# Wood v. Reynolds

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · September 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11132527

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL WOOD, :
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:22-cv-351
V. :
JUDGE WALTER H. RICE
ANTHONY REYNOLDS, et al.,
Defendants. :

DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING PLAINTIFF MICHAEL WOOD'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. #48); SUSTAINING
DEFENDANTS ANOTHONY REYNOLDS’S RUSSELL
GARMAN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. #60);
SUSTAINING DEFENDANT ZACH STORTS’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. #61); OVERRULING AS MOOT
DEFENDANT ZACH STORT’S MOTION TO STRIKE (DOC. #70);
JUDGMENT TO ENTER IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST
PLAINTIFF; TERMINATION ENTRY

This matter comes before the Court on four separate motions, three of which
seek summary judgment. Plaintiff Michael Wood (“Plaintiff”) filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment against Defendants Anthony Reynolds (“Reynolds”), Russell
Garman (“Garman”), and Zach Storts' (“Storts”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Doc.
#48. Defendants Reynolds and Garman filed a joint response in opposition, Doc.

1 The Docket, as well as some of the previous filings on this case, mistakenly refer to Zach
Storts as “Zach Stortz.”

#60, and Defendant Storts filed a separate response in opposition to the motion.
Doc. # 53. Plaintiff filed a single combined reply in support of his motion. Doc. #65.
The joint response filed by Defendants Reynolds and Garman also contained
their own Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. #60. Plaintiff's reply in support of
his motion doubled as his response to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Reynolds and Garman. Doc. #65. Defendants Reynolds and Garman
filed a reply in support of their motion. Doc. #67.
Defendant Storts also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. #61.
Plaintiff's reply in support of his motion (which served as the response in opposition
to the motion filed by Defendants Reynolds and Garman) also served as his

response in opposition to the motion filed by Defendant Storts. Doc. #65. Defendant
Storts thereafter joined in the reply filed by Defendants Reynolds and Garman,
which also served as the reply in support of his motion. Doc #67.
After this series of filings, all three motions for summary judgment are fully
briefing and ripe for decision. Several weeks after the close of briefing, Plaintiff filed

a “Notice” in which he asks the Court to take judicial notice of several of his
allegations. Doc. #69. Defendant Storts moved to strike this filing as an
unauthorized sur-reply. Doc. #70. Plaintiff responded by filing an “Objection” to
Storts’s motion. Doc. #71.

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is
OVERRULED and Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are both
SUSTAINED. Defendant Storts’s Motion to Strike is OVERRULED AS MOOT.
I. Legal Standard
Summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Ce/otex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those
portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. /a. at 323; see also Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir.
1991).
“Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must

present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary
to resolve the difference at trial.” 7Ta/ley v. Bravo Pitino Rest., Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241,
1245 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986). Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary
judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It
is not sufficient to “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586

(1986). Rule 56 “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified]
pleadings” and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. “The plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of
evidence in support of his position; the evidence must be such that a jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Michigan Prot. & Advoc. Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18
F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir. 1994).
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute
about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In
determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a court must assume

as true the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of that party. /a. at 255. If the parties present conflicting evidence, a court may
not decide which evidence to believe. Credibility determinations must be left to the
factfinder. 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 3d § 2726
(1998). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a court
need only consider the materials cited by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). “A
district court is not . . . obligated to wade through and search the entire record for

some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claim.” /nterRoyal

Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091
(1990). If it so chooses, however, a court may also consider other materials in the
record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
Il. Procedural and Factual Background
This dispute rises as a result of traffic stop conducted on January 9, 2021. On
that evening, Plaintiff was driving an Oldsmobile sedan in Clark County, Ohio. At

some point that evening, Defendant Reynolds, who was driving a marked German
Township police SUV, began following Plaintiff. Plaintiff later turned into a
residential driveway where he parked his car and refused to identify himself. During
his conversation with Plaintiff, Reynolds observed a “strong odor of an alcoholic
beverage” coming from Plaintiff, noticed that Plaintiff's eyes appeared glassy and
bloodshot, and saw both an open box of Bud Light and an open, partially crushed

can on the passenger seat.
Defendants Storts and Garman arrived later and Storts was able to identify
Plaintiff from prior interactions. When Reynolds once again instructed Plaintiff to

step out of the vehicle, Plaintiff complied and was handcuffed and secured in
Reynolds’s police cruiser. Having confirmed Plaintiff's identity, Storts checked his
driving record and discovered that Plaintiff did not have a valid driver's license. At
that point, Plaintiff was arrested for two state offenses: R.C. § 4510.11(A) (driving
under a suspension) and R.C. § 4510.14(A) (driving under an OVI suspension).

