# Tellez v. Harris County Texas

> District Court, S.D. Texas · September 4, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11133265

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** September 4, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
September 04, 2025
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT , Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
GABRIELLA TELLEZ, □ §
§
Plaintiff, § □
§
Vv. § Civil Action No. H-24-4058
§
HARRIS COUNTY TEXAS AND § .
CHRISTOPHER ROGERS § .
| §
Defendants. §
ORDER
Pending before the Court are Defendant Harris County’s Motion to Dismiss

(Document No. 8); and Defendant Christopher Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss
(Document No. 10). Having considered the Defendants’ motions, submissions, and
applicable law, the Court determines that Defendant Harris County’s motion should
be denied, and Defendant Christopher Rogers’ motion should be granted,
‘L_BACKGROUND
This is a matter involving alleged violations of the United States Constitution. ©
Plaintiff Gabriella Tellez brings suit against Defendants Harris County and
Christopher Rogers (“Rogers”) (collectively, “Defendants”. Plaintiff alleges that.
Defendants deprived her of her Second and Fourth Amendment rights by detaining
her, arresting her, seizing her property, charging her, and jailing her, “all without

warrant or reasonable suspicion or probable cause” during Plaintiff's employment

Mills Auto Storage, an impound lot used by law enforcement for impounded
vehicles. !
On December 10, 2022, a nonparty to this matter, Alvin Riggins (“Riggins”),
came to Mills Auto Storage to retrieve his car after being released from jail. Plaintiff.
contends that Riggins was unable to show proof of ownership, and thus, Plaintiff
denied Riggins entry to the lot causing him to become angry. Plaintiff further
contends that Riggins pushed open the gate and begin approaching Plaintiff. At that
point, Plaintiff deployed her personal firearm and pointed it at Riggins. Plaintiff
alleges that Riggins turned away and walked out of the impound lot. Shortly
thereafter, officers from the Harris County Sherrif’s Department arrived on the scene
and Plaintiff was arrested for assault with a deadly weapon.
Based on the foregoing, on October 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court
asserting claims against the Defendants for “violations of the Fourth Amendment,”
“violations of the Second Amendment,” and “municipal liability.”? On November
18, 2024, Harris County filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. On November 25, 2024, Rogers filed a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On December 9, 2024,

! Plaintiff's Complaint, Document No. 1, § 9.
? Plaintiff's Complaint, Document No. 1 at 14-16.

Plaintiff responded to the Defendants’ pending motions to dismiss. On December
16, 2024, both Defendants replied in support of their motions to dismiss.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces
does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ .. . it demands more than . . . ‘labels
and conclusions.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “[t]he
‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Canal Breeches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (Sth Cir.
2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464,
467 (Sth Cir. 2004)). To survive the motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
“Conversely, ‘when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point

of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” Cuvillier

v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (Sth Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).
il. LAW & ANALYSIS
Harris County and Rogers both move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint,
contending that the Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Court will consider, in turn, the merits of each pending motion before the Court.
A, Defendant Harris County’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Harris County is municipally liable for
Rogers’ actions because they failed to properly train Rogers. Harris County moves

_ to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, contending that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Harris County argues that they cannot be found liable if
qualified immunity is found to apply to Rogers’ actions and that Plaintiffs
allegations are conclusory. Plaintiff contends that the pleadings are sufficient to
satisfy the applicable pleading requirements and survive a motion to dismiss.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a municipality may be liable if execution of the
government’s policy results in constitutional violations. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To succeed on a claim
for municipal liability, a plaintiff must prove “a policymaker; an official policy; and

a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy of custom.”
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (Sth Cir. 2001). However, the Fifth

Circuit has made clear that overcoming a motion to dismiss requires only that the
plaintiff “plead facts that the challenged policy was promulgated or ratified by the
city’s policymaker.” Gorden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 285 (Sth Cir. 2016). A
plaintiff is not required to reference a specific municipal policy in their pleadings.
id.
Here, Harris County relies on Supreme Court precedent arguing that “[i]f the
Deputies are not liable, then Defendant [Harris County] cannot be liable.” See City
of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475. U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (holding that a jury’s conclusive
finding that an officer did not violate a constitutional right necessarily precluded a
finding that the city itself violated a constitutional right).* Harris County further
alleges that Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed because it makes conclusory
allegations regarding training and supervision. In response, Plaintiff contends that
she has plead sufficient facts to meet the pleading stage requirements.
A thorough review of the record in this case reveals that Plaintiff has plead

3 Defendant Harris County’s Motion to Dismiss, Document No. 8, { 34.
4 The Court has independently reviewed Los Angeles v. Heller. In doing so, the
Court notes that Heller is distinguished from this current case because Heller did not
address the question of qualified immunity. It is long established that a municipality can
be held liable for policies that result in constitutional violations. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

sufficient facts giving rise to her municipal liability claim against Harris County.°
Thus, given the Fifth Circuit’s guidance that a Plaintiff must only plead facts
suggesting that the municipality promulgated a policy that resulted in a
constitutional violation, and that facts pleaded must only make a claim plausible, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently plead their municipal liability claim.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Harris County’s motion to dismiss should be
denied. The Court will now consider Rogers’ pending motion to dismiss.
B. Defendant Christopher Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss
Rogers moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, contending that Plaintiff fails

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rogers contends that he is entitled

to qualified immunity and thus, immune from suit. In response, Plaintiff contends
that she has plead sufficient facts showing that there was a clearly established
constitutional right that was violated and thus, that Rogers’ motion should be denied.
When government officials are sued for a constitutional violation under
Section 1983, they may assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Porter

v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 612 (Sth Cir. 2004). “Qualified
immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from

> A review of the Plaintiff's complaint reveals that Plaintiff plead facts including
“fajny training and supervision on these issues [an individual’s right to own and properly
use a firearm] would have prevented the violation of Gabriella’s well-established
Constitutional rights.” Plaintiffs Complaint, Document No. 1, § 97.

[civil] liability ‘unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Glenn v.
City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (Sth Cir. 2001) (quoting Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d
274, 276 (Sth Cir. 1995)). The defense of qualified immunity provides ample room
for mistaken judgments on the government actors’ part and protects “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Estate of Davis ex rel.
McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 380 (Sth Cir. 2005) (quoting
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Qualified immunity is “immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237
(2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
Once qualified immunity is asserted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the defense does not apply. See McClendon vy. City of Columbia, 305
F.3d 314, 323 (Sth Cir. 2002). This burden requires the plaintiff to allege sufficient
facts showing that: (1) the defendants violated a clearly established constitutional
right; and (2) the defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable under the
circumstances. Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 537 (Sth Cir. 2004). This inquiry
also requires a court to “ask whether the law so clearly and unambiguously
prohibited his conduct that every reasonable official would understand that what he
is doing violates the law.” Morgan v. Swanson, 696 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011).
“In other words, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question confronted by the official beyond debate.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S.
765, 779 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
In the current case, Rogers contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Rogers further contends, based on Supreme Court precedent, that “Plaintiff has no
clearly established right to an exhaustive investigation of potential defenses prior to
arrest.” See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979). In response, Plaintiff

argues that “[a] constitutional right is ‘clearly established’ if no reasonable officer
would have thought the officer’s acts passed constitutional muster.”’ Plaintiff
contends that they have pleaded sufficient facts to show that there was a clearly
established constitutional right.
Here, Rogers contends that “[t]he allegations against the Deputies show they
are entitled to qualified immunity.”® Rogers further contends that Fifth Circuit case
law makes clear that “[t]he existence of an affirmative defense does not vitiate
probable cause to make an arrest.”’ In response, Plaintiff offers limited rebuttal,
raising only the affirmative defense that Plaintiff had a clearly established

6 Defendant Christopher Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss, Document No. 10, { 27.
7 Plaintiff's Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Documents 8 & 10,
Document No. 11, 4 19.
8 Defendant Christopher Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss, Document No. 10, 27.
° Defendant Christopher Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss, Document No. 10, { 28; see
also Loftin v. City of Prentiss, 33 F.4th 774, 780 (Sth Cir. 2022).

constitutional right allegedly violated by Rogers. The,Court has reviewed the record
in this matter in detail. A thorough review of the record reveals that Plaintiff fails to
sufficiently show that Rogers’ actions were objectively unreasonable given the
circumstances. Thus, given the Fifth Circuit’s guidance that a plaintiff bears the
burden of alleging sufficient facts showing both a violation of a person’s rights and
unreasonable action by the allegedly offending officer, the Court finds that
Plaintiff's claim fails to overcome Rogers’ presumption of qualified immunity.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, and thus, her claims against Rogers should be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendant Harris County’s Motion to Dismiss (Document No.
8) is DENIED. The Court further
ORDERS that Defendant Christopher Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss (Document
No. 10) is GRANTED. The Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff Gabriella Tellez’s claims against Christopher Rogers
are DISMISSED.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this i} day of September, 2025.

‘DAVID HITTNER
United States District Judge

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11133265. Public record. Not legal advice.
