# Isaac v. Manning

> District Court, D. Oregon · September 2, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11131767

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** September 2, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11131767

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity
- holding that an alleged custom or practice claim cannot be based “on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

LOGAN MARTIN ISAAC, Case No. 6:25-cv-01159-MC

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

JAMES IVORY MANNING, JR., SHELLY
BOSHART DAVIS, RENEE PERRY,
OREGON STATE POLICE, OREGON
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REBECCA
MAILE, and JOHN and JANE DOES 1–10,

Defendants.

MCSHANE, Judge:

Self-represented Plaintiff, Logan Martin Isaac, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) in this action against Oregon legislators and law enforcement agencies that allegedly
deprived him of his constitutional rights. Before the Court, in addition to Plaintiff’s Complaint, is
Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed IFP and Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Pro
Bono Counsel. ECF Nos. 1–3. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s IFP Application is
GRANTED and his Motion for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel is DENIED.
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff Logan Martin Isaac is a resident of Albany, Oregon and a disabled United States
Army veteran. Compl. 2, ECF No. 1. Since 2016, Plaintiff “has dedicated significant time and

1 At this stage, the Court takes all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true. See Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop
Tr., 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000).
resources to advocating for military civil rights legislation[.]” Id. at 3. Plaintiff is understandably
concerned about veteran suicide statistics and believes there is a need for civil rights protections
for veterans and military families. Id. He has discussed military civil rights legislation with
members of the Oregon Legislative Assembly and advocated for proposed legislation that would
strengthen protections for veterans and their families. See id. at 3–8.

On January 27, 2025, Plaintiff visited Representative Davis’s office to follow up on the
status of one such law. Id. at 4. Plaintiff expressed frustration with the delays, commented that
“seventeen battle buddies are going to die today,” and noted that his “next stop [was] going to be
the Oregonian[.]” Id. Defendant Perry characterized Plaintiff’s statement as a “threat,” though
Plaintiff alleges that he never made any threat of harm, violence, or unlawful conduct. Id. at 4–5.
Defendant Perry threatened to call the police, and Defendant Oregon State Police (“OSP”) came
to the scene, but Perry allegedly told police that “they did not view Plaintiff’s conduct as rising to
the level of requiring his removal from the premises[.]” Id. at 5.
A hearing had been scheduled for the following day, January 28, 2025, on Senate Joint

Memorial 1 (“SJM 1”). “SJM 1 urged Congress to conduct public hearings on anti-military bias
and improve enforcement of hate-crime protections for military families.” Id. at 6 (internal
quotation marks omitted). But following the January 27th incident, the “scheduled hearing was
immediately canceled[.]” Id.
On February 7, 2025, Representative Davis issued a letter that banned Plaintiff from her
office for one year, citing the January 27th incident. Id. at 5.
Two weeks later, on February 21, 2025, Plaintiff asserted his intent to continue his
advocacy efforts despite Representative Davis’s office ban. Id. at 6. Later that day, Legislative
Administrator Brett Hanes issued a memo stating that Plaintiff’s “visits to the Capitol have caused
alarm, disruption and concern,” and requiring Plaintiff to give advance notice to OSP and have a
mandatory escort when visiting the State Capitol. Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
One week later, on February 28, 2025, Plaintiff saw Matt Keating, a Senior Policy Advisor
to Senator Manning, at a restaurant in Salem, Oregon. Id. at 7. Plaintiff filmed himself as he
expressed frustration that hearings were not being scheduled for the bills he supported, and Keating

stated he was “just waiting for [his] lunch[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff
alleges that Senator Manning later admitted that he retaliated by refusing to schedule a hearing for
a veterans’ protection bill, SB 1057, because “[Keating] was confronted in a restaurant by the bill
requestor with a video camera.” Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff filed multiple small claims actions related to these facts, and he alleges that
Defendant Maile made misrepresentations and interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to obtain
discovery for those claims. Id. at 8–9.
Together, Plaintiff alleges that these actions amount to a conspiracy retaliating against him
for his advocacy and discriminating against him based on his status as a veteran. Id. at 9.

