# Sanchez, Lorenzo v. State of Florida

> District Court, S.D. Florida · August 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130661

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130661

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a claim is procedurally barred “if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present [the claim] in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claim[] procedurally barred”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-62003-CIV-DAMIAN

LORENZO SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.
/

ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Petitioner, Lorenzo Sanchez’s (“Sanchez” or
“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [ECF No. 1]. In the Petition, Sanchez attacks the constitutionality of his
convictions and sentence entered in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward
County, Florida, in State of Florida v. Sanchez, No. 21-000265CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2021).
The State of Florida (“State”) filed a Response [ECF No. 10 (“Response”)] to the Petition
pursuant to this Court’s Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 8], along with a supporting appendix
[ECF No. 12] and state court transcripts [ECF No. 11]. Petitioner filed a Reply. [ECF No. 14
(“Reply”)]. The Petition is now ripe for review.
THE COURT has considered the Petition and the above-referenced filings, the
pertinent portions of the record, and relevant legal authority and is otherwise fully advised.
For the reasons that follow, the Petition is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Charges
On May 1, 2014, the State charged Sanchez with attempted first-degree murder and
felon in possession of a firearm. [ECF No. 12-1 at 4–5].

B. Trial and Sentencing
Sanchez proceeded to trial. [ECF No. 11, Trial Transcripts, hereinafter, Tr. at ___].
Sanchez represented himself at trial. [ECF No. 12-1 at 31–44]. The jury found Sanchez guilty
of both counts. Id. at 243–55. The trial judge sentenced Sanchez to life in prison for the
attempted murder count and fifteen years for the felon in possession of a firearm count. Id. at
245, 248.
C. Direct Appeal and Collateral Proceedings
Sanchez filed a direct appeal in Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal (“Fourth
DCA”). Id. at 287–88. On appeal, Sanchez alleged eight trial court errors: (1) denial of his

discovery objections to the victim’s police statements and lab reports, Dr. Kikhudt’s
disclosures as a medical, bullets, and ballistics expert, and Detective Plaska’s testimony; (2)
denial of Petitioner’s special jury instruction that the State must prove that Petitioner’s killing
of the victim was not justifiable or excusable; (3) denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress; (4)
striking a juror for hardship; (5) limiting the cross examination of Mr. Schaefer; (6)
consideration of Petitioner’s lack of remorse at sentencing; (7) comments to the jury regarding
the firearm count; and (8) trial by a six-person jury. [ECF No. 12-2 at 2–74]. On March 16,
2023, the Fourth DCA per curiam affirmed without written opinion in Sanchez v. State, 358 So.
3d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).
Sanchez returned to the state trial court on April 12, 2023, by filing a Motion for
Postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Id. at 192–203. In that
Motion, Sanchez raised two grounds for relief:
(1) A Gilglio claim that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony from the

victim and eyewitness Hanes when they testified how many times the victim was
shot and the locations of the bullet wounds; and
(2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Petitioner to testify at the motion to
suppress hearing to establish standing to contest Petitioner’s arrest.
During the pendency of his Rule 3.850 motion, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his
conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm by challenging the charging document
in the 2005 drug case that rendered him a convicted felon. Id. at 205–07.
The trial court denied all of Sanchez’s claims with prejudice. Id. at 217–22. Sanchez
moved for rehearing. Id. at 224–29. The court denied the motion because Sanchez failed to

