# Cynthia Martinez v. County of Los Angeles

> District Court, C.D. California · September 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11134951

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** September 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11134951

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “the question in determining whether qualified immunity applies is whether all reasonable officers would agree that [the officer’s behavior violated the plaintiff’s rights] in this instance”
- noting that hearsay statements do not enter into the analysis on summary judgment

## Opinion text

O

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYNTHIA MARTINEZ, Case No. 2:20-cv-01063-JWH-MBK
RAUL MARTINEZ,
RUDY ALEXANDER MARTINEZ,
JANE DOE, a minor, and ORDER REGARDING
JOHN DOE, a minor, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs, [ECF No. 54] AND PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
v. ADJUDICATION [ECF No. 57]

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
DEPUTY MELVIN CASTRO
(No. 516511),
DEPUTY JOSE HURTADO
(No. 552712),
DEPUTY QUINN ALKONIS
(No. 623539),
SGT. GREGORY BERG (No. 470638),
and
DOES 1 THROUGH 10 inclusive,

Defendants.
I. SUMMARY OF DECISION
Before the Court are two opposing motions:
e the motion of Defendants County of Los Angeles (the “County”), Deputy Melvin
Castro, Deputy Jose Hurtado, Deputy Quinn Alkonis, and Sergeant Gregory Berg
for summary judgment regarding certain of the claims for relief asserted by
Plaintiffs Cynthia Martinez, Raul Martinez, Rudy Alexander Martinez, Jane Doe,
and John Doe,’ and
e Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication regarding certain of their claims.”
Neither Motion is case-dispositive. Each Motion is opposed and is fully briefed.* The
Court conducted a hearing on the Motions in December 2023.* For the reasons set forth
below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion and
DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed their original pleading in February 2020.° Following the resolution
of a related criminal case,° Plaintiffs filed their operative Amended Complaint in March
2022.’ Defendants filed their Answer in due course.*®
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert the following seven claims for relief:

1 Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. as to Specified Claims in Pls.’ Operative Compl. (“Defendants’
Motion”) [ECF No. 54].
2 Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. Adjudication (“ Plaintiffs’ Motion”) [ECF No. 57].
3 See Pls.’ Opp’n to Defendants’ Motion (“Plaintiffs’ Opposition”) [ECF No. 58]; Defs.’
Opp’n to Plaintiffs’ Motion (“‘Defendants’ Opposition”) [ECF No. 59]; Defs.’ Resp. in Supp. of
Defendants’ Motion (“‘Defendants’ Reply”) [ECF No. 61]; Pls.’ Reply in Supp. of Plaintiffs’
Motion [ECF No. 62].
4 See Mins. of Hr’¢g re: Plaintiffs’ Motion & Defendants’ Motion [ECF No. 63].
5 Compl. [ECF No. 1].
6 See Scheduling Notice and Order [ECF No. 29].
7 First Am. Compl. (the “Amended Complaint”) [ECF No. 30].
8 Defs.’ Answer to the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 31].

ry

e excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the “First Claim”) by Cynthia
and Rudy’ against Deputy Castro, Deputy Hurtado, Deputy Alkonis, Sergeant
Berg, and the Doe Defendants (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”);
e false arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the “Second Claim”) by all Plaintiffs
against the Individual Defendants;"
e negligence in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815.2(a) & 820(a) (the “Third
Claim’’) by all Plaintiffs against the Individual Defendants;
¢ common law assault and battery (the “Fourth Claim”) by Cynthia and Rudy
against the Individual Defendants;”°
e a Monell claim for municipal liability in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), (the “Fifth Claim’’)
by all Plaintiffs against the County and the Doe Defendants;
e violation of Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 52 & 52.1 (the “Bane Act”’) (the “Sixth Claim’’)
by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants;’> and
e malicious prosecution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the “Seventh Claim’’) by
Cynthia, Raul, and Rudy against all Defendants.”
Through their instant Motion, Defendants seek summary judgment in their favor
on all of Plaintiffs’ claims for relief except the First and Fourth Claims with respect to
Rudy.” Conversely, Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on their Second Claim for false
arrest with respect to Raul and Jane and John Doe, and on their Third Claim for
negligence with respect to Raul and Jane and John Doe."®

Throughout this Order, the Court refers to Plaintiffs by their first names to avoid
confusion among family members with the same surname; the Court intends no disrespect.
10 Amended Complaint J] 40-50.
un Id. at JF 51-60.
v Id. at Tf 61-65.
3 Id. at 66-74.
4 Id. at TF 75-89.
1 Id. at JF 90-96.
Id. at JF 97-104.
v See generally Defendants’ Motion.
8 See generally Plaintiffs’ Motion.

III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court
construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Barlow v.
Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991). However, “the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine
issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986)
(emphasis in original). The substantive law determines the facts that are material. See id.
at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. Factual
disputes that are “irrelevant or unnecessary” are not counted. Id. A dispute about a
material fact is “genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
Under this standard, the moving party has the initial burden of informing the court
of the basis for its motion and identifying the portions of the pleadings and the record that
it believes demonstrate the absence of an issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof
at trial, the moving party need not produce evidence negating or disproving every
essential element of the non-moving party’s case. See id. at 325. Instead, the moving
party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case. See id.; In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). The
party seeking summary judgment must show that “under the governing law, there can be
but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
If the moving party sustains its burden, the non-moving party must then show that
there is a genuine issue of material fact that must be resolved at trial. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324. A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248. “This burden is not a light one. The non-moving party must show more than the
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). The non-moving party must make this showing on all matters
placed at issue by the motion as to which the non-moving party has the burden of proof at
trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Furthermore, a party “may object that the material cited to support or dispute a
fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). “The burden is on the proponent to show that the material is
admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is anticipated.” Advisory
Committee Notes, 2010 Amendment, to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Reports and declarations in
support of an opposition to summary judgment may be considered only if they comply
with Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that they “be
made on personal knowledge, set forth facts that would be admissible evidence, and show
affirmatively that the declarant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”
Nadler v. Nature’s Way Prod., LLC, 2015 WL 12791504, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2015);
see also Loomis v. Cornish, 836 F.3d 991, 996–97 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that hearsay
statements do not enter into the analysis on summary judgment).
B. Evidentiary Objections
The material facts set forth below are sufficiently supported by admissible
evidence and are uncontroverted. They are “admitted to exist without controversy” for
the purpose of summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); L.R. 56-3. The court
deems a fact undisputed when the parties’ “disputes” of that fact are merely
restatements of the same fact, they do not actually contradict the substance of a fact, or
they argue the relevancy and materiality of an otherwise undisputed fact. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); L.R. 56-3.
“[O]bjections to evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant, speculative, and/or
argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal conclusion are all duplicative of the
summary judgment standard itself”; they are thus “redundant” and need not be
considered. Burch v. Regents of Univ. of California, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal.
2006); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Factual disputes
that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”). The Court OVERRULES all
such objections not otherwise specifically addressed.
IV. FACTS
A. Cynthia’s 911 Call and Dispatch’s Call for Service
In the afternoon of December 20, 2018, officers from the Carson Sheriff’s Station
were dispatched to Plaintiffs’ home in the City of Carson in response to a family
disturbance call.19 During her deposition, Cynthia noted that previously that day she had
consulted Carson Mental Health about her 20-year-old son Rudy’s history of erratic

