# United States v. Wesner Jean-Pierre

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · September 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11132037

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** September 3, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** NEW
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a district court may rely on “reasonable in- ference[s],” but not ones that are “speculative to the point of being clearly erroneous”
- explaining “speculative” inferences are improper when they are “clearly erro- neous”
- explaining that a defendant’s due process rights are violated when, inter alia, “challenged evidence is materially false or unrelia- ble”

## Opinion text

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-12002
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

WESNER JEAN-PIERRE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:23-cr-00045-TKW-1
____________________

Before BRANCH, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Wesner Jean-Pierre appeals his 26-month sentence for aiding
and assisting in the preparation of false income tax returns. He
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-12002

makes three arguments on appeal regarding the Sentencing Guide-
lines. After careful review, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June 2023, a federal grand jury returned an indictment
charging Jean-Pierre with 34 counts of aiding and assisting in the
preparation of fraudulent tax returns, 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). The in-
dictment listed 34 tax returns underlying each count, the taxpayer’s
initials, the year, and the false items claimed. Later, Jean-Pierre
pled guilty to all counts pursuant to a written plea agreement. As
part of his guilty plea, Jean-Pierre agreed to a statement of facts
that, he conceded, the government could prove at trial. The fol-
lowing facts were part of this stipulation.
Jean-Pierre was a tax preparer who owned a business called
WJP Financial Services, LLC (“WJP”). WJP, which had an office in
Pensacola, Florida, was staffed by Jean-Pierre and some other em-
ployees “who helped file returns on behalf of taxpayers.” Jean-
Pierre, who had been preparing tax returns since around 2015, had
“the skill and experience to understand what he was doing when
filing tax returns,” and he had earned a degree at Valencia College,
where he took accounting classes. He also attended annual train-
ing seminars on tax preparation through H&R Block and Jackson
Hewitt.
Jean-Pierre “routinely prepared fraudulent individual tax re-
turns” for WJP clients by falsely claiming various items—including
Schedule C income and expenses, Schedule A itemized deductions,
household employee income, Child Tax Credits (“CTC”),
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24-12002 Opinion of the Court 3

Additional Child Tax Credits (“ACTC”), Federal Tax Paid on Fuels
Credits (“FTC”), Earned Income Tax Credits, and American Op-
portunity Tax Credits—which were added to the returns to in-
crease client refunds. As part of their investigation of Jean-Pierre,
law enforcement interviewed WJP clients, who identified Jean-
Pierre as their return preparer and confirmed that he had prepared
the 34 returns listed in the indictment. Most of these returns were
prepared in the presence of the taxpayers, but some were done
electronically or by phone. Jean-Pierre collected fees based on his
clients’ tax refund. Each of the taxpayers interviewed by the offic-
ers identified the items on their returns as false and asserted that
they had never provided Jean-Pierre with figures or documentation
to support those items. Jean-Pierre would “rarely, if ever, go over
the tax returns with the taxpayers,” and would sometimes send the
returns to the taxpayer “with only the first two pages, so [the] tax-
payers could not see the false claims.” The factual stipulation also
provided a chart which described each return and the items on each
return which Jean-Pierre falsely reported.
In advance of sentencing, a probation officer prepared a
presentence investigation report (“PSI”) that detailed Jean-Pierre’s
offense conduct consistent with the factual proffer. The PSI con-
tained additional relevant facts, as follows.
The government initially investigated Jean-Pierre after be-
coming aware of “a questionable pattern” of items on 1,949 returns
he prepared. The investigation established that Jean-Pierre’s own
tax returns contained similar suspicious items to those he filed on
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-12002