present anything the trial court “overlooked or misapprehended.” Id. at 159. Sanchez twice
appealed, which the Fourth DCA consolidated into a single appeal. Id. at 161–99. On July 3,
2024, the Fourth DCA per curiam affirmed without written opinion and without requiring a
response from the State. Id. at 200; see also Sanchez v. State, 390 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024).
D. The Instant Petition
On October 15, 2024, Sanchez initiated the instant proceedings under Section 2254.
See Petition. Construing the Petition liberally, consistent with Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520–21 (1972), Sanchez presents the following claims for relief:
Claim One: The government suppressed statements of Willard Robinson that
were exculpatory to the defense, contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). Petition at 4.
Claim Two: The government suppressed scientific and medical evidence and
export reports, contrary to Brady. Id. at 8.
Claim Three: The government suppressed the police report of Detective
Dennis Plaska, contrary to Brady. Id. at 11.
Claim Four: Violation of Fourth Amendment when trial court denied
Petitioner’s motion to suppress because Petitioner was arrested without an
arrest warrant. Id. at 14.
Claim Five: Violation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when trial court limited
Petitioner’s cross-examination of a witness. Id. at 18.
Claim Six: Violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
when trial court denied Petitioner’s requested jury instruction. Id. at 20.
Claim Seven: Violation of the Sixth Amendment when Petitioner was tried by
a six-person jury. Id. at 21.
Claim Eight: Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call Petitioner at the
motion to suppress hearing regarding Petitioner’s warrantless arrest. Id. at 21.
Claim Nine: The government knowingly used perjured testimony, contrary to
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Id. at 23.
Claim Ten: Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments on
grounds Petitioner was convicted of felon in possession of a firearm because
the underlying felony conviction was based on an erroneous information. Id. at
34.
This Court addresses Petitioner’s claims for relief in turn below.
II. EXHAUSTION AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The State asserts that the Petition appears to be timely as to Claims One through Nine
but argues that Claim Ten is time-barred. Response at 5. The State further asserts that Claims
One through Six and Ten are unexhausted. Id. at 7. The Court considers each below.
A. Legal Standard As To Exhaustion.
Petitioner’s federal habeas case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See also Abdul–
Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007); Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1331 n.9 (11th
Cir. 2007). “AEDPA limits the scope of federal habeas review of state court judgments . . . .”
Pittman v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 871 F.3d 1231, 1243 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)). “The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas

relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,
and not as a means of error correction.” Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison,
818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).
“Habeas petitioners generally cannot raise claims in federal court if those claims were
not first exhausted in state court.” McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and Kelley v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343 (11th
Cir. 2004)). “In order to be exhausted, a federal claim must be fairly presented to the state
courts.” Id. (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). “It is not sufficient merely that
the federal habeas petitioner has been through the state courts . . . .” Kelley, 377 F.3d at 1343–

44 (citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 275–76, and Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). “Rather,
in order to ensure that state courts have the first opportunity to hear all claims, federal courts
‘have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon
the federal courts.’” McNair, 416 F.3d at 1302 (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 275). “While
[federal habeas courts] do not require a verbatim restatement of the claims brought in state
court, [they] do require that a petitioner presented his claims to the state court ‘such that a
reasonable reader would understand each claim’s particular legal basis and specific factual
foundation.”” Id. (citing Kelley, 377 F.3d at 1344–45); see also McNair, 416 F.3d at 1303 (“We
therefore hold that ‘[t]he exhaustion doctrine requires a habeas applicant to do more than

scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record.’” (quoting Kelley, 377
F.3d at 1345)). Importantly, “the petitioner must make the state court aware that the claims
asserted present federal constitutional issues. ‘It is not enough that all the facts necessary to
support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law
claim was made.’” Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson,

459 U.S. at 5–6; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995) (“Respondent did not
apprise the state court of his claim that the evidentiary ruling of which he complained was not
only a violation of state law, but denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
In order to properly exhaust a claim in state court, the habeas petitioner must also raise
his federal claim in the state court system in the manner and at the time dictated by the state’s
procedural rules. Marshall v. Dunn, 497 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1140 (N.D. Ala. 2020). If “a
petitioner fails to raise his federal claims in compliance with relevant state procedural rules,
the state court’s refusal to adjudicate the claim ordinarily qualifies as an independent and

adequate state ground for denying federal review.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009). If
the petitioner fails to do so, the federal habeas court must dismiss claims that either (1) have
been explicitly ruled procedurally barred by the highest state court considering the claims, see
e.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989), or (2) are not exhausted but would clearly be
barred if returned to state court. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991). See
also Raleigh v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t Corr., 827 F.3d 938, 957 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that a claim
is procedurally barred “if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which
the petitioner would be required to present [the claim] in order to meet the exhaustion
requirement would now find the claim[] procedurally barred”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at
735 n.1). Thus, “[f]ederal courts are precluded from addressing claims that have been held to
be procedurally defaulted under state law.” Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206, 210 (11th Cir. 1993).
B. Discussion As To Exhaustion.
1. Claims One Through Three