19 Am. Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts & Genuine Disputes (the “Joint Statement”)
[ECF No. 69] No. 14.
behavior, which included episodes of slamming doors and yelling profanities.20
Representatives of Carson Mental Health instructed that in the event that Rudy behaved
erratically in the future, Cynthia should call 911 to summon paramedics and a response
team to evaluate and treat her son.21
Later that day, Cynthia’s 13-year-old son, John Doe, called 911 and passed the
phone to Cynthia.22 Although it is disputed whether Rudy actually behaved violently
toward his family members,23 Cynthia told the dispatcher that her son, “a special ed
child,” was “going out of control,” was “going psycho,” was “being very aggressive”
and “very violent,” and that she was “scared he [wa]s going to attack somebody.”
Cynthia also related to the dispatcher that her son did not have access to a firearm, but
Rudy, who could be heard in the background, stated otherwise.24 Cynthia requested
support from paramedics, stating “that’s what he needs, he needs support from medical
. . . .”25
The dispatcher relayed to the responding officers that Rudy was “going out of
control,” that he had a firearm (but that no firearm was visible), and that Rudy would be
aggressive with the officers.26 The dispatcher told Cynthia to step outside and meet with
the officers; Rudy followed Cynthia to the garage.27 The dispatcher later communicated
to the responding officers that Rudy was following Cynthia around with a pocketknife.28
B. The Defendant Deputies Arrive at the Martinez Home
Defendants Deputy Castro, Deputy Alkonis, Deputy Hurtado, and Sergeant Berg
(collectively, the “Defendant Deputies”) responded to the call for service. They met at
the gate to the Martinez’s property to formulate a tactical plan.29 The Defendant
Deputies then approached the Martinez property with their firearms unholstered,30 and

20 See id. at No. 72.
21 See id.
22 See id. at No. 73.
23 See id. at No. 71.
24 Id. at No. 75; Joint Compendium of Evid. (the “Compendium”) [ECF No. 56], Ex. 27
(the “911 Call”).
25 See Joint Statement No. 74; 911 Call.
26 See Joint Statement No. 15.
27 Id. at Nos. 78 & 79.
28 Id. at No. 15.
29 See id. at No. 17.
30 Id. at No. 94.
Cynthia—who has a physical disability for which she uses a cane as a mobility aid—met
them outside.31
Deputy Castro asked Cynthia to identify her son—the disturbing party.32 As
Cynthia was talking, Deputy Castro observed a person matching Rudy’s description
walking toward him; Rudy’s right hand was in his pocket.33 Cynthia confirmed that the
individual walking toward the Defendant Deputies was her son, Rudy.34 She also advised
the Defendant Deputies multiple times that Rudy was “special ed.”35 The Deputies did
not ask Cynthia any more questions or otherwise consult her regarding the situation.36
At that point, Rudy was approximately 30 yards away from the Defendant
Deputies, near his family’s garage.37 Rudy’s father, Raul, was standing to the side of the
open garage door.38 It is disputed whether Rudy was exhibiting externalized indicators of
mental illness, including fearfulness, pacing, muttering, talking to himself, failing to
maintain eye contact, unusual eye or body movement, inability to communicate
effectively, struggling to follow orders effectively, reclusiveness, extreme expression of
emotion, failure to respond to commands, or memory loss.39 Nevertheless, the Defendant
Deputies did not ask any questions of Rudy, Raul, or Cynthia about Rudy’s mental state,
and they did not contact the Mental Evaluation Team, paramedics, or the Los Angeles
Fire Department to stage resources for mental health services.40 The Defendant
Deputies also omitted from their incident reports that Cynthia told them that Rudy was
“special ed.”41
It is disputed whether the Defendant Deputies attempted to disengage or
deescalate the situation.42 It is also disputed whether the Defendant Deputies believed
that Rudy was armed and was possibly concealing a weapon and whether the Defendant

31 Id. at Nos. 18 & 70.
32 Id. at No. 81.
33 Id. at No. 18.
34 Id. at No. 19.
35 Id. at Nos. 90 & 96.
36 See id. at Nos. 82 & 83.
37 Id. at No. 84.
38 Id. at No. 23.
39 See id. at Nos. 24, 68, & 69.
40 See id. at Nos. 88 & 89.
41 See id. at No. 91.
42 See id. at Nos. 25 & 86.
Deputies asked to see Rudy’s alleged weapon.43 It is undisputed, however, that the
Defendant Deputies decided to halt Rudy’s retreat into the garage and that they
approached Rudy; Deputies Castro and Hurtado pointed their firearms at Rudy, and
Deputy Alkonis pointed her taser at him.44 As the Defendant Deputies advanced closer
to Rudy, they directed Cynthia to “get back” (or words to that effect), and Deputy
Castro ordered Rudy to stop, to remove his hand from his pocket, and to turn around.45
The Defendant Deputies gave Rudy simultaneous, overlapping commands.46
C. Physical Altercation and the Defendant Deputies’ Use of Force
Cynthia inserted herself between the Defendant Deputies and Rudy, asserting that
Rudy was “special ed.”47 Deputy Castro ordered Cynthia to back up, and he requested
that her younger son—John Doe—remove Cynthia from the scene. Deputy Castro then
grabbed Cynthia, stating “Hey, you called us.”48 Meanwhile, Rudy approached Deputy
Castro, but the manner of Rudy’s approach—including whether Rudy verbally threatened
or physically harmed any of the Defendant Deputies or others at the scene up to that
point—is disputed.49
Deputy Castro punched Rudy in the face with both his right and left fists and
grabbed Rudy’s right hand.50 Deputy Hurtado held Rudy’s arms, with his arms around
Rudy’s neck and shoulder, while Deputy Castro punched Rudy.51 Rudy appears to have
resisted the Defendant Deputies’ use of force, although the nature of Rudy’s actions
during the altercation is disputed.52 The Defendant Deputies and Rudy stumbled back
into the garage door, where Deputy Castro hit Rudy with his baton—first on Rudy’s
shoulder and then on his leg—and Deputy Castro punched Rudy again.53 In the course of
the scramble, Deputy Castro fell to the ground twice.54