behalf of his clients. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) sent an
undercover agent to WJP in February 2021, as part of its investiga-
tion. When the agent arrived at WJP, there were only two tax pre-
parers there: Jean-Pierre and an employee named Jalesa Haynes.
Haynes prepared a return for the undercover agent which included
“a negative amount of more than $8,000” that the agent had not
reported or provided documentation to support. Haynes did not
go over the return with the undercover agent.
The investigation also concluded that Jean-Pierre’s fee struc-
ture was inconsistent and excessive. Some clients “did not even
know how they were charged because Jean-Pierre would not give
them a straight answer,” while others were charged “several hun-
dred dollars per return,” and one client was charged almost $1,000
per return. These fees “far exceed[ed]” standard rates for the ser-
vice provided.
Relevant to his argument on appeal, the PSI concluded that
Jean-Pierre qualified for an aggravating role adjustment under
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) because there were at least two criminal partic-
ipants in the scheme—Jean-Pierre and Haynes— and as the owner
of WJP, Jean-Pierre managed at least one employee who prepared
a false return in his presence. The PSI noted that Jean-Pierre em-
ployed eight individuals but concluded there was not sufficient ev-
idence to conclude the other employees—besides Haynes—were
criminal participants in the scheme. The PSI also noted that the
investigation included only 39 of the 1,949 returns prepared at WJP
and that Jean-Pierre only used his personal Preparer Tax
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Identification Number (“PTIN”) for 14 of those 39 returns. Yet the
IRS concluded that Jean-Pierre used other return preparers’ num-
bers to prepare the other returns. Still, both Jean-Pierre and other
tax preparers at WJP used Jean-Pierre’s Electronic Filing Identifica-
tion Number (“EFIN”).
The PSI calculated an estimate of “conservative tax loss
caused by Jean Pierre” over the full 1,949 returns, based on tax due
and owing from witness interviews. First, it concluded that
$142,248 constituted the amount of tax due and owing based on
witness interviews. Then it added $6,080 of fraudulent FTC and
Education Credits listed on Jean-Pierre’s personal tax returns,
$244,726 of fraudulent FTC credits added to tax returns using Jean-
Pierre’s PTIN, and $512,762 of fraudulent FTC credits added to tax
returns by other preparers’ PTINs where Jean-Pierre’s EFIN was
used. Based on these figures, the PSI calculated a total loss of
$905,816 to the IRS.
The PSI next calculated Jean-Pierre’s guidelines imprison-
ment range. First, it assigned him a base offense level of 20, see
U.S.S.G. § 2T1.4(a)(1), because he was responsible for more than
$550,000, but less than $1,500,000 in loss. It then added two levels,
see U.S.S.G. § 2T1.4(b)(1)(A) & (B), because Jean-Pierre committed
his offenses as part of a scheme from which he derived a substantial
portion of his income and because he was in the business of prepar-
ing tax returns. Next, it assigned him two more levels because he
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-12002

was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the criminal
activity, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). 1
The PSI then reduced Jean-Pierre’s offense level by three,
under U.S.S.G § 3E1.1(a) & (b), based on his acceptance of respon-
sibility. It also applied a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G.
§ 4C1.1(a), because it concluded Jean-Pierre counted as “a Zero-
Point Offender” under that provision. Concluding that Jean-Pierre
had no adult criminal history, it assigned him a criminal history cat-
egory of I. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A. The PSI then calculated, based
on an offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of I, a
guideline imprisonment range of 30 to 37 months. The PSI also
noted that the maximum term of imprisonment for each count was
three years.
After the initial PSI was prepared, Jean-Pierre filed objec-
tions arguing: (i) the proper loss amount was $148,328; (ii) he did
not abuse a position of private or public trust; and (iii) the two-level
managerial role enhancement should not apply. The government
disagreed. A probation officer prepared a revised PSI which made
some changes relevant to this appeal. The revised PSI concluded
that Jean-Pierre did not meet the criteria to be a “Zero-Point Of-
fender” under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a) because he received the two-