Claims One through Three were raised as discovery violations and trial court error
under Claim I in Petitioner’s direct appeal: “The court erred in its rulings as to the state’s
many failures to make timely discovery, and the lack of procedural prejudice does not
affirmatively appear in the record.” See ECF No. 12-2 at 29–50. Petitioner headed Claim I on
direct appeal as “THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT’S
DISCOVERY OBJECTIONS.” Id. at 29. Petitioner alleged that:
The record shows repeated instances of late discovery by the state. The court overruled
Appellant’s objections without complying with the legal requirements for disposition
of discovery issues. The record does not show the absence of procedural prejudice
beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction should be reversed.

Id. at 29.
On appeal, Petitioner alleged Claim One as “WR’s police statement and the lab
report.” Id. at 35. Petitioner also alleged that the state failed to timely disclose the taped
testimony of Willard Robinson, the victim. Id. at 35–38. And Petitioner argued that the trial
court erred when it found “there is no Discovery Violation.” Id. at 36; Tr. at 400. Despite four
pages of alleged trial court errors, Petitioner failed to make any reference to the Constitution
in his direct appeal. See ECF No. 12-2 at 35–39. Thus, Petitioner failed to present Claim One
to the state court, and it is therefore unexhausted.
Petitioner alleged Claim Two as “The bullets and the ballistics expert” in his direct
appeal. Id. at 42. Petitioner argued that various trial court errors and discovery violations
related to the State’s ballistic expert. Id. at 42–47. Petitioner’s only reference to constitutional
claims was in paraphrasing his own testimony to the trial court. Id. at 43 (“[Petitioner] alleged
violations of the discovery rule, due process, the Fourteenth Amendment, Article I, Section
9 of the state constitution and Brady.”). Petitioner’s paraphrasing his own passing references
to the trial court about constitutional violations, with no argument or substance, are nothing

more than “makeshift needles in the haystack.” McNair, 416 F.3d at 1303. Thus, Petitioner
failed to present Claim Two to the state court, and it is therefore unexhausted.
Petitioner alleged Claim Three as a “discovery issue during Det. Plaska’s testimony”
in his direct appeal. See ECF No. 12-2 at 47. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred when
it found that no discovery violation occurred regarding the disclosure of Plaska’s police report.
Id. at 49. Again, Petitioner’s only reference to a constitutional claim was in paraphrasing his
own testimony to the trial court during Plaska’s testimony, which falls short of raising a
constitutional issue. Id. at 49 (“Appellant said he had not time to investigate it and did not
know bullets were recovered and did not have time to depose the witnesses with an expert, it

was a violation of rule 3.220 and the state and federal constitutions.”). Thus, Petitioner failed
to present Claim Three to the state court, and it is therefore unexhausted.
2. Claims Four Through Six
The Court addresses Claims Four through Six on the merits below.
3. Claim Ten
In Claim Ten, Sanchez seeks to attack the charging documents underlying his 2005
drug conviction, which was used as a basis for his current conviction. Petition at 34. Sanchez
is no longer in custody pursuant to that conviction and, therefore, fails the “in custody”
requirement for federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488,

492 (1989) (“The question presented by this case is whether a habeas petitioner remains ‘in
custody’ under a conviction after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because
of the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentences imposed for
any subsequent crimes of which he is convicted. We hold that he does not.”). “When the
second sentence is imposed, it is pursuant to the second conviction that the petitioner is

incarcerated and is therefore ‘in custody.’” Id. at 492–93. Therefore, Claim Ten must be
denied for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
4. Conclusion As To Exhaustion
In his Reply, Petitioner alleges that he “did exhaust these claims by citing to the state
court the specific provision of the constitution relied on in his Habeas petition” and by “fairly
presenting in his claim the substance of [his] federal claims.” [ECF 14 at 1]. However,
Petitioner cannot raise a constitutional claim by pleading his factual allegations. Snowden, 135
F.3d at 735 (“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were
before the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.”) (quoting
Anderson, 459 U.S. at 5–6).