43 See id. at Nos. 20 & 93.
44 See id. at Nos. 26, 85 & 95.
45 Id. at Nos. 21 & 22.
46 Id. at No. 87.
47 Id. at No. 27.
48 See id. at Nos. 27, 28, 29, 62, & 97.
49 See id. at Nos. 30 & 100.
50 See id. at Nos. 31, 32, 33, 98, & 99.
51 Id. at Nos. 34, 103, & 104.
52 See id. at Nos. 35, 36, 37, 39, 101, & 102.
53 Id. at Nos. 106, 107, & 109.
54 See id. at Nos. 35, 36, & 43.
Raul pleaded with the Defendant Deputies to “[s]top, let him [i.e., Rudy] be,” and
Cynthia and Raul physically joined the altercation between Rudy and the Defendant
Deputies.55 Cynthia may have used her cane to prevent Deputy Castro from striking
Rudy with his baton,56 and, either as a result of Cynthia’s action or on his own initiative,
Deputy Alkonis grabbed Cynthia’s cane.57 Deputy Castro placed himself between the
parents and the other Deputies, and, after Deputy Alkonis tased Rudy twice and punched
him three or four times, the Defendant Deputies eventually wrestled Rudy to the ground
and handcuffed him.58 No Deputy at any point attempted to prevent or stop the
Defendant Deputies’ use of force.59
D. Detentions and Arrests
After the Defendant Deputies handcuffed Rudy, they also handcuffed Cynthia,
Raul, and John Doe.60 The Defendant Deputies arrested Cynthia and Raul for Battery on
a Peace Officer, but both were subsequently charged by the Los Angeles District Attorney
with misdemeanor obstruction under Cal. Penal Code § 148.61 It is undisputed that John
Doe never attempted to interfere with the Defendant Deputies nor to make physical
contact with the Defendant Deputies; that the Defendant Deputies never considered John
Doe to be a suspect; and that the Defendant Deputies never saw John Doe commit any
illegal act.62 Nevertheless, the Defendant Deputies detained John Doe for more than an
hour in a patrol car, where he remained in handcuffs for some of that time before he was
interviewed.63 Eventually, the Defendant Deputies transported Rudy, Cynthia, Raul, and
John Doe to the police station.64 No Deputy attempted to prevent or stop the arrests and
detentions of the Martinez family members.65

55 See id. at Nos. 38, 42, 108, 113, & 114.
56 See id. at No. 40.
57 Id. at No. 105; see also id. at No. 41.
58 See id. at Nos. 44, 45, 46, 110, 111, & 115.
59 See id. at No. 132.
60 Id. at No. 115.
61 Id. at Nos. 46, 47, & 121
62 Id. at Nos. 113, 114, 117, & 118.
63 See id. at Nos. 115 & 116.
64 See id. at No. 120.
65 See id. at No. 133.
E. Minor Children Custody Issue
During the Martinez family’s encounter with the police, Cynthia and Raul’s nine-
year-old daughter—Jane Doe—was in the care of neighbors, Juan and Maria Bernui.66
The Defendant Deputies removed Jane Doe from the Bernuis’ care without her parents’
consent and transported Jane Doe to the police station, where both minor Martinez
children—John and Jane Doe—were placed in the temporary custody of the Department
of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”).67 In Plaintiffs’ Motion, they describe the
specific circumstances of Jane Doe’s seizure from the Bernuis’ home based upon the
declaration of Jane Doe,68 but those events are not included in the Statement of Facts and
are apparently disputed.69 It is undisputed, however, that no Deputy attempted to
prevent or stop the custody transfer of the two minors.70
The parties dispute whether any officer informed Cynthia or Raul of the
whereabouts of John and Jane Doe, but Cynthia’s signature does appear on an Arrested
Person’s Children’s form indicating that Cynthia was advised that she was entitled to two
additional telephone calls to arrange for child care and that the minors were under the
care of DCFS.71 Cynthia and Raul desired, and gave consent, for their eldest son, Raul
Jr., to take physical custody of the minors while their parents were in police custody.72
F. Search of the Martinez Home
After the physical altercation, detentions, and arrests, members of the police team
conducted a search of the Martinez home.73 The Defendant Deputies did not ask for
consent to search the residence,74 but Defendants claim that the Defendant Deputies
received radio traffic alerting them that an unknown individual may have run into the

66 See id. at No. 122.
67 See id. at Nos. 53, 54, 120, & 123.
68 See Plaintiffs’ Motion 10:7-27.
69 See generally Defendants’ Opposition.
70 See Joint Statement No. 133.
71 See id. at No. 124; Compendium Ex. 19.
72 See Joint Statement No. 125. Plaintiffs assert that fact Nos. 126 and 127—alleging that
Raul Jr. attempted to collect the children at the police station but was refused—lack foundation
and that they are thus inadmissible.
73 See id. at No. 58.
74 Id. at No. 128.
home.” Deputy Castro was the handling deputy with the authority to authorize such a
search, although it is disputed who actually authorized the search.”
In their search of the home, officers left drawers open, they misplaced items, and
they broke doorhandles.” The Deputy Defendants did not participate in the search,” but
no Deputy attempted to stop or report the search.”
G. Legal Aftermath of the Arrests
The charges against Cynthia and Raul were dismissed.*° After initial proceedings
in state court, the charges against Rudy were also dismissed.*"
On December 24, 2018, the Los Angeles District Attorney filed a felony complaint
against Rudy, thereby initiating the action captioned as People v. Rudy Martinez, Case
No. TA147782 (the “Criminal Case”).** The felony complaint in the Criminal Case
alleges that Rudy committed the following crimes on December 20, 2018:
e Battery with Injury on Peace Officer (Sergeant Berg) pursuant to Cal. Penal Code
§ 243(c)(2);
e Battery with Injury on Peace Officer (Deputy Hurtado) pursuant to
Cal. Penal Code § 243(c)(2);
e Resisting Executive Officer (Deputy Castro) pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 69;
and
e Resisting Executive Officer (Deputy Alkonis) pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 69.*
On December 18, 2019, Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Lynn D. Olson
conducted a preliminary hearing in the Criminal Case.** Rudy was represented by

