# Deleon v. Fox

> District Court, D. Maryland · September 5, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11133800

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** September 5, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11133800

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating a district court may not “conjure up questions never squarely presented”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

)
CHRIS DELEON, )
)
Plaintiff pro se, )
) Civil Action No. 25-cv-00080-LKG
v. )
) Dated: September 5, 2025
MARGARET FOX, et. al., )
)
Defendants. )
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
In this civil action, the Plaintiff pro se, Chris deLeon, brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
against the Defendants, Margaret Fox; Officer Charles Pyles, Officer John Doe 2 and Officer
John Doe 3 (collectively, the “Officer Defendants”); and the Honorable Kathleen M. Dumais,
Associate Judge of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, the Honorable Jennifer
S. Fairfax, Associate Judge of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, the
Honorable Eric J. Nee, Associate Judge of the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery
County, and the Honorable Aileen E. Oliver, Associate Judge of the District Court of Maryland
for Montgomery County (collectively, the “Judicial Defendants”), arising from a dog walking
incident that resulted in the issuance of a peace order against the Plaintiff. See generally ECF
No. 1. The Judicial Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims, pursuant to
Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), and a memorandum in support thereof. ECF Nos. 7 and 7-1.
Officer Pyles has also filed a motion to quash service of the summons and complaint, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). ECF No. 13.
In addition, the Plaintiff has filed a motion for default judgment. ECF No. 11. The
motions are fully briefed. ECF Nos. 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16. No hearing is necessary to
resolve the motions. L.R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons that follow, the Court: (1)
GRANTS the Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7); (2) GRANTS Officer Pyles’
motion to quash (ECF No. 13); (3) DENIES the Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF
No. 11); (4) DISMISSES Counts I, II and III in the complaint as to the Judicial Defendants; (5)
QUASHES the service of the summons and complaint as to Officer Pyles; and (6) DIRECTS
the Plaintiff to properly serve Officer Pyles with the summons and complaint as required by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(e), by September 26, 2025.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
A. Factual Background
In this civil action, the Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to Section 1983 and the United
States Constitution against the Defendants, arising from a dog walking incident that resulted in
the issuance of a peace order against the Plaintiff. See generally ECF No. 1. The Plaintiff
asserts the following three claims in the complaint: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983/Fourteenth
Amendment (Count I); (2) violation of the First Amendment (Count II); and (3) violation of the
Fourth Amendment (Count III). Id. at 6-7. As relief, the Plaintiff seeks, among other things, to
recover actual and punitive damages, costs and attorneys’ fees from the Defendants. Id. at
Prayer for Relief.
The Parties
Plaintiff Chris deLeon is a resident of Maryland. Id. at 2.
Defendant Margaret Fox is a resident of Maryland. Id. at 1-2.
Defendant Officer Pyles is a police officer employed by the Montgomery County,
Maryland Police Department (the “MCPD”). Id. at 2.
Defendant Officer John Doe 2 is a police officer employed by the MCPD. Id. at 2-3.
Defendant Officer John Doe 3 is a deputy sheriff with the MCPD. Id. at 3.
Defendant Judge Kathleen Dumais is an Associate Judge of the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County, Maryland. ECF No. 7 at 1.
Defendant Judge Eric J. Nee is an Associate Judge of the District Court of Montgomery
County, Maryland. Id.
Defendant Judge Jennifer Fairfax is an Associate Judge of the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County, Maryland. Id.

1 The facts recited in this memorandum opinion are taken complaint; the Judicial Defendants’ motion to
dismiss and memorandum in support thereof; Officer Pyles’ motion to quash; and the Plaintiff’s
responses in opposition thereto. ECF Nos. 1, 7, 7-1, 12, 13, 14 and 15.
Defendant Judge Aileen Elizabeth Oliver is an Associate Judge of the District Court of
Montgomery County, Maryland. Id.
The Dog Walking Incident
As background, this case arises from a dispute between the Plaintiff and his neighbor,
Defendant Margaret Fox, regarding whether the Plaintiff can use the sidewalk in front of Ms.
