). To be

“materially adverse”, Xi must show that Purdue’s action “might have dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68
(internal citation omitted). The adverse action element of a retaliation claim is
frequently described in terms of an adverse employment action, but the Supreme Court
has been clear that the adverse action need not affect the plaintiff’s “terms and

conditions of employment.” Id. at 64.
Xi advances no facts to create a triable issue on whether Purdue subject her to an
adverse action. Xi alleges Purdue retaliated against her by prohibiting her from re-
applying for promotion to Full Professor until 2024 instead of 2023. They did no such
thing. The only evidence advanced by Xi are her deposition comments that Cziczo told

her to “give up” on re-applying for Full Professor. [DE 32-1 at 58.] Xi says she
clandestinely recorded Cziczo as he made these comments during her annual review on
April 5, 2023, [id. 55–56], but she did not provide the Court with a copy of this recording
during briefing on Purdue’s motion for summary judgment. Cziczo denies having
made that comment. [DE 32-6 at 2, ¶8.]

While a disputed issue of fact, this alleged exchange does not rise to the level of
an adverse action that could have dissuaded a reasonable person from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination. In Barker v. YMCA of Racine, the Seventh Circuit
rejected the plaintiff’s claim that her supervisors’ emails and comments requesting the
plaintiff to withdraw her state discrimination claim against them constituted an adverse
action. 18 Fed.Appx. 394, 398 (7th Cir. 2001). The Seventh Circuit noted that the

supervisors’ comments may have made plaintiff “uncomfortable”, but they were not
evidence of threats or efforts to prevent the plaintiff from pursuing her claims. Id. Even
assuming Xi is correct that Cziczo told her he would “give up” if he were in Xi’s
position, this discouragement is too thin, certainly thinner than in Barker, to be
considered an adverse action.

Xi has presented no other evidence of adverse action by Purdue. To the contrary,
Xi’s allegations that Cziczo prohibited her from re-applying in 2023 are clearly refuted
by the documentary evidence presented. The evidence suggests Purdue merely
cautioned Xi that it would be an uphill battle to re-apply in 2023 because she would
have to re-use her letters of recommendation. Cziczo emailed Xi that there were “issues

. . . with running a case in two consecutive years . . . due to the 24-month ‘life’ [cycle] of
a letter of reference.” [DE 32-1 at 218.] Cziczo wrote “it is typically not possible” to
apply in back-to-back years, but he said he was “of course be open to discussing what
the implications are regarding [Xi reapplying in] 2023.” Id. The full context of these
emails paints a different picture of this exchange. Cziczo’s email suggests he had
concerns with Xi applying in back-to-back years with the same letters of

recommendation, but he indicated an openness to discussing that possibility. No
reasonable jury could find that Cziczo’s words of caution and Purdue’s application of a
broadly applicable policy concerning letters of recommendation for the College of
Science constituted an adverse action. See Kinsella v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., LLC., No. 18 C 7803,
2021 WL 3737731, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2021) (finding plaintiff’s allegations
“stem[med] from a company policy that affected every employee”, including plaintiff,

so did not rise to the level of adverse action). The evidence suggests Purdue
recommended Xi wait another year to re-apply so she could strengthen her application
with new letters of recommendation. No reasonable juror could conclude that Purdue’s
response would deter others from filing charges of discrimination.
Finally, Xi presents no triable issues concerning causation. The standard for

causation in a Title VII retaliation case is traditional but-for causation. See Cung Hnin v.
TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014). Flesch met with Xi on January 18,
2023, and suggested Xi wait to re-apply until 2024 to acquire new letters of
recommendation. [DE 32-2 at 9, ¶38; 10, ¶42.] Importantly, this meeting occurred before
Xi submitted her January 25, 2023, application for reconsideration, which she says

initiated Purdue’s retaliation. The fact that Purdue had already recommended Xi wait
another year to re-apply before the event she says instigated that response weakens the
already loose connection between these events.
Additionally, Purdue’s Operating Procedures for Granting Academic Tenure
forbade Xi from nominating herself for promotion because she had been considered for

promotion within the previous three years. [DE 32-2 at 68.] Thus, Xi was dependent on
the Statistics Primary Committee to nominate her for promotion in the 2023 cycle. The
Primary Committee declined to nominate Xi, but Xi presented no evidence that this was
because of her January 2023 request to reconsider her 2022 application for promotion. Xi
claims that Cziczo’s decision to check with the College of Science concerning her
eligibility for re-applying in 2023 is murky and similarly unsupported. In her

deposition, Xi suggested Cziczo should not have consulted with the College of Science
concerning her re-applying in 2023. [DE 32-1 at 77–79.] But there is again no evidence
that the College of Science directed Cziczo or the Department of Statistics to forbid Xi
from re-applying because of her appeal of her 2022 application. Rather, the evidence
suggests Cziczo, as interim dean from a different department, was not familiar with the

application process for the Department of Statistics.
Xi also vaguely claims without evidence that Purdue in April 2023 changed its
university-wide policy concerning letters of recommendation in retaliation for her
January 2023 request for reconsideration. Xi points to an undated College of Science
Promotion Outline from 2023 that references an April 2023 memo which announced a

new policy that “deans will explicitly review and sign off on all letter-writers in
advance of the letters being solicited.” [DE 32-1 at 212–13; 82–85.] Xi suggests Lin’s
resignation as head of the Department of Statistics triggered this policy change and that
Cziczo somehow had a hand in securing this change. [Id. at 85–86.] But by Xi’s own
admission she “do[es] not know” how or why Cziczo purportedly changed this policy.
[Id. at 86.] There is simply nothing in the factual record presented by Xi to support this

bare-bones allegation of a university-wide conspiracy to change broadly applicable
rules concerning letters of recommendation in response to her January 2023 request for
reconsideration. Because Xi has presented no facts to create a triable issue of a prima
facie case of retaliation, summary judgment is warranted for Purdue on this claim too.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendant The Trustees of Purdue University’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [DE 29] is GRANTED. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor
of The Trustees of Purdue University. The Clerk is instructed to CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: September 8, 2025.

/s/ Philip P. Simon
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11135322. Public record. Not legal advice.