# Mace v. Williams

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · August 4, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11132504

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** August 4, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11132504

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a prisoner's liberty interest is “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
- rejecting a complaint concerning the opening of legal mail not bearing the required “special mail” inscription outside of an inmate's presence

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER MACE CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-1559-P

VERSUS CHIEF JUDGE EDWARDS

DUSTY WILLIAMS, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In accordance with the standing order of this court, this matter was referred to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge for review, report and recommendation.
STATEMENT OF CLAIM
Before the court is a civil rights complaint filed in forma pauperis by pro se plaintiff
Christopher Mace (“Plaintiff”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This complaint was received
and filed in this court on June 8, 2022. He is currently incarcerated at the Sabine Parish
Detention Center but claims his civil rights were violated by prison officials while
incarcerated at the Claiborne Parish Detention Center (“CPDC”) in Homer, Louisiana.
Plaintiff names Warden Dusty Williams, Assistant Warden Steve Risner, and Nurse
Michelle Cromens as defendants.
Plaintiff claims he was transferred to the CPDC on June 7, 2021, and all his personal
property and legal work were taken from him at intake. He states that CPDC had a “no
paper-no book” policy for all new intakes, and Steve Risner was responsible for
implementing this policy, regardless of state law.
Plaintiff claims that on June 9, 2021, he was not present when his property was
searched and seized. He claims he was not provided an inventory sheet and confiscation

sheet as required by state law. He claims he was not given any options regarding his
property, including sending it home, donating it, or destroying it. He claims his property
included pictures of his family members, letters from his family members, items from his
deceased mother, and numerous other items. He claims his property also included his legal
work and three law books.

Plaintiff states he was given one laundry bag containing some of his clothes and
hygiene items from his personal property. He admits he was told that he could copy his
legal work and books for ten cents a page.
Plaintiff states that on April 4, 2022, Warden Dusty Williams posted a notice in the
dorms stating that DOC inmates had seven days to send home all confiscated personal

property or it would be destroyed per DOC guidelines. He signed two property release
forms releasing his property to his uncle. He claims that on April 8, 2022, his uncle came
to CPDC to collect his property, and he was given a brown paper bag with one pair of
sweatpants, one pair of shoes, and one t-shirt. He claims CPDC lost or destroyed the
remainder of his personal property that was taken. He claims that on June 22, 2022, Dusty

Williams admitted to him that the building where the inmates’ personal property was stored
had a roof cave in and all property was thrown away. He claims that on July 23, 2022,
Dusty Williams again said that all the property was destroyed.
Plaintiff claims the law library was insufficient and as a result he missed two filing
deadlines regarding his application for post-conviction relief. He claims he had to write

his own supervisory writ because there were no properly trained law library clerks. He
claims there were no tables in the library where inmates could sit and research. He claims
a layman could not look up cases or statutes and could not Shepardize case law. He claims
that when there was an inmate counsel, he helped 550 inmates and took forever to call him.
He claims he possibly missed a third deadline regarding his application for post-conviction

relief because the inmate counsel was locked up on May 25, 2022 and transferred on May
26, 2022. He claims that after the inmate counsel transferred, there was no inmate counsel
or access to a law library.
Plaintiff claims he was denied medical and mental health treatment. He claims he
requested mental health treatment from a trained professional who was either a counselor

or a chaplain. He claims he requested to speak to a mental health counselor because of his
grief caused by the loss of his parents six days apart while he was incarcerated, the stress
of his children crying and acting out because there were no contact visits, and the stress of
trying to get the class he needed for parole. He claims the stress caused him to lose his
appetite and sleep. He also claims the stress caused him to vomit. He claims he chewed

his nails because of the anxiety caused by the policies of Warden Williams and the behavior
of the staff. He admits he received treatment from Dr. Camielle and Nurse Smith in
September of 2021. He claims Dr. Camielle counseled him via a videocall, prescribed
Elavil1 for him, and ordered Nurse Smith to set up counseling for him. He claims Nurse
Smith told the doctor that she would speak with the Warden because the facility no longer

had a contract with mental health.
Plaintiff claims that on May 20, 2022, he made a sick call because he had chronic
diarrhea for three months caused by the patties served in the chow hall and mental health
issues. He claims Nurse Michelle told him there would be no mental health treatment
because the facility did not have a mental health doctor due to the cost. He claims Nurse

Michelle also denied him a special diet. He claims Nurse Michelle then sent him to the
dorm without taking his vitals, examining him, or addressing his chronic diarrhea. He
claims Nurse Michelle did not schedule a doctor’s appointment for him. He claims he was
charged $7.00 for the sick call fee. Plaintiff admits that on June 8, 2022, he was offered
anti-diarrhea medication which he refused.

Plaintiff claims his privacy and HIPAA rights were violated during his May 20,
2022 sick call. He claims Nurse Michelle had sex offender/trusty Joshua Lofton present
during the sick call. He claims Lofton told Nurse Michelle what was in his medical file.
He also claims Lofton was present on June 8, 2022 during the discussion of his grievance
in the administrative remedy procedure. He alleges that on June 12, 2022, Lofton was

heard by another inmate discussing his request for mental health and his grievance about
the medical department.

1 Elavil is a prescription medicine used to treat symptoms of depression. See
https://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/amitriptyline-oral-route/description/drg-
20072061.
Plaintiff claims the facility takes an exorbitant amount of time to process standard
first class mail because of the no paper/no book policy. He claims Captain Guss2 opens

and reads every letter. He admits that it is acceptable for Captain Guss to open and read
every letter.
Plaintiff claims mail has been lost. He claims Steve Risner blames the U.S. Postal
Service for the lost mail in his responses to his complaints.
Plaintiff claims legal/privileged mail is not processed correctly. He claims that

before scanning the mail to put on the kiosk, privileged mail is typically brought to the
dorms and distributed by a trusty. He claims trusties Lofton and Crowley are allowed to
hand out mail to inmates without verifying their identity.
Plaintiff claims that on November 27, 2021, C/O Dudley delivered his legal mail to
him and had him sign for a letter that was in a blank envelope that said “opened, copied,

unread and placed in your file.” Plaintiff claims the legal mail was opened without him
being present. He claims that on May 30, 2022, his legal mail was opened, scanned and
put on the electronic kiosk without him being present.
Plaintiff claims mail sent to him which was postmarked on July 19, 2021 was not
received until July 28, 2021, postmarked on September 10, 2021 was not received until

November 2, 2021, postmarked on October 12, 2021 was not received until November 16,
2021, and postmarked on November 17, 2021 was not received until December 27, 2021.

2 Plaintiff does not name Captain Guss as a defendant.
He claims the delays caused him to miss deadlines with the courts. He also claims his IRS
stimulus check was delayed.

Plaintiff claims that on May 30, 2022, his privileged mail from the IRS which
included forms he had to return was opened outside his presence, scanned, and put on the
kiosk. He claims this happened to no other inmates in the dorm and their letters were
delivered by the trusties. He claims he brought this issue to the attention of shift supervisor
Lt. Dill and he said that there was no one to scan it because it was Memorial Day. He

claims that on June 1, 2022, he wrote a request to the Warden, and he responded on June
3, 2022 that “I believe your documents were located and given to you.” Plaintiff claims
his response had nothing to do with his legal and/or privileged mail. He believes these
actions were in retaliation for his grievance filed in the administrative remedy procedure
on May 23, 2022 regarding the medical department.

Plaintiff claims the facility does not provide basic supplies and hygiene items such
as soap, toothpaste, toothbrushes, and razors to all DOC inmates per the policy
implemented by Warden Williams. He admits inmates are provided with toilet tissue. He
also claims basic clothing such as socks, underwear, boxers, t-shirts, and slippers are not
provided. He claims inmates are only provided with one orange jumpsuit. He claims that

when he asked about his “state issue,” he was told to buy it at the commissary. He claims
inmates are denied meals and medications if they are not wearing socks and twice, he had
to borrow another inmate’s socks.
Plaintiff claims the facility denies contact visits and only allows electronic video
visits. He claims the video visits require a monetary cost of 50 cents a minute and software

to be installed on the electronic devices of his family and friends. He claims he was denied
contact with his family and friends and his family ties were weakened. He claims he was
unable to have an intimate relationship with his children.
Plaintiff claims that on June 8, 2022, he was denied due process in the administrative
remedy procedure when Michelle Cromens who was identified in his grievance and trusty