1 Because the PSI assigned Jean-Pierre two levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), it

did not apply a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, which applies
when a defendant abuses a position of public or private trust or uses a special
skill in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment
of the offense. U.S.S.G. § 2T1.4, comment. (n.4). Still, the PSI noted that this
adjustment would also be warranted based on Jean-Pierre’s offense conduct.
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24-12002 Opinion of the Court 7

level managerial role enhancement. Accordingly, the revised PSI
calculated Jean-Pierre to have a total offense level of 21. With a
total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of I, the PSI
calculated Jean-Pierre’s guideline range to be 37 to 46 months’ im-
prisonment.
Jean-Pierre filed a sentencing memorandum advocating for
a sentence of probation. He contended that, because of his lack of
criminal history, he had a very low risk of recidivism. He also ar-
gued that he qualified for the “Zero-Point Offender” reduction un-
der U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 because, even if he was considered a manager,
he had not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise under 21
U.S.C. § 848. He asked the district court to impose a downward
variance even if it disagreed with his argument about § 4C1.1 con-
sidering “his otherwise law-abiding life.” He also argued that a pro-
bationary sentence would allow him to make restitution.
At sentencing, the district court addressed Jean-Pierre’s
guidelines objections. First, Jean-Pierre again argued that he qual-
ified for a two-level reduction under § 4C1.1(10) because he was
not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. The court agreed
that Jean-Pierre was not engaged in a continuing criminal enter-
prise, as the term is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848, but determined that
a managerial role adjustment alone would disqualify him from the
§ 4C1.1(10) reduction, so it overruled the objection as long as the
aggravating role adjustment was proper.
As to the managerial role adjustment, Jean-Pierre argued
that, although he owned WJP, it was a small enterprise that did not
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-12002

delineate divisions of responsibility. The government responded
that Jean-Pierre’s personal ETIN was used on every tax return filed
under his business, and many people filed returns on the business’s
behalf—thus he was clearly managing the business and the people
under him. It explained that the PSI had concluded Jean-Pierre’s
other employees, besides Haynes, were not criminally liable be-
cause they were acting on behalf of Jean-Pierre himself, not in fur-
therance of the scheme.
The court then heard testimony from Special Agent David
Tucker, a special agent with the IRS, who testified as follows. Jean-
Pierre owned WJP and had at least five employees. Each tax pre-
paring business has an “electronic filing identification number” or
“EFIN” that “gives them authorization to file tax returns with the
IRS.” Then, each employee that prepares tax returns “should have
a preparer tax identification number” or a “PTIN.” In any event,
at WJP, Jean-Pierre and his employees “were using each other’s
PTIN numbers” so it was impossible to tell who prepared which
return. For the individual returns charged in the indictment, the
taxpayers identified Jean-Pierre as the one who prepared the re-
turn, but different PTIN numbers were used. The owner of an
EFIN, however, is responsible for reviewing and approving all tax
returns transmitted to the IRS under that EFIN.
During the undercover operation, Haynes prepared the un-
dercover agent’s tax return, and Jean-Pierre “was there while it was
being done.” The tax return had a refund to the undercover agent,
including a fuel tax credit and “a false Schedule C.” Jean-Pierre
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prepared a tax return for another witness that day. Haynes and
Jean-Pierre both used a different employee’s PTIN to prepare
fraudulent tax returns that day, although that employee was not
seen in the business.
Agent Tucker then testified about the loss amount calcula-
tion. He explained that the calculation consisted of the loss
amounts from actual counts of conviction in addition to the loss
amount from FTCs. Tucker stated that this was “the most con-
servative way to come up with the relevant conduct number.”
Tucker also explained that FTCs are credits for off-highway busi-
ness use, typically used by construction companies, farmers, and
others who have off-road vehicles or equipment that are not regis-
tered for on-highway use. Jean-Pierre included FTCs on 69% of
the tax returns filed through his EFIN, in contrast to the 2019 na-
tional average of .3% and the 2022 national average of 0.4%.
On Jean-Pierre’s personal tax return, which was introduced
into evidence, Jean-Pierre claimed 2,718 gallons of gasoline for off-
highway business use and 1,628 gallons of gasoline used for an in-
ner-city bus “or like vehicle.” Agent Tucker explained that, in Jean-
Pierre’s interview, Jean-Pierre explained that he only owned a
Dodge Challenger and thought he could claim FTC credits because
he was a business partner in a trucking business, though the truck-
ing business did not qualify for FTC credits because it uses on-high-
way vehicles. Jean-Pierre also stated that he had not read the in-
structions for FTCs, and thus he did not understand how to
properly use FTCs on tax returns. Based on these answers, Agent
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Tucker added all fuel tax credits filed under Jean-Pierre’s EFIN into
Jean-Pierre’s relevant conduct. Moreover, every interview the IRS
did with WJP clients confirmed that the FTCs were false, the clients
had not discussed the FTC with Jean-Pierre, and they had not pro-
vided documentation.
Agent Tucker explained that some of the WJP clients had
been audited, some had paid the IRS back, and some had not yet
done so. Even so, “for the most part, the money [wa]s gone from
the Government because the IRS only has three years to audit
somebody after their tax return is submitted,” and the three-year
limitations period had run. He also explained that, given Jean-
Pierre’s lack of knowledge on how FTCs worked and the fact his
clients had not provided him documentation to support them, no
FTC under his EFIN was accurate.
Following this testimony, Jean-Pierre argued the evidence
did not show that he directed Hayes as to how to prepare the tax
returns, but simply showed that Hayes prepared tax returns while
Jean-Pierre was present in the office. He also argued he was not in
a position of private trust because he was simply running a business
performing a service. The government argued that Jean-Pierre di-
rected Haynes on how to perpetrate the scheme and that he was
responsible for every tax return filed, and circumstantial evidence
showed that he trained his employees to include fraudulent credits.
The court found that the managerial enhancement applied,
stating, “I heard sufficient evidence that [Jean-Pierre was] in charge
of this organization and, thus, responsible for all the returns that
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24-12002 Opinion of the Court 11

are prepared under his employer number.” It concluded “the fact
that the evidence showed that they were passing each other’s
PTINs . . . around suggests to me that he at least allowed that to
happen and, thus, allowed this activity to go on.” It also deter-
mined that Jean-Pierre was in a position of trust, so “he would qual-
ify for both [enhancements], but because the way the guidelines
work, you can only get one of the” two enhancements. It con-
cluded: “I think the guideline appropriately gives him the role ad-
justment. But, again, if I’m wrong about that and he should not
have gotten the role adjustment, then he would have gotten the
same plus-two for the position of trust.”
As to the loss amount calculation, Jean-Pierre argued the
FTC amounts were not verified by interview, and the IRS incor-
rectly assumed that all FTCs added using his PTIN and EFIN were
fraudulent. The government responded that every tax return that
Agent Tucker reviewed with an FTC was fraudulent, and thus the
court could infer based on the national averages, the reviewed tax
returns, and the witness statements that every FTC applied by Jean-
Pierre was false. It asserted that the total loss amount would have
been much higher had it been based on every false item on every
tax amount. The court overruled this objection as well, explaining:
“the loss is probably greater than that because the other potentially
fraudulent credits were not even looked into beyond the inter-
views that were conducted. And so I suspect there was a larger loss
out there that just isn’t captured in the amount that’s shown.”
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Having resolved the outstanding objections, the district
court concluded that Jean-Pierre had a total offense level of 21 and
a criminal history category of I, resulting in a guideline range of 37
to 46 months. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A. However, it added that the
maximum penalty on each count was 36 months’ imprisonment.
The government asked for a guidelines sentence, noting the num-
ber of false tax returns and the effect of Jean-Pierre’s crime on WJP
clients who trusted Jean-Pierre to prepare their tax returns. Jean-
Pierre again argued for a probationary sentence.
The court noted that Jean-Pierre’s otherwise “very law-abid-
ing” life, strong work history, and strong work ethic “cut[] in his
favor.” It balanced this against the “significant” nature and circum-
stances of the offense of tax fraud—for which, in addition to the
identifiable victims, “the entire public is a victim.” It opined that it
needed to send a message to others in Jean-Pierre’s position that
crime does not pay, but also needed to balance the need for Jean-
Pierre to pay his restitution. Accordingly, it granted Jean-Pierre a
downward variance and imposed a sentence of 26-months’ impris-
onment on each count, to run concurrently, to be followed by a 1-
year term of supervised release.
The district court entered judgment consistent with its state-
ments at sentencing, and Jean-Pierre appealed. After his notice of
appeal, the parties agreed to a total restitution amount of $830,840,
and the district court entered an order to this effect. Jean-Pierre did
not appeal his restitution.
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“When the government seeks to apply an enhancement un-
der the Sentencing Guidelines over a defendant’s factual objection,
it has the burden of introducing ‘sufficient and reliable’ evidence to
prove the necessary facts by a preponderance of the evidence.”
United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2013)
(quoting United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 (11th Cir.
2007)). On appeal, the imposition of an aggravating role enhance-
ment and the amount of loss attributable to the defendant are fac-
tual findings that we review for clear error. United States v. Shabazz,
887 F.3d 1204, 1222 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Cavallo,
790 F.3d 1202, 1232 (11th Cir. 2015). To be clearly erroneous, the
finding of the district court must leave us with a “definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Isaac, 987 F.3d 980, 990 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v.
Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010)). Clear error is a very
deferential standard. See, e.g., OHI Asset (VA) Martinsville SNF, LLC
v. Wagner (In re Wagner), 115 F.4th 1296, 1303 (11th Cir. 2024). Ac-
cordingly, where a factfinder can have multiple permissible views
of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between those permissible
views does not amount to clear error. See id.
A district court may base its factual findings on facts admit-
ted in the defendant’s guilty plea, undisputed statements in the
presentence investigation report (“PSI”), or evidence presented at
the sentencing hearing. United States v. Matthews, 3 F.4th 1286, 1289
(11th Cir. 2021). “The court may also make reasonable inferences
from the evidence.” Id.; see also United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d
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14 Opinion of the Court 24-12002

883, 885 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that, at sentencing, a court can
make inferences, “based on common sense and ordinary human
experience”); United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1367 (11th Cir.
2009) (explaining that a district court may rely on “reasonable in-
ference[s],” but not ones that are “speculative to the point of being
clearly erroneous”). Still, a “district court ‘may not speculate about
the existence of a fact that would result in a higher sentence.’”
United States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 727 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting
United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011)).
When a party raises a constitutional issue for the first time
on appeal, we review only for plain error. United States v. Harris,
741 F.3d 1245, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Utsick,
45 F.4th 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2022) (laying out the elements of
plain-error review).
III. DISCUSSION
As we noted above, Jean-Pierre makes three arguments on
appeal, each relating to the district court’s application of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines. We address each argument in turn.
A. The District Court did not err in applying U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(c)’s Managerial Enhancement.
Jean-Pierre first argues that the district court erred in impos-
ing the managerial role enhancement because the government did
not meet its burden to show that his subordinates knew they were
violating the tax code and willfully broke the law. He contends
that his subordinates at WJP were merely employees who made
“technical mistakes at work without knowledge of the tax code
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requirements.” He also contends that Haynes was only observed
making errors once and there was not sufficient evidence to show
that her mistakes were willful. Jean-Pierre also argues that this is-
sue “implicates his due-process right to a sentence grounded in
facts, not speculation,” so we should review it under “the preserved
constitutional-error standard.” He contends that this error harmed
him, despite the district court’s downward variance, because the
sentencing guidelines informed the court’s downward variance.
Whether we view Jean-Pierre’s argument through the lens
of due process or as a challenge to the application of the sentencing
guidelines, we apply clear error review to the factual question of
whether the managerial enhancement was properly applied.
Shabazz, 887 F.3d at 1222; see Chavez, 584 F.3d at 1367 (explaining
“speculative” inferences are improper when they are “clearly erro-
neous”); cf. United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256, 1269 (11th Cir.
2010) (explaining that a defendant’s due process rights are violated
when, inter alia, “challenged evidence is materially false or unrelia-
ble”). In other words, if the district court’s findings were not clearly
erroneous, his due process challenge fails, because the findings
were also not impermissibly speculative. 2
Under § 3B1.1(c), a defendant receives a two-level increase
in his offense level if he was “an organizer, leader, manager, or su-
pervisor in any criminal activity” involving fewer than five

2 We also note that Jean-Pierre did not raise any due process challenge at sen-

tencing, so to the extent that his challenge presents that issue, it would be re-
viewed only for plain error. See Harris, 741 F.3d at 1248.
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16 Opinion of the Court 24-12002

participants. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Whether the enhancement ap-
plies depends on several factors, including:
(1) the exercise of decision making authority, (2) the
nature of participation in the commission of the of-
fense, (3) the recruitment of accomplices, (4) the
claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the
crime, (5) the degree of participation in planning or
organizing the offense, (6) the nature and scope of the
illegal activity, and (7) the degree of control and au-
thority exercised over others.