Once Plaintiff was under arrest, Reynolds called Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, Kevin Miller, to determine the next steps. The officers, along with Mr.
Miller, determined that Plaintiff's vehicle needed to be impounded and inventoried,
but Plaintiff had locked the vehicle and refused to turn over the keys. After seeking
Plaintiff's assistance with gaining access to the vehicle, and being denied, Storts
and Reynolds used a “slim jim”? tool to unlock the vehicle. At this point, Reynolds
searched and inventoried that vehicle before transporting Plaintiff to the Clark
County Jail.
While Reynolds was on the phone with Miller, it was determined that
Reynolds should seek to obtain a warrant to draw blood from Plaintiff, to determine
whether Plaintiff was intoxicated. After Miller prepared the warrant, Reynolds met
with Clark County Court of Common Pleas Judge Richard O’Neill, who signed the

warrant to draw blood from Plaintiff. Reynolds and Garman transported Plaintiff to
the Springfield Medical Center where four vials of blood were drawn.
Plaintiff's state charges were officially filed via an indictment several days
later. On March 22, 2021, the Clark County Court of Common Pleas determined that
Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and suppressed all evidence
found. The charges against Plaintiff were dropped the next day.

2 A “slim jim” tool is a special instrument specifically designed to open locked car doors.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on December 1, 2022, alleging ten claims: (1) |
unlawful arrest for failure to ID (“Claim One”); (2) unlawful arrest for obstructing
official business (“Claim Two”); (3) unlawful arrest for OVI (“Claim Three”); (4)
unreasonable search of car/seizure of contents (“Claim Four”); (5) unreasonable
seizure of car (“Claim Five”); (6) unreasonable search for contact with [Plaintiff's]
genitals (“Claim Six”); (7) unreasonable search/seizure of blood (“Claim Seven");
(8) malicious prosecution for failure to ID (“Claim Eight”); (9) malicious prosecution
for obstructing official business (“Claim Nine”); (10) malicious prosecution for OVI
(“Claim Ten”). Doc. #1.
On January 24, 2023, the United States Magistrate Judge issued an initial
Report and Recommendations which properly attempted to recharacterize
Plaintiffs Claims into recognizable causes of action. Doc. #5. These categories of
claims were:
A. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment false arrest claims of “failure to
ID,” Obstructing Official Business, and “OVI;”
B. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment unreasonable search and
seizure claims for search of his car, for contact with his genitals
during a pat down, and search of his blood;
C. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claims,
(failure to ID, Obstructing Official Business, OV]);
D. Nine claims of conspiracy to interfere with constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. 8 1985; and
E. Nine claims of failure to prevent conspiracy to interfere with
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 8 1986.

Doc. #5, PagelD #42. Plaintiff amended his Complaint on March 9, 2023, providing
additional allegations which the Magistrate Judge considered to be claims for civil
conspiracy, respondeat superior, failure to intervene, and guilt by association. Doc.
#11. After the Amended Complaint was filed, the Magistrate Judge filed a second
Report and Recommendations in which she recommended that only the following
claims be permitted to continue into discovery:
A. Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim against Defendants Reynolds,
Garman, and Stort[s] in their individual capacities;
B. Plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim against Defendants Reynolds,
Garman, and Stort[s] in their individual capacities;
C. Plaintiff's unlawful search claim for the search and seizure of
Plaintiff's vehicle and its contents against defendant Stort[s] in his
individual capacity;
D. Plaintiff's unlawful search of blood against defendants Garman and
Reynolds in their individual capacities;
E. Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim against defendants Garman
and Reynolds in their individual capacities;
F. Plaintiff's respondeat superior claim against defendant Garman in
his individual capacity as to the wrongful arrest claim brought
against defendant Reynolds; and
G. Plaintiff's failure to intervene claim against Stort[s], Garman, and
Reynolds in their individual capacities for failure to intervene
regarding all Defendants participation in Plaintiff's arrest, and
against Garman and Reynolds for their failure to intervene
regarding Stort[s]’ search and seizure of Plaintiff's vehicle and its
contents.
Doc. #13, PagelD #125. The Court adopted these recommendations in their totality.
Doc. #16.
Following the end of discovery, all parties moved for summary judgment in
their favor. Though, as described above, the web of responses and replies is

