# Myers v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (Hillsborough)

> District Court, M.D. Florida · September 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11134823

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** September 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11134823

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[t]he state court’s application of clearly established federal law must be objectively unreasonable” for a federal habeas petitioner to prevail and that the state court’s “clear error” is insufficient

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

LUZ MARIBEL MYERS,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 8:23-cv-414-KKM-SPF

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
___________________________________
ORDER
Luz Maribel Myers, a Florida prisoner, timely1 filed a pro se Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging her state-
court conviction for manslaughter with a weapon. (Doc. 1.) Having
considered the petition, (id.), and the response in opposition, (Doc. 8), the
petition is denied.2 Because reasonable jurists would not disagree, a
certificate of appealability also is not warranted.
I. BACKGROUND

1 A state prisoner has one year from the date his judgment becomes final to file a § 2254
petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This one-year limitation period is tolled during the
pendency of a properly filed state motion seeking collateral relief. See id. § 2244(d)(2). The
appellate court affirmed Myers’s conviction on October 19, 2016. (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 9.) Her
judgment became final 90 days later, on January 17, 2017, when the time to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari expired. See Bond v. Moore, 309
F.3d 770, 774 (11th Cir. 2002). After 184 days of untolled time, on July 21, 2017, Myers
filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
(Doc. 8-2, Ex. 10.) That motion remained pending—and the limitation period was
paused—until October 28, 2022, when the appellate mandate issued. (Id., Ex. 22.) At that
point, Myers had 181 days—or until April 27, 2023—to seek federal habeas relief. She met
the deadline, filing her petition on February 17, 2023. (Doc. 1 at 18.) Therefore, the petition
is timely.

2 Myers did not file a reply.
In the early morning hours of February 5, 2013, Myers killed her
boyfriend by stabbing him in the chest with a “butcher knife.” (Doc. 8-2, Ex.
3, at 576.) Several hours before the stabbing, Myers met up with her mother

and sister at the Hard Rock Casino in Tampa, Florida. (Id. at 343–44.) Myers
and her sister got “a little . . . drunk” while their mother gambled. (Id. at 330–
31.) Around 10:00 p.m., the three left the casino and drove to Myers’s
apartment. (Id. at 320–21.) Myers’s boyfriend—Orlando Benitez—lived in
the apartment, but he was working at the time. (Id. at 324, 357.) Myers and
her sister continued to drink while waiting for Benitez to arrive. (Id. at 324.)
Benitez came home around midnight. (Id.) He seemed “happy.” (Id. at

349.) Twenty minutes later, Myers’s mother and sister left the apartment. (Id.
at 325.) Around 1:30 a.m., Myers called her mother. (Id. at 327.) She said,
“Orlando says he doesn’t love me anymore.” (Id.) In the background of the
call, Benitez could be heard denying Myers’s statement. (Id.) Myers hung up
after telling her mother she loved her. (Id. at 328.)
Approximately thirty minutes later, at 2:03 a.m., Myers called 911. (Id.
at 378.) Asked what was “going on,” Myers said, “Domestic violence and I
did it. . . . I stabbed him.” (Id. at 380–81.) When officers arrived at the

apartment, they found Myers “cradling” Benitez on the floor. (Id. at 393.) He
was pronounced dead at 2:29 a.m. (Id. at 468.) The medical examiner later
explained that Benitez died from a single “stab wound to the chest.” (Id. at
868.) The knife traveled through his chest muscles, heart, and spine before
coming to rest in his backbone. (Id. at 851–62.) The direction of the wound
was “downward,” and it required “deliberate force”—comparable to the
force needed to “stab[] into a melon.” (Id. at 858, 863, 890.) Based on these
facts, the medical examiner concluded that the wound was “not accidental.”