See id. at Nos. 58 & 60.
See id. at No. 130.
” See id. at No. 129.
8 See id. at No. 59.
See id. at No. 131.
80 See id. at No. 134.
See id.
82 Id. at No. 2.
88 Id. at No. 3.
Id. at No. 5.

counsel during that proceeding,85 and Deputy Castro and Deputy Alkonis both testified.86
Rudy’s counsel introduced into evidence a cell phone video of the incident.87
It is disputed whether the evidence now known to the Defendant Deputies is
materially different from the evidence that was presented at the preliminary hearing,88 but
after considering the evidence and arguments from the prosecution and Rudy’s counsel in
the preliminary hearing, Judge Olson found sufficient cause to believe that Rudy was
guilty of all counts alleged in the felony complaint.89 Nevertheless, the charges against
Rudy were subsequently dropped.90
H. LASD Policy and Training
It is the policy of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) that all sworn
personnel have a duty to protect life, liberty, and property and to adhere to all federal and
state laws.91 LASD Policy also requires Department members to use only that amount of
force that is objectively reasonable to perform their duties.92 Department members must
possess reasonable suspicion before detaining a suspect and probable cause before
arresting a suspect.93 Officers are also trained to note in their incident reports if they
make contact with a mentally ill suspect.94
I. LASD Deputy Gangs
Defendants concede that social groups known as “deputy gangs”—characterized
by exclusivity, violent proclivities towards citizens, and shared signs and symbols—exist
within the LASD.95 Those deputy gangs have a history of recruiting in jails.96 Deputy
gangs are known to mark members with a shared tattoo, which is frequently positioned on

85 Id. at No. 6.
86 Id. at No. 7.
87 Id. at No. 8.
88 Id. at No. 12.
89 Id. at No. 10.
90 Id. at No. 134.
91 Id. at No. 63.
92 Id. at No. 64.
93 Id. at No. 65.
94 Id. at No. 92.
95 Id. at No. 135.
96 Id. at No. 136.
the member’s lateral calf.97 One known deputy gang tattoo depicts a red-eyed skull
holding a “dead man’s hand” and a firearm.98
Deputy Hurtado has a tattoo on his lateral calf depicting a red-eyed skull holding a
“dead man’s hand” and a firearm.99 Deputy Hurtado received his tattoo as a new
sheriff’s deputy while he was assigned to a jail facility.100
V. ANALYSIS
A. Collateral Estoppel with Respect to Rudy’s Claims Based Upon an Alleged
Lack of Probable Cause to Arrest Him
Defendants first argue that Rudy is estopped from asserting his Second Claim for
false arrest, his Third Claim for negligence, his Sixth Claim under the Bane Act, and his
Seventh Claim for malicious prosecution to the extent that he asserts those claims based
upon an alleged lack of probable cause to arrest him. Defendants contend that the issue of
probable cause was already litigated and was decided against Rudy in his Criminal Case.101
Pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel—also known as issue preclusion—
“once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different
cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation.” Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 153 (1979). To determine whether collateral estoppel is appropriately applied in
a case, a court examines three factors: (1) “whether the issues presented by this litigation
are in substance the same as those resolved against [a party in a prior case]”;
(2) “whether controlling facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the
[prior case’s resolution]”; and (3) “whether other special circumstances warrant an
exception to the normal rules of preclusion.” Id. at 155.
“[A] preliminary hearing determination ‘that there was sufficient evidence to hold
the plaintiff over for trial may, in some situations, preclude the plaintiff from relitigating
the issue of probable cause to arrest in a subsequent civil suit.’” Patterson v. City of Yuba
City, 748 F. App’x 120, 121 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting McCutchen v. City of Montclair, 73
Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1147 (1999)). But collateral estoppel will not apply when: (1) “‘the

97 Id. at Nos. 137 & 139.
98 Id. at No. 138.
99 Id. at No. 140.
100 Id. at No. 141.
101 Defendants’ Motion 20:18-23:6; see also Defendants’ Reply 2:13-3:25.
issue of probable cause was not litigated at the preliminary hearing for tactical reasons’;
(2) the plaintiff has alleged that ‘the arresting officer lied or fabricated evidence presented
at the preliminary hearing’; or (3) ‘the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing
[was] not the same as the evidence available to [the officers] at the time of plaintiff’s
arrest.’” Id. (quoting McCutchen, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 1147); see also Awabdy v. City of
Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2004) (“a plaintiff can rebut a prima facie
finding of probable cause,” such that collateral estoppel does not apply, “by showing that
the criminal prosecution was induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence,
or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith,” including at the preliminary
hearing).
Here, the issues of reasonable suspicion and probable cause were litigated during
the preliminary hearing in Rudy’s Criminal Case, but whether the evidence now known to
Defendants is materially different from the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing
is disputed.102 Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants presented false testimony
regarding the circumstances of Rudy’s detention and arrest—specifically with respect to
the Defendant Deputies’ knowledge of Rudy’s “special education” status and the
potential legal effect of that knowledge, what Cynthia told Deputy Castro at the scene,
and whether and to what extent Rudy was behaving aggressively toward his family or the
Defendant Deputies.103 Those factual issues are largely disputed, and, therefore, they are
properly resolved by a jury.104 Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to summary
judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel on the issues of reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to detain or arrest Rudy. With respect to Defendants’ collateral estoppel
argument, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.
B. Cynthia’s Excessive Force Claims
Next, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Cynthia’s
First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Claims, to the extent that those claims are based
upon an alleged excessive use of force, because the force used against Cynthia was
objectively reasonable.105

