# DELIU v. FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS

> District Court, N.D. Florida · August 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11133757

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 6, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

FRANCISCO CATALIN DELIU,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:23-cv-156-MW-MJF

FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR
EXAMINERS, et al.,

Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In this civil action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff
contends that the Florida Supreme Court violated the Due Process
Clause and Florida law when it created the Florida Board of Bar
Examiners, and the Board violated Plaintiff’s right to due process of law
when the Board failed to review expeditiously Plaintiff’s application for
admission to the Florida Bar. Plaintiff sues the Florida Board of Bar
Examiners, its members, its executive director, and its general counsel—
in their official capacities. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 39. Plaintiff
responded in opposition. Doc. 43. Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim,

the District Court should grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a Florida resident and “an admitted barrister and

solicitor” in other nations that Plaintiff does not specify. Doc. 26 ¶ 4. In
2021, Plaintiff applied for admission to the Florida Bar, and the Florida
Board of Bar Examiners (“the Board”) has not recommended that the

Florida Supreme Court authorize Plaintiff to practice law in Florida. Id.
¶ 3.
Plaintiff contends that the Florida Supreme Court violated Florida

law when it created the Board. Plaintiff further contends that the Board
has violated his constitutional rights by processing his application and
preventing the Florida Supreme Court from considering Plaintiff’s

application to the Florida Bar. Doc. 26 at ¶ 49. For relief, Plaintiff seeks
a court order: (1) compelling the Board to place his bar application before
the Supreme Court for consideration; and (2) precluding the Board from

exercising any jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s application to practice law in
Florida.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes defendants to
move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a claim to survive dismissal, the

“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” rather than the

mere possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Failure to State a Claim for a Denial of “Procedural” Due
Process

In a claim asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff contends
that the Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth-Amendment right to
procedural due process of law.1 Doc. 26 at 15–16.

1 Plaintiff also contends that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fifth-
Amendment right to due process of law. Doc. 26 at 16. But the Due
1. “Unconstitutional Delegation of Authority” Claim

Plaintiff alleges that the Florida Supreme Court denied Plaintiff
due process of law by delegating to the Board the Florida Supreme
Court’s authority to admit attorneys to the Florida bar. See Doc. 26 at 10,

16.
Under the United States Constitution, delegation of federal power
is limited by the separation of powers principle incorporated in the first

three Articles of the Constitution. See Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220, 245
(2021); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 223
(2020). The Constitution, therefore, places limitations on delegations of

federal powers. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472
(2001); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991).
But the United States Constitution does not require “the states to

have a tripartite system of government.” United Beverage Co. of S. Bend
v. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 760 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1985).

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment “applies only to violations of
constitutional rights by the United States or a federal actor.” Jones v.
City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff does not
assert a claim against the United States or a federal actor. Thus, Plaintiff
has failed to state a Fifth-Amendment due-process claim.
“[M]aintenance of the separation of powers in the States is not, in and of

itself, a concern of the Federal Constitution.” Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S.
72, 100 (1959).
Nevertheless, a state’s delegation of legislative power to private

organizations devoid of a “standard by which the power thus given is to
be exercised,” can violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143–44 (1912);

see City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 677 (1976);
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 120
(1928); Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 168–70 (1923). A state “legislative

body may not constitutionally delegate to private parties the power to
determine the nature of rights to property in which other individuals
have a property interest, without supplying standards to guide the

private parties’ discretion.” Gen. Electric Co. v. New York State Dep’t of
Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1455 (2d Cir. 1991).
To state a due-process claim that a state unlawfully delegated

authority to a private entity, a plaintiff must allege at least the following:
(1) The state delegated legislative power to a private board;
(2) The state failed to provide the private board any standard by
which to exercise the delegated power;

(3) The state lacks any ability to review meaningfully the board’s
decisions, thus depriving the plaintiff of a process to seek
redress; and

(4) The state deprived the plaintiff of life, liberty, or property.
Roberge, 278 U.S. at 120; Douglas, 261 U.S. at 168–70; Eubank, 226 U.S.
at 143–44; Rice v. Village of Johnstown, Ohio, 30 F.4th 584, 590–91 (6th