The Eleventh Circuit has held that even where, as here, the claims are unexhausted
and procedurally barred, the petitioner is entitled to federal habeas review of the claim if
petitioner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged
violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[] will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Raleigh, 827 F.3d at 957 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at
735 n.1). Here, Petitioner does not establish, or even allege, cause for the default, actual
prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See generally Petition. His claims are,
therefore, unexhausted and procedurally barred. Because Petitioner can never return to state
court to rectify this problem, his Petition is due to be denied with prejudice as to Claims One,
Two, Three, and Ten.
The Court addresses the remaining claims below.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO 2254 CLAIMS

A. Deference Under Section 2254.
Under AEDPA, federal habeas corpus review of final state court decisions is “‘greatly
circumscribed’ and ‘highly deferential,’” Ledford, 818 F.3d at 642 (quoting Hill v. Humphrey,
662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)), and is generally limited to the record that was before
the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Id. (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S.
170, 182 (2011)).
The federal habeas court is first tasked with identifying the last state court decision, if
any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d
1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court is not required to issue an opinion explaining its

rationale, because even the summary rejection of a claim, without explanation, qualifies as
an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
100 (2011); Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Wilson v. Sellers,
584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018); Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 585 U.S. 961, 964–65 (2018).
Where the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in the state forum, Section 2254(d)
prohibits relitigating the claim unless the state court’s decision was (1) “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States;” 1 or, (2) “based on an unreasonable determination

1 “[C]learly established Federal law” consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the
dicta, set forth in the decisions of the Supreme Court at the time the state court issues its
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d); Harrington, 562 U.S. at 97–98; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13. When relying
on Section 2254(d)(2), a federal court can grant relief if the state court rendered an erroneous
factual determination. Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016).

Because the “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners
whose claims have been adjudicated in state court,” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013),
“[f]ederal courts may grant habeas relief only when a state court blundered in a manner so
‘well understood and comprehended in existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that
‘there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102–03). This standard is intentionally difficult to meet. Harrington,
562 U.S. at 102.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal

defendants the right to the assistance of counsel during criminal proceedings against them.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984). When assessing counsel’s performance
under Strickland, the court employs a strong presumption that counsel “rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.” Id. at 690.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must
demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the petitioner suffered
prejudice as a result of that deficiency. Id. at 687. To establish deficient performance, the

decision. White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
412 (2000)).
petitioner must show that, in light of all the circumstances, counsel’s performance was outside
the wide range of professional competence and “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Id. at 687–88; see also Cummings v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1356
(11th Cir. 2009). The court’s review of counsel’s performance should not focus on what is

possible, prudent, or appropriate but should focus on “what is constitutionally compelled.”
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987).
Regarding the prejudice component, the Supreme Court has explained “[t]he
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. A court need not address both prongs of Strickland if the defendant makes an
insufficient showing on one of the prongs. Id. at 697. Further, counsel is not ineffective for
failing to raise non-meritorious issues. Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2001).
Nor is counsel required to present every non-frivolous argument. Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d

1267, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013).
Furthermore, a Section 2254 petitioner must provide factual support for his or her
contentions regarding counsel’s performance. Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401, 1406–07 (11th
Cir. 1987). Bare, conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance are insufficient to satisfy the
Strickland test. See Boyd v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 697 F.3d 1320, 1332–34 (11th Cir. 2012).
IV. DISCUSSION
With the foregoing in mind, this Court addresses each of the exhausted grounds
asserted in the Petition in turn.
A. Claim Four

In Claim Four, Sanchez alleges a Fourth Amendment violation on grounds the trial
court denied his motion to suppress based on Sanchez’s warrantless arrest. Petition at 18.
Sanchez challenged the trial court’s ruling on direct appeal [ECF No. 12-2 at 58], where his
claim was considered and summarily rejected per curiam without opinion. Sanchez v. State, 358
So. 3d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).
Claim Four is not cognizable under federal habeas review. “[W]here the State has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state
prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.