102 See supra Part IV.G.
103 See Plaintiffs’ Opposition 6:12-7:11; see generally Amended Complaint.
104 See generally supra Part IV.
105 Defendants’ Motion 23:10-13 & 28:16-29:22.
Because Plaintiffs’ Third Claim for relief for negligence arises from their § 1983
claims, throughout this Order the Court looks to the underlying § 1983 claims in
analyzing both their § 1983 and negligence claims.106
1. § 1983 Excessive Force Claims
“In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by
identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged
application of force.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). “Where, as here, the
excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free
citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable . . . seizures’ of the person.” Id. “Determining whether the force used to
effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful
balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at
396 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).
The Ninth Circuit’s test for assessing the objective reasonableness of a particular
use of force considers: “(1) the severity of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights by evaluating the type and amount of force inflicted, (2) the
government’s interest in the use of force, and (3) the balance between the gravity of the
intrusion on the individual and the government’s need for that intrusion.” Lowry v. City
of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1256 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting Glenn v. Washington
County, 673 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotations omitted). “This standard
requires the court to ‘judge the reasonableness of a particular use of force from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.’” Ballew v. City of Pasadena, 2022 WL 17974488, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23,
2022) (quoting Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2021)). “The calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham,
490 U.S. at 396-97.
Here, many details of the physical altercation—including facts relating to
Cynthia’s involvement—are disputed.107 Because Cynthia’s excessive force claims
depend upon those disputed facts, summary judgment based upon the merits of those

106 See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 61-65; see also Black v. City of Blythe, 562 F. Supp. 3d 820,
830 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (negligence claims may arise from § 1983 claims).
107 See supra Part IV.C.
claims is not appropriate. With respect to Defendants’ argument that the force used
against Cynthia was objectively reasonable, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.
2. Qualified Immunity for Cynthia’s Excessive Force Claim
Defendants further argue that Deputy Castro is entitled to qualified immunity with
respect to Cynthia Martinez’s First Claim for excessive force.108
a. Qualified Immunity Standard
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability
unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at
the time of the challenged conduct.” Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015). Thus, a
qualified-immunity analysis involves two separate steps: the court first determines
whether the facts show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; if so, the
court must then determine whether that constitutional right was clearly established at
time of the alleged unlawful action. See id.; Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 762 (9th
Cir. 2009). “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”
Taylor, 575 U.S. at 825 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
The non-movant bears the burden of proving the second prong. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Barr, 79 F.4th 996, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2023). The law does “not require a case directly
on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Nevertheless, “‘existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’”
Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
(per curiam)); see also Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding that “the question in determining whether qualified immunity applies is whether
all reasonable officers would agree that [the officer’s behavior violated the plaintiff’s
rights] in this instance”). “In other words, immunity protects all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Kisela, 584 at 104 (quoting White,
580 U.S. at 79).
b. Application to Cynthia’s Excessive Force Claims
Defendants argue that “no prior case gave Deputy Castro notice that a push or
shove to move Cynthia out of the way while attempting to detain an assaultive, high-risk,
potentially armed suspect [i.e., Rudy], was an unconstitutional use of force.”109 In their

108 Defendants’ Motion 23:13-17 & 25:1-28.
109 Id. at 25:13-15.
Opposition, Plaintiffs counter that Cynthia had a “clearly-established right to be free
from excessive force,” and they cite a non-precedential case—Acasio v. Lucy, 2017 WL
1316537 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2017)—for the proposition that officers are “not entitled to
qualified immunity merely because [their] push did not result in injury.”110 Id. at *8. In
reply, Defendants acknowledge that “the standard for reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment is objective” and that “not every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary, violates the Fourth Amendment,” but they argue that the “force used
against Cynthia amounted to nothing more than a push or shove in the context of a
volatile, rapidly evolving situation.”111
Here, many of the facts concerning the altercation—including whether Rudy was
“assaulting, high-risk, [and] potentially armed,” as Defendants assert—are in dispute.112
But, even assuming the existence of the first prong—that Deputy Castro violated
Cynthia’s Fourth Amendment rights—Deputy Castro is entitled to qualified immunity
under the second prong.
Plaintiffs cite Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2001), for the proposition
that “[w]hen the circumstances show that there is no need for force, any force used—
including a push of [sic] pull—is constitutionally unreasonable.”113 See id. at 880. But the
Ninth Circuit in Fontana did not address the issue of qualified immunity. See id. at 882
n.8. Furthermore, the Fontana court was discussing a “sexual bodily intrusion”; the
Ninth Circuit noted that “there can be no ‘countervailing governmental interest’ to
justify sexual misconduct.” Id. at 880 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Therefore,
Fontana is inapt.
Plaintiffs also rely upon Jimenez v. City of Costa Mesa, 174 F. App’x 399 (9th Cir.
2006). Although the particular section of that non-precedential case to which Plaintiffs
cite does not deal with qualified immunity, a different section does. In Jimenez, the Ninth
Circuit determined that an officer was entitled to qualified immunity for his single push of
one plaintiff who leaned over the officer during an arrest, which did not result in any
injury to the plaintiff: “When weighed against the government’s interest in this case, the
minimal intrusion was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. at 402.
However, the Ninth Circuit held that the same officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity for pushing a different plaintiff, resulting in “several injuries” to that plaintiff,
in response to that plaintiff’s verbal inquiry about the arrestee from three to four feet