United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1348 (11th Cir. 2018) (altera-
tion adopted) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022, 1026
(11th Cir. 2009)). A defendant need not meet each consideration
to qualify, and instead, the government need only show that “evi-
dence that the defendant exerted some control, influence or deci-
sion-making authority over another participant in the criminal ac-
tivity.” Id. (quoting Martinez, 584 F.3d at 1026); see also U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1, comment. (n.2).
“A ‘participant’ under § 3B1.1 is ‘a person who is criminally
responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have
been convicted.’” United States v. Zitron, 810 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th
Cir. 2016) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.1)). In assessing
whether a person was “criminally responsible,” we may consider
any of the person’s acts directed or influenced by the defendant that
constituted relevant conduct. Id. at 1261–62. When a defendant is
convicted of filing false tax returns, in determining whether a per-
son was a participant under Section 3B1.1 “it makes no difference
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24-12002 Opinion of the Court 17

that [the person] did not actually help [the defendant] file the false
returns—it is enough that they knowingly assisted in some way in
[the defendant’s] criminal tax scheme.” Id. at 1256–57, 1262.
On this record, we do not find clear error. As the owner of
the business, Jean-Pierre necessarily exerted some level of control,
influence, or decision-making over his employees. Dixon, 901 F.3d
at 1348. This is both proven by the circumstantial evidence pre-
sented at the sentencing hearing—which showed that Jean-Pierre
was responsible for every return submitted under his EFIN and was
present when Haynes prepared the undercover agent’s fraudulent
tax return—and by the reasonable inferences that the district court
drew from that evidence. Philidor, 717 F.3d at 885; Chavez, 584 F.3d
at 1367. The district court also found significant the fact that the
employees were using each other’s PTINs, suggesting that Jean-
Pierre “allowed that to happen.”
On appeal, Jean-Pierre focuses on the lack of direct evidence
that Haynes had the requisite criminal mens rea and contends that
because the government did not prove she was criminally respon-
sible, the enhancement should not apply. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, com-
ment. (n.1). Although the evidence supporting the enhancement
would have been even stronger if, for example, Haynes had testi-
fied that she knew she was engaging in the scheme, Zitron, 810 F.3d
at 1261, “in common experience[,] circumstantial evidence is most
likely to be the only evidence of a subjective state of mind,” United
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18 Opinion of the Court 24-12002

States v. Smith, 548 F.2d 545, 549–50 (5th Cir. 1977) 3 (quoting United
States v. Wetzel, 514 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1975)). 4 Here, the cir-
cumstantial evidence showed that, in Jean-Pierre’s presence,
Haynes prepared a false tax return for an undercover agent that
included various items that were unsupported by the evidence pre-
sented by the agent to generate a negative amount of over $8,000,
and then did not review that return with the agent. This was suffi-
cient to suggest that Haynes had the requisite criminal mens rea.
Haynes’s actions mirrored Jean-Pierre’s broader scheme and were
wholly inconsistent with the role of a tax preparer in common un-
derstanding. The district court did not commit clear error or en-
gage in unwarranted speculation to assume that Haynes “know-
ingly assisted in some way in [Jean-Pierre’s] criminal tax scheme.”
Zitron, 810 F.3d at 1256–57, 1262 (emphasis added). Accordingly,
we affirm on this issue.
B. The District Court did not err in denying Jean-Pierre a
“Zero Point Reduction” under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1.
In November 2023, Amendment 821 to the Sentencing
Guidelines went into effect. See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Adopted
Amendments (Effective November 1, 2023), Amend. 821 (“Amendment