(Id. at 864.)
Soon after the stabbing, Myers agreed to speak with law enforcement.
(Id. at 740–41.) She said, “We started arguing and I remember picking up the
knife. . . . I don’t know if I went at him with it or if he came at me, but I had
it in my hand. And then after that it went through him.” (Id. at 754.) Myers
later claimed that she grabbed the knife because she “was trying to hurt
herself,” and Benitez “was trying to stop [her].” (Id. at 756.) She explained,

however, that Benitez was not “yelling” or “being mean” to her. (Id. at 757.)
Before the stabbing, Myers had been “Baker Acted” three times.3 (Id. at 921–
22.)
Myers was charged with manslaughter with a weapon.4 (Id., Ex. 2.) The
case went to trial. Myers argued that the stabbing was an “accident” that
occurred when “[s]he went for a knife to kill herself” and Benitez “tried to
stop her.” (Id., Ex. 3, at 968.) The jury found Myers guilty as charged. (Id., Ex.

3 Florida’s Baker Act “allows a person to be placed involuntarily in a treatment
facility if clear and convincing evidence indicates that the person is mentally ill,
and . . . there is a substantial likelihood that . . . the person will inflict serious bodily
harm on himself or another person.” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th
Cir. 2003).

4 To prove manslaughter, the prosecution must establish either that (1) the
defendant “intentionally committed an act . . . that caused the death of the victim”
or (2) the victim’s death “was caused by the [defendant’s] culpable negligence.”
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.7.
4.) She received a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. (Id., Ex. 5.) Myers
appealed, and her conviction was affirmed. (Id., Ex. 9.) She then moved for
postconviction relief under Rule 3.850. (Id., Ex. 10.) Following an evidentiary

hearing, the postconviction court denied relief, and the appellate court
affirmed in an unexplained decision. (Id., Exs. 11, 15–16, 21.) This federal
habeas petition followed. (Doc. 1.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER SECTION 2254
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs this proceeding. Carroll v. Sec’y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir.
2009). Habeas relief under the AEDPA can be granted only if a petitioner is

in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “The power of the federal courts to grant a writ
of habeas corpus setting aside a state prisoner’s conviction on a claim that
his conviction was obtained in violation of the United States Constitution is
strictly circumscribed.” Green v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 28 F.4th 1089, 1093 (11th
Cir. 2022).
Section 2254(d) provides that federal habeas relief cannot be granted
on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s

adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.

For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), the phrase “clearly established Federal
law” encompasses the holdings only of the United States Supreme Court “as
of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 412 (2000). This section “defines two categories of cases in which a state
prisoner may obtain federal habeas relief with respect to a claim adjudicated
on the merits in state court.” Id. at 404. First, a decision is “contrary to”
clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion
opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if
the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a
set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413.

Second, a decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly
established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing
legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably
applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. The AEDPA was
meant “to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court
convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone,
535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on whether the state
court’s application of clearly established federal law is objectively

unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable application is different from an
incorrect one.” Id. at 694. As a result, to obtain relief under the AEDPA, “a
state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an
error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
103 (2011); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (stating that “[t]he
state court’s application of clearly established federal law must be
objectively unreasonable” for a federal habeas petitioner to prevail and that
the state court’s “clear error” is insufficient).
When the last state court to decide a federal claim explains its decision
in a reasoned opinion, a federal habeas court reviews the specific reasons as

stated in the opinion and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable.
Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). But the habeas court is “not limited
by the particular justifications the state court provided for its reasons, and
[it] may consider additional rationales that support the state court’s
determination.” Jennings v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 55 F.4th 1277, 1292
(11th Cir. 2022). When the relevant state-court decision is not accompanied
with reasons for the decision—such as a summary affirmance without
discussion—the federal court “should ‘look through’ the unexplained

decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant
rationale [and] presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same
reasoning.” Wilson, 584 U.S. at 125. The state may “rebut the presumption by
showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on
different grounds than the lower state court’s decision.” Id.
For purposes of § 2254(d)(2), “it is not enough to show that ‘reasonable
minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question.’”
Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1525 (2022) (quotations omitted). “An

unreasonable determination of the facts occurs when the direction of the
evidence, viewed cumulatively, was too powerful to conclude anything but
the petitioners factual claim.” Teasley v. Warden, Macon State Prison, 978 F.3d
1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). A state court’s findings of fact are presumed correct, and a
petitioner can rebut the presumption of correctness afforded to a state
court’s factual findings only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1).
Even where a petitioner succeeds in rebutting the presumption, he
must show that the state court’s decision is “based on” the incorrect factual
determination. Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025, 1035 (11th
Cir. 2022). This is because a state court decision may still be reasonable “even
if some of the state court’s individual factual findings were erroneous—so
long as the decision, taken as a whole, doesn’t constitute an ‘unreasonable
determination of the facts’ and isn’t ‘based on’ any such determination.” Id.