110 See Plaintiffs’ Opposition 7:12-8:11.
111 Defendants’ Reply 4:1-12.
112 See supra Part IV.C.
113 Plaintiffs’ Opposition 8:2-5.
away; the Jimenez court determined that “[a] reasonable officer under the circumstances
‘would have had fair notice that the force employed was unlawful, and that any mistake to
the contrary would have been unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Drummond ex rel. Drummond
v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003)). Deputy Castro’s treatment of
Cynthia in this case—grabbing her, without causing her any injury, when she inserted
herself in the altercation between the Defendant Deputies and Rudy—is more akin to the
officer’s behavior in Jimenez with respect to the first plaintiff, for which that officer was
entitled to qualified immunity, rather than the second plaintiff.
Finally, Acasio v. Lucy, 2017 WL 1316537 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2017), which
Plaintiffs also cite, dealt with an officer who pushed an elderly plaintiff who “was
complying with the officer’s orders and did not otherwise present a threat to anyone’s
safety” “onto [a] chair with such force that [the plaintiff] fell to the ground injuring her
hip and back.” Id. at *9. Again, here, Deputy Castro caused Cynthia no harm when he
grabbed her as he attempted to move her aside.
Although relevant authorities need not be directly on point to qualify as “clearly
establish[ing]” a plaintiff’s rights for the purpose of qualified immunity, none of the cases
that Plaintiffs raise here would have put Deputy Castro on notice that his conduct
violated Cynthia’s Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion with
respect to Cynthia’s First Claim for excessive force is GRANTED because Deputy
Castro is entitled to qualified immunity on that claim.
C. Cynthia and Raul’s False Arrest Claims
Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on Cynthia and
Raul’s Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Claims for relief to the extent that
those claims are based upon an alleged lack of probable cause to arrest them because the
Defendant Deputies possessed probable cause pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 148.114
Plaintiffs oppose those arguments115 and contend in their own Motion that the Defendant
Deputies lacked any probable cause to arrest Raul because, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code
§§ 692 and 694, Cynthia and Raul were using reasonable force to defend Rudy from the
Defendant Deputies’ excessive use of force. Plaintiffs assert that they are therefore
entitled to summary judgment with respect to Raul’s false arrest and negligence claims.116

114 Defendants’ Motion 26:1-28:7 (Second Claim) & 28:16-29:22 (Third, Fourth, Sixth, and
Seventh Claims).
115 Plaintiffs’ Opposition 8:12-16:14.
116 Plaintiffs’ Motion 11:1-13:1.
1. § 1983 False Arrest Claims
“A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a [violation of law]
committed in the officer’s presence[] is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the
arrest is supported by probable cause.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003).
“To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, [the court]
examine[s] the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide[s] ‘whether these
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,
amount to’ probable cause”—i.e., that the arrestee was guilty of the violation of law. Id.
at 371 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). That determination
“depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
California law prohibits “willfully resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing] any
public officer [or] peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt[ed] discharge [of] any duty
of his or her office or employment.” Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1). “California courts
have concluded that [§ 148] ‘penalizes even passive delay or obstruction of an arrest, such
as refusal to cooperate.’” Hart v. City of Redwood City, 99 F.4th 543, 552 n.4 (9th Cir.
2024) (quoting People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 356 n.6 (1969), disapproved on another
ground in People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1222 (1990)). The statute “cannot be
supposed to ‘criminalize[] a person’s failure to respond with alacrity to police orders,’
but where the suspect acts defiantly, such passive obstruction has been held to satisfy
Section 148.” Id. (quoting In re Muhammed C., 95 Cal. App. 4th 1325, 1330 (2002)).
“Under [California] Penal Code, sections 835 and 835a, an officer may lawfully use
only [r]easonable force to make an arrest or to overcome resistance.” Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d
at 356–57. And California law authorizes “other parties” “in aid or defense of [a] person
about to be injured” to “make resistance sufficient to prevent the [commission of a
public] offense.” Cal. Penal Code §§ 692 & 694; see also Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d at 357
(“Sections 692 and 693 set forth the basic privilege one has to defend against unlawful
force.”). Pursuant to those statutes, the “long-standing rule” in California is “that
although one is not immune from criminal liability for his resistance to an invalid police
action, he cannot be convicted of an offense against a peace officer ‘engaged in . . . the
performance of . . . duties’ unless the officer was acting lawfully at the time.” Gonzalez, 51
Cal. 3d at 1217 (emphasis and alteration in original).
“California cases hold that although the court, not the jury, usually decides
whether police action was supported by legal cause, disputed facts bearing on the issue of
legal cause must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty element, since
the lawfulness of the victim’s conduct forms part of the corpus delicti of the offense.” Id.
Here, such “disputed facts” pervade the analysis of Cynthia and Raul’s claims for false
arrest. Indeed, Defendants did not move for summary judgment on Rudy’s claim for
excessive force; during the hearing, Defendants’ counsel conceded that doing so would
have been an overreach. Therefore, to the extent that Cynthia and Raul interfered with
Rudy’s arrest—which, itself, is disputed—the reasonableness of their interference is
similarly in dispute and properly belongs before a jury for resolution. Therefore,
Defendants’ Motion with respect to Cynthia and Raul’s claims based upon their allegedly
unlawful arrests, and Plaintiffs’ Motion with respect to the Raul’s claims specifically, are
DENIED.
2. Qualified Immunity for Cynthia and Raul’s False Arrest Claims
Defendants argue that the Defendant Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity
with respect to Cynthia and Raul’s claims for false arrest: “When considering the
perimeter Deputies were trying to maintain around the arrest of Rudy, the difficulty the
Deputies were having with gaining control of Rudy, and the escalating nature of the
physical altercation with Rudy, a reasonable officer could have believed that probable
cause existed to arrest Raul and Cynthia for refusing to get back and interfering with their
efforts to place Rudy under arrest during the incident.”117
“‘[W]here the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity depends on the
resolution of disputed issues of fact in their favor, and against the non-moving party,
summary judgment is not appropriate.’” Johnson, 79 F.4th at 1005 (quoting Wilkins v.
City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2003)). In their brief reference to qualified
immunity, Defendants do not address Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the defense-of-
others exception under Cal. Penal Code §§ 692 and 694; that analysis, as discussed above,
depends heavily upon disputed facts.118 Therefore, the application of qualified immunity
is not appropriate at this stage. Defendants’ Motion, with respect to the application of
the qualified immunity defense to Cynthia and Raul’s claims for false arrest, is DENIED.
D. Lawfulness of Defendants’ Treatment of Minors John and Jane Doe
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
Second, Third, and Sixth Claims to the extent that those claims are based upon the
Defendant Deputies’ delivery of minors John and Jane Doe into DCFS custody.119
Plaintiffs oppose those arguments,120 and they contend in their own Motion that no
exigent circumstances justified Defendants’ warrantless removal of Jane and John Doe