3 All Fifth Circuit decisions issued by the close of business on September 30,

1981, are binding precedent in this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d
1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
4 Indeed, as we recently explained in a case regarding currency transaction re-

porting, in financial crimes requiring willfulness, a “jury almost always must
infer mens rea . . . . from irregular patterns . . . and related context.” United
States v. Zayas, 141 F.4th 1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 2025).
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24-12002 Opinion of the Court 19

821”). Relevant here, Amendment 821 added a new section,
U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 (2023), which provided for a decrease in a defend-
ant’s offense level with the satisfaction of ten criteria. Id. Specifi-
cally, the defendant must not have: (1) received any criminal his-
tory points under Chapter Four, pt. A; (2) received an adjustment
under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4; (3) used violence or credible threats of vio-
lence in connection with the offense; (4) caused death or serious
bodily injury; (5) committed a sex offense; (6) personally caused
substantial financial hardship; (7) possessed, received, purchased,
transported, transferred, sold, or disposed of a firearm or danger-
ous weapon; (8) committed an offense under U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1;
(9) received an adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1; or (10) received
an adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 and not have engaged in a
continuing criminal enterprise. U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a) (2023). 5
Here, the district court did not err in denying Jean-Pierre a
reduction under § 4C1.1 because Jean-Pierre received an

5 In 2024, the Sentencing Commission amended U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a) “by strik-

ing paragraph (10) as follows: ‘(10) the defendant did not receive an adjust-
ment under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a continuing
criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848;’; and by inserting at the end
the following new paragraphs (10) and (11): ‘(10) the defendant did not receive
an adjustment under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role); and (11) the defendant was
not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848.’”
See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Adopted Amendments (Effective November 1, 2024),
Amend. 831. In doing so, the Commission clarified that it “intended
§ 4C1.1(a)(10)” to make “defendants . . .ineligible . . . if they either have an ag-
gravating role or engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise,” rather than
only if they have both, and the amendment clarified that point. Id.
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20 Opinion of the Court 24-12002

aggravating role enhancement under § 3B1.1 and was thus ineligi-
ble. See U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(10) (2023). We affirm as to this issue.
C. The District Court did not clearly err in determining the
loss amount.
In his final argument, Jean-Pierre contends that the district
court erred in calculating the loss to the IRS for purposes of the
Guidelines. He contends that the district court’s “computation was
error for five independent reasons.” First, he contends that the dis-
trict court improperly relied on losses which were not proven to be
willful. Second, he argues the district court’s conclusion that all
1,344 FTC claims were incorrect was based on “speculation” be-
cause there were only 12 confirmed false FTCs. Third, he argues
that the government’s reference to the national average for FTCs
was unreliable because the government did not establish the
makeup of WJP’s clientele—in other words, the government did
not establish that WJP clients are eligible for FTCs at the national
rate. Fourth, “there was no breakdown of which FTCs were filed
with [Jean-Pierre’s] personal involvement. This argument relies on
his prior argument that “generally, [his] subordinates were crimi-
nally innocent.” Fifth, he contends that the testimony of Agent
Tucker was not “reliable and specific” because Tucker did not ex-
plain how he came to the sum of the FTCs. Jean-Pierre also argues
that this issue implicates his due process rights. 6

6 Again, however, Jean-Pierre did not raise a due process challenge before the

district court, so this aspect of his argument is only reviewed for plain error.
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24-12002 Opinion of the Court 21

As noted above, we review the district court’s determination
of the loss amount for clear error. Cavallo, 790 F.3d at 1232. The
Guidelines do not require that the sentencing court make “a precise
determination of loss.” Id. Instead, “‘a sentencing court need only
make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available infor-
mation.’” Id. (alteration adopted, quoting U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, com-
ment. n.3(A)). The Guidelines explain that, in tax cases, “tax loss
shall be treated as equal to 28% of the unreported gross income
(34% if the taxpayer is a corporation) plus 100% of any false credits
claimed against tax, unless a more accurate determination of the
tax loss can be made.” U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(c)(1)(A).
All relevant conduct may be considered in determining the
loss amount, as long as the government can prove the conduct by
a preponderance of the evidence. Cavallo, 790 F.3d at 1233–34. We
concluded a district court erred when it made no specific factual
findings on which to base the loss amount and instead stated that
it just “pick[ed] a figure, like any jury would, about halfway in be-
tween” the parties’ loss estimates of $0 and $3.4 million. United
States v. Gupta, 572 F.3d 878, 888–89 (11th Cir. 2009). Still, failing
to make specific factual findings as to loss amount “will not result
in reversal ‘if the record otherwise supports the court’s determina-
tions.’” United States v. Maitre, 898 F.3d 1151, 1160 (11th Cir. 2018)
(alteration adopted) (quoting Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 727).