Lofton “covered” it with him. He claims Cromens was irritated and cursed at him because
of the claims he raised. He claims he appealed the response to his grievance on June 22,
2022.
Plaintiff claims he was retaliated against because he filed this lawsuit. He claims
that on June 22, 2022, Warden Dusty Williams threatened him about the lawsuit. He claims

that on July 19, 2022, he requested an update on the appealed grievance. He claims he
received two letters from this court and received an emergency transfer to Bayou Dorcheat
Correctional Center. He claims that on July 20, 2022, he was transferred back to CPDC
and locked in a suicide cell. He claims that on July 23, 2022, Warden Williams released
him into the same dorm he was transferred from on July 19, 2022. He claims that on

August 15, 2022, Risner intercepted a motion destined for his court. He claims that on
August 19, 2022, Risner retaliated against him with a third transfer in 30 days.
Plaintiff claims he was denied access to books, magazines or newspapers even sent
directly from the publisher or bookstore. He claims that on August 11, 2022, CPDC
blocked all local new channels on all dorm televisions. He claims CPDC unblocked all
local news channels on August 17, 2022.

Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Property Claims
Plaintiff claims his property was confiscated and lost or destroyed. He filed this
claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act which provides redress for
persons "deprived of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States" by a person acting under color of state law. Accordingly, the
initial inquiry and threshold concern of the reviewing court is whether Plaintiff's
constitutional rights have been violated. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 107 S. Ct.
1908 (1981).
The property of which Plaintiff was allegedly deprived can constitute "property"

within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its loss
is worthy of redress if the loss implicates constitutional rights. See id. at 542, 107 S. Ct. at
1916. However, the Fourteenth Amendment is not a font of tort law to be superimposed
upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States. See Baker v. McCollan,
433 U.S. 137, 99 S. Ct. 2689 (1979). A constitutional deprivation of property without due

process of law, as differentiated from a state tort law claim, must be intentional and plaintiff
must allege specific facts which support such a conclusion.
Absent an intentional deprivation of property where the charge only supports a
negligent failure by defendants, a constitutional deprivation does not lie. "[T]he Due
Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended
loss of or injury to life, liberty or property." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106
S. Ct. 662, 663 (1986). Moreover, even in instances where intentional deprivation occurs

where an adequate state post-deprivation remedy is available, the Due Process Clause is
not implicated. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984),
on remand, 744 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1984); Marshall v. Norwood, 741 F.2d 761, 764 (5th Cir.
1984). Mere assertions of intentionality are not enough in the absence of specific facts
supporting the assertions and "even if the taking were intentional, the state could afford the

[plaintiff] due process by providing a post-deprivation remedy for the redress of the
unforeseeable, unauthorized injury... alleged." Lewis v. Woods, 848 F.2d 649, 652 (5th
Cir. 1988). Louisiana law provides Plaintiff the opportunity to seek redress for his loss,
whether intentional or negligent. See La. Civ. Code art. 2315.
Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not permit a remedy for the mere violation of

prison policies or even state law. Scheidel v. Secretary of Public Safety & Corrections,
561 Fed. Appx. 426 (5th Cir. 2014) (“violations of prison rules do not alone rise to the
level of constitutional violations and, therefore, such claims are not actionable under §
1983.”); Sylvester v. Cain, 311 Fed. Appx. 733, (5th Cir. 2009) (“violations of state law
and prison regulations, without more, do not state a viable constitutional claim under §

1983”); and Brown v. Williams, 124 Fed. Appx. 907, 909 (5th Cir. 2005) (“a mere violation
of state law does not state a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Legal Access Claims
Plaintiff claims the law library was insufficient and there were no properly trained
law library clerks. He claims that because of the insufficient law library, he missed
deadlines regarding his application for post-conviction relief. He claims he had to prepare

his supervisory writ without a properly trained law library clerk. He also claims mail delays
caused him to miss deadlines with the courts. Prisoners have a constitutional right of
meaningful access to the courts. Degrate v. Godwin, 84 F.3d 768, 768-69 (5th Cir.1996)
(quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977)).
However, this constitutional guarantee is not without limitation. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343 (1996) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d
64 (1987)). In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, (1996), the Supreme Court reviewed its
holding in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, (1977) which is the source of a prisoner's
constitutional right to "meaningful access to the courts.” While the Supreme Court
reaffirmed a prisoner’s right of access to the courts in Lewis, the Court limited the

parameters of Bounds and set forth a standard to be applied when determining whether to
grant relief for an access to the courts violation. In so holding, the Court noted that a
prisoner must show an actual injury, explaining that this requirement is derived from the
doctrine of standing. Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2179. The Court used the analogy of a prisoner
who is denied access to that of a healthy prisoner who has been deprived of medical

treatment. In both cases, neither the access deprived prisoner nor the healthy prisoner have
sustained constitutional injury, and thus, are not entitled to relief under Section 1983. The
Court emphasized that the court’s role is to provide relief to claimants who have suffered
actual harm, not to interfere with the management of prisons.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit has held that a prisoner cannot prevail on an access
to the courts claim without proving an actual injury in non-frivolous litigation as a result
of the defendant’s alleged unconstitutional conduct. Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273,

275 (5th Cir. 1998); Chriceol v. Phillips, 169 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999).
Application of the actual injury requirement to the instant case supports a finding
that Plaintiff‘s claims are frivolous. Clearly, Plaintiff has not satisfied the “actual injury”
requirement as he makes no claims of injury in his complaint or amended complaints.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he lost the right to commence, prosecute or appeal

any suit because of the actions of Defendants. In fact, Plaintiff was able to fully litigate
his application for post-conviction relief in the state court. See State v. Mace, 2023-KH-
1003, 373 So.3d 710 (La. 12/5/23). He admits that he prepared a supervisory writ. He also
admits in his amended complaint, that at the time he filed his complaint and amended
complaint, he had not lost the right to commence, prosecute, or appeal any suit. Thus, he

has failed to state any actual injury.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Medical Claims
Plaintiff claims he was denied proper medical and mental health treatment.
Plaintiff filed this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act which

provides redress for persons "deprived of any rights, privileges or immunities" by a person
acting under color of state law. The particular right protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
matters which concern alleged denial of or inadequate medical care is the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The lack of proper inmate medical care rises to the level of a constitutional
deprivation under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution only if the
evidence shows that the prison officials showed "deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292 (1976); See also Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1978 (1994). It is only deliberate
indifference, "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or an act "repugnant to the
conscience of mankind," that constitutes conduct proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, 97 S. Ct. at 292; See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96

S. Ct. 2909 (1976). Further, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants possessed a
culpable state of mind. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-302, 111 S. Ct. 2321,
2323-27 (1991); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838-47, 114 S. Ct. at 1979-84. In addition,
disagreement with the diagnostic measures or methods of treatment afforded by prison
officials does not state a claim for Eighth Amendment indifference to medical needs. See

Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997).
In this case, after a thorough review of Plaintiff’s complaint, read in a light most
favorable to him, the court finds that the facts alleged do not support a finding of deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that
Defendants were attentive to the medical needs of Plaintiff. It has been consistently held

that an inmate who has been examined by medical personnel fails to set forth a valid
showing of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Norton v. Dimazana, 122
F.2d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997); Callaway v. Smith County, 991 F. Supp. 801, 809 (E.D.
Tex. 1998); Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985); Mayweather v. Foti, 958
F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff admits that in September of 2021, he was seen by Dr.
Camielle and Nurse Smith. He also admits the Dr. Camielle counseled him and prescribed
him medication. The medication prescribed for him is used to treat the symptoms of

depression. Plaintiff admits that on May 20, 2022, he was seen by Nurse Michelle for his
chronic diarrhea and mental health issues. He admits that on June 8, 2022, he was offered
anti-diarrhea medication. Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of factual allegations that would
tend to show Defendants acted with a culpable state of mind or that their actions were
"unnecessary and wanton."

Plaintiff disagrees with the treatment Defendants provided him. He claims he
should have been provided counseling with a mental health professional and given a special
diet. As previously discussed, disagreement with the diagnostic measures or methods of
treatment afforded by prison officials does not state a claim for Eighth Amendment
indifference to medical needs.

Plaintiff’s allegations, if accepted as true, may amount to a state law claim for
negligence, a tort. However, mere negligence, neglect or medical malpractice does not
amount to a denial of a constitutional right as these actions on the part of Defendants do
not rise to the level of a constitutional tort. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30,
106 S. Ct. 662, 664 (1986); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S. Ct. at 292; Lewis v. Woods, 848

F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1988). The fact that Plaintiff does not believe that his medical
treatment was as good as it should have been is not a cognizable complaint under the Civil
Rights Act. See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1985). Prisoners are not
constitutionally entitled to the best medical care that money can buy. See Mayweather v.
Foti, 958 F.2d. 91 (5th Cir. 1992).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.