465, 494–95 (1976) (footnotes omitted). Thus, Claim Four must be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Claim Five
In Claim Five, Sanchez alleges a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights on grounds the trial
court limited Petitioner’s cross-examination of a witness, John Schaefer. Petition at 19.
Sanchez alleges that he was unable to cross-examine Shaefer to show that the shooter wore a
mask and that there was a “scuffle” prior to the shooting. Id.
“[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned

to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other
things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation
that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679
(1986). Further, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent,

the defense might wish.’” Id. (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). Here,
Sanchez was given the opportunity to cross-examine Schaefer regarding his statements on
whether the shooter wore a mask and whether there was a “scuffle” prior to the shooting. See
Tr. at 568–69; 581; 590–92. The state court records reflect that Sanchez repeatedly attempted
to improperly question Schaefer. See id. at 566–67. Nevertheless, after a lengthy discussion
outside the presence of the jury, the trial court allowed Sanchez to further question Schaefer.
See id. at 584–88. To the extent Sanchez seeks to raise a constitutional issue because the trial
court enforced Florida evidentiary rules, Sanchez’s claim must fail. The Eleventh Circuit has
plainly stated that it is within the trial court’s discretion to limit or circumscribe a pro se

defendant’s cross examination in order to comply with the rules of evidence. United States v.
Rodriguez, 735 F. App’x 638, 644 (11th Cir. 2018) (considering a pro se defendant’s allegation
that the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause when it limited the cross-examination
of two witnesses and holding “the court was trying to ensure that the testimony was taken in
accord with the Federal Rules of Evidence and to minimize delay. This was comfortably
within the district court’s discretion.”).
To the extent Sanchez seeks to question the trial court’s ruling on state evidentiary
issues, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“[I]t is not
the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions.”).
Sanchez challenged the trial court’s ruling on direct appeal [ECF No. 12-2 at 63–67],
where his claim was considered and summarily rejected per curiam without opinion. Sanchez
v. State, 358 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). The state court’s rejection of this claim is not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal constitutional principles and should not

be disturbed here. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Sanchez is, therefore, not entitled to relief
under Claim Five.
C. Claim Six
In Claim Six, Sanchez contends that the jury instructions violated his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Petition at 20. The Eleventh Circuit has held that
in order to merit federal habeas review, jury instructions must render the trial fundamentally
unfair. Jones v. Dugger, 888 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[I]mproper jury instructions
can never be the basis for federal habeas corpus relief unless the instruction rendered the whole
trial so unfair as to amount to a denial of due process.” (citation omitted)).

Sanchez challenged the trial court’s ruling on direct appeal [ECF No. 12-2 at 52],
where his claim was considered and summarily rejected per curiam without opinion. Sanchez
v. State, 358 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). Sanchez has not shown that the jury instructions
rendered his trial fundamentally unfair or even alleged any prejudice from the instructions.
Therefore, the state court’s rejection of this claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of federal constitutional principles and should not be disturbed here. See Williams,
529 U.S. at 413. Sanchez is, therefore, not entitled to relief under Claim Six.
D. Claim Seven
In Claim Seven, Sanchez claims a violation of the Sixth Amendment on grounds he

was tried by a six-person jury. Petition at 21. The Supreme Court settled this exact issue over
fifty-years ago. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Supreme Court considered
Florida’s use of a six-person jury for non-capital offenses. The Court held that “petitioner’s
Sixth Amendment rights, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, were
not violated by Florida’s decision to provide a six-man rather than a 12-man jury.” Id. at 103.

Therefore, Claim Seven is without merit and is due to be denied.
E. Claim Eight
In Claim Eight, Sanchez claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call
Sanchez at the motion to suppress hearing regarding his warrantless arrest. Petition at 21.
Sanchez alleges that he should have been called in order to establish standing to object to the
warrantless arrest. Id.
In Florida, a warrant is not required if an arrest is based on probable cause. Chaney v.
State, 956 So. 2d 535, 537 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Elliot v. State, 597 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 4th DCA
1992). “Probable cause to arrest or search exists when the totality of the facts and

circumstances within an officer’s knowledge sufficiently warrant a reasonable person to
believe that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed.” League v. State, 778 So. 2d
1086, 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citation omitted). “A finding of probable cause does not
require absolute certitude.” Curtis v. State, 748 So. 2d 370, 374 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
Therefore, police needed probable cause, not a warrant, to properly arrest Sanchez.
Sanchez does not allege that, had he testified, the court would have found Sanchez
was arrested without probable cause. Therefore, whether Sanchez could establish standing to
challenge the warrantless arrest is immaterial—because no warrant was needed. Thus,
Sanchez cannot show that, had he been called, “the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Claim Eight plainly fails under Strickland.
The state court’s rejection of this claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of federal constitutional principles and should not be disturbed here. See Williams,
529 U.S. at 413. Therefore, this Court finds Claim Eight of the Petition to be without merit.
F. Claim Nine

