# Scott v. Greene

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · September 2, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11131471

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 2, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11131471

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that the standard for municipal liability in Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), applies to corporations as well

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

DELON SCOTT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) 3:24-cv-03110-CRL
v. )
)
LATOYA HUGHES, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, presently incarcerated at
Western Illinois Correctional Center, asserts claims for violations of the United States
Constitution based on occurrences during his imprisonment at Western.
I. PROCEDURAL POSTURE AND PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Plaintiff’s initial complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 12).
Plaintiff’s timely Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 13) is granted, and the Court will
assess the merit of Plaintiff’s claims below.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (Doc. 17) is granted in part and denied
in part. Plaintiff requests free copies of his original and amended complaints,
reconsideration of the Court’s denial of his motion to request counsel, and a transfer to
Dixon Correctional Center.
The Clerk is to send Plaintiff a copy of the Amended Complaint upon docketing.
For any additional copies of other documents, Plaintiff must write to the Clerk’s office,
identify the pleading he wants copies of, and request the cost. The Clerk will provide him
that information. He must then send payment to the clerk, specifying the document he
wants printed, and the Clerk will send him the requested copies. The Court declines to

reconsider the denial of Plaintiff’s earlier motion for pro bono counsel as there is no basis
to do so.
Plaintiff’s request that the Court order him transferred to Dixon Correctional
Center is denied because it is not developed or factually supported. Prison administrators
have broad authority regarding the day-to-day operations of the prison system, and
Plaintiff has not advanced any basis for this Court to order him transferred to a different

prison. See Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012); 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
II. ALLEGATIONS
The case is before the Court for a merit review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and identify and dismiss any legally
insufficient claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.
The Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the
plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements
and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief that is plausible

on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff sues IDOC Director Latoya Hughes, Warden Brittany Greene, Assistant
Warden Tara Goins, Correctional Officer/Sergeant Ms. Zimmerman, Correctional Officer
Mr. Mangold, Nurse Ms. J. Patton, Mental Health Practitioner Ms. B. Little, Psychiatrist
Kathryn Adams, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. Wexford holds the contract to provide
medical care at Western. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and punitive damages,

and a transfer to Dixon Correctional Center.
On June 8, 2023, Plaintiff entered #2 Housing Unit coming from a daily routine
scheduled visit at the Health Care Unit. Defendants Zimmerman and Mangold were in
the foyer. After Plaintiff checked in with the house tower, he was stopped by
Zimmerman, who asked what was bulging from Plaintiff’s pocket. Plaintiff said it was
medication and showed it to Zimmerman. Zimmerman asked Plaintiff why he was on

controlled medication and Plaintiff told her he suffered a prior gunshot wound to his
penis. Zimmerman then told Plaintiff to stretch out his arms and spread his legs. During
the search that ensued, Zimmerman was repeatedly “stroking” Plaintiff’s penis and
scrotum, through his pants, and wedged his underwear and pants into his buttocks so
tightly that Plaintiff’s skin was broken. After this search, Zimmerman asked Plaintiff,

“did you like it?”
Plaintiff said he wanted to file a PREA report on Zimmerman, and Mangold told
Plaintiff to lock up or he would be sent to restrictive housing. Plaintiff went to his
assigned cell and noticed blood in his underwear. He pressed a security button in his cell
several times but did not receive a response.

During the 3-11 shift, apparently that same day, Plaintiff gave Defendant Nurse
Patton a sealed envelope reporting the incident with Zimmerman. He also said that he
was sexually abused by Zimmerman causing blood in his underwear and requested help.
Patton denied Plaintiff emergency services. Plaintiff did not receive medical attention for
about 40 days. Plaintiff does not allege taking any additional steps to receive medical care
or to make a PREA report.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Zimmerman has a history of sexually abusing inmates
at Western Illinois Correctional Center. Defendant Greene (the Warden) and Goins
(Assistant Warden) failed to act on information that Zimmerman was sexually abusing
inmates, which plausibly resulted in Plaintiff being searched in a sexually abusive
manner. Plaintiff tried taking 20mg of Prozac for depression but had a bad reaction. As
he prepared his complaint, Plaintiff hallucinated and “can’t get the sight of bloody

underwear out of his mind.”
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Zimmerman based
on the alleged sexualized and injurious search. Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 649 (7th
Cir. 2009); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003); May v. Trancoso, 412 F.

App’x 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Mangold do not state a claim. Plaintiff’s
allegations do not give rise to a plausible inference that Mangold was positioned to 1)
know the full nature of Zimmerman’s search, and 2) reasonably intervene, such that he
was required by the Constitution to take some immediate action during the search. Gill

v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998,
1007 (7th Cir. 2018). Mangold’s order for Plaintiff to lock up or face discipline also does
not state a claim – there was no risk of harm to Plaintiff by requiring him to lock up, and
there is no private cause of action based on dissatisfaction with the handling of a PREA
report. See Closson v. Kohlhepp, No. 21-cv-772, 2021 WL 3363139, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 3,
2021).