Moreover, Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies regarding
his May 20, 2022 medical visit claims prior to filing his complaint in the court. Plaintiff
filed his complaint on June 8, 2022. He did not receive a response to his May 23, 2022
request for administrative remedy regarding his May 20, 2022 medical visit until June 16,
2022 which was after he filed this complaint.

Congress has commanded that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). Section 1997e requires Plaintiff to properly
exhaust available administrative remedies before filing a Section 1983 suit. See Woodford

v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006). This exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion of
administrative remedies in accordance with prison procedures, and an untimely or
otherwise procedurally defective grievance or appeal will not suffice. Woodford, 126 S.Ct.
2378. The Fifth Circuit has applied the requirement to claims such as the use of excessive
force, see Wendell, 162 F.3d at 887, and denial of medical care. See Harris v. Hegmann,

198 F.3d 153 (5th Cir. 1999). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense, and “inmates are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in
their complaints.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). However, dismissal may be
appropriate when, the complaint on its face establishes the inmate's failure to exhaust. See
Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir.2007); Hicks v. Lingle, 370 Fed. Appx. 497,
498 (5th Cir.2010).
Payment of Medical Fees

Plaintiff complains he had to pay a $7.00 sick call fee for his May 20, 2022 medical
visit. Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to free medical care. Hutchinson v. Belt,
957 F.Supp. 97 (W.D. Louisiana 1996) (citations omitted). Furthermore, Plaintiff does
not allege that he was denied medical treatment because he could not pay the fee.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s medical fee claim should be dismissed with prejudice as

frivolous.
Privacy Claims
Plaintiff claims that on May 20, 2022, Inmate Lofton was present during his sick
call and had access to his medical file. He claims that on June 8, 2022, Inmate Lofton was
present during the discussion of his grievance in the administrative remedy procedure. He

claims this violated his privacy and HIPAA rights.
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). Plaintiff makes no showing that

the medical visit or grievance discussion violated the Constitution and laws of the United
States. There is a consensus among the United States Courts of Appeal that prisoners have
no absolute constitutional right in the privacy of their medical records. See Walker v.
Gerald, 2006 WL 1997635 (E.D. La. 2006) and the cases cited therein.
To the extent that Plaintiff might imply a right and cause of action pursuant to the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub.L. No. 104-
191, §§ 261-264, 110 Stat.1936 (1996), his claim also fails. HIPAA is the federal statute

which provides for confidentiality of medical records. However, as further noted in Walker
v. Gerald, “... HIPAA provides no express or implied private cause of action for its
violation ...” Walker, at 6 and cases cited therein.
“Prisoners cannot enjoy greater privacy protection than individuals in free society,
and some amount of sharing of medical information in areas where it might be overheard

by other patients-e.g., in hospital emergency rooms, school infirmaries, and the waiting
room of a doctor's office-is commonplace.” Franklin v. McCaughtry, 110 Fed. Appx. 715,
719 (7th Cir. Sept.7, 2004) (citations omitted). There is no clearly defined law which
would require the doctor or nurse to examine and question Plaintiff in a particular setting
or in extreme privacy. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered any harm or

that any of his medical information was used against him by other inmates. See Patin v.
LeBlanc, CIV.A. 11-3071, 2012 WL 3109402, at 21 (E.D. La. May 18, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, CIV.A. 11-3071, 2012 WL 3109398 (E.D. La. July 31, 2012).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Moreover, Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies regarding

his privacy claims prior to filing his complaint in the court. Plaintiff filed this complaint
on June 8, 2022. He did not receive a response to his May 23, 2022 request for
administrative remedy which addressed Lofton being present at his May 20, 2022 medical
visit until June 16, 2022 which was after he filed this complaint. His claim regarding
Lofton being present at the discussion of his administrative remedy occurred on the day his
complaint was filed in this court. Thus, Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative
remedies prior to filing these claims. See Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 (5th