Under Claim Nine, Sanchez argues that the State committed a Giglio violation when
it presented evidence that the victim was shot six times—in the chest, arms, back and neck—
but a police report did not reflect a gunshot to the neck and listed only four gunshot wounds
rather than six. Petition at 21.
“In order to prevail on a Giglio claim, a petitioner must establish that the prosecutor
‘knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was
false testimony,’ and that the falsehood was material.” Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327,
1339 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1110 (11th Cir. 1995)).
Further, “the suggestion that a statement may have been false is simply insufficient; the

defendant must conclusively show that the statement was actually false.” Maharaj v. Sec’y for
Dep’t of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2005).
Here, a review of the state court records shows that Sanchez’s claim is without merit.
At trial, the State questioned the officer about the discrepancy in the police report:
Q: Did he have any gunshot wound to his neck?
A: Per my report no. But when I was at the hospital they were doing all of
the medical care. I am not sure of the end result if they found the wound,
but mine was a quick synopsis of what I initially saw.
Q: How many wounds did he have to the back, sir?
A: I never roll the victim over when they are in a trauma hospital. He was
intubated. I don’t roll the victim over. I don’t want to dislodge any tracheal
tube so I leave it as is. I take the doctor’s word on what we got initially. Later
down the road they will be doing surgery and things of that sort. I am not sure

what’s on his back, because I never rolled him over. I just photograph what I
see with the bandages on his arms, the chest, the lung, tubes, and things of that
sort.
Tr. at 677. Thus, the police report reflects what the officer saw when the victim was in critical
condition at the hospital. However, the medical reports Sanchez included in one of his
postconviction motions show that the victim suffered “multiple gunshot wounds and is now
paraplegic.” [ECF No. 12-3 at 21]. The reports also show that bullets were recovered from
the victim’s neck while he was on life support: “Bullet fragments are again seen overlying the
left chest and midline neck.” Id. at 30. The fact that further inspection revealed more gunshot
wounds that were not readily apparent does not create false or perjured testimony.

The state court’s rejection of this claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of federal constitutional principles and should not be disturbed here. See Williams,
529 U.S. at 413. Therefore, this Court finds Claim Nine of the Petition to be without merit.
For the above discussed reasons, this Court finds that each of the grounds for relief
asserted in the Petition is due to be denied. Thus, this Court must consider whether to issue a
certificate of appealability.
V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts provides that “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when
it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” If a certificate is issued, “the court must state
the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).” 28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(a). A timely notice of appeal must still be filed, even if the court issues
a certificate of appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings, Rule 11(b), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254.
After review of the record, this Court finds that Sanchez is not entitled to a certificate
of appealability. “A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To merit
a certificate of appealability, a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists would find
debatable both (1) the merits of the underlying claims and (2) the procedural issues he or she
seeks to raise. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); see also Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d
926, 935 (11th Cir. 2001). Because this Court finds that the claims raised are clearly without
merit, Sanchez cannot satisfy the Slack test and, therefore, a certificate of appealability shall

not issue as to the claims asserted in the Petition.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that the Petitioner has failed to set
forth an entitlement to habeas relief.2
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF No. 1] is
DENIED.
2. A certificate of appealability is DENIED.

2 Because the Court can “adequately assess [Petitioner’s] claim[s] without further factual
development,” an evidentiary hearing is not required. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275
(11th Cir. 2003).
3. The Clerk of Court is INSTRUCTED to CLOSE this case.
4. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at the Southern District of Florida, this 31st
day of August 2025.

MELISSA Y Jab
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: Lorenzo Sanchez, Pro Se
L58882
Florida State Prison
Inmate Mail/Parcels
7819 NW 228th Street
Raiford, FL 32026
Jessenia J Concepcion
Office of the Attorney General
1515 North Flagler Drive
9th Floor
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
jessenia.concepcion@myfloridalegal.com

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130661. Public record. Not legal advice.