# Fight Sports LLC and Roberto De Abreu Filho A/K/A Roberto "Cyborg" Abreu v. Mandy Schneider

> Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · August 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130466

## Case

- **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
- **Decided:** August 29, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130466

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that courts may only consider actions taken by nonresident defendant when evaluating sufficiency of minimum contacts for exercise of personal jurisdiction

## Opinion text

Opinion issued August 29, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-23-00897-CV
———————————
FIGHT SPORTS LLC AND ROBERTO DE ABREU FILHO A/K/A
ROBERTO “CYBORG” ABREU, Appellants
V.
MANDY SCHNEIDER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 295th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2023-36632

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After appellee Mandy Schneider was sexually assaulted by her Brazilian jiu-

jitsu instructor, she sued multiple defendants, including the instructor, the gym, and

appellees Fight Sports LLC (“Fight Sports”) and Roberto De Abreu Filho a/k/a
Roberto “Cyborg” Abreu. Fight Sports is a Florida company, and Abreu lives in

Florida. The trial court denied their special appearance, and they appealed.

We conclude that the court lacks general personal jurisdiction over both

Abreu and Fight Sports because their forum contacts do not demonstrate that either

appellee is essentially at home in Texas. We further conclude that the court lacks

specific jurisdiction over both Abreu and Fight Sports because there is no nexus

among Fight Sports, Schneider’s claims, and the State of Texas.

We reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment dismissing

Schneider’s claims against Abreu and Fight Sports.

Background

When Schneider was about thirteen years old, she began Brazilian jiu jitsu

training at a Rockstar Martial Arts franchise location in Frisco, Texas (“Rockstar”).

Rodrigo Da Costa Oliveira worked as an instructor and coach for Rockstar.

Oliveira had trained with and received his black belt from Abreu at a Fight Sports

gym in Florida. In October 2020, when Schneider was sixteen years old, Oliveira

drove her to Houston to compete in a jiu jitsu tournament. Entrance to the

tournament was limited only to competitors associated with larger gyms, so—as is

commonly done in the sport of Brazilian jiu jitsu—Rockstar paid a fee to Fight

Sports in exchange for the right to compete under the Fight Sports “banner” and

with a Fight Sports patch on Schneider’s uniform.

2
When Schneider and Oliveira arrived in Houston, they checked into separate

hotel rooms. Later that night, Schneider came to Oliveira’s room to get bottled

water from him. Oliveira coaxed her to stay and review fighting videos in advance

of the next day’s competition. According to Schneider’s pleading, however, he

gave her alcohol, sparred with her, and then raped her.

In the weeks immediately after the sexual assault, Schneider confided in two

other Rockstar employees, who shamed her, suggested the assault was her fault,

and pressured her not to report it. But about three weeks after the assault,

Schneider told a third Rockstar employee, who got the franchise owners involved

and encouraged Schneider to make a police report. Schneider then told her parents,

who called the police.

Oliveira fled, and Schneider’s father texted Abreu to inquire if he knew of

Oliveira’s whereabouts and his “work visa status with Fight Sports.” Abreu

responded: “As we know Rodrigo is already out of the country, I already

disconnected him from the team. About the visa I spoke to the lawyer today and

the procedure is I’ll send a letter to the immigration breaking the Visa.” Abreu then

promptly sent a letter to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

(USCIS) saying that he was the owner and president of Fight Sports, three years

prior he filed a petition to classify Oliveira as a Beneficiary in P-1 status, and

3
because Oliveira no longer worked “at Fight Sports,” he requested withdrawal of

his petition.

About two-and-a half years after the assault, Schneider filed suit against

Oliveira, Rockstar, Abreu, Fight Sports, and others. She asserted claims for sexual

assault, aggravated sexual assault, and assault and battery against Oliveira. She

alleged the following claims against “all defendants”: (1) agency, respondeat

superior, and vicarious liability for Oliveira’s actions; (2) negligent failure to

protect;1 (3) negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training;2 and retention

based on the defendants’ providing and allowing Oliveira “direct and continued

access to minors” and failing to properly screen, hire, train, investigate, monitor,

and supervise Oliveira; and (4) negligent failure to train or educate employees,

1
Schneider alleged that all defendants failed to protect her from Oliveira’s assault
based, specifically, on Fight Sports and Abreu’s prior knowledge of unrelated
sexual assaults committed by instructors against students. She alleged that Fight
Sports and Abreu had a duty to protect her against the risk of injury by instructors
(including Oliveira), and they breached this duty by failing to adopt, implement,
and enforce proper procedures.
2
Schneider alleged that all defendants failed to properly screen, hire, and train their
coaches (including Oliveira), they knew or should have known that Oliveira
should not have been interacting with minors, and they provided Oliveira direct
and continued access to minors while failing to adequately supervise him.