Cir.2007); Hicks v. Lingle, 370 Fed. Appx. 497, 498 (5th Cir.2010).
Legal Mail Claims
Plaintiff claims the facility takes an exorbitant amount of time to process standard
first class mail because of the “no paper/no book” policy. He claims Captain Guss opens
and reads every letter. Plaintiff does not challenge the fact that Captain Guss opens and

reads every letter. Plaintiff claims that on November 27, 2021 and May 30, 2022, he
received legal mail which was opened outside of his presence.
The opening of a prisoner's legal mail outside of his presence does not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation. Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 825 (5th Cir. 2009)
(recognizing that “the violation of [a] prison regulation requiring that a prisoner be present

when his incoming legal mail is opened and inspected is not a violation of a prisoner's
constitutional rights” when there is no proof that such tampering was prejudicial to the
inmate's access to the courts and when the practice was reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests); Henthorn v. Swinson, 955 F.2d 351, 353 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
a complaint concerning the opening of legal mail not bearing the required “special mail”

inscription outside of an inmate's presence); See also Singletary v. Stadler, 2001 WL
1131949 (5th Cir. 2001) (unpublished per curiam) (affirming that “prisoners do not have a
constitutional right to be present when privileged, legal mail is opened and inspected”).
This is still true even if the prison has a policy that such mail is to be opened only in the
inmate's presence, because “a prison official's failure to follow the prison's own policies
does not, itself, result in a constitutional violation.” Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 681
(5th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff claims legal/privileged mail is not processed correctly. He claims trusties
distribute the mail to inmates without verifying their identity. Plaintiff has failed to raise
any identifiable constitutional violation. Furthermore, he does not allege that he has
suffered any harm because of this process.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.

Conditions of Confinement Claims
Plaintiff filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
which provides redress for persons "deprived of any rights, privileges or immunities" by a
person acting under color of state law. The particular right protected under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 in matters which concern alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement is the

Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Under the Eighth
Amendment, prison officials are required to provide humane conditions of confinement,
ensuring that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and must
take reasonable measures to guarantee safety of inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994).

An Eighth Amendment claim has two required components. See Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991). First, the deprivation alleged must be
sufficiently serious. See id., 111 S. Ct. at 2324. "[O]nly those deprivations denying 'the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave" to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. Id., 111 S. Ct. at 2324 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399 (1981)). Second, the prison official must have acted with
a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See id. at 305, 111 S. Ct. at 2328; Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 838, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. In prison condition of confinement cases, that state of mind is
deliberate indifference, which the Supreme Court defined as knowing of and disregarding
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See id., 114 S. Ct. at 1979. However, mere
neglect and/or negligence do not constitute deliberate indifference. See Fielder v.
Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1997).

Furthermore, this court should consider the duration and the totality of the specific
circumstances that constituted the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement. Palmer v.
Johnson, 193 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff does not claim that he has been denied hygiene supplies or clothing.
Instead, he alleges only that he has not been provided with free hygiene supplies and

clothing. Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to allege that he sustained any harm or injury as a
result of not being provided free hygiene supplies or clothing. In fact, he states that twice
he borrowed socks and did not miss meal or pill call. In this case, Plaintiff states no facts
that would satisfy the threshold requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation. Thus,
the Court does not consider the deprivations alleged to be sufficiently serious.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Visitation Claims
Plaintiff claims CPDC does not allow contact visits. It is well settled that “visitation
privileges are a matter subject to the discretion of prison officials.” Berry v. Brady, 192
F.3d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859, 96 S.Ct. 114, 46 L.Ed. 2d 86 (1975)).
An inmate has no constitutional right to contact visitation privileges. See Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed. 2d 418 (1995) (holding that a
prisoner's liberty interest is “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed. 2d 447
(1979) (stating that prison officials should be accorded the widest possible deference in the

application of policies and practices designed to maintain security and preserve internal
order); Berry, 192 F.3d at 508 (citing McCray, 509 F.2d at 1334).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Administrative Remedy Process Claims
Plaintiff claims that on June 8, 2022, he was denied due process in the administrative

remedy procedure. Inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to a prison
administrative grievance procedure. See Oladipupo v. Austin, et al., 104 F.Supp.2d 626
(W.D.La.2000); Brown v. Dodson, et al., 863 F.Supp. 284 (W.D.Va.1994); Flick v. Alba,
932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir.1991). A prison official's failure to comply with a state
administrative grievance procedure is not actionable under Section 1983 because a state

administrative grievance procedure does not confer any substantive constitutional right
upon prison inmates. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 898, 109 S.Ct. 242, 102 L.Ed.2d 231.
Furthermore, state administrative grievance procedures are separate and distinct
from state and federal legal procedures. Thus, a prison official's failure to comply with state
administrative grievance procedures does not compromise an inmate's right of access to

the courts. Flick, supra. Thus, insofar as Plaintiff alleges that the defendants failed to
comply with a prison administrative grievance procedure, those allegations, standing alone,
do not provide an arguable basis for recovery under Section 1983.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Moreover, Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies regarding

this claim prior to filing his complaint in the court. Plaintiff filed his complaint in this
court on June 8, 2022. His claim regarding the administrative remedy process occurred on
the day his complaint was filed in this court. Thus, Plaintiff did not exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to filing this claim. See Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328
(5th Cir.2007); Hicks v. Lingle, 370 Fed. Appx. 497, 498 (5th Cir.2010).

Retaliation Claims
Plaintiff claims he was retaliated against because he filed this complaint in this
court. He claims Warden Williams threatened him. He claims he was transferred multiple
times and locked in a suicide cell. He claims that on August 15, 2022, a motion destined
for his court was intercepted.

Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies regarding these
retaliation claims prior to filing his complaint in the court. Plaintiff filed his complaint on
June 8, 2022. These claims of retaliation began on June 22, 2022. Thus, Plaintiff did not
exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing these retaliation claims. See Carbe v.
Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir.2007); Hicks v. Lingle, 370 Fed. Appx. 497, 498 (5th
Cir.2010).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Denial of Television Claims
Plaintiff claims that from August 11, 2022 to August 17, 2022, CPDC blocked all
local news channels on all dorm televisions. Prisoners have no constitutional right to watch
television because watching television is not one of life's necessities nor is it a basic human

need. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d
282 (1987); McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir.1998); Woods v. Edwards,
51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir.1995).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Moreover, Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies regarding

this claim prior to filing his complaint in the court. Plaintiff filed his complaint in this
court on June 8, 2022. His claims regarding the denial of local news channels occurred
from August 11, 2022 through August 17, 2022. Thus, Plaintiff did not exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to filing this claim. See Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328
(5th Cir.2007); Hicks v. Lingle, 370 Fed. Appx. 497, 498 (5th Cir.2010).

Conclusory Claims
Plaintiff claims his legal mail was delayed. He claims his IRS stimulus check was
delayed. He claims his IRS mail containing forms was scanned and not delivered to him until
later. He believes this delay may have been because he filed a grievance in the administrative
remedy procedure on May 23, 2022. He claims he was denied access to books, magazines, and/or
newspapers even sent directly from the publisher or bookstore.
A Section 1983 plaintiff has long been required to plead his case with "factual detail
and particularity," not mere conclusory allegations. Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473

(5th Cir. 1985); Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court has
abolished this heightened pleading standard for claims against municipalities, Leatherman
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct.
1160 (1993), but the requirement remains firmly in place for claims against individual
public officials. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc).

In this case, Plaintiff has named individual prison officials as defendants and is
therefore required to give factual details regarding his alleged constitutional rights
violations. Plaintiff has failed to do so as to these claims even though he has filed a
complaint and two amended complaints.
Accordingly, these claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which

relief may be granted.
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff filed this proceeding in forma pauperis ("IFP"), if this court finds
Plaintiff's complaint to be frivolous, it may dismiss the complaint as such at any time,
before or after service of process, and before or after answers have been filed. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986); Spears v.
McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1985). District courts are vested with extremely
broad discretion in making a determination of whether an IFP proceeding is frivolous and
may dismiss a claim as frivolous if the IFP complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact. See Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22 (5th Cir. 1995); Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114
(5th Cir. 1993); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989).

Accordingly;
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s civil rights claims regarding his property,
legal access, medical treatment, medical fee, privacy, legal mail, conditions of
confinement, visitation, administrative remedy procedure, and television be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that his

conclusory claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). IT IS
FURTHER RECOMMENDED that retaliation claims beginning on June 22, 2022 be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

OBJECTIONS
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties
aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an
extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another

party’s objection within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Counsel
are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the District Judge
at the time of filing.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and
recommendations set forth above, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy
shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking, on appeal, the
proposed factual findings and legal conclusions that were accepted by the district court and
that were not objected to by the aforementioned party. See Douglas v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d
1415 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc).
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in chambers, in Shreveport, Louisiana, on this 4th
day of August 2025.
=|
Mark L. Hornsby
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11132504. Public record. Not legal advice.