(quoting Hayes v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 10 F.4th 1203, 1224–25 (11th Cir.
2021) (Newsom, J., concurring)).
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Myers alleges ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. Under the well-known, two-part standard articulated in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to succeed, she must show both
deficient performance by her counsel and prejudice resulting from those
errors. Id. at 687.

The first part “requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. The lynchpin of this analysis is whether
counsel’s conduct “was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Id. at
688. A petitioner establishes deficient performance if “the identified acts or
omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.” Id. at 690. A court “must judge the reasonableness of

counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of
the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id. “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id.
The second part requires showing that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. “An error by counsel, even if
professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of
a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691.

To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
“The question [on federal habeas review of an ineffective-assistance
claim] ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination’
under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether that determination

was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.’” Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.
465, 473 (2007)). Consequently, federal petitioners rarely prevail on claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel because “[t]he standards created by
Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply
in tandem, review is doubly so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (quotation and
citations omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Ground One—Failure to Raise Insanity Defense
Myers contends that trial counsel should have called a “licensed
psychologist” to testify about her “state of mind prior, during, and after [the]
criminal episode.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) A psychologist allegedly could have
established an “insanity defense” by explaining that Myers “did not know

the nature or consequences of her act, and that [she] was unable to
distinguish right from wrong.” (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 10, at 3.) Under Florida law, a
defendant pursuing an insanity defense bears the burden of proving, by
“clear and convincing evidence,” that because of a mental defect, she either
“[d]id not know what [she] . . . was doing or its consequences,” or, if she
knew what she was doing and its consequences, that she “did not know that
what [she] . . . was doing was wrong.” Fla. Stat. § 775.027.
At the evidentiary hearing, counsel described his efforts to investigate

an insanity defense. Before trial, he retained two experts—Dr. Richard
Carpenter and Dr. Michael Maher—to “determine whether” Myers “had a
claim of . . . not guilty by reason of insanity.” (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 15, at 26–27.) Both
experts “opined” that Myers “did not meet the definition” of insanity. (Id. at
27.) Thus, counsel had no “good-faith basis” to pursue an insanity defense.
(Id.) Moreover, he did not “believe this was an insanity case” because Myers
“maintained that it was an accidental stabbing, [and that] she had no intent

to stab” Benitez. (Id. at 28.)
The postconviction court held that Myers failed to “establish[]
deficient performance or prejudice.” (Id., Ex. 16, at 3.) It explained that
counsel “did investigate the viability of an insanity defense” by
“consult[ing] with Drs. Carpenter and Maher”—neither of whom “found
that [Myers] met the definition of not guilty by reason of insanity.” (Id.)
Because no evidence supported an insanity defense, “relief [was] not
warranted on” Myers’s assertion of ineffective assistance. (Id.)

This ruling was reasonable. A lawyer cannot be “ineffective for failing
to raise a nonmeritorious issue.” Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th
Cir. 2001). Here, counsel had no basis to pursue an insanity defense. The two
experts who evaluated Myers found that she “did not meet the definition”
of insanity. (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 15, at 27.) Nothing in the record rebuts that
conclusion. True, Myers’s history of being “Baker Acted” suggests that she
suffered from mental illness. But she presents no evidence that her mental
illness made her unable to distinguish right from wrong, or to know what

she was doing and its consequences. “[M]ental illness that does not result in
insanity, as defined [by Florida law], is not a defense.” Perez v. State, 306 So.
3d 126, 130 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). Thus, “counsel was not deficient for
failing to pursue an unsupported insanity defense.” Almeida v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., No. 24-11318, 2024 WL 5482646, at *1 (11th Cir. Nov. 1, 2024).
B. Ground Two—Failure to Hire “Forensic Specialist”
Myers contends that trial counsel should have hired a “forensic

specialist” to testify that “the incident was an accident due to [the] angle of
[the] knife during the stabbing.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) As noted above, the medical
examiner opined that the fatal stab wound “was not accidental.” (Doc. 8-2,
Ex. 3, at 864.) She based that finding on “the location of the wound, the
direction of the wound [i.e., downward], and the amount of force it would
take to cause such a wound.” (Id.) According to Myers, a “forensic specialist”
could have “rebut[ted] the medical examiner’s testimony by showing that
the angle of the stab wound was in fact made by [Benitez] falling on the

knife.” (Id., Ex. 10, at 3.)
The postconviction court rejected this claim because Myers failed to
meet “her burden of proof in demonstrating prejudice.” (Id., Ex. 16, at 5.) It
noted that Myers “did not present evidence at the evidentiary hearing in
support of her allegation that if counsel had consulted with a forensic expert,
the expert would have been able to contradict the medical examiner’s
testimony.” (Id.) Thus, Myers “ha[d] not demonstrated that but for counsel’s
failure to call a forensic expert, there [was] a reasonable probability the

outcome of trial would have been different.” (Id.)
The rejection of this claim was reasonable. Myers never identified any
“forensic specialist” who could challenge the medical examiner’s
conclusions. Nor did she show that any forensic expert “had actually
reviewed the evidence in [her] case.” Finch v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 643 F.
App’x 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2016). “Without some specificity as to the proposed
expert’s testimony, any assertion that an expert would testify consistently

with [Myers’s] claims [was] mere speculation and [did] not entitle [her] to []
relief.” Id. Thus, the postconviction court reasonably concluded that Myers’s
speculative allegations were insufficient to establish prejudice. See, e.g., Holt
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 489 F. App’x 336, 338 (11th Cir. 2012) (state court
reasonably rejected ineffective-assistance claim based on failure to retain
expert because “[i]t [was] speculative that an expert witness would in fact
have testified” favorably to the defense); Jimenez v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No.
8:19-cv-684-MSS-AEP, 2021 WL 5416150, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2021) (“[I]n

his post-conviction motion, [petitioner] neither identified an expert who
could have testified [favorably to the defense] nor presented an affidavit or
testimony to substantiate that testimony. Because [petitioner’s] ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was speculative, the state court did not
unreasonably deny the claim.”).
C. Ground Three—Failure to Present Photographs of Bruises
Myers faults trial counsel for failing to introduce photographs of
“bruising” on her arms and wrists. (Doc. 1 at 9; Doc. 8-2, Ex. 10, at 3.) The

photographs were taken the day after the stabbing. (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 15, at 15.)
According to Myers, they would have shown that Benitez “was trying to
prevent [her] from committing suicide and was accidentally stabbed as a
result.” (Doc. 1 at 9.)
At the evidentiary hearing, counsel explained that he made “a strategic
decision not to offer [the photographs] into evidence.” (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 15, at
29.) Counsel was concerned that the prosecution would use the photographs

to “say [that] if [Benitez was] grabbing [Myers’s] biceps, he [was] trying to
keep her off of him and keep the knife away.” (Id. at 30.) That, in turn, would
suggest the stabbing was “intentional.” (Id.) Because the defense theory was
that “this was an accident”—and because Myers “never said it was self-
defense”—counsel “did not think [the photographs] benefited her case.” (Id.)
The postconviction court held that Myers could not show “deficient
performance.” (Id., Ex. 16, at 6.) It explained that counsel “considered the
possibility of using the photographs at trial but rejected the idea because the

state also could have used the photographs to argue [Benitez] was
attempting to keep [Myers] away from him.” (Id.) In the court’s view, that
decision was “reasonable” given “the state’s potential ability to use the
[photographs] in support of its own theory of the case.” (Id. at 7.)
This ruling was not “so lacking in justification that there was an error
well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility
for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. A strategic decision

by counsel “will be held to have been ineffective assistance only if it was so
patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen it.”
Dingle v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 480 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2007). “Because
Strickland allows for a range of strategic choices by trial counsel, so too is
there considerable leeway for state courts to determine the reasonableness
of those choices.” Franks v. GDCP Warden, 975 F.3d 1165, 1176 (11th Cir.
2020). Therefore, to prevail on her ineffective-assistance claim, Myers