Cir. 2022); United Beverage Co. of S. Bend, 760 F.2d at 159.
The Florida Supreme Court Did Not Delegate Legislative
Power to the Board. Under Florida law, the power to admit or deny

admission to the bar is a judicial power, not a legislative power.2 Florida
law specifically states:

2 Florida is not an outlier in this respect. Most states entrust the power
to control admission to the bar to the highest court of a particular state.
See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam); Middlesex Cnty.
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (New
Jersey); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of the State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232,
248 (1967) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333,
378–79 (1866); Nichols v. Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d 726, 732 (11th Cir.
2016) (Alabama). Indeed, this is one of the reasons that attorneys are
sometimes referred to as “officers of the court.” Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.
at 378.
• “The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and
the discipline of persons admitted.” FLA. CONST., art. v § 15.

• “Admissions of attorneys and counselors to practice law in the
state is hereby declared to be a judicial function.” Fla. Stat. §
454.021(1).

• “The Supreme Court of Florida, being the highest court of said
state, is the proper court to govern and regulate admissions of
attorneys and counselors to practice law in said state.” Fla.
Stat. § 454.021(2).

Thus, to the extent the State of Florida delegated power to the
Board to assess the fitness of attorneys to be admitted to practice in
Florida courts, it did not delegate legislative power. Because Florida did
not delegate legislative power to the Board, Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Florida Supreme Court Provided Standards to Govern
the Board. There is a second, independent reason to dismiss Plaintiff’s
“delegation” claim: The State of Florida has provided the Board with
standards to govern its conduct.3

3 In traditional delegation claims, as long as there is an “intelligible
principle” to guide the agency in applying the law, courts will not “disturb
[the] grant of authority.” Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Consumers’ Rsch.,
606 U.S. __, 145 S. Ct. 2482, 2491 (2025). This simply requires that both
The Florida Supreme Court promulgated and approved the Rules

of the Supreme Court Relating to the Admissions to the Bar. See Fla. Bar
Admiss. R. 1-12. The Supreme Court created the Board “to implement
the rules relating to bar admissions.” Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 1-13. The Rules

require the Board to “ensure that each applicant has met the
requirements of the rules with regard to character and fitness, education,
and technical competence prior to recommending an applicant for

admission” and “recommend the admission of every applicant who has
complied with all the requirements of the applicable rules, who has
attained passing scores on the examination and who has demonstrated

the requisite character and fitness for admission.” Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 1-
14.2, 1-16, 5-10. Thus, the Rules require the Board to “conduct an
investigation to determine the character and fitness of each applicant or

registrant.” Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 3-21.
The Rules also identify the “essential attributes for all applicants.”
Fla Bar Admiss. R. 3-10. Furthermore, the Rules set forth what

the “general policy” that an agency must pursue, and the boundaries of
its delegated authority are clear such that the courts, agency and public
can ascertain whether the agency followed the law. Id.; see Bush v.
Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 332 (Fla. 2004).
misconduct may be cause for further inquiry before recommendation of

admission can be made, factors that must be considered in assigning
weight and significant to the prior misconduct, and factors to be
considered in deciding whether an applicant has sufficiently shown

“rehabilitation.” See Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 3-11, 3-12, 3-13.
The Florida Supreme Court also prescribed the categories of
conduct that make an applicant ineligible to apply for admission. See.

Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 2-13.
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court provided the Board with
sufficient standards to govern its conduct and did not empower the Board

to act arbitrarily. For this reason, too, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible
due-process claim based on the alleged delegation of authority to the
Board.

The Florida Supreme Court Retains Final Authority to
Review the Board’s Decisions. There is a third independent reason to
dismiss Plaintiff’s delegation claim: The Florida Supreme Court retains

the authority to review and overrule any decision by the Board.
The Board of Bar Examiners was created by the Florida Supreme
Court. LaBossiere v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 279 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla.
1973). The Board also is “subject to the direct control and supervision of

that court.” Ramos v. Tomasino, 701 F. App’x 798, 804 (11th Cir. 2017)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). “Because the Florida
Supreme Court retains plenary authority over the actions of . . . the Board

of Bar Examiners, it retains the ultimate power to make admissions.” Id.
(internal citations and quotations omitted); Uberoi v. Supreme Court of
Florida, 819 F.3d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir. 2016); Lopez v. Fla. Bd. Of Bar