Fox’s home to walk his dogs (the “Dog Walking Incident”). ECF No. 1. The Plaintiff alleges
that, while he was walking his dogs, Ms. Fox told him that he could not be in front of her home,
that the sidewalk in front of her home was her property and that his dogs were not permitted to
use the bathroom on her property. Id. at 1. The Plaintiff also alleges that Ms. Fox demanded
that he leave the area and sprayed him with her water hose. See id.
The Plaintiff alleges that he “called the police against [Ms. Fox] for assault and battery.”
Id. at 7. And so, the Plaintiff alleges that Officer Pyles and at least two unknown MCPD officers
arrived on the scene shortly thereafter. Id. at 1. The Plaintiff further alleges that when MCPD
officers asked Ms. Fox “if she was threatened by the Plaintiff, she said no,” and that she “stated
under oath that she thought this was a silly neighborly dispute.” Id. at 7.
In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that “[a]ccording to Ms. Fox’s sworn written statement,
she said that the police escorted the Plaintiff from the public sidewalk. That was a lie.” Id. at 2.
Lastly, the Plaintiff alleges that in Ms. Fox “testified that the police told her to file a peace order
against the Plaintiff. If that is correct, then the police officer improperly gave her legal advice.”
Id.
The Peace Orders
Following the Dog Walking Incident, the Plaintiff and Ms. Fox both sought peace orders
(the “Peace Orders”) in the Montgomery County courts. Specifically, Ms. Fox and the Plaintiff
filed cross-petitions for peace orders in the District Court for Montgomery County, Maryland on
January 9, 2023, and January 10, 2023, respectively. ECF No. 7-2 (Defendant Fox’s Petition For
Peace Order); ECF No. 7-3 (The Plaintiff’s Petition For Peace Order). Judge Nee presided over
the final hearings on the Peace Orders. ECF No. 7-1 at 1.
On January 18, 2023, Judge Nee granted Ms. Fox’s petition for a peace order and
determined that the Plaintiff committed “an act which placed [Ms. Fox] in fear of imminent
serious bodily harm.” ECF No. 7-4 (Defendant Fox’s Peace Order). Judge Nee also granted the
Plaintiff’s petition for a peace order and determined that Ms. Fox committed “assault in any
degree.” ECF No. 7-9 (The Plaintiff’s Peace Order). And so, the Peace Orders remained in
effect until March 18, 2023. Id.; ECF No. 7-4
On January 25, 2023, the Plaintiff appealed Judge Nee’s Peace Order to the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, Maryland. ECF No. 7-5 (Appeal). On March 1, 2023, Judge Dumais
held a hearing regarding the appeal and affirmed Judge Nee’s decision to issue the Peace Order
in favor of Ms. Fox. ECF No. 7-6 (Dumais Order).
On March 6, 2023, the Plaintiff requested an extension of his Peace Order by six months,
because of an “underlying criminal offense” and his “fears [of] continued harassment, threats,
and assaults until the outcome of the criminal matter has been finalized.” ECF No. 7-10 at 1
(Request For Extension). On March 30, 2023, Judge Nee held a hearing on this request and
denied the request. ECF No. 7-12 (Hearing Notice); ECF No. 7-13 (Order Denying Request For
Extension). And so, on March 31, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari with
the Supreme Court of Maryland challenging Judge Dumais’ decision. ECF No. 7-7 (Petition for
Writ of Certiorari).2
Thereafter, on March 21, 2024, Ms. Fox filed a second petition for a peace order against
the Plaintiff. ECF No. 7-14 (Second Fox Petition). On April 1, 2024, Judge Oliver presided
over the final hearing on the petition and determined that the Plaintiff had harassed Ms. Fox.
ECF No. 7-15 (Second Fox Peace Order). And so, Judge Oliver granted Ms. Fox’s second
petition for a Peace Order. Id. The Plaintiff, subsequently, appealed Judge Oliver’s Peace Order
on April 23, 2024. ECF No. 7-16 (Appeal of Second Fox Peace Order). On March 1, 2024,
Judge Fairfax presided over the appeal hearing and affirmed Judge Oliver’s decision. ECF No.
7-17 (Fairfax Order).