“would have to show that no reasonable jurist could find that [her] counsel’s
performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct.”
Id.
Myers cannot make this showing. At trial, counsel argued that the
stabbing was an “accident” that took place when Myers “went for a knife to
kill herself.” (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 3, at 968.) Counsel was aware of the photographs
of Myers’s bruises, but he made “a strategic decision not to offer [them] into
evidence.” (Id., Ex. 15, at 29.) In his view, the photographs could hurt the

defense by suggesting that the stabbing was “intentional.” (Id. at 30.)
Specifically, the prosecution could use them to argue that Benitez “grabb[ed]
[Myers’s] biceps” to “keep her off of him and keep the knife away.” (Id.)
Thus, counsel “considered the situation and decided that [presenting the
photographs] would be more harmful than advantageous to the defense.”
Straight v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1985). A fairminded jurist
could “readily conclude that such a strategic decision was not below the
objective standard of reasonableness.” Id.

D. Ground Four—Failure to Address Discrepancy Regarding
Benitez’s Height and Weight
Myers argues that trial counsel should have “challenged” the medical
examiner’s testimony about Benitez’s “height and weight.” (Doc. 1 at 11.) At
trial, the medical examiner said that Benitez was “5’11” and 160 pounds.”
(Doc. 8-2, Ex. 3, at 836.) According to Myers, Benitez actually stood 5’6” and
weighed approximately 170 pounds. (Id., Ex. 10, at 4.) Myers herself stood

5’3” tall. (Id., Ex. 3, at 763.) She contends that Benitez’s true “height and
weight” were “key information” because the medical examiner relied on
“the angle of the knife” to conclude that the stabbing was not accidental.
(Doc. 1 at 11; Doc 8-2, Ex. 10, at 4.) In Myers’s view, “correct information”
about Benitez’s stature would have supported the defense that the stabbing
was an “accident.” (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 10, at 4; Doc. 8-2, Ex. 20, at 6.)
At the evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that he had no “memory”
of discussing Benitez’s height and weight with Myers. (Id., Ex. 15, at 39.) He

explained, however, that he did not think the discrepancy “would have
made a difference” at trial. (Id. at 40.) Counsel noted that the direction of the
stab wound was “downward.” (Id. at 39.) And if Myers “put[] her hand in
the air, raise[d] it up, it [was] going to be taller or up to [Benitez’s] height or
above his height.” (Id.) Thus, regardless of whether Benitez was 5’6” or 5’11”,
Myers could have stabbed him “in a downward motion.” (Id.)
The postconviction court rejected this claim, finding neither “deficient

performance [nor] prejudice.” (Id., Ex. 16, at 8.) As the court noted, the
medical examiner “testified at trial [that] the knife traveled in a downward
stabbing motion,” going “through portions of the ribcage and into the
backbone.” (Id.) Based on this testimony, the court found “reasonable”
counsel’s statement that “he did not think challenging [Benitez’s] height as
testified to by the medical examiner would have affected the outcome of
trial.” (Id. at 9.) The court explained that “regardless of [Benitez’s] height, the

knife traveled in a downward motion.” (Id.) Moreover, Myers failed to
“present[] any evidence in support of her allegation that [Benitez’s] height
played a role in the direction the knife traveled.” (Id.)
The postconviction court reasonably found no prejudice.5 “The
prejudice prong requires the petitioner to establish a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome at trial would have been
different.” Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 767 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014).
“It is not enough for the [petitioner] to show that the errors had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
693. Instead, “counsel’s errors [must be] so serious as to deprive the

5 Because this claim fails for lack of prejudice, I need not decide whether counsel’s
performance was deficient. See Brown v. United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th Cir.
2013) (“If a defendant fails to satisfy either Strickland prong, we need not address
both.”).
[petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. “Applying
AEDPA to Strickland’s prejudice standard, [I] must decide whether the state
court’s conclusion that [counsel’s] performance . . . didn’t prejudice

[Myers]—that there was no substantial likelihood of a different result—was
so obviously wrong that its error lies beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Mungin v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 89 F.4th 1308, 1317 (11th
Cir. 2024).
Myers fails to meet her burden. She presents no evidence that the
alleged height difference would have undermined the medical examiner’s
conclusion that the stab wound was “not accidental.” (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 3, at 864.)