4
agents, representatives, and contractors.3 Schneider’s pleading included the

following specific factual allegations about Fight Sports and Abreu:

• Fight Sports is a Brazilian jiu jitsu academy managed by Abreu with
“affiliated gyms” in North and South America, Africa, and Europe.

• Abreu was Oliveira’s jiu jitsu instructor, and he promoted Oliveira to
black belt.

• “At some point, Defendant Abreu brought Defendant Oliveira to
Texas where Defendant Oliveira became a Fight Sports affiliated
instructor at a Rockstar Martial Arts gym, which was also affiliated
with Fight Sports.”

• After meeting with Schneider and learning of the sexual assault, the
owners of the Frisco Rockstar franchise contacted Abreu and told him
about the assault.

• After Schneider’s father “insisted,” Abreu wrote to USCIS saying that
Oliveira “was no longer working at Fight Sports” and asking to
withdraw his petition to classify Oliveira as a beneficiary for P-1 visa.

• After reporting the sexual assault, Schneider saw Abreu “at an event,”
but he “would only approach [her] when she was alone.” Later, Abreu
revoked Oliveira’s black belt.

• Abreu knew that in 2018, a different Fight Sports instructor was
charged with three counts of sexual assault of a minor student.

Fight Sports and Abreu filed a verified special appearance, which was

supported by Abreu’s affidavit. They argued that their only connection to Oliveira,

and thus the underlying case, was that Oliveira had been a member of the Fight

3
Schneider alleged that all defendants breached their duty to protect Plaintiff from
sexual assault by Oliveira by failing to properly train or educate employees,
agents, or independent contractors of Fight Sports and Rockstar.
5
Sports gyms in Florida and received his jiu jitsu black belt under Abreu’s training.

Abreu’s affidavit provided the following relevant facts and denials:

• Abreu is a seven-time world Jiu Jitsu No-Gi champion.

• Abreu is the manager of Fight Sports, which is a Florida LLC.

• Neither Fight Sports nor Abreu has ever actively advertised or
marketed in Texas.

• Neither Fight Sports nor Abreu has any agents, franchises,
independent contractors, or employees in Texas.

• Neither Fight Sports nor Abreu has any bank accounts or real property
in Texas. Neither has leased real property in Texas. Neither has ever
paid taxes to Texas.

• Neither Fight Sports nor Abreu renders “any training or business
advice to Texas businesses.”

• Abreu testified that “[d]uring my professional career, I have travelled
all over the world to compete and to give seminars. I have been to
Texas three-four times to give seminars. In those three-four instances,
I was asked to travel to Texas to give the seminars. Only Fight Sports
LLC received compensation for the seminars.”

• Fight Sports has certified affiliated gyms, which are called “Fight
Sports” gyms. None are in Texas. Rockstar is not a Fight Sports
affiliated gym. Neither Fight Sports nor Abreu has “any ownership,
interest, control or management of any Rockstar Martial Arts entity or
its personnel.” “There has never been a business relationship between
Fight Sports LLC and Rockstar Martial Arts.” Neither Fight Sports
nor Abreu is responsible for hiring, training, supervising, or
contracting Rockstar Martial Arts employees, agents, or contractors.
Neither Fight Sports nor Abreu owns, controls, or directs day to day
activities of Rockstar.

• “For the past thirty years, the national competitive martial arts
community is structured in such a way that smaller gyms, such as

6
[Rockstar], can pay a nominal fee to larger organizations such as Fight
Sports LLC, to participate in competitive events.” The smaller jiu jitsu
facilities across the world will pay a nominal fee in order to wear the
Fight Sports logo at national competitions [like the one Schneider
attended in October 2020]. “The sponsorship allows the smaller gyms
to wear the Fight Sports logo and fly the Fight Sports banner at
competitions . . . .”

• Neither Fight Sports nor Abreu “solicited, asked, targeted, or
approached” Rockstar for them to use the Fight Sports logo or banner.

• Oliveira “was never any employee, agent, or contractor” of Fight
Sports. He was not an instructor at any Fight Sports facility; he was
“one of hundreds of members” of a Fight Sports gym in Florida,
where he trained.

• Neither Fight Sports nor Abreu “brought Oliveira to Texas.”

In Schneider’s response to the special appearance, she argued that Fight

Sports had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Texas

because it was a recognized international brand in martial arts. She argued that

Fight Sports had earned about $41,150 over five years from the fees paid by Texas

gyms for competition sponsorship and from seminars. She argