# Brown 640704 v. Solorio

> District Court, W.D. Michigan · September 4, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11133241

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Michigan
- **Decided:** September 4, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11133241

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c
- holding the right to petition protects only the right to address government; the government may refuse to listen or respond

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______

DEMETRIUS JAMAL BROWN,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-921

v. Honorable Maarten Vermaat

UNKNOWN SOLORIO et al.,

Defendants.
____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action
under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a
putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless
notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros.,
Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under
longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a
named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in
that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless
a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non

directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive
rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s
claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the
proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette
Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of
the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent

of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a
consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),

1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Applying these standards, the Court will partially dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim as detailed below.
Discussion
I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Chippewa Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. The events
about which he complains occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia,
Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following IBC personnel: Correctional Officer Solorio,

Warden Matt MaCauley, and Grievance Coordinator Unknown Brooke. (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.2.)

1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
In Plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges that on May 7, 2025, at around 5:00 p.m. at IBC,
Defendant Solorio “was passing out dinner food trays.”2 (Id., PageID.3.) Defendant Solorio
“opened [Plaintiff’s] food slot to give [Plaintiff his] food,” and “after [Plaintiff] received [his]
food, [he] kept [his] hand in the food slot requesting to speak with a sergeant.”3 (Id.) Defendant
Solorio told Plaintiff “no” and was “getting mad.” (Id.) Thereafter, Defendant Solorio “slammed

[Plaintiff’s] hand in [the] food slot knowing [Plaintiff’s] hand was holding it.” (Id.) Plaintiff
“yell[ed] for help to release [his] hand out [of] the slot.” (Id.) Two to three minutes later, Defendant
Solorio returned to Plaintiff’s cell and opened the food slot with his keys. (Id.)
Approximately an hour after this incident, Plaintiff received medical treatment. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that his “hand was bleeding and swollen/broken.” (Id.) An unnamed non-party
nurse told Plaintiff to wear a splint for his broken “hand/fingers” from May 7, 2025, to May 24,
2025. (Id.)
At an unspecified time after the incident, non-party Sergeant Sissell told Plaintiff that
“[Plaintiff] was on bullshit”; Plaintiff claims that non-party Sergeant Sissell later reviewed “the

body cam and s[aw that Plaintiff] wasn’t.” (Id. (phrasing in original retained).)
Additionally, at an unspecified time after the incident with Defendant Solorio, Plaintiff
filed a grievance about the matter, and “the grievance coordinator denied [them] to cover up [the]
assaults.” (Id.)

2 In this opinion, the Court corrects the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation in quotations from
Plaintiff’s complaint.
3 This practice is commonly known as taking one’s food slot “hostage.” An inmate takes his food
slot “hostage” by preventing it from being closed, typically by placing his hand or arm in the slot.
See, e.g., Earby v. Ray, 47 F. App’x 744, 745 (6th Cir. 2002). This action violates MDOC prison
rules. See Annabel v. Armstrong, No. 1:09-cv-796, 2011 WL 3878379, at *4 n.5 (W.D. Mich. Mar.
30, 2011), R & R adopted by 2011 WL 3878385 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2011).
Subsequently, at an unspecified time “when the warden knew [the] ombudsman was
coming to see [Plaintiff], he made the nurses and [correctional officers] take [Plaintiff’s] splint
when [Plaintiff’s] hand was still hurting and swollen to cover up [Plaintiff’s] second assault.”4
(Id.)
Based on the foregoing allegations, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise an

Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Solorio, Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process and § 1983 civil conspiracy claims against Defendant MaCauley, and First
and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendant Brooke. As relief, Plaintiff “want[s] to sue
and justice be served for [the] physical and mental abuse [he has] been through.” (Id., PageID.4.)
II. Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

4 Plaintiff does not explain what he means by a “second assault.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
However, the Court notes that Plaintiff filed a prior case in this Court, which remains pending, in
which he alleged that excessive force was used against him in January of 2025 while he was
incarcerated at IBC. See Brown v. Mann, No. 1:25-cv-759 (W.D. Mich.). In light of this, it is
possible that Plaintiff considers the events underlying the present complaint to be the “second
assault” at IBC. However, that is not at all clear from Plaintiff’s present complaint.
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271