somewhat more tangled in this case than in others, at this point all motions have
been fully briefed and are ripe for review.
ltl. Analysis
Many of Plaintiffs remaining claims are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

creates a cause of action allowing a plaintiff to sue state actors who violate their
constitutional rights. Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 49 F.4th 1000, 1008 (6th
Cir. 2022). However, to recover, Defendants’ actions must be outside the protection
offered by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects
government officials performing discretionary functions “insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would know.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
The Sixth Circuit uses a three-part test to determine whether qualified
immunity applies in a given case: (1) did a constitutional violation occur; (2) was the
right that was violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable person
would have known; and (3) did the plaintiff allege sufficient facts supported by
sufficient evidence to indicate that the official’s alleged actions were objectively
unreasonable in light of clearly established constitutional rights. Williams v. Mehra,
186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999). As the analysis below shows, Plaintiff fails to show
that a constitutional violation occurred and therefore cannot meet the first prong of
this test.

A. Unlawful Arrest
Plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim is a § 1983 claim, requiring evidence that
Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. More specifically, “[i]n order for

a wrongful arrest claim to succeed under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the
police lacked probable cause.” Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 2002).
Probable cause exists when there is “reasonably trustworthy information . . .
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [an individual] had committed

or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). “If an officer
has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor
criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment,
arrest the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
In the context of a claim for unlawful arrest, “[a]s long as the arrest is
supported by probable cause on one charge, then a false arrest claim cannot move
forward.” Howse v. Hodous, 953 F.3d 402, 409 (6th Cir. 2020). Defendants submit
five different criminal offenses that they believe were supported by probable cause

at the moment of arrest including (1) obstructed license plate; (2) fictitious license
plate; (3) failure to identify himself; (4) driving under suspension; and (5) driving
under the influence. Doc. #53, PagelD #425-28; Doc. #60, PagelD #491-93.
Plaintiff's response is two-fold. First, he argues that the Clark County judge’s
finding that the OVI arrest was unsupported by probable cause is conclusively
10

binding on the probable cause issue. Doc. #65, PagelD #555. Second, he invokes a

recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United States to argue that an invalid

arrest overrides any other lawful rational for the arrest, making the whole process
improper. /d. (citing Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio, 602 U.S. 556 (2024)).
Plaintiff’s reliance on Chiaverini is misplaced. In that case, the Court dealt
with an issue pertaining to malicious prosecution and held that a single lawful
charge cannot immunize additional malicious charges from being subject to a
subsequent civil suit for malicious prosecution. Chiaverini, 602 U.S. at 561. The
Court determined that the proper inquiry is one into causation: did the unlawful
conduct cause the implementation of a seizure or extend the seizure. /d. at 564-65.
Here, there was clear probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving with a
fictitious license plate. Plaintiff was indisputably driving an Oldsmobile sedan which

was displaying a license plate belonging to a 2007 Chevrolet Truck. This is a clear
violation of Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) § 4549.08(A)(3). Regardless of whether
probable cause existed for the other charges, his fictitious plate violation petmitted
his arrest. Under the Sixth Circuit’s direction in Howse, this presence of probable
cause requires the dismissal of Plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim. Howse, 953 F.3d
402 at 409. Therefore, this claim is DISMISSED.