117 Defendants’ Motion 28:10-15; see also Defendants’ Opposition 12:1-7.
118 See supra Part V.C.1.
119 Defendants’ Motion 29:23-33:22.
120 Plaintiffs’ Opposition 8:12-16:14.
from their parents’ custody,121 that Defendants’ warrantless seizure of Jane Doe from her
neighbors’ home violated the Fourth Amendment,122 that Defendants lacked any
reasonable suspicion to detain John Doe in handcuffs after the incident,123 and that,
therefore, they—John and Jane Doe—are entitled to summary judgment on their Second
and Third Claims.124
1. § 1983 False Arrest and Negligence Claims for Placing the Minors in
DCFS Custody
The parties agree on the governing law regarding the warrantless placement of
John and Jane Doe into DCFS custody: “Officials, including social workers, who remove
a child from its home without a warrant must have reasonable cause to believe that the
child is likely to experience serious bodily harm in the time that would be required to
obtain a warrant.” Rogers v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007).
Defendants cite only United States v. Bradley, 321 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2003), for the
proposition that John and Jane Doe necessarily “faced imminent danger of serious bodily
injury in the time it would take to obtain a warrant” because both parents had been
arrested, and, therefore, neither parent was available to care for the minors. Id. at 1215.
Bradley involved a nine-year-old child and the child’s claim arising from the defendant
officers’ warrantless entry into his house. See generally id. The officers who arrested the
child’s mother on drug charges could not find the child in the places where the mother
said that he was located. See id. at 1215. The officers entered the house “to determine if
[the child] was being supervised by a responsible adult,” which the district court held—
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed—was protected by the community caretaking exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Id. at 1214-15. Bradley does not elaborate
on whether the community caretaking exception extends to circumstances in which a
child is apparently being supervised by a responsible adult, as Jane Doe was by the Bernui
family, or—as in John Doe’s case—when the child is alone at home but is a teenager and
there is no clear indication of unsafe conditions (such as drugs) in the home. Finally,
Bradley does not deal with the removal of a child at all; it addresses only a warrantless
entry into a home.
Here, the undisputed facts do not conclusively support either Defendants’ or
Plaintiffs’ positions regarding the alleged wrongful transfer of the minor children into
DCFS custody—neither child was conclusively in danger or conclusively safe, and the

121 Plaintiffs’ Motion 6:13-9:15.
122 Id. at 9:16-10:27.
123 Id. at 11:1-13:1.
124 Id. at 13:2-22.
extent to which the parents were allowed to arrange for the care of the children is
disputed. Indeed, in Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion, Defendants rely upon
Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000), to argue that “[w]hether reasonable
cause to believe exigent circumstances [to justify the removal of minor children] exist in a
given situation, ‘and the related questions, are all questions of fact to be determined by a
jury.’”125 Therefore, both Defendants’ and Plaintiffs’ Motions with respect to the
placement of the minor children into DCFS custody are DENIED.
2. Plaintiffs’ Motion with Respect to the Warrantless Seizure of Jane Doe
and the Detention of John Doe
Plaintiffs contend that Jane Doe is separately entitled to summary judgment on her
Second and Third Claims for the Defendant Deputies’ warrantless seizure of her from
the Bernuis’ home.126 Similarly, Plaintiffs argue that John Doe is entitled to summary
judgment on his Second and Third Claims for the Defendant Deputies’ conduct in
detaining him with handcuffs without reasonable suspicion.127 Defendants respond that
Plaintiffs have failed to prove causation—i.e., that the Defendant Deputies actually
participated in the seizure and detention of the minors—and that whether exigent
circumstances existed to authorize the seizure and detention of the children is disputed
and appropriate for resolution by a jury.128 As discussed, the factual history of this case
concerning the minor children is almost entirely disputed.129 Therefore, Plaintiffs’
Motion with respect to the seizure and detention of Jane and John Doe is DENIED.
3. Qualified Immunity for the Minors’ Claims
Defendants argue that, “[a]t minimum, no reasonable officer in this case would
believe that placing John Doe and Jane Doe in temporary protective custody with DCFS
would violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . particularly given the short
notice and the Deputies’ lack of experience or expertise with child custody
evaluations.”130 In response, Plaintiffs cite In re S.D., 99 Cal. App. 4th 1068 (2002), for
the proposition that “[t]here is no ‘Go to jail, lose your child’ rule in California” and
that, pursuant to that case, the Defendant Deputies were on notice that Cynthia and Raul
were entitled to the opportunity to arrange for their minor children’s care. Id. at 1077–78.

125 Defendants’ Opposition 7:1-3 (quoting Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138).
126 Plaintiffs’ Motion 9:16-10:27 (Second Claim) & 13:3-22 (Third Claim).
127 Id. at 11:1-12:21 (Second Claim) & 13:3-22 (Third Claim).
128 Defendants’ Opposition 4:22-7:26.
129 See supra Parts IV.D, IV.E, & V.D.1.
130 Defendants’ Motion 31:8-13; see also Defendants’ Opposition 8:9-9:6.
As discussed, the facts underlying Plaintiffs’ wrongful removal claims are in
dispute, but Plaintiffs’ citation to the S.D. case is persuasive regarding the qualified
immunity issue. Therefore, Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity in defense of the
minor children’s claims is DENIED.
4. The Minors’ Bane Act Claim
Defendants aver that they are separately entitled to summary judgment on John
and Jane Doe’s Sixth Claim under the Bane Act to the extent that that claim is based
upon the children’s wrongful detention and seizure and the transfer of the children into
DCFS custody.131
“‘The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper
means (i.e., threats, intimidation or coercion), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from
doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do
something that he or she was not required to do under the law.’” Shoyoye v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 955–56 (2012) (quoting Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th
329, 334 (1998)). “A defendant is liable if he or she interfered with or attempted to
interfere with the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by the requisite threats, intimidation, or
coercion.” Id. at 956. “[W]here coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation
alleged, . . . the statutory requirement of ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion’ is not met”
because “[t]he statute requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion
inherent in the wrongful detention itself.” Id. at 959; see also Allen v. City of Sacramento,
234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 69, as modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 6, 2015) (“a wrongful arrest
or detention, without more, does not satisfy both elements of [the Bane Act],” and
“conclusory allegations of ‘forcible’ and ‘coercive’ interference with plaintiffs’
constitutional rights are inadequate to state a cause of action [under the Bane Act]”).
Here, Plaintiffs’ only constitutional theory of recovery for John and Jane Doe is for
wrongful seizure.132 With respect to John Doe’s claims, Plaintiffs concede that the
contemplated coercion was “inherent in Defendant Deputies’ placement of [him] into
protective custody.”133 Therefore, to the extent that John Doe’s Bane Act claim is
premised on his wrongful seizure and delivery into DCFS custody, Defendants’ Motion is
GRANTED.
With respect to Jane Doe, however, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendant Deputies
made clear, unequivocal threats in the presence of Jane Doe to arrest Mr. and Mrs. Bernui