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Nurse Patton do not state a claim. He does
not plausibly allege that Patton was aware of, and consciously disregarded, a serious risk
of physical harm. Plaintiff alleges he gave Patton a sealed envelope regarding his
allegations against Zimmerman shortly after the search occurred, while Patton was
passing out medications. Plaintiff said that there was blood in his underwear and alleges
that she did not ensure he received emergency care. Deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need is actionable as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Petties v. Carter,
836 F.3d 722, 729-30 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir.
2008). Deliberate indifference is proven by demonstrating that a prison official knows of
a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and “either acts or fails to act in disregard of that
risk.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiff does not allege he

suffered a serious risk of physical injury or that he was further harmed by Patton not
immediately interrupting her assigned med pass duties to ensure he received emergency
care.
Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Wexford Health Sources Inc., do not state
a claim. Wexford is potentially suable under a theory of municipal liability. Woodward v.

Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the standard
for municipal liability in Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), applies
to corporations as well). However, “for a Monell claim to survive … a plaintiff must plead
facts that plausibly suggest”: 1) deprivation of a constitutional right, 2) the deprivation
can be traced to some municipal action (i.e., ‘a policy or custom’), such that the challenged
conduct is properly attributable to the municipality itself, 3) the policy or custom

demonstrates municipal fault, i.e., deliberate indifference, and 4) the municipal action
was the moving force behind the federal-rights violation. Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist.,
74 F.4th 521, 522 (7th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). All requirements “must be
scrupulously applied to avoid a claim for municipal liability backsliding into an
impermissible claim for vicarious liability” under the respondent superior doctrine.
Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Plaintiff

has failed to allege a claim against Wexford. There is no plausible inference from
Plaintiff’s allegations that a policy or practice of Wexford are to blame for any issues
Plaintiff experienced.
Plaintiff does not plausibly allege any claims against Mental Health Practitioner
Ms. B. Little and Psychiatrist Kathryn Adams. The only allegations possibly related to

these Defendants are that he tried Prozac and had a bad reaction. These allegations do
not state any claim.
Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants IDOC Director LaToya Hughes, Warden
Brittany Greene, and Assistant Warden Tara Goins, present a close call. To hold a
supervisory Defendant liable under § 1983, Plaintiff must “show that the defendants were

personally responsible for the deprivation of their rights.” Wilson v. Warren Cty., Illinois,
830 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2016). The mere fact that a defendant was a supervisor or
director in the chain of command is insufficient to establish liability because the doctrine
of respondeat superior (supervisor liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C.
§1983. Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 616 (7th Cir. 2008); Pacelli v. DeVito, 972 F.2d 871, 877
(7th Cir. 1992) (supervisors are not liable for the errors of their subordinates). Instead, “a

defendant is personally responsible ‘if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation
occurs at his direction or with his knowledge and consent.’” Id. quoting Gentry v.
Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff does not allege the personal involvement of LaToya Hughes, IDOC
Director. However, Plaintiff does allege that Brittany Greene and Tara Goins both knew
that Zimmerman was sexually abusing inmates and essentially turned a blind eye to the

abuse. These allegations are enough to state an Eighth Amendment claim at the pleadings
stage.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend [13] is GRANTED. Clerk is to docket
the amended complaint.

2. Plaintiff's Motion for Various Miscellaneous Relief [17] is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. It is granted to the extent that the Clerk is to send
Plaintiff a full copy of the Amended Complaint, and otherwise denied.

3. Upon merit review of the Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
Court finds Plaintiff states Eighth Amendment claims against Zimmerman,
Greene, and Goins. Plaintiff does not state a claim against Defendants
Latoya Hughes, Mr. Mangold, Nurse Ms. J. Patton, Mental Health
Practitioner Ms. B. Little, Psychiatrist Kathryn Adams, and Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., who are to be terminated as Defendants by the Clerk. Any
other claims shall not be included in the case, except at the Court's discretion
on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15.

4. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is advised to wait until
counsel has appeared for Defendant(s) before filing any motions, to give
notice to said Defendant and an opportunity to respond to any motions.
Motions filed before counsel has filed an appearance on behalf of Defendant
will be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the
Court now, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

5. The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing Defendant a waiver
of service. Defendant has 60 days from the date the waiver is sent to file an
answer. If Defendant has not answered or appeared through counsel within
90 days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the
status of service. After Defendant has been served, the Court will enter an
order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

6. For a named Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by
Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address
will provide to the clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not
known, said Defendant's forwarding address. This information will be used
only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall
be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public
docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

7. This district uses electronic filing, so, after defense counsel has filed an
appearance, defense counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of
any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff need not mail copies
of motions and other papers to defense counsel that Plaintiff has filed with
the Clerk. But this does not apply to discovery requests and responses.
Discovery requests and responses are not filed with the clerk. Plaintiff must
mail discovery requests and responses directly to defense counsel. Discovery
requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they
are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not
begin until defense counsel has filed an appearance and the Court has
entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in more
detail.

8. Defense counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff and shall
arrange the time for the deposition.

9. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in
mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court
of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of
this lawsuit, with prejudice.

10. If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the clerk within
30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect
formal service through the U.S. Marshals service on that Defendant and will
require said Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
11. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

12. The Clerk is directed to attempt service on Defendant under the standard
procedures.

Entered this 2nd day of September, 2025.
s/Colleen R. Lawless
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11131471. Public record. Not legal advice.