(1994).
A. Defendant Solorio
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Solorio used excessive force against him when Defendant
Solorio “slammed [Plaintiff’s] hand in [Plaintiff’s] food slot . . . .” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
As relevant to excessive force claims, the Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of
confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are
“totally without penological justification.” Id. However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to
a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “On occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and
discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under
common law.’” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Combs v.
Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)). Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth
Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”

Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034,
1037 (6th Cir. 1995)); Bailey v. Golladay, 421 F. App’x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011).
There is an objective component and a subjective component to Eighth Amendment claims.
Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693,
702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison
officials.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The objective

component requires a “contextual” investigation that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of
decency.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Although
the extent of a prisoner’s injury may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official,
it is not dispositive of whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy,
559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause
harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant
injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
In this action, Plaintiff alleges that on May 7, 2025, while Defendant Solorio was passing
out food trays, Plaintiff “kept [his] hand in the food slot requesting to speak with a sergeant.”
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Solorio told Plaintiff “no”
and was “getting mad.” (Id.) Defendant Solorio then “slammed [Plaintiff’s] hand in [the] food slot
knowing [Plaintiff’s] hand was holding it.” (Id.) Subsequently, an unnamed non-party nurse told
Plaintiff to wear a splint for his broken “hand/fingers” from May 7, 2025, to May 24, 2025. (Id.)
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court must take Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true

and in the light most favorable to him. Although Plaintiff has by no means proven his claims, the
Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant
Solorio at this time. See, e.g., Nelson v. Sharp, No. 96-2149, 1999 WL 520751, at *2 (6th Cir. July
14, 1999) (discussing that “the question of the degree of force used by the prison guard is
analytically distinct from the question of whether [the prisoner] violated prison rules by keeping
his hand in the food slot,” and concluding that a prisoner-plaintiff may be able to “prove that [a
correctional officer] violated his Eighth Amendment rights by slamming the food slot door on his
hand in such a manner as to inflict unnecessary pain in a wanton manner, not justified by prison
necessity or the degree of violation”).

B. Defendant MaCauley
Plaintiff alleges that at an unspecified time “when the warden knew [the] ombudsman was
coming to see [Plaintiff], he made the nurses and [correctional officers] take [Plaintiff’s] splint
when [Plaintiff’s] hand was still hurting and swollen to cover up [Plaintiff’s] . . . assault.” (Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff does not discuss Defendant MaCauley by name in the body of his
complaint; however, Plaintiff identifies Defendant MaCauley as the warden at IBC. (See id.,
PageID.2, 3.) The Court generously construes Plaintiff’s reference to “the warden” to be a
reference to Defendant MaCauley, and the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise a
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim and a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim against
Defendant MaCauley.
As to any intended substantive due process claims, “[s]ubstantive due process . . . serves
the goal of preventing governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, regardless
of the fairness of the procedures used.” Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs.,
640 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir.
1996)). Specifically, “[s]ubstantive due process ‘prevents the government from engaging in

conduct that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.’” Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). “Conduct shocks the conscience if it ‘violates the decencies
of civilized conduct.’” Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 589 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cnty. of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998)).
Here, although Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory manner that “when the warden knew [the]
ombudsman was coming to see [Plaintiff], he made the nurses and [correctional officers] take
[Plaintiff’s] splint when [Plaintiff’s] hand was still hurting,” Plaintiff alleges insufficient facts to
support this conclusory assertion and to show that this was the reason he did not have his splint.

Under these circumstances, the facts alleged in the complaint fall short of showing the sort of
egregious conduct that would support a substantive due process claim. Cf. Cale v. Johnson, 861
F.2d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that framing an inmate by planting evidence may violate
substantive due process where a defendant’s conduct shocks the conscience and constitutes an
“egregious abuse of governmental power”), overruled in other part by Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175
F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Accordingly, any intended Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process claim against Defendant MaCauley will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim.
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to raise a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim against
Defendant MaCauley, as explained below, Plaintiff fails to state such a claim. A civil conspiracy
under § 1983 is “an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action.”
See Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d
935, 943–44 (6th Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must show the existence of a single plan, that the

alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiff of a
federal right, and that an overt action committed in furtherance of the conspiracy caused an injury
to the plaintiff. Id.; Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011). Moreover, a
plaintiff must plead a conspiracy with particularity, as vague and conclusory allegations
unsupported by material facts are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 (recognizing that
allegations of conspiracy must be supported by allegations of fact that support a “plausible
suggestion of conspiracy,” not merely a “possible” one); Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th
Cir. 2008); Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003); Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d
1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that any “agreement” or “plan” existed. (See generally
Compl., ECF No. 1.) Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy are wholly conclusory. Plaintiff
has a subjective belief that Defendant MaCauley and unnamed non-parties took actions against
him; however, Plaintiff alleges no facts that indicate the existence of a plan, much less that any
Defendant shared a conspiratorial objective. Plaintiff’s subjective belief and personal
interpretation of the events, without supporting facts, are insufficient to show that Defendant
MaCauley engaged in a conspiracy.
As the United States Supreme Court has held, such allegations, while hinting at a sheer
“possibility” of conspiracy, do not contain “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that
an agreement was made.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57. Instead, the Supreme Court has
recognized that although parallel conduct may be consistent with an unlawful agreement, it is
insufficient to state a claim where that conduct “was not only compatible with, but indeed was
more likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed . . . behavior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). Accordingly, because Plaintiff does not allege facts to show an

agreement among Defendant MaCauley and the unnamed non-parties, Plaintiff fails to state a
plausible § 1983 civil conspiracy claim.
Accordingly, for these reasons, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant MaCauley will
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
C. Defendant Brooke
Plaintiff identifies Defendant Brooke as the grievance coordinator at IBC. (See Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff does not discuss Defendant Brooke by name in the body of
complaint; however, Plaintiff alleges that at an unspecified time after the incident with Defendant
Solorio, Plaintiff filed a grievance about matter, and “the grievance coordinator denied [them] to
cover up [the] assaults.” (Id., PageID.3.) The Court generously construes Plaintiff’s reference to

“the grievance coordinator” to be a reference to Defendant Brooke, and the Court construes
Plaintiff’s complaint to raise First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendant Brooke
regarding Plaintiff’s use of the grievance procedure at IBC.
Various courts have repeatedly held that there exists no constitutionally protected due
process right to an effective prison grievance procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467
(1983); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer,
80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002);
see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75
(4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). And, Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the
grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23
F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir.
Mar. 28, 1994). Thus, because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in the grievance process, any
response, or lack thereof, to Plaintiff’s grievances did not deprive Plaintiff of due process.
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to allege that his right to petition the

government was violated by any interference with the grievance process, this right is not violated
by a failure to process or act on his grievances. The First Amendment “right to petition the
government does not guarantee a response to the petition or the right to compel government
officials to act on or adopt a citizen’s views.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999);
see also Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (holding the right to
petition protects only the right to address government; the government may refuse to listen or
respond). Defendant Brooke’s actions also did not bar Plaintiff from seeking a remedy for his
grievances. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). “A prisoner’s constitutional right to assert
grievances typically is not violated when prison officials prohibit only ‘one of several ways in

which inmates may voice their complaints to, and seek relief, from prison officials’ while leaving
a formal grievance procedure intact.” Griffin v. Berghuis, 563 F. App’x 411, 415–16 (6th Cir.
2014) (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130 n.6 (1977)). Indeed,
Plaintiff’s ability to seek redress is underscored by his pro se invocation of the judicial process.
See Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Even if Plaintiff had been improperly
prevented from filing a grievance, his right of access to the courts to petition for redress of his
grievances (i.e., by filing a lawsuit) cannot be compromised by his inability to file institutional
grievances. Cf. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 640–44 (2016) (reiterating that, if the prisoner is
barred from pursuing a remedy by policy or by the interference of officials, the grievance process
is not available, and exhaustion is not required).
Accordingly, Defendant Brooke and any intended claims against Defendant Brooke will
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Conclusion

The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Having conducted the
review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendants MaCauley and Brooke will
be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Solorio remains in
the case.
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: September 4, 2025 /s/Maarten Vermaat
Maarten Vermaat
United States Magistrate Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11133241. Public record. Not legal advice.