The District Court Litigation
The Plaintiff commenced this civil action on January 10, 2025. ECF No. 1. In the
complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that certain MCPD officers violated Section 1983 and “initiated
contact with [him] based on a false assertion that he was on the property of Defendant Fox, when
they knew or should have known, that [he] was on public property and had the right to be there.”
Id. at 6. The Plaintiff further alleges that “[t]he defendants, including Defendant Fox, violated

2 On June 20, 2023, the Supreme Court of Maryland denied the Plaintiff’s appeal. ECF No. 7-8 (Denial
of Petition for Writ of Certiorari).
[his rights under the First Amendment] by prohibiting the Plaintiff from exercising the right to be
in public, and specifically, on the public sidewalk.” Id. at 7. In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that
Judges Nee, Oliver and Fairfax “violated [his] right to be free from discrimination” by, among
other things “suggest[ing] that the Plaintiff just walk on a different street” and telling “the
Plaintiff [that he] was out on the public sidewalk located in front of Defendant Fox’s home for
[too] long.” Id. And so, the Plaintiff seeks, among other things, to recover actual and punitive
damages, costs and attorneys’ fees from the Defendants. Id. at Prayer for relief.
On February 21, 2025, the Plaintiff filed a Proof of Service with regards to Officer Pyles,
stating that Officer Pyles was served with a copy of the summons and complaint via certified
mail on February 7, 2025. ECF No. 5-2 at 1. A certified mail card that is addressed to Officer
Pyles at the 3rd District of the MCPD, 1002 Whitestone Dr., Silver Spring, MD 20904 is attached
to the Proof of Service. See id. The returned receipt is signed by Billie Wilson and dated
February 14, 2025. See id. at 2.
On April 8, 2025, Officer Pyles filed a motion to quash service of the summons and
complaint, along with supporting affidavits. ECF Nos. 13, 13-1 and 13-2. In his sworn affidavit,
Billie Wilson states that: (1) he “serve[s] as front desk staff for the Montgomery County Police
Department, 3rd District located at 1002 Whitestone Dr., Silver Spring, MD 20904;” (2) “[o]n
February 14, 2025, [he] received, [via] certified mail, a package addressed to Office[r] Pyles;”
and (3) “[o]n February 14, 2025, [he] was not authorized to accept service on behalf of Officer
Pyles in his individual capacity, nor [has he] ever been authorized to accept such service on his
behalf.” ECF No. 13-2 at ¶¶ 1-4. Officer Pyles also states in his sworn affidavit that: “[he has]
not been personally served with the Complaint and Summons in this action, nor [has he]
authorized any person to accept service of the Complaint and Summons on [his] behalf,” and
“Billie Wilson . . . was not authorized to accept service on [his] behalf on February 14, 2025.”
ECF No. 13-3 at ¶¶ 2-3.
B. Procedural History
On January 10, 2025, the Plaintiff filed the complaint. ECF No. 1. On February 28,
2025, the Judicial Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and
(b)(6), and a memorandum in support thereof. ECF Nos. 7 and 7-1. On March 17, 2025, the
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF No.
12.
On March 12, 2025, the Plaintiff filed a motion for a default judgment as to Officer
Pyles. ECF No. 11. On April 10, 2025, Officer Pyles filed a response in opposition to the
Plaintiff’s motion. ECF No. 14.
On April 8, 2025, Officer Pyles filed a motion to quash service of the summons and
complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). ECF No. 13. On April 16, 2025, the Plaintiff
filed a response in opposition to the motion to quash. ECF No. 16. On April 30, 2025, Officer
Pyles filed a reply brief. ECF No. 16.
The parties’ respective motions having been fully briefed, the Court resolves the pending
motions.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Pro Se Litigants
The Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter without the assistance of counsel. And so, the
Court must construe the complaint liberally. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980). But,
in doing so, the Court cannot disregard a clear failure to allege facts setting forth a cognizable
claim. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating a district court may not “conjure
up questions never squarely presented”); Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 13-478, 2013 WL
6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Although a pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more
leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obliged to ferret through a
[c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true
substance, if any, is well disguised.”) (quotations and citations omitted). And so, if a plaintiff
fails to allege sufficient facts setting forth a cognizable claim, the Court must dismiss the
complaint.