11

B. Unlawful Search
Plaintiff has two unlawful search claims. One relates to the alleged unlawful
search and seizure of Plaintiff's vehicle and its contents and is brought against
Defendant Storts. The second is an unlawful search of blood claim, brought against
Defendants Garman and Reynolds.
7. Search Of Vehicle
Pursuant to Plaintiff's arrest, his vehicle was searched without a warrant.
Defendant Storts argues this search was done properly, under the “inventory
search” exception to the general warrant requirement. Doc. #53, PagelD #429-31;

see United States v. Snoddy, 976 F.3d 630 (6th Cir. 2020). Inventory searches are
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement usually imposed by the Fourth
Amendment. Co/orado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). “A vehicle is lawfully
seized and, thus, subject to an inventory search if it is lawfully impounded.”
Snoddy, 976 F.3d at 634. Law enforcement officers may exercise discretion to
impound a vehicle “so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal
activity.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987).
The German Township Police Department has a policy in place to determine
when impoundment of a vehicle is necessary. Under this policy, officers are
permitted to impound any vehicle that falls into one of seven categories, including:
12

“(1) When authorized by State Law or local ordinance . . . [and] (7) When in the
judgment of the officer, it is necessary to protect the safety and integrity of the
vehicle and/or its contents.” Doc. #53-5, PagelD #454. Under Ohio law, if an offender
is convicted of driving under an OVI suspension, impoundment of the vehicle in
question is required. R.C. § 4510.14(B)(1)(d), (2)(d).
Plaintiff argues that his license was not under suspension at the time of the
incident because he never had a valid license in the first place, reasoning that “[o]ne
cannot suspend that which does not exist”. Doc. #48, PagelD #291 (quotation
omitted). Some Ohio cases appear to present dicta that supports such a line of
reasoning, but they do not use that argument to support a legal finding. See State

v. Williams, 477 N.E. 2d 656, 657-58 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (granting defendant's
assignment of error wherein he argued that a prior conviction for driving under
suspension precluded a subsequent conviction for driving without a license); State

v. Davis, 2002-Ohio-6778, *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting defendant's assignment
of error because record displayed sufficient evidence that license was suspended).
To the contrary, the Court is convinced by the recent opinion in State v. Lewis,
which held that a non-existent license can be suspended, resulting in additional
restrictions should a license eventually be sought. State v. Lewis, 2020-Ohio-4633,
*4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020).

13

Here, Plaintiff was under an OVI suspension when the incident occurred. Doc.
#53-4, PagelD #442. Considering the evidence present during the incident, that
Plaintiff was driving a vehicle on public roadways, Defendants possessed sufficient
probable cause to believe he was in violation of Ohio law. As a result of the

presence of probable cause, Plaintiff's vehicle was properly impounded pursuant
to both the German Township Police Department policy and Ohio law. Because the
vehicle was properly impounded, the search conducted during that impoundment
was also lawfully conducted. Therefore, this claim is DISMISSED.
2. Seizure of Blood
Generally, “[p]olice officers are entitled to rely on a judicially secured warrant
for immunity from a § 1983 action for illegal search and seizure unless the warrant
is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that official belief in the existence of
probable cause is unreasonable.” Yancey v. Carroll Cnty., 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th
Cir. 1989). However, where an officer knowingly makes false statements and
omissions to the judge leading to the issuance of the warrant, the officer is not
entitled to rely on the judicial determination. /d.
Plaintiffs theory of liability relating to the blood draw is two-fold. First,
Defendants should have known that the blood draw was unconstitutional as it was
taken more than three hours after the interaction began. Doc. #48, PagelD #324.
Second, Defendants fabricated testimony and presented deliberately false and
14

materially misleading statements in pursuit of obtaining the search warrant. /d. at
PagelD #324-25. His first point fails because the Supreme Court of Ohio has
determined that the statutory time limit on blood samples is waived so long as the
administrative requirements are substantially complied with.? State v. Hass/er, 875
N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 2007); see also State v. Waldock, 33 N.E.3d 505 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015)
(rejecting argument to suppress blood sample as untimely); State v. Barger, 91
N.E.3d 277 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (same); State v. Bordeau, 217 N.E.3d 945 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2023) (same).
Plaintiff's second argument, that Defendants knowingly lied and presented
false information to the judge, is unsupported. Admitting that the state court never
addressed the issue of false statements, Plaintiff attempts to shift the burden to
Defendants on the issue. Doc. #48, PagelD #325. In his view, Defendants must have
lied if the state court ultimately invalidated the warrant after the fact.
The application for the search warrant was filed as an attachment to one of
Defendants’ briefs. Doc. #60-2, PagelD #512-13. Despite having this attachment,

3 As an example of administrative requirements, R.C. 8 4511.19(D)(1)(b) requires
that “[o]nly a physician, a registered nurse, an emergency medical technician-
intermediate, an emergency medical technician-paramedic, or a qualified
technician, chemist, or phlebotomist shall withdraw a blood sample for the purpose
of determining the alcohol, drug, controlled substance, metabolite of a controlled
substance, or combination content of the whole blood, blood serum, or blood
plasma.”
15

Plaintiff does not identify any examples of lies, false information, or misstatements
contained within the application. At this stage, Plaintiff cannot rely on unsupported
generalities to continue his case, especially in light of evidence presented to the

contrary. Because there is no evidence that Defendants presented false information
in pursuit of a search warrant, and because Ohio does not require strict compliance
with the three-hour blood testing deadline, Plaintiff's claim is DISMISSED.
Cc. Failure to Intervene
“Law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene to protect the
constitutional rights of citizens from infringement from other law enforcement
officers.” Bunkley v. City of Detroit, Mich., 902 F.3d 552, 565 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation omitted). Failure to intervene is considered a claim brought under 81983,
though there is an open question within the Sixth Circuit regarding the precise
source of the cause of action. Chaney-Snel/ v. Young, 98 F.4th 699, 721 (6th Cir.
2024). Regardless, an officer may be liable if that officer “observes or has reason to
know: (1) that excessive force is being used; (2) that a citizen has been unjustifiably
arrested; or (3) that any constitutional violation has been committed by a law
enforcement official.” Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2nd Cir. 1994); Bunkley,
902 F.3d at 565-66.
Here, Defendants may be liable if Plaintiff presents facts to support the
proposition that any of the three Anderson situations was unfolding on the night in
16

question. In this matter, the requirement proves unobtainable. There are no
allegations that excessive force was used that evening, and this Court has explained
the lack of allegations supported a finding that a constitutional violation occurred.
Defendant attempts to argue that he was unjustifiably arrested because his OVI
charges were later dismissed after the evidence was suppressed. Doc. #48, PagelD
#334. (“Even though | was actua/ly arrested for failure to comply with the lawful
order of police, at the moment of arrest, at that time, | was also effectively arrested
for every violation officially charged which accrued during the unlawful custodial
arrest.) (emphasis in original). As explained above, this reasoning is incorrect, and
Plaintiff's arrest was lawful. Therefore, Defendants did not have a duty to intervene,

nor are they subject to claims stemming from a failure to intervene. This claim is
DISMISSED.
D. Respondeat Superior
Ordinarily, “8 1983 liability must be based on more than respondeat superior,
or the right to control employees." Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.
1999). There is a narrow exception to this rule which permits liability to a superior
office if they “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some
other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the
official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesces in the

17

unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Hayes v. Jefferson Cnty., Ky.,
668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982).
Here, this claim fails for a simple reason. Respondeat superior is premised
on a finding of underlying unconstitutional conduct. As extensively explained
above, there is no unconstitutional conduct in this case, so there cannot be vicarious
liability for the unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, this claim is DISMISSED.
E. Civil Conspiracy
To be successful on a claim for civil conspiracy under § 1983, plaintiffs must
show that “(1) a single plan existed, (2) the conspirators shared a conspiratorial
objective to deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, and (3) an overt act

was committed.” Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 290 (6th Cir. 2007). At the

summary judgment stage, plaintiffs are entitled to “rely on circumstantial evidence

to establish an agreement among the conspirators,” but the claims “must be pled
with some degree of specificity and [] vague and conclusory allegations
unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state such a claim under 8
1983.” Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2012); Gutierrez v. Lynch,
826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff brought several allegations involving violations of his constitutional
rights against Defendants. To this point, each of them has failed. The Court
recognizes that a successful claim for civil conspiracy does not require successful
18

infringement of rights, only a conspiratorial plan. Yet, in this case, this is a
distinction without a difference. Plaintiff has failed to present evidence supporting
his claim of a civil conspiracy in the face of Defendants’ evidence showing the lack
thereof. In short, Plaintiff's bare allegations do not support any of the three
elements identified in Aevis. As a result, this claim is DISMISSED.
F. Malicious prosecution
Unlike the other claims, malicious prosecution is not a § 1983 claim premised
on unconstitutional actions. Instead, malicious prosecution is an Ohio tort which
requires that the plaintiff prove: “(1) Malice in instituting (or continuing) the
prosecution, (2) lack of probable cause, and (3) termination of the action in favor of
the defendant.” Swiecicki v. Delgado, 463 F.3d 489, 503 (6th Cir. 2006). “As a general
rule, the finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand
jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause. However, an
exception applies where the indictment was obtained wrongfully by defendant
police officers who knowingly presented false testimony to the grand jury.”
Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff was indicted by a grand jury for felony OVI. Doc. #48, PagelD
#281. Therefore, the only method by which Defendants may be liable for malicious
prosecution requires a showing that they presented false testimony to the grand
jury. Plaintiff attempts to make this argument, but does so in merely conclusory
19

fashion, failing to point to any factual allegations to support his position. /d. (“| was
later indicted for felony OVI based on the same deliberately false and materially
misleading statements used to obtain the invalid and void warrant.”). Plaintiff

cannot continue to pursue claims by merely restating the conclusions he hopes to

prove, he must allege facts which support that conclusion and present evidence
that might justify a juror to find in his favor. See Turner v. Henley Appraisals, LLC,
No. 3:23-cv-371, 2025 WL 775274, *5-6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2025) (Rice, J.). Because
Plaintiff has not produced evidence to rebut the presumption that the grand jury
indictment was proper, this claim is DISMISSED.
G. Motion to Strike
Defendant Storts filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's filing dated July 28, 2025,

as an unauthorized sur-reply. Doc. #70. Plaintiff does not present his filing as a sur-
reply. In his Objection to the motion, he disavows that conclusion, stating that he

was “merely emphasizing facts apparent from the record and that | will testify to at
trial.” Doc. #71, PagelD #578.
The Court will assume, arguendo, that Plaintiff's view is correct, and the filing
is nothing more than a notice to the court having nothing to do with the motions.
Given that the motions above are to be sustained in favor of defendants and the

case dismissed, the filing will thus be inconsequential.

20

However, even if the Court views the filing as an attempted sur-reply, then it
should be struck. Under the Local Rules, a motion may be followed by a response
in opposition to the motion and a reply by the movant in support of the motion.
S.D. Civ. R. 7.2(a)(2). However, “[n]o additional memoranda beyond those
enumerated are permitted except upon leave of court for good cause shown.” □□□
Plaintiff indisputably did not seek leave to file a sur-reply. Considering Plaintiff's pro
se status and reading his filings in the light most favorable to him, the Court does

not find good cause shown for filing a sur-reply. If this filing is a sur-reply it should
be stricken.
Given the analysis in this Decision, the Court does not need to conclusively
determine whether this filing was a sur-reply or not. If the filing was a sur-reply, it
would be stricken and excluded from consideration for the purposes of the motions
for summary judgment. If the filing was not a sur-reply, it still would not be
considered for the purposes of the motions for summary judgment. Further, as the
determination of the motions for summary judgment lead to the termination of the

case, it is immaterial whether Plaintiff's filing is an attempt at a sur-reply or not.
Therefore, Defendant Storts’s Motion to Strike, Doc. #70, is OVERULED AS MOOT.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Plaintiff Michael Wood, Doc. #48, is OVERRULED. The Motion for Summary
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Judgment filed by Defendants Anthony Reynolds and Russell Garman, Doc. #60, is
SUSTAINED. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Zach Storts,
Doc. #61, is SUSTAINED.
Judgment is to be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff.
The above captioned case is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket
records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western
Division, at Dayton.

Date: September 3, 2025 stene 1d Ree
WALTER H. RICE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11132527. Public record. Not legal advice.