See Harris, 741 F.3d at 1248. In any event, we need not address that issue in
depth because Jean-Pierre has not shown error.
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22 Opinion of the Court 24-12002

To begin, we note that the district court’s loss calculation
began from a conservative point. Agent Tucker explained that—
even though many of the fraudulent returns charged in the indict-
ment had numerous false items—the loss was based only on FTCs.
This was because the FTCs are rare, all WJP clients who were in-
terviewed said that the FTCs were improperly applied, and Jean-
Pierre improperly used FTCs himself on his own tax return. More-
over, Jean-Pierre pled guilty to willfully committing 34 counts of
aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns and of the
39 returns the government evaluated, 33 had false FTC returns.
His factual proffer also stated that he “routinely prepared fraudu-
lent individual tax returns” that contained FTC credits. Accord-
ingly, Agent Tucker added all the FTCs used on Jean-Pierre’s ETIN
and PTIN, the FTCs on Jean-Pierre’s personal tax returns, and the
amount it had discovered from witness interviews. 7 Moreover,
Jean-Pierre does not dispute the inclusion of the tax due from wit-
ness interviews or the fraudulent FTC and education credits listed
on his own personal tax returns—he only challenges the inclusion
of the FTCs added to tax returns using his PTIN and EFIN.
Given the evidence we have summarized, the district court
did not clearly err in concluding that Jean-Pierre’s use of FTCs was
fraudulent and willful on all the returns used in the loss calculation.

7 We reject Jean-Pierre’s assertion that Agent Tucker’s testimony was not re-

liable and specific enough. Agent Tucker’s testimony was clear on where the
figures came from and was consistent with the numbers previously provided
in the PSI.
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24-12002 Opinion of the Court 23

Indeed, faced with this evidence, a reasonable inference is that all
FTCs added to tax returns using Jean-Pierre’s PTIN and EFIN were
false because Jean-Pierre admitted that he had not read the rules
for applying FTCs, WJP applied them at a rate exponentially higher
than the national average, and WJP clients who were interviewed
stated that they had not provided documentation for the FTCs that
he applied. Matthews, 3 F.4th at 1289; Philidor, 717 F.3d at 885.
Moreover, the district court permissibly concluded that Jean-Pierre
was in charge of WJP and generally responsible for the filings on
his ETIN, so Jean-Pierre’s argument that the court failed to break
down which FTCs were filed with his personal involvement is mis-
placed. Philidor, 717 F.3d at 885.
Of course, under some circumstances, an extrapolation
from a subset of data might be too speculative or unsupported. See
United States v. Annamalai, 939 F.3d 1216, 1238 (11th Cir. 2019);
cf. United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2010). Addi-
tionally, in some cases a district court might not adequately resolve
the parties’ dispute about the correct loss amount. See Gupta, 572
F.3d at 888–89. However, we have explained that such a situation
is not present here. Instead, Jean-Pierre simply disagrees with the
district court view of the evidence. Yet a factfinder’s choice be-
tween permissible views of the evidence is not clear error. Wagner,
115 F.4th at 1303; see also United States v. Esformes, 60 F.4th 621, 638
(11th Cir. 2023) (“If the district court’s account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of
appeals may not reverse it . . . .” (quoting Anderson v. City of Besse-
mer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985))). Because the loss amount
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24 Opinion of the Court 24-12002

was a permissible view of the evidence, we affirm as to this issue as
well.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons we have explained, we find no reversible er-
ror in any of the rulings of the district court. Accordingly, we af-
firm Jean-Pierre’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11132037. Public record. Not legal advice.