B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1), is a challenge to the Court’s “competence or authority to hear the case.” Davis v.
Thompson, 367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005). The Supreme Court of the United States
has explained that subject-matter jurisdiction is a “threshold matter” that is “inflexible and
without exception.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1995) (quoting
Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). And so, an objection that the
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction “may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own
initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.” Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has also explained that the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Evans v. B.F.
Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac
R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)). Given this, the Court “regard[s]
the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue[] and may consider evidence outside the pleadings
without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment,” when deciding a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Id. (citation omitted). And so, if a plaintiff “fails to
allege facts upon which the court may base jurisdiction,” then the Court should grant a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Davis, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
C. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 And Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 governs service of the summons and complaint on a
defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. Specifically, Rule 4(e) provides that, to effectuate service an
individual within a judicial district of the United States, a plaintiff may: (1) serve the individual
in accordance with state law; (2) deliver a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual
personally; (3) leave a copy of the summons and complaint at the individual’s dwelling or usual
place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (4) deliver a
copy of the summons and complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
When a defendant challenges service of process, “the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing the validity of service pursuant to Rule 4” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
O’Meara v. Waters, 464 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476 (D. Md. 2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(l)(1).
Where a plaintiff improperly serves a defendant, the Court may quash the service, permitting the
plaintiff to attempt to properly serve the defendant. Shlikas v. SLM Corp., No. CIV. WDQ-09-
2806, 2011 WL 2118843, at *2 (D. Md. May 25, 2011), aff’d, 546 F. App’x 290 (4th Cir. 2013)
(citing Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 576 (4th Cir. 1983)).
In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has held that “[g]enerally, when service of process gives
the defendant actual notice of the pending action, the courts may construe Rule 4 liberally to
effectuate service and uphold the jurisdiction of the court.” O’Meara, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 476
(citing Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1963); Armco, Inc. v. Penrod–
Stauffer Bldg. Sys., Inc., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984)). But “[e]ven when Defendants
receive actual notice of the proceedings against them, [the] Plaintiff still must comply with ‘plain
requirements for the means of effecting service of process.’” Davis v. Balt. City Cmty. Coll., No.
19-cv-2194-ADC, 2019 WL 5636362, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2019) (quoting Armco, 733 F.2d at
1089). And so, “[i]n Maryland, service by mail is proper only when the complaint and summons
are sent using ‘certified mail requesting . . . [r]estricted [d]elivery.’” Jarvis v. Dist. Taco, LLC,
No. CV 23-1029, 2023 WL 3847428, at *3 (D. Md. June 6, 2023) (citing Maryland Rule 2-
121(a)). And so, “[s]ervice is thus invalid where, for example, the plaintiff merely sends the
documents by first class mail.” Id. (citing Md. State Firemen’s Ass’n v. Chaves, 166 F.R.D. 353,
355 (D. Md. 1996)).
D. Eleventh Amendment And Judicial Immunity
The Fourth Circuit has held that “[s]overeign immunity deprives federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear claims, and a court finding that a party is entitled to sovereign immunity must
dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamics Info.
Tech., Inc., 888 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted) (affirming dismissal under Rule
12(b)(1)). The Supreme Court has also held that the Eleventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution bars a suit in federal court against a state, one of its agencies or departments, or one
of its officials acting in an official capacity, without a valid abrogation or waiver of the state’s
sovereign immunity. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.
139, 144-45 (1993); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). The
Supreme Court has also recognized that “[t]he ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is
that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.” Bd. of Trs. of
Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). And so, this Court has long held that the
State of Maryland has not waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for suits in
federal court. See, e.g., Dixon v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 345 F. Supp. 2d 512, 513 (D. Md.
2003).
The doctrine of judicial immunity provides that judges are “absolutely immune from suit
for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities or within [their]
jurisdiction.” See Cogswell v. Rodriguez, 304 F. Supp. 2d 350, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-12 (1991)). In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has held that:
[J]udicial immunity is strong medicine. When it applies it is absolute. It
not only protects judges from ultimate liability in a case, but also serves as
a complete bar to suit. It applies even to judicial acts flawed by the
commission of grave procedural errors, and protects even actions alleged to
have been done maliciously or corruptly.