Exam’rs, 231 So. 2d 819, 821 (Fla. 1969). Indeed, the rules for admission
to the Florida Bar specifically authorize applicants to seek review by the
Florida Supreme Court of the Board’s decisions and actions, including

any undue delay by the Board. See e.g., Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 2-30.2; Fla.
Bar Admiss. R. 3-40.
Because the Florida Supreme Court retains the authority to review

and overrule any decision by the Board, Plaintiff’s delegation claim also
fails.
2. Claim that the Board Has Failed to Address Plaintiff’s
Application Promptly

Plaintiff also alleges that the Board denied Plaintiff due process of
law by suspending consideration of Plaintiff’s application and by failing
to make a character and fitness determination expeditiously. Doc. 26 ¶¶

15, 17(e).
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state must “provide fair
procedures and an impartial decisionmaker before infringing on a

person’s interest in life, liberty, or property.” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d
1550, 1561 (11th Cir. 1994). For a procedural due process claim, the
“deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in

‘life, liberty, or property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due
process of law.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). In other

words, a claim for a violation of due process under § 1983 “is not complete
when the deprivation occurs” rather it is complete only when “the State
fails to provide due process.” Id. at 126. Thus, to state a claim for a

violation of the right to procedural due process, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty or property;
(2) governmental deprivation of that interest; and

(3) the state provided inadequate procedures.
Bank of Jackson Cnty. v. Cherry, 980 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1993);
see Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023).
Florida Provided Adequate Procedures to Challenge the

Board’s Suspension of Plaintiff’s Application and the Board’s
Delay. Florida Bar Rules Regarding Admission of Attorneys provided—
and continue to provide—Plaintiff with avenues to challenge: (1) the

Board’s suspension of Plaintiff’s bar application; (2) any undue delay by
the Boad in processing Plaintiff’s bar application; and (3) the Board’s
recommendation to the Florida Supreme Court, if the Board makes an

adverse recommendation.
To the extent Plaintiff challenges the Board’s decision to suspend
his bar application, the rules governing admission to the Florida Bar

provide Plaintiff an opportunity to seek Florida Supreme Court review of
the Board’s decision:
Any applicant or registrant who is dissatisfied with an
administrative decision of the board that does not concern
character and fitness matters may, within 60 days after
receipt of written notice of that decision, file a petition with
the Supreme Court of Florida for review of the action.

Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 2-30.2 (emphasis added); see Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs
re Webster, 3 So.3d 1058, 1059 (Fla. 2009) (reviewing the Board’s decision
to cease processing Webster’s application for admission to the Florida
Bar); Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners re R.L.V.H., 587 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla.
1991) (reviewing a decision by the Board that a petitioner was ineligible

to apply for admission to the Florida Bar).
Furthermore, the Rules permit applicants “whose character and
fitness investigation is not finished within 9 months from the date of

submission of a completed Bar Application” to petition the Supreme
Court of Florida for an order directing the board to conclude its
investigation. Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 3-40.2.

Additionally, if the Board makes an adverse recommendation
regarding an applicant’s character and fitness, the Rules also permit
applicants to seek judicial review of the Board’s determination. See Fla.

Bar Admiss. R. 3-40.1. Plaintiff does not allege that these avenues of
seeking relief from the Florida Supreme Court are unavailable to him.
Because Florida law provided Plaintiff adequate process to address

the Board’s decision to suspend Plaintiff’s bar application, and any undue
delay by the Board, and any adverse recommendation the Board may
make, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a denial of due process.

B. Failure to State a “Substantive” Due Process Claim
The United States Supreme Court has held that, in addition to its
procedural component, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment encompasses a “substantive” component. County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998); Maddox v. Stephens, 727
F.3d 1109, 1118 (11th Cir. 2013). The substantive aspect of the Due
Process clause, however, protects only “fundamental” rights. See

McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)). Fundamental rights are those “deeply rooted in our legal
tradition” and that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”

Hillcrest Property, LLP v. Pasco County, 915 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir.
2019); Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of Ala., 114 F.4th 1241, 1296 (11th Cir.
2024). A violation of substantive due process occurs when an individual’s

fundamental rights are infringed, regardless of the fairness of the
procedure. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556.
To state a plausible “substantive” due process claim, a plaintiff

must allege:
(1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutionally protected
interest; and

(2) the deprivation was the result of an abuse of governmental
power sufficient to raise an ordinary tort to the stature of a constitutional
violation.
Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 2016); Manzini

v. The Florida Bar, 511 F. App’x 978, 982 (11th Cir. 2013).4
Florida Law Cannot Create a Substantive Right. When
“substantive rights are created only by state law,” they “are not subject

to substantive due process protection . . . because substantive due
process rights are created only by the [United States] Constitution.”
McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556. Plaintiff asserts that, under the Florida

Constitution, he has a “fundamental right” to have the Florida Supreme
Court “exclusively” address his bar application. Doc. 26 ¶ 48. But the
Florida constitution cannot create a fundamental right sufficient to state

a plausible claim for relief on “substantive” due process grounds. See also
Hillcrest Prop., LLP, 915 F.3d at 1298 (“fundamental rights in the
constitutional sense do not include ‘state-created rights.’”).

4 There is a second type of substantive due process claim. “When ‘state
created rights are infringed by a ‘legislative act,’ the substantive
component of Due Process Clause generally protects that person from
arbitrary and irrational government action.” Hillcrest Property, LLP, 915
F.3d at 1299. Plaintiff, however, does not allege that a legislative act
infringed his rights.
Furthermore, even if the Florida Constitution could create a

fundamental right for purposes of a substantive due process claim, as
discussed above, Plaintiff has not been deprived of his Florida
constitutional right to have the Florida Supreme Court address his bar

application. The Florida Supreme Court retains the ultimate decision-
making authority regarding whether Plaintiff is admitted to the Florida
Bar.

There is No Fundamental Right to Practice Law. To the extent
Plaintiff claims that he has the fundamental right to practice law, the
Eleventh Circuit has unequivocally held otherwise: “The right to practice

law is not a fundamental right.” Kirkpatrick v. Shaw, 70 F.3d 100, 103
(11th Cir. 1995) (citing Jones v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Ala. State Bar, 737
F.2d 996, 1000 (11th Cir. 1984)); Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1390

n.2 (11th Cir. 1998).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not alleged that the Defendants
deprived him of a constitutionally-protected interest, he has failed to

state a substantive due process claim.
C. Plaintiff’s Claim Under Florida Law that the Florida
Supreme Court Violated Florida Law When It Created the
Board

Finally, Plaintiff asks the District Court to invalidate the Florida
Supreme Court’s creation of the Board because Florida law—specifically
the Florida Constitution and Fla. Stat. § 454.021—purportedly did not
authorize the Florida Supreme Court to create the Board. Doc. 26 ¶¶ 19–
44.

Because Plaintiff’s ultra vires claim is based on the Florida
Constitution, the District Court must follow Florida law. Highland
Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937). The construction of a

state statute and state constitution by the state supreme court is binding
on federal courts, and the words of the state supreme court “are the words
of the statute.” N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963); Highland

Farms Dairy, 300 U.S. at 612; see also Mississippi Valley Title Ins. Co. v.
Thompson, 754 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014); Johnston v. Tampa
Sports Auth., 530 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2008).

As noted above, the Florida Constitution vests “exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law” in
the Florida Supreme Court. FLA. CONST., art. v § 15. This authority is
also codified in Florida statute. Fla. Stat. § 454.021(2) (“The Supreme

Court of Florida, being the highest court of said state, is the proper court
to govern and regulate admissions of attorneys.”).
The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions and

concluded that its creation of the Board was a lawful exercise of its
exclusive constitutional and statutory authority. LaBossiere, 279 So. 2d
at 289; In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1977); State

ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Evans, 94 So. 2d 730, 734 (Fla. 1957). Because the
Florida Supreme Court has definitively held that its creation of the Board
was an act within the authority entrusted to the Court by the Florida

Constitution, Plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim to the contrary.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully

RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
1. GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. 39;
2. DISMISS this civil action; and

3. DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 6th day of August, 2025.

/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PLAINTIFF
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to address all preliminary matters and to make
recommendations regarding dispositive matters. See
N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to these proposed findings
and recommendations must be filed within fourteen
days of the date of the report and recommendation.
Any different deadline that may appear on the
electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. A party who fails to object to the
magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations
contained in a report and recommendation waives the
right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.
See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11133757. Public record. Not legal advice.