LEGAL STANDARD
This Court has discretion in deciding whether to grant IFP. See O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920
F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990). To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make two
determinations. First, a court must determine whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of
commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court
must screen the complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has raised a cognizable legal
claim. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008). “[T]he court shall dismiss
the case at any time if the court determines that” the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court construes pleadings by self-represented
plaintiffs liberally and affords the plaintiffs the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles
Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988).
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

The Court is satisfied by Plaintiff’s representation that he is “unable to pay the fees for
these proceedings[.]” Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 1, ECF No. 2. Plaintiff’s Motion
to Proceed IFP is GRANTED, and the Court moves on to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint for claims
that are frivolous or fail to state a claim for relief.
II. Plaintiff’s Complaint
A complaint is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” and the Court
applies the familiar standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) when considering Plaintiff’s claims.
Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.
2012). Under that standard, the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact and construes

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. Legal conclusions, however, “are not entitled
to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “Dismissal is proper only
if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle
him to relief.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112.
Construing Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally at this early stage in the proceedings, Plaintiff
may have viable, non-frivolous claims against Defendants. But some of Plaintiff’s claims do not
survive as they are currently pled. First, Plaintiff brings § 1983 Equal Protection claims against
the Oregon Department of Justice and Oregon State Police, but state agencies and municipal
departments are not amenable to suit under § 1983 because they are not “persons” under the text
of that statute. See, e.g., Mistriel v. Kern Cnty., No. 1:02-cv-06922, 2011 WL 864495, at *3 (E.D.
Cal. Mar. 10, 2011) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th
Cir. 2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim for Relief is DISMISSED as to Defendants OSP and DOJ.
Second, Defendant Maile, as Assistant Attorney General, is “absolutely immune for

conduct during performance of official duties.” Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th
Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). That immunity does not extend to actions that are “wholly unrelated
to or outside of [the attorney’s] official duties,” or to ministerial or administrative functions. Id.;
Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff challenges representations Maile
made in the course of litigation, which were clearly made in the course of her official duties.
Defendant Maile is thus immune from suit for the alleged conduct, and Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim for
Relief is DISMISSED.
Third, Plaintiff seeks to impose municipal liability against Defendants OSP and DOJ under
§ 1983, alleging official policies or customs of violating Due Process and Equal Protection rights.

But Plaintiff alleges nothing that allows the Court to infer that Defendants have any policy or
custom of violating individuals’ rights. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that an alleged custom or practice claim cannot be based “on isolated or sporadic
incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that
the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy”). Neither has he alleged that
any of the individuals who made these decisions have final policy-making authority. See Gillette
v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992) (listing ways plaintiffs may allege a policy,
custom, or practice). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Claim for Relief is DISMISSED.
Other Defendants may ultimately be subject to various immunities or have acted entirely
lawfully. See, e.g., Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing absolute
prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity); Burnard v. Giblin, No. 22-1982, 2024 WL
458640, at *2–4 (D. Or. Feb. 6, 2024) (discussing various immunity doctrines). But with only
Plaintiff’s Complaint before it, the Court cannot say that Plaintiff could not prove any set of facts
that would allow liability. Plaintiff’s Complaint is not subject to dismissal for being entirely

frivolous at this time, so his Application for Leave to Proceed IFP, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED.
III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel
Plaintiff asks the Court to appoint pro bono counsel because his claims “requir[e] complex
constitutional analysis and extensive discovery from multiple government entities.” Mot.
Appointment Pro Bono Counsel 1, ECF No. 3.
There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). When an individual proceeds IFP, the Court may
request an attorney to represent them only where “exceptional circumstances” are present. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). To determine whether

exceptional circumstances are present, the Court considers both “the likelihood of success on the
merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of
the legal issues involved.” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims may be able to succeed, but Plaintiff has demonstrated an ability
to clearly state his allegations and allow his claims to be heard on the merits. The Court sees no
exceptional circumstances at this stage, so Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel is
DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, ECF No. 3,
is DENIED. If Plaintiff wishes to do so, he may file an amended complaint within 30 days of this
Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 2nd day of September 2025.

s/Michael J. McShane
Michael McShane
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11131767. Public record. Not legal advice.