131 Defendants’ Motion 32:1-8 & 32:11-22.
132 See generally Amended Complaint.
133 Plaintiffs’ Opposition 21:7-10.
and take Jane Doe into custody if they did not comply with the deputies’ orders to give
them custody of her.”134 Therefore, to the extent that Jane Doe’s Bane Act claim is
premised on her wrongful seizure and delivery into DCFS custody, Defendants’ Motion
is DENIED.
5. Statutory Immunity
Defendants assert that they are entitled to statutory immunity under
Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815.2, 820.2, and 821.6 with respect to Plaintiffs’ Third Claim for
negligence and Plaintiffs’ Sixth Claim under the Bane Act, to the extent that those claims
are based upon the acts of taking Jane and John Doe into protective custody.135
Under Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2, “California public entities, including local
governments, are derivatively liable for the negligent acts or omissions of public
employees within the scope of their employment.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of
Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 638 (9th Cir. 2012). But California law declares that public
employees are not liable for discretionary acts or omissions, regardless of whether that
discretion was abused. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2. California also provides
prosecutorial immunity for a “public employee” who “institut[es] or prosecut[es] any
judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if [the
public employee] acts maliciously and without probable cause.” Id. at § 821.6. Another
provision of California law extends individual public employees’ immunity to the public
entity that employs them. See id. at § 815.2. Finally, the law limits immunity for juvenile
court social workers, child protection workers, and other similar public employees for
perjury, fabrication of evidence, failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, or obtaining
testimony by duress, fraud, or undue influence, if those acts were committed with malice.
See id. at § 820.21.
In their Opposition, Plaintiffs correctly assert that neither Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2
nor § 821.6 applies here. “‘As a matter of law, section 820.2 [discretionary] immunity
does not apply to an officer’s decision to detain or arrest a suspect,’” because “§ 820.2
covers only ‘policy’ decisions made by a ‘coordinate branch[] of government,’ not
‘operational decision[s] by the police purporting to apply the law.’” Sharp v. Cnty. of
Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 920–21 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064,
1084-85 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. California, 83 F.4th 754,
772-73 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom. Diaz v. Polanco, 144 S. Ct. 2520 (2024)).

134 Id. at 20:27-21:1.
135 Defendants’ Motion 32:8-10 & 32:23-33:22; see also Defendants’ Opposition 9:7-10:7.
Similarly, “[t]he ‘prosecutorial’ immunity under Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6 does not apply
because it is limited to malicious-prosecution claims.” Id.
Therefore, Defendants’ claim of statutory immunity is DENIED.
E. Lawful Search
Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
Second Claim for false arrest to the extent that that claim is based upon the allegedly
unlawful search of the Martinez family home.136 Defendants argue that the search was
justified as a “protective sweep”—“‘a quick and limited search of premises, incident to
an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers and others.’”137
Defendants cite United States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1989), for the proposition
that the search—characterized as a “protective sweep”—was constitutional because the
Defendant Deputies were attempting only to secure the house after its residents had been
arrested just outside the door.138
As both parties agree, warrantless searches of a home are presumptively
unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
587 (1980). A warrantless search may be justified as a “protective sweep” when the facts
would lead a reasonable officer to believe that the need to secure the home was justified.
See Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. And the “protective sweep,” if justified, must be limited to the
extent reasonable to secure the premises. See id. at 335-36.
Here, the facts regarding the reasonableness of searching the Martinez home at all,
and the reasonableness of the extent of that search—which unquestionably left the home
in a shambles—are in dispute.139 Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate;
Defendants’ Motion with respect to the search of the home is DENIED.
F. Monell Claim
Finally, Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ Fifth Claim under Monell.140

136 Defendants’ Motion 33:23-34:28.
137 Id. at 34:7-10 (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990)).
138 See id. at 34:2-28.
139 See supra Part IV.F.
140 Defendants’ Motion 35:2-36:16.
Monell stands for the proposition that a local government can be liable for a § 1983
claim against its individual employee. See generally Monell, 436 U.S. 658. A local
government is liable for an injury under § 1983 under three circumstances: (1) the local
government’s policy or custom inflicted the injury; (2) the local government failed to
train its employees in a manner that amounts to “deliberate indifference” to a
constitutional right; or (3) the individual who committed the constitutional violation was
a final decisionmaker or ratified the unconstitutional conduct. See Rodriguez v. Cnty. of
Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 803 (9th Cir. 2018).
Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED with respect to the individual claims on which
they are entitled to summary judgment—Cynthia’s First Claim for excessive force and
John Doe’s Bane Act Claim, to the extent that that claim is premised on his wrongful
detention and delivery into DCFS custody—because the County cannot be liable for
conduct that is not unconstitutional. See generally Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
With respect to Plaintiffs’ remaining § 1983 claims, Defendants’ Motion is
DENIED. Although the County’s official policies and training materials prohibit
constitutional violations like the ones alleged in this case, the County’s unofficial policies
and actual training practices—including with respect to the so-called Deputy gangs—are
in dispute.141
VI. DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
2. Specifically, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED with respect to the
following issues and claims:
a. Cynthia Martinez’s First Claim for excessive force;
b. John Doe’s Sixth Claim for violation of the Bane Act, to the extent
that that claim is premised on his allegedly wrongful detention and delivery into
DCFS custody; and
c. Plaintiffs’ Monell claim with respect to the above two claims.
3. Except in noted in Paragraph 2 above, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.

141 See supra Parts IV.H & I.
4, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.
5. Pursuant to the Court’s earlier Order vacating the case schedule, the
parties are DIRECTED to confer forthwith and to file no later than September 19, 2025,
a Joint Status Report and proposed scheduling order.
6. A Scheduling Conference is SET for October 3, 2025, at 11:00 a.m. in
Courtroom 9D of the Ronald Reagan Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, 411 W. 4th
Street, Santa Ana, California. Counsel for the parties are DIRECTED to appear at that
date and time.
IT ISSO ORDERED.

Dated: September 2, 2025 WHO
john . Holcomb
ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2 See Order Granting Joint Stipulation to Modify Scheduling order [ECF No. 67].

“aay

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11134951. Public record. Not legal advice.