That conclusion rested on “the location of the wound, the direction of the
wound [i.e., downward], and the amount of force it would take to cause such
a wound.” (Id.) Nothing in the record suggests that the medical examiner—
or any other expert—would have deemed the stabbing accidental if Benitez
were five inches shorter than the medical examiner said he was. Myers’s
“speculation” to the contrary “is insufficient to carry [her] burden [as] a
habeas corpus petitioner.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1187 (11th Cir.
2001). In any event, even if Benitez were 5’6” rather than 5’11”, Myers likely

could have caused the same wound by raising her arm lower than she
otherwise would have. (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 15, at 39.) Because “some fairminded
jurists could agree” that Myers failed to show prejudice, “federal habeas
relief must be denied.” Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2011).
E. Ground Five—Failure to Introduce Police Report
Lastly, Myers contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
introduce a “police report of [an] incident that took place” in June 2012,
several months before the stabbing. (Doc. 1 at 13; Doc. 8-2, Ex. 10, at 4.)

According to Myers, the police report “would have shown that [Benitez] had
intervened [during] a previous suicide attempt [when Myers] attempted to
overdose and cut herself.” (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 10, at 4.) In Myers’s view, this would
have supported her defense that Benitez “was accidentally stabbed as a
result of intervening in [her] suicide attempt.” (Doc. 1 at 13.)
The postconviction court held that Myers could not “establish deficient
performance for counsel’s failure to introduce the police report from the June

2012 incident.” (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 11, at 7.) Citing Florida law, the court explained
that the “police report constitute[d] inadmissible hearsay and would not
have been admitted at trial absent an applicable hearsay exception.” (Id.)
Furthermore, Myers was “unable to identify any recognizable hearsay
exception that would permit the introduction of the . . . police report as
admissible evidence.” (Id.) Thus, Myers was “not entitled to relief.” (Id.)
This ruling was reasonable. “[A]lthough the issue of ineffective
assistance . . . is one of constitutional dimension,” a court “must defer to the

state’s construction of its own law when the validity of the [ineffective-
assistance] claim . . . turns on state law.” Pinkney v. Sec’y, DOC, 876 F.3d 1290,
1295 (11th Cir. 2017). Such deference is required here. The postconviction
court held that counsel was not deficient because, as a matter of Florida law,
the police report was inadmissible hearsay. (Doc. 8-2, Ex. 11, at 7.) Thus, the
postconviction court “already has told us how the issue[] would have been
resolved under Florida state law had [counsel] done what [Myers] argues he
should have done.” Herring v. Sec’y. Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1354–55

(11th Cir. 2005). That determination is binding on federal habeas review. See
Morris v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:07-cv-1830-JDW-AEP, 2010 WL 5330505,
at *7 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2010) (federal court must “defer to the state court’s
conclusion” that “the proposed witness testimony would have been
inadmissible as hearsay”).
In short, the postconviction court “authoritatively decided as a matter
of [Florida] law” that Myers’s proposed evidence was inadmissible. Calhoun

v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, 92 F.4th 1338, 1351 (11th Cir. 2024). A lawyer
cannot be “ineffective for failing to offer inadmissible evidence.” Tompkins v.
Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, the postconviction court
reasonably concluded that counsel was not deficient for failing to introduce
the police report. See Ward v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 20-13797-C, 2021 WL 4772143,
at *4 (11th Cir. Apr. 20, 2021) (“The state court denied this claim based on its
finding that [the proposed witness’s] testimony would not have been
admissible under Florida law, and the district court correctly found that it

should not second-guess such a finding.”).
V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement
to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
Instead, a district court or court of appeals must first issue a certificate of
appealability (COA). Id. “A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). To obtain a COA, Myers must show that reasonable jurists
would find debatable both the merits of the underlying claims and the
procedural issues she seeks to raise. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000). Myers has not made the requisite showing. Finally, because Myers is
not entitled to a COA, she is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
It is therefore ORDERED that Myers’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, (Doc. 1), is DENIED. The CLERK is directed to enter judgment
against Myers and in Respondent’s favor and to CLOSE this case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on September 8, 2025.

athryn’Kimball Mizelle
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11134823. Public record. Not legal advice.