Gibson v. Goldston, 85 F.4th 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). But, as the Fourth Circuit has also recognized, “[j]udicial immunity does not
protect judges so much as it protects the judicial acts they undertake as part of their public
service. . . .” Id. (emphasis omitted). Given this, “judges are not protected if they act in the
‘clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter,’ or when they engage in nonjudicial
acts.” Id. (citations omitted). And so, when determining whether judicial immunity should
apply, the Court “examine[s] the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class
of officials has been lawfully entrusted,” and then “evaluate[s] the effect that exposure to
particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions.”
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
E. Default Judgment And Fed. R. Civ. P. 55
Lastly, Rule 55 governs default judgments entered “[w]hen a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure
is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The Court may enter default
judgment at the plaintiff’s request and with notice to the defaulting party. Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(b)(2). Although courts maintain “a strong policy that cases be decided on the merits,” United
States v. Schaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 453 (4th Cir. 1993), default judgment is appropriate
when the “adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.”
S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (D. Md. 2005). Lastly, pursuant to Local Rule
108.2 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, the Clerk of the Court must enter default before the Plaintiff may
file a motion for default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; L.R. 108.2; see also Evans v. Prince
George’s Cmty. Television, Inc., No. 8:19-CV-03529-PX, 2021 WL 3037445 (D. Md. July 19,
2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 1644640 (4th Cir. May 24, 2022) (“[Plaintiff’s] motion for default
judgment is premature given that the Clerk had not yet entered default, a necessary
precondition.”); Sigala v. ABR of VA, Inc., No. GJH-15-1779, 2016 WL 1643759, at *2 n.2 (D.
Md. Apr. 21, 2016) (obtaining a Clerk’s entry of default is a “necessary prerequisite to obtaining
judgment by default.”) (citation omitted)).
IV. ANALYSIS
Pending before the Court are three motions that are ripe for resolution by the Court.
First, the Judicial Defendants have moved to dismiss the claims brought against them in
this civil action, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), upon the grounds that: (1) the
Court may not consider the Plaintiff’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine; (2)
the Judicial Defendants enjoy immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; and (3) the Plaintiff’s
claims against them are barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. See ECF No. 7-1
at 5-8. In addition, the Judicial Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the claims
brought against them in this case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because the Plaintiff has
not provided “a clear statement of the facts necessary to constitute any cause of action against the
Judicial Defendants.” See id. at 9-10.
The Plaintiff counters that the Court should not dismiss his claims against the Judicial
Defendants, because: (1) he “request[s] that the [C]ourt examine whether these judges
overstepped their official duties, in violation of [the Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights” and (2) the
Judicial Defendants are not immune from his claims. ECF No. 12 at 1 and 2-5. And so, the
Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id. at 1 and 8.
Second, the Plaintiff has moved for default judgment against Officer Pyles, upon the
grounds that Officer Pyles has neither responded to the complaint, nor otherwise defended this
action, after having been properly served with the summons and complaint. See ECF No. 11; see
also ECF No. 15. Officer Pyles opposes the Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, because he
has not been properly served with the summons and complaint. ECF No. 12 at 1-2. And so,
Officer Pyles requests that the Court deny the Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment. Id.
Lastly, Officer Pyles has moved to quash the service of the summons and complaint in
this matter, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), because the Plaintiff has not properly served
him with a copy of the summons and complaint, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. ECF No. 13 at
1-2; see also ECF No. 13-2. In his response in opposition to the motion to quash, the Plaintiff
appears to concede that he did not personally serve Officer Pyles with a copy of the summons
and complaint, or serve these documents on an authorized agent of Officer Pyles, as required by
Rule 4. ECF No. 15 at 1-2. But, the Plaintiff, nonetheless, contends that service of process was
proper. Id. at 1. And so, the Plaintiff requests that the Court deny Officer Pyles’ motion to
quash. Id. at 2.
For the reasons that follow, the Court must dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims against the
Judicial Defendants, because these claims are subject to of Eleventh Amendment immunity and
barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Officer Pyles has also shown that the Plaintiff failed
to properly serve him with a copy of the summons and complaint as required by Rule 4. And so,
the Court: (1) GRANTS the Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7); (2) GRANTS
Officer Pyles’ motion to quash (ECF No. 13); (3) DENIES the Plaintiff’s motion for default
judgment (ECF No. 11); (4) DISMISSES Counts I, II and III in the complaint as to the Judicial
Defendants; (5) QUASHES the service of the summons and the complaint as to Officer Pyles;
and (6) DIRECTS the Plaintiff to properly serve Officer Pyles with the summons and complaint
as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e), by September 26, 2025.
A. The Court Must Dismiss The Claims Against The Judicial Defendants
As an initial matter, the Court must dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims in this civil action
against the Judicial Defendants, because these claims are subject to Eleventh Amendment
immunity and barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. It is well-established that the
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars a suit in federal court against a state,
one of its agencies or departments, or one of its officials acting in an official capacity, without a
valid abrogation or waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer
Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144-45 (1993); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Haldeman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984). Relevant to this dispute, this Court has held that the State of Maryland has not waived its
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for suits in federal court. See, e.g., Dixon v. Balt. City
Police Dep’t, 345 F. Supp. 2d. 512, 513 (D. Md. 2003).
In addition, under the doctrine of judicial immunity, judges are “absolutely immune from
suit for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities or within [their]
jurisdiction.” See Cogswell v. Rodriguez, 304 F. Supp. 2d 350, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-12 (1991)). In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has held that
judicial immunity “serves as a complete bar to suit” and “protects even actions alleged to have
been done maliciously or corruptly.” Gibson v. Goldston, 85 F.4th 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2023)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, judicial immunity does not protect
judges who “act in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter,’ or when they
engage in nonjudicial acts.” Id. (citations omitted). And so, when determining whether judicial
immunity should apply to this case, the Court “examine[s] the nature of the functions with which
a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted,” and then “evaluate[s] the
effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise
of those functions.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
In this case, the Plaintiff’s claims against the Judicial Defendants are subject to Eleventh
Amendment immunity and barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity for several reasons. First,
there is no dispute that the Judicial Defendants are Associate Judges of the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, Maryland and the District Court of Montgomery County, Maryland. See
ECF No. 7 at 1; ECF No. 1 at 3-4. The complaint also makes clear that the Plaintiff is suing the
Judicial Defendants in their official capacities as Maryland State Judges and that the Plaintiff’s
claims arise from official acts that the Judicial Defendants undertook in litigation involving the
Plaintiff. ECF No. 1 at 3-8.
As this Court has previously recognized, the State of Maryland has not waived its
sovereign immunity for suit in federal court. Dixon, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 513. Because the
Judicial Defendants are State of Maryland officials, the Eleventh Amendment bars the Plaintiff’s
claims in this federal lawsuit against these State officials. Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t. § 12-
101(a)(1), (11) (West 2025) (a Maryland State Judge is state personnel); Will, 491 U.S. at 66;
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100. And so, the Court must DISMISS the Plaintiff’s claims against the
Judicial Defendants.
The dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claims against the Judicial Defendants is also warranted,
because these claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. A careful reading of the
complaint makes clear that the Plaintiff seeks to challenge certain judicial actions taken by the
Judicial Defendants related to the Peace Orders. See ECF No. 1 at 5-22; see also Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1503(a) (authorizing Maryland State District Court Judges to grant
peace orders); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1506(b)(1)-(2) (authorizing Maryland State
Circuit Court Judges to hear appeals of a final peace orders). Because the decisions and rulings
of the Judicial Defendants related to the Peace Orders are clearly judicial acts that fall within the
scope of their professional duties as judicial officers, the Plaintiff’s claims challenging these acts
are precluded by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Cogswell, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 356 (citing
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-12); see also Parker v. State, 653 A.2d 436, 441 (Md. 1995) (“[A] judge
who has a general judicial authority to perform the kinds of acts for which he is sued is
absolutely immune from civil liability for those acts.”) (citation omitted). And so, the Court
must also DISMISS the Plaintiff’s claims against the Judicial Defendants pursuant to the
doctrine of judicial immunity.3
B. The Plaintiff Has Not Properly Served Officer Pyles
Turning to the remaining motions pending before the Court, the Plaintiff has not shown
that he is entitled to default judgment against Officer Pyles, because he has not properly served
Officer Pyles with a copy of the summons and complaint as required by Rule 4. And so, the
Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. For this same reason, the Court
GRANTS Officer Pyles’ motion to quash service.
Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that service of process on an
individual within a judicial district of the United States be accomplished by either: (1) serving
the individual in accordance with state law; (2) delivering a copy of the summons and complaint
to the individual personally; (3) leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the individual’s
dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there;
or (4) delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or
by law to receive service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). “In Maryland, service by mail is
proper only when the complaint and summons are sent using ‘certified mail requesting . . .
[r]estricted [d]elivery.’” Jarvis v. Dist. Taco, LLC, No. CV 23-1029, 2023 WL 3847428, at *3
(D. Md. June 6, 2023) (citing Maryland Rule 2-121(a)).
Here, there is no dispute that the Plaintiff attempted to serve Officer Pyles by sending the
summons and complaint via certified mail to Officer Pyles at the MCPD, 3rd District. ECF No.
5-2. It is also undisputed that Billie Wilson, who is a front desk staff person for the MCPD, 3rd
District, received the summons and complaint on February 14, 2025, and that Mr. Wilson is not
authorized to accept service on behalf of Officer Pyles. ECF No. 13-2 at ¶¶ 1-4. It is similarly
undisputed that Officer Pyles has not been personally served with the summons and complaint.
ECF No. 13-3 at ¶¶ 2-3.
Given these undisputed facts, the Court must conclude that the Plaintiff has not properly
served Officer Pyles with the summons and complaint as required by Rule 4. See Jarvis, 2023

3 Because the Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s claims against the Judicial Defendants are precluded
under the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of judicial immunity, the Court does not reach the other
arguments raised in the Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
WL 3847428, at *3 (“In Maryland, service by mail is proper only when the complaint and
summons are sent using ‘certified mail requesting . . . [r]estricted [d]elivery’”) (citing Maryland
Rule 2-121(a)). And so, the Plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to a default judgment
against Officer Pyles in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; see also S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh, 359 F.
Supp. 2d 418, 421 (D. Md. 2005) (To obtain a default judgment, the Plaintiff must show that the
“adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.”).
For this same reason, Officer Pyles has also shown that it is appropriate to quash the
service of the summons and complaint. Shlikas v. SLM Corp., No. CIV. WDQ-09-2806, 2011
WL 2118843, at *2 (D. Md. May 25, 2011) (when a summons and complaint are not properly
served, the Court may quash the service and permit the plaintiff to attempt to properly serve the
defendant), aff’d, 546 F. App’x 290 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697
F.2d 574, 576 (4th Cir. 1983)). And so, the Court: (1) DENIES the Plaintiff’s motion for a
default judgment (ECF No. 11) and (2) GRANTS Officer Pyles’ motion to quash service (ECF
No. 13).
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, a careful reading of the complaint makes clear that the Plaintiff’s claims against
the Judicial Defendants are subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity and barred by the doctrine
of judicial immunity. Officer Pyles has also shown that the Plaintiff failed to properly serve him
with a copy of the summons and complaint as required by Rule 4. And so, for the foregoing
reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7);
(2) GRANTS Officer Pyles’ motion to quash (ECF No. 13);
(3) DENIES the Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 11);
(4) DISMISSES Counts I, II and III in the complaint as to the Judicial Defendants;
(5) QUASHES the service of the summons and complaint as to Officer Pyles; and
(6) DIRECTS the Plaintiff to properly serve Officer Pyles with the summons and
complaint as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e), by September 26, 2025.
A separate Order shall issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Lydia Kay Griggsby
LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11133800. Public record. Not legal advice.