# JIMENEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · September 2, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11131771

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** September 2, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

EDWIN J,
Plaintiff,
Vv. Civil Action No, 24-9362 (RK)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, OPINION
Defendant.

KIRSCH, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Edwin J.’s | (“Edwin” or “Plaintiff’) appeal
‘from the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (the “Commissioner” or
“Defendant”) final decision, which denied Edwin’s request for Social Security disability and
supplemental security income benefits. (ECF No. 1.) The Court has jurisdiction to review this
appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and reaches its decision without oral argument pursuant to Local
Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
I, BACKGROUND
In this appeal, the Court must answer the following question: does substantial evidence
support Administrative Law Judge Karen Shelton’s (“Judge Shelton”) determination that Edwin
was not disabled?

' The Court identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial only. See D.N.J. Standing Order 2021-10.

A. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Edwin filed an application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income on March 3, 2021, (Administrative Record (“AR”) at 200-06, 209-13.)* The Social
Security Administration (the “Administration”) denied the requests initially (id. at 111, 116) and
after reconsideration (id. at 122, 125). Edwin then requested a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALI”), Ud. at 129.) On June 29, 2023, Edwin appeared by video at a hearing in front
of Judge Shelton, wherein she heard testimony from Edwin, who was represented by counsel, and
a vocational expert, Jessica Conrad (“VE”). (/d. at 39-71.) On October 19, 2023, Judge Shelton
issued a written decision finding that Edwin was not disabled. (7d. at 18-31.) After receiving notice
of Judge Shelton’s unfavorable decision, Edwin requested review by the Appeals Council. (/d. at
197-98.) On July 26, 2024, the Appeals Council determined that the reasons asserted by Edwin for
appeal “do not provide a basis for changing the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.” (/d, at 1,)
This appeal followed. (ECF No. 1.) The Administrative Record was filed on December 9,
2024, (ECF No. 6.) Edwin filed a moving brief CECF No. 7, “Pl. Br.”), the Commissioner
responded (ECF No. 9, “Def. Opp.”) and Edwin replied (ECF No. 10). The appeal is now ripe for
review by this Court.
B. JUDGE SHELTON’S DECISION
On October 19, 2023, Judge Shelton issued a decision finding that Edwin was not disabled
from his alleged onset date of January 25, 2021 through the date of decision.? (AR at 18-31.) At

* The Administrative Record (“AR”) is available at ECF Nos, 6-1 through 6-19. This Opinion will reference
only page numbers in the Record without the corresponding ECF numbers.
3 Plaintiff initially sought Social Security benefits based on an alleged onset date of March 13, 2020. (AR
at 200.) In his brief before the ALJ, Plaintiff amended his alleged onset date to January 25, 2021, which
was the date he stopped working. (Ud. at 346; see also id. at 50 (hearing transcript).)

the time of the alleged onset date, Plaintiff was fifty-years old, had obtained his GED, and had
been previously gainfully employed in a variety of physically demanding jobs, including roofing
supervisor, equipment installer, and floor grinder. (/d, at 29-30.) Plaintiff testified that he left his
most recent job in 2020 after he started “experiencing a lot of fatigue” from pulling heavy objects
and walking distances. (/d. at 56.) Next, his “shoulder{s] started giving out,” which led him to seek
professional medical help and ultimately see an orthopedic surgeon for issues with his left
shoulder, id.) Although there is no dispute that Plaintiff injured his shoulders and subsequently
underwent a series of surgeries and therapies, the lasting effect of these injuries, including the
impact of these injuries on Plaintiff's day-to-day life, were the focus of the ALJ’s inquiry in
reviewing thousands of pages of underlying medical documents and self-reports.
In reaching her determination that Edwin was not disabled, Judge Shelton applied the five-
step process for determining whether an individual is disabled as set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404, 1520(a) and 416.920(a). (/d. at 19-20.) At Step One, Judge Shelton found that Edwin had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, January 25, 2021." (Ud. at
20 (citing 20 CLFLR, §§ 404,1571 et seq., 416.971 et seq.).) At Step Two, Judge Shelton found that
Edwin suffered from four severe impairments: (1) soft tissue injury of upper extremity (frozen
shoulders and status-post surgery); (2) myocardial infarction and chronic ischemic heart disease;
(3) hypertension; and (4) degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine. (/d. at 21 (citing 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c)).}
The ALJ also analyzed five additional impairments, concluding that each one was non-
severe. Ud. at 21-22.) First, although Plaintiff had a body mass index of 35 (id. at 21 (citing id. at

4 While Edwin did earn $5,929 in the first quarter of 2021, this solely represented compensation for work
performed prior to the alleged onset date of January 25, 2021. (AR at 21.)

1115--1119)), the ALJ considered the “potential impact of obesity in causing or contributing” to
Plaintiff's other existing impairments and found no evidence of “any specific or quantifiable
impact” on Plaintiffs functioning. (/d. (citing id, at 398, 539, 592, 603-04, 724, 731-32, 739, 749,
761, 766, 816-817, 1136, 1296, 1534, 1540, 1607, 1616, 1630).) Accordingly, obesity was a non-
severe impairment. Ud.) Second, the ALJ assessed the impact of an impairment from Plaintiff's
hernia surgery in March 2022, id.) Judge Shelton similarly found this impairment to be non-severe
because of a “general absence in the record of findings demonstrating significant ongoing digestive
abnormalities or exacerbations” as well as no indication that the hernia surgery more than
minimally affected Plaintiff’s ability to work. (/d. (citations omitted).)
Third, Judge Shelton found no severe impairment resulting from Plaintiff’s “acute episode
of gout” in 2023 and bilateral foot pain. (d. at 21.) Plaintiff’s gout had been treated and was not
recurring. (ld. (citing 1107-1128 (emergency department medical records, June 15, 2023).)
Fourth, despite Plaintiff's diagnosis of “chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and asthma,” he
was “prescribed inhalers for help with breathing” which “improved his respiratory symptoms.”
(id, at 22.) Judge Shelton found that there was a “general absence in the record” of any ongoing
respiratory abnormalities, need for invasive treatment, or more than minimally negative impacts
on Plaintiff's ability to work. (/d. (citing ¢.g., id. at 398, 539, 592, 603-04, 724, 731-32, 739, 749,
761, 766, 816-17, 1136, 1296, 1534, 1540, 1607, 1616, 1630).) Finally, although the ALJ
acknowledged that Plaintiff sought treatment for lower back pain, she cited to Plaintiff's medical
records showing that, according to a September 2022 physical examination, Plaintiff could
“ambulate on heels, on toes, and tandem without loss of balance.” (/d. at 22 (citing id, at 828).)
Despite the findings of non-severity as to the aforementioned five impairments, Judge Shelton

nonetheless considered them when determining Plaintiff's ultimate residual functional capacity.
Ud.)
At Step Three,” Judge Shelton determined that Edwin did not have an “impairment or
combination of impairments” that qualified under the Administration’s limited impairments. (fd.
at 22-23 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, 416,926).}
Then, as a precursor to Step Four, Judge Sheiton determined that Edwin had the Residual
Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform “light work with additional reaching, postural, and
workplace environmental limitations.” (/d. at 27.) These additional limitations included Edwin’s
capacity to lift limited weight at waist level but not overhead and not from the floor; stand, walk,
and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; only occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch;
and never reach bilaterally overhead (but can frequently reach in all other directions. (/d. at 23.)°
As required, Judge Shelton began by accounting for Edwin’s alleged symptoms and
assessed whether those allegations were consistent with the medical evidence in the record. (See
id, at 24.)
Citing to Edwin’s Function Report, filed with the Administration in September 2021, Judge
Shelton noted that Edwin alleged he could net push, pull, carry lift, or reach because of pain in his
shoulders; struggled with personal care and grooming because of difficulty using his arms; and
could only walk for a quarter mile before needing to rest for at least 15 minutes (/d. at 24 (citing

Plaintiff does not contest the findings at Step 3, (See generally Pl. Br.)
6 Specifically, the ALJ determined Edwin’s RFC as:
lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 20 pounds frequently, but at waist level, not
overhead and not from the floor; and stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday
and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs;
never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch; and
never crawl. He can never reach overhead bilaterally but can frequently reach in all other
directions. He must avoid and have less than occasional exposure to extreme heat,
humidity, or pulmonary irritants such as chemical fumes.
(AR at 23.)

c<

id, at 269—73),) Edwin further testified that that he could not work because his ability to lift and
carry was extremely limited—as indicated by the fact that he had recently dropped a gallon of milk
after carrying it only 15 steps. Ud. (citing id. at 57).) Plaintiff further testified as to his inability to
keep a tight grip on anything due to pain radiating from his shoulders, as well as recent neck pain,
chest pain, and arm weakness. (/d.)
However, the ALJ ultimately did not credit Plaintiff's allegations and testimony, finding
that the “objective medical evidence and the claimant's treatment history are not entirely consistent
with the allegations of the severity of physical functional limitations.” Ud.) Specifically, Judge
Shelton pointed to a myriad of physical exams that showed “normal gait, good to full motor
strength, and intact sensation and coordination.” Ud. (citing id. at 398, 539, 592, 603-04, 724,
731-32, 739, 749, 761, 766, 816-17, 1136, 1296, 1534, 1540, 1607, 1616, 1630).) Some of
Edwin’s own testimony, the ALJ explained, also contradicted his allegations as to his difficulties.
Specifically, Edwin had expressed an ability to write with a pen or pencil, walk around a lake, go
places with his girlfriend and her children, make simple meals, dress and bathe independently, and
go shopping and to appointments unaccompanied. (Id. at 26’ (citing id, at 269-73, 497),)
Judge Shelton painstakingly reviewed a mountain of medical data from Edwin’s visits with
various medical practitioners and found them to contradict his claims of disability:
¢ A February 2021 cardiac catheterization study “showed unremarkable findings,
with no significant coronary artery disease, patent stents in the left anterior
descending and circumflex arteries, and normal left ventricle systolic function.” □□□□
at 25 (citing id. at 545),)
e After undergoing a procedure for left shoulder arthroscopy in March 2021,
Plaintiff was told twice that he should go to physical therapy to improve the pain
and stiffness in his shoulder. (/d. at 26 (citing id. at 404, 409).) By July, Plaintiff

7 Two pages of the ALJ’s opinion appear to have been inadvertently swapped during the filing of the
Administrative Record. Page 25 of the AR is page 9 of the ALP’s opinion, while page 26 of the AR is page
8 of the ALJ's opinion. (See AR at 25-26.)

ff

“had functional range of motion of the left shoulder with no rigidity.” Ud. (citing
id, at 414, 417, 419).)
¢ An October 2021 consultative examination revealed that Edwin, despite having
decreased range of motion in his shoulder, had intact sensation and dexterity in his
hands, full grip and pinch strength, and full strength, full range of motion, and intact
sensation in his lower extremities. Plaintiff also had a normal gait without use of an
assistive device, good hand-eye coordination, and abilities to heel walk, toe walk,
and squat. (id. at 27 (citing id, at 496-500).)
¢ In February 2022, Edwin underwent a procedure for right shoulder arthroscopy
and rotator cuff repair, after which he participated in physical therapy. A month
later, although Plaintiff still experienced some shoulder stiffness, he had “no other
acute complaints.” (7d. at 26 (citing id. at 592).) Another follow-up appointment in
May 2022 showed that Plaintiff had “full range of motion” in his right shoulder.
(id. (citing id. at 811).) A physical examination showed additional recovery
including “full strength” of the upper extremities, except for “slightly reduced
bilateral shoulder abduction strength.” (/d. (citing fd. at 828).)
¢ In November 2022, after reportedly experiencing headaches, dizziness, nausea,
and chest pain, Plaintiff underwent a cardiac catheterization procedure that
“showed normal coronary arteries” that led to Edwin being “discharged to home
the next day in stable condition.” (7d. at 25 (citing id. at 1276).) Plaintiff otherwise
denied significant ongoing chest pains or shortness of breath. U/d. at 25, 27 (citing
id. at 398, 539, 592, 603-04, 724, 731-32, 739, 749, 761, 766, 816-17, 1136, 1296,
1534, 1540, 1607, 1616, 1630).)
® Following a procedure for disc arthroplasty in February 2023, care providers noted
that recovery could take time and recommended physical therapy while further
remarking that during a physical exam Edwin showed “normal gait, with an ability
to walk on heels and toes, normal muscle bulk with no atrophy, normal motor
strength in all extremities, intact sensation and coordination, and grossly normal
range of motion.” (/d. at 25 (citing id. at 1570),)
All told, Judge Shelton found that despite Plaintiff's allegations of “extreme limitations in
standing, walking, sitting, and lifting,” the medical findings demonstrated “normal gait, good to
full motor strength, intact sensation and coordination, and adequate control of cardiac symptoms
with medication,” and the many activities of daily living also evidenced substantial ability. (fd, at
27.) Accordingly, even with his impairments, Judge Shelton found that Edwin could perform a
limited range of light work. (fd.)

Judge Shelton next evaluated the medical opinions and prior administrative medical
findings before her: first, Drs. Esther Tomor and Toros Shahinian opined, inter alia, that Edwin
could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for about
six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday. (/d. at
27 (citing id. at 77, 85, 92, 100).) Judge Shelton found these opinions to be persuasive, (fd, at 27—
28.) Second, Dr. Juan Carlos Cornejo agreed, opining, inter alia, that Edwin was “not limited from
walking and standing with reasonable breaks; would be able to sit for a reasonable amount of time
with needed breaks; [and] has no significant balance limitations and good functionality of his right
and left hands.” (7d. at 28 (citing id. at 500).) Judge Shelton found also found this opinion to be
persuasive. Ud.) Third, in stark contrast to the credited medical opinions, Edwin’s primary care
provider, Polino Sasso, FNP, claimed, infer alia, that Edwin could only “sit for 30 minutes, stand
for 30 minutes, and walk for 30 minutes in an eight-hour workday,” “must alternate between sitting
and standing every five minutes” and “must lie down for 30 minutes every hour.” (/d. (citing id.
at 2161).) Judge Shelton found this third opinion to be unpersuasive. (/d.)
Asa final step in determining Edwin’s RFC, the ALJ reviewed a letter submitted by Evelyn
Quervalu, Plaintiffs friend. Ms. Quervalu described Edwin’s “strugglef]” with his medical
condition in his daily life, based on her observations from being around him “for [t]he most part
of the last 4 years.” (See id. at 29 (citing id. at 314-15).) Judge Shelton found these statements to
be inconsistent with the objective medical record, including physical exam findings. Ud. (citing
id, at 398, 494-500, 539, 592, 603-04, 724, 731-32, 739, 749, 761, 766, 816-17, 1136, 1276,
1296, 1316, 1457, 1534, 1540, 1607, 1616, 1630, 2063).)

Moving to Step Four, Judge Shelton found that Edwin was unable to perform any of his
past work as either a roofing supervisor, equipment installer, or floor grinder. (fd. at 29-30 (citing
20 C.FLR. §§ 404.1565 and 416.965).)
Finally, at Step Five, accounting for Edwin’s RFC, age, education, and work experience,
in conjunction with testimony offered by the VE at the June 29, 2023 hearing, Judge Shelton found
that there were jobs “that exist in significant numbers in the national economy” that Plaintiff could
perform, Ud. at 30-31 (citing 20 C.F.R, §§ 404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, 416.969a).)
Specifically, the VE testified—and the ALJ concluded—that Edwin could work as a hand
packager, a cashier, or a small parts assembler. Ud.) Accordingly, Judge Shelton found that Edwin
had not been disabled from his alleged onset date of January 25, 2021 through the date of her
decision. (/d. at 31.)
I. LEGAL STANDARD
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether the
Commissioner's findings are “supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If the
Appeals Council denies a claimant’s request for review, “the ALJ’s decision is the Commissioner’s
final decision.” Matthews y. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir, 2001) (citation omitted). Substantial
evidence ts “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the
evidence.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Rutherford v. Barnhart,
399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)). Put differently, “[iJt means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d
310, 316 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Phunmer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 422 (3d Cir. 1999)), This
evidentiary threshold “is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019),

The scope of the Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is “quite limited.” Rutherford, 399
F.3d at 552, On review, the Court may not “re-weigh the evidence or impose [its] own factual
determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the factual
inquiry differently.” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Hartranft v.
Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)).
B. ESTABLISHING ELIGIBILITY FOR DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS
A claimant may establish disability under the Social Security Act by proving that he is
unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not Jess than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C, § 423(d)(1)(A).
The ALJ applies a well-established “five-step sequential evaluation process,” which requires
considering whether the claimant:
(1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) suffers from an
impairment or combination of impairments that is “severe”; (3)
suffers from an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) is able to perform his or her
past relevant work; and (5) is able to perform work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy.
McCrea vy. Comim’r of Soc. Sec, 370 F.3d 357, 360 Gd Cir. 2004) (citing 20 CFR.
404.1520(a)-(f), 416.920(a)—(f).® The claimant bears the burden at the first four steps, at which
point it shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five. Hess vy, Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201 (3d
Cir, 2019) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)).

® This five-step process applies to both applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income. McCrea, 370 F.3d at 360 1.3.

Ww

HI. DISCUSSION
Edwin appeals Judge Shelton’s determination of non-disability. (See ECF No. 1.) Edwin
raises three issues on appeal: first, that Judge Shelton failed to consider Plaintiff's extensive
surgical history, physical limitations, and medical evidence when determining that Edwin could
sustain “light work;” second, that Judge Shelton improperly minimized the severity of Edwin’s
symptoms; and third, that Judge Shelton erroneously discounted the medical opinion of Ms. Sasso.
(Pl. Br. at 4-5.)’ For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.
A. LIGHT WORK DETERMINATION
Plaintiff first contests Judge Shelton’s determination that Edwin was capable of performing
“light” work, arguing that the ALJ (i) failed to account for Edwin’s limitations in pushing, pulling,
and manipulation, (ii) cherry picked evidence, (iii) improperly relied on vocational analysis, and
(iv) should have found that Edwin was only capable of sedentary work. Ud. at 18-20.) The
Commissioner responds that Judge Shelton appropriately considered and sufficiently articulated
her reliance on physical exam findings, treatment notes, diagnostic studies, prior administrative
medical findings, and opinions of the consultative examiner in concluding that Edwin’s RFC
should include light work. (Def. Opp. at 10.)
“RFC is what an individual can still do despite his or her functional limitations and
restrictions caused by his or her medically determinable physical or mental impairments.” SSR 96-
09p. Importantly, it is the role of the ALJ—not the Court—to weigh the evidence in the record and
determine Plaintiff's appropriate RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c). Although an RFC must be

° Since Plaintiff's brief is not paginated, the Court cites to Plaintiff's brief using the page numbers in the
CM/ECF header.

“accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests,” the ALJ need
not “make reference to every relevant treatment note in a case where the claimant... has
voluminous medical records.” Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41-42; see also Cotter vy. Harris, 642 F.2d
700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). Should potentially conflicting evidence exist in the record, an ALJ must
“give some indication of the evidence which [she] rejects and fher] reasons for discounting such
evidence,” Burnett vy, Commn’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000), Indeed, an ALJ “need
not specifically address every piece of evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the
evidence and [her] conclusions.” Peter G. v. Conmun’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-3797, 2024 WL
3518117, at *9 (DNL, July 24, 2024) (quoting O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618
(7th Cir. 2010)), The Court’s role on appeal is only to evaluate whether substantial evidence
supports the RFC, See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 3d Cir. 2002).
Edwin’s various contentions against Judge Shelton’s RFC determination boil down to a
single argument: that there is evidence in the record that could have supported a different RFC,
(See, é.g., Pl. Br. at 19 (“The ALJ selectively cited isolated findings, such as Plaintiff's ability to
waik around a lake, while ignoring the overwhelming evidence of chronic pain, reduced range of
motion, and functional deficits.”’).) These arguments ignore the deference this Court must give the
ALJ, Even if there is some evidence in the record to support a more sedentary RFC, “[t]he ALI’s
decision may not be set aside merely because [a reviewing court] would have reached a different
decision,” See Cruz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 244 F, App’x 475, 479 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Hartranft,
181 F.3d at 360).
Here, Judge Shelton clearly and satisfactorily explained the basis for her RFC decision. See
Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41. In nearly six single-spaced pages, the ALJ carefully considered
Plaintiffs alleged symptoms, including his own reports that he could not push, pull, carry, lift or

14

reach; that he had difficulty using his arms; that he could not drive due to shoulder pain; that he
could only walk a quarter of a mile before needing to rest; that he had dropped a gallon of milk.
after carrying it fifteen steps; and that he could not keep a tight grip on anything, (See AR at 24.)
However, Judge Shelton appropriately found that there was ample objective medical evidence that
contradicted Edwin’s own self-serving statements and testimony. (See id, at 24-27.) For example,
whereas Edwin complained of a very limited ability to lift and reach, which he contended would
inhibit his capacity to perform light work, Judge Shelton pointed to reports from 2022 wherein Dr.

_ David Dickerson of Performance Orthopaedics and Sports Medicine found that Edwin had a “full
range of motion” in his shoulder and was “healing well” from his surgeries. (See, e.g., id. at 603-
04.) Additional records provided by Ocean Health Initiatives, Inc. showed that in 2021, after the
alleged disability onset date, Edwin had “normal movement of all extremities.” (See, ¢.g., id. at
749, 761.) In March 2023, just a few months prior to Edwin’s testimony before Judge Shelton
about his debilitating inability to lift his arms, examination notes from Princeton Brain, Spine and
Sports Medicine showed that he had “normal range of motion.” (d. at 1570.) Judge Shelton cited
to and explained these findings throughout her decision.
As another example, Judge Shelton found that after Edwin sought treatment for neck pain
and reported numbness radiating to his upper extremities, a May 2022 MRI showed “no nerve root
or cord impingement.” Ud. at 26 (citing, e.g., id. at 817 (There is no nerve root or cord
impingement.”)).) Plaintiff contends that this finding is a “‘mischaracteriz[ation]” since there were
“clear findings of cord compression and severe stenosis.” (Pl. Br. at 19.) This argument is
unpersuasive, however, because the ALJ was merely quoting the record—-which explicitly
indicated no nerve root or cord impingement—and because the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff's
stenosis elsewhere in her decision. (See AR at 25-26.)

Plaintiff cites to what he calls “overwhelming evidence of chronic pain, reduced range of
motion, and functional deficits,” (see PL. Br. at 19 (citing AR at 269, 408, 828)), but Judge Shelton
did not err in finding a light work RFC in consideration of the evidence in the record, To
substantiate Edwin’s limited range of motion, he first cites to his own Function Report—which
Judge Shelton cited and discredited as inconsistent with objective medical records, (See AR at 269;
id. at 24.) The second citation, to a 2021 medical examination, indicates that Edwin had limited
range of motion in his left shoulder, but fil range of motion in his right shoulder. (fd, at 408.) This
evidence, too, supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Edwin’s subjective complaints of a total inability
to use his shoulders was inconsistent with the objective medical findings. Only Plaintiff's third
record citation indicates some decreased range of motion. (See id, at 828.) Not only is this evidence
hardly “overwhelming,” but the ALJ was not required to discuss every single piece of evidence
specifically. See, e.g., Peter G., 2024 WL 3518117, at *9,!°
B. EDWIN’S SYMPTOMS
Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ improperly discounted his subjective symptoms by
“selectively relying on isolated instances of higher activity levels while disregarding the totality
of the evidence.” (Pl. Br. at 20.) As Plaintiff correctly states, SSR 16-3p directs the Commissioner
to consider Plaintiff's “own description or statement of . . . [his] physical or mental impairment.”
See SSR 16-3p. These statements about symptoms “will not alone establish” disability, but might,
in conjunction with other medical evidence, lead to a finding of disability. See 20 C.F.R.

© Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s decision contravened two Social Security regulations, though both
are inapplicable here. First, Plaintiff avers that Judge Shelton failed to account for pushing, pulling, and
manipulative limitations, as required by SSR 96-9p, but this regulation is only about unskilled sedentary
jobs, not light work jobs. Second, Plaintiff cites to a table that requires a finding of disability in certain
instances, but this table similarly applies only to work at a sedentary ievel. (Pl. Br. at 19-20); 20 C.ELR.
Subpart P, App. 2, Tbl. 1, R. 201.14.

§ 416,.929{a); Miller v. Comm’ r of Soc. Sec., 719 F, App’x 130, 134 Gd Cir. 2017) (“The ALJ has
wide discretion to weigh the claimants subjective complaints.”). The administrative regulations
articulate a two-step process that the Conunissioner must follow to determine whether a clatmant’s
alleged symptoms limit a claimant’s ability to work. SSR 16-3p.
The evaluation process begins once the claimant states his subjective symptoms. Id. (“We
define a symptom as the individual’s own description or statement of his or her physical or mental
impairments,””), In the first step of the process, the ALJ must determine “whether there is an
underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be
expected to produce the individual’s symptoms, such as pain.” SSR 16-3p; see also Hartranft, 181
F,3d at 362, Second, “if the ALJ finds that such an impairment exists, the ALJ must ‘evaluate the
intensity and persistence’ of the symptoms and the effects that those symptoms have on the
individual’s ability to work.” Lori C. v. Comm’r of Soc, Sec., No. 23-4369, 2024 WL 4803787, at
(D.NJ. Nov. 15, 2024) (citation omitted), An AL] “has wide discretion to weigh the claimant’s
subjective complaints [] and may discount them when they are unsupported by other relevant
objective evidence,” Miller, 719 F. App’x at 134 (citations omitted), “Examples of objective
evidence include whether a claimant has sought treatment, or taken medication, to alleviate their
pain.” Id,
Judge Shelton appropriately followed the two-step process. First, the ALJ determined that
Edwin’s medically determinable impairments—including his soft tissue injury, myocardial
infarction and chronic ischemic heart disease, hypertension, degenerative disc disease, obesity,
umbilical hernia, bilateral foot pain, lower back pain, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
and asthma— “could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (AR at 24.) As to
the second step, however, Judge Shelton found that Plaintiff's statements “concerning the

intensity, persistence, and limiting effect of these symptoms” were “not entirely consistent with
the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (/d.)
Plaintiff attempts to undermine this finding based on two separate arguments: first, that
there was sufficient evidence that supported Plainuff’s statements concerning intensity,
persistence, and limiting effect, and second, that the ALJ should not have considered certain
evidence that she found to contradict Plaintiff's statements. (See Pl. Br. at 20-23.) The evidence
that Plaintiff contends supports his statements mostly consists of additional statements that
Plaintiff made himself elsewhere in the record. For example, Plaintiff cites to his own hearing
testimony where he explained that he could not carry a gallon of milk for 15 steps without dropping
it and asserted that he had pain generating down his arm that precluded him from keeping a tight
grip. (Ud. at 21 (citing AR at 57-58 (hearing transcript).) Plaintiff also cites to the record of his
own self-reports. (id. (citing AR at 269 (“My shoulders do not allow me to raise my arms, extend,
or pull.””); 270 (“For the most part, 1 make sandwiches .. . I have to keep items where I don’t have
to reach or raise my arms to get them.”)).) By definition, these statements in Edwin’s own words
are not objective evidence; they are just his claimed symptoms. See SSR 16-3p, The ALJ did not
err by not considering them at this step.
Plaintiff also argues that some medical evidence in the record supports his position, and
that Judge Shelton did not sufficiently consider that evidence. The mere fact that some medical
exists (0 support a contrary position does not mean that the ALJ erred in her determination, See
Simmonds v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 54, 58 (3d Cir. 1986) (While there is other evidence in the record
that could support a finding of disability ... [the Court’s] inquiry is not where the ALJ could have
reasonably made a different finding based on the record. Rather, we must review whether the
ALI’s actual findings are supported by substantial record evidence.” (emphasis added).) Judge

Shelton’s determination was indeed supported by substantial evidence, including a significant
amount of evidence in the record, which she cited.
Plaintiff next takes issue with Judge Shelton’s consideration of what he refers to as
“isolated activities,” (Pl, Br, at 21-22.) According to Plaintiff, the ALJ relied too heavily on
Plaintiff's stated ability to walk around a lake or write with a pen because those activities “do not
reflect Plaintiff's ability to perform sustained work-related tasks,” (7d. (citing AR at 25).) Here,
Plaintiff overstates Judge Shelton’s reliance on these activities of daily living. Although the ALJ’s
decision certainly accounted for Edwin’s own reported ability to engage in a variety of daily
activities (see AR at 26), the bulk of her analysis was centered on the many contradictions between
Edwin’s testimony and the objective medical evidence in the record (id. at 24-27). Judge Shelton
considered Plaintiff's daily activities as just one of many factors that went into her decision, which
was not error, See Cunningham v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 507 F, App’x 111, 118 Gd Cir, 2012)
is appropriate for an ALJ to consider the number and type of activities in which a claimant
engages when assessing his or her residual functional capacity,”); see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(3)(i) (allowing an ALJ to consider “daily activities” as a ‘“‘factor[] relevant to []
symptoms, such as pain”); James R. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-5030, 2023 WL 6389097, at *8 (D.N_J.
Sept. 30, 2023) (“[A]ctivities of daily life may be used by the ALJ as probative evidence of non-
disability.”); Diego H. v. Bisignano, No. 23-3870, 2025 WL 2058144, at *7 (D.NJ. July 23, 2025)
(finding ALJ did not err by considering Plaintiff's daily activities alongside other factors).'!

'! To the extent Plaintiff contends that the activities cited by the ALJ are “sporadic” or “occasional” rather
than “daily,” (see Pl. Br. at 22) the record does not support an inference that any cited activity was merely
sporadic. For example, Edwin testified “T’ll walk around the lake” (AR at 60) and “I can write” (id. at 58).

14

C. MEDICAL OPINIONS
Judge Shelton considered three medical opinions as part of her determination as to whether
Ewin was disabled: (i) state consultants Drs. Tomor and Shahinian; (41) internal medicine
consultant Dr. Cornejo; (iii) and Ms. Sasso, a Family Nurse Practitioner (FNP) and Edwin’s
primary care provider. (AR at 27-29.) The ALJ found the first two opinions persuasive, and the
third opinion unpersuasive. (/d.) On appeal, Plaintiff contests only Judge Shelton’s evaluation as
to Ms. Sasso’s opinion, (Pl, Br. at 23.)
It is not the Court’s function to second-guess or substitute its judgment for that of the
factfinder ALJ, but rather to ensure, consistent with its limited, circumscribed role, that the
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 38. Here,
Judge Shelton properly applied the correct legal framework when evaluating the persuasiveness of
Ms. Sasso’s medical opinion and appropriately incorporated the facts and opinions of each medical
professional into her RFC analysis.
When making a disability determination, an ALJ must review and evaluate all medical
opinions that are part of the record. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121. However, not all medical opinions
are created equal, or assessed equally. It is the sole province of the ALJ to consider medical
opinions, decide how persuasive each medical opinion is, and articulate the persuasiveness of each
opinion as part of the written determination. See Cooper v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 563 F. App’x
904, 913 Gd Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927). Before 2017, opinions by treating medical
sources were automatically given more weight than those by non-treating sources, otherwise
known as the “treating source rule.” See 20 CLFLR. § 416.927(c)(2) (“Generaliy, we give more
weight to medical opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the
medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical

impairment(s).”). For claims filed after March 27, 2017, like the instant matter, the regulations
require the Commissioner to consider the following factors when evaluating all medical opinions:
(1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant, including the length of the
treating relationship, the frequency of examinations, and the purpose of the treatment relationship;
(4) the medical source’s specialization; and (5) other factors, including, but not limited to,
“evidence showing a medical source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an
understanding of our disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404,1520c(c), 416.920c(c). □
The regulations emphasize that “the most important factors” for the ALJ and
Commissioner to consider when evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions are the factors
of supportability and consistency. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Accordingly, the ALJ must
“discuss supportability and consistency” when articulating his “consideration of medical opinions
and prior administrative medical findings.” Lee Ann M. v, O'Malley, No. 22-1104, 2024 WL
4184486, at *7 (D.NJ. Sept. 13, 2024) (citations omitted). “Supportability” is “the extent to which
the medical source’s opinion is supported by relevant objective medical evidence and explanations
presented by the medical source.” Carolyn N. v. Comin’r of Soc. Sec,, No. 22-4957, 2023 WL
8271767, at *5 (D.NJ. Nov. 30, 2023) (quotation omitted). “Consistency” is “the extent to which
the medical source’s opinion is consistent with the record as a whole.” /d. (quotation omitted).
When an ALJ evaluates a medical opinion, she is not required “to use particular language
or adhere to a particular format in conducting [her] analysis.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501,
505 Gd Cir. 2004) (citing Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119-20). Instead, the Court must “ensure that there
is sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.”
Td.

QO

Judge Shelton clearly considered both supportability and consistency in her evaluation of
Ms. Sasso’s medical opinion, Although Ms. Sasso had been treating Plaintiff since at least
September 2020 (see AR at 773), her official opinion for the purposes of Plaintiff's disability
determination took the form of a single page with checkboxes. (See AR at 2161 (dated May 11,
2023).) Ms. Sasso first opined that Edwin could lift and carry a “sub-sedentary” amount of
weight——up to five pounds occasionally and nominal weight frequently. Ud.) Next, Ms. Sasso
determined that Edwin could sit, stand, and walk for just 30 minutes each in an 8-hour work-day.
(d.) Ms. Sasso then checked boxes indicating that Plaintiff was required to alternate sit/stand every
five minutes away from his work station, would need to lie down at unpredictable intervals hourly
for 30 minutes, and could never twist, stoop, crouch, climb stairs, climb ladders, reach, or push
and pull. (/d.) According to Ms. Sasso’s form opinion, Plaintiff would need to elevate his legs to
waist level every time he sits, would need breaks five or more times throughout the day (not
including lunch and two fifteen-minute breaks), and would only be able to focus continuously for
0-59 minutes at a time. (/d.) In the single text box on the form, Ms. Sasso provided the following
“medical findings” supporting her opinion: “multiple musculoskeletal problems, 3 surgeries
recent, cardiac [], stent in heart, DM, asthma.” (/d,)
i. Supportability
As Judge Shelton noted, Ms. Sasso’s opinion cited to no “objective medical evidence that
would suggest such extreme physical functional limitation.” (id. at 28.) Indeed, this opinion is
clearly not supportable because it marks the most extreme limitation in nearly every category, even
though Ms. Sasso had previously noted more moderate or mild symptoms throughout her years of
treating Plaintiff. (See, e.g., id. at 766 (January 2021 medical records indicating “normal movement
of all extremities” and “normal” strength and tone); 761 (February 2021 medical records indicating

An

“normal movement of all extremities”); 753 (March 2021 medical records indicating that Plaintiff
was “ambulating normally”); 722~24 (May 2022 medical records wherein Plaintiff reported
“heavy” exercise, and “no shortness of breath when walking” and “normal gait and station’’),)
Moreover, “[fjorm reports in which a physician’s obligation is only to check a box or fill
in a blank are weak evidence a best.” Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993). The
form Ms, Sasso used to convey her opinion is weak because it does not explain why, despite her
prior findings that he could walk and had normal extremity movement, she suddenly found that
Edwin could only work in a role that required him to neither walk, nor stand, nor sit for more than
30 minutes at a time.; see also Whitaker v. Comm’r, No. 23-535, 2024 WL 1346698, at *i □□
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2024) (noting that the medical professional “did not state what Plaintiff could
do for the remaining hours of the workday unaccounted for by her sit, stand, and walk limitations”).
2. Consistency
Judge Shelton also considered the consistency factor, concluding that Ms. Sasso’s opinion
was “inconsistent with the current and complete record as a whole, which likewise does not suggest
such extreme physical functional limitation.” (AR at 28.) Citing to nearly a dozen other medical
exhibits from the extensive record, the ALJ pointed to evidence of Edwin’s “normal gait, good to
full motor strength, and intact sensation and coordination” as well as “treatment notes, physical
exam findings, and diagnostic studies demonstrating adequate control of cardiac symptoms with
medication.” (/d, at 28-29 (citing e.g., id, at 398 (Performance Orthopaedics & Sports Medicine),
494-500 (Momentum Medicine Plus LLC), 539 (Cardiology Associates of Ocean County); 592,
603-04 (Performance Orthopaedics & Sports Medicine); 816-17 (same); 1136 (CentraState
Medical Center); 1276, 1296, 1316; 1457 (RJWBarnabas Health); 1534, 1540 (Cardiology
Associates of Ocean County); 2063 (CentraState Medical Center),)

v4

Plaintiff argues that despite the many medical findings that were inconsistent with Ms.
Sasso’s opinion, there are also some that were consistent. Given Judge Shelton’s exhaustive
analysis of a complex record, the fact that some evidence goes the other way is of no moment.
Indeed, as stated, “an ALJ’s decision does not lack substantial evidence simply because the ALJ
might have reached a different result.” Gunn v. Kijakazi, 705 F. Supp. 3d 315, 326 (B.D. Pa. 2023);
see also Simmonds, 807 F.2d 54, 58 (3d Cir. 1986) (“While there is other evidence in the record
that could support a finding of disability ... [the Court’s] inquiry is not whether the ALJ could
have reasonably made a different finding based on the record. Rather, we must review whether the
actual findings are supported by substantial record evidence.” (emphasis added).) Without
question, the ALJ’s “actual finding[],” namely that Ms. Sasso’s single-page form opinion was
unpersuasive, is supported by substantial evidence. See Sinumonds, 807 F.2d at 58.
Judge Shelton’s evaluation of the various medical opinions, as well as her overall
engagement with the underlying medical and administrative record, bespeak a detailed and
exhaustive analysis of Edwin’s disability claim. The ALJ’s determination of non-disability is
supported by substantial evidence.

ae

CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the record as a whole, the decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

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ROBERT KIRSCH ~ en
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 2, 2025

72

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11131771. Public record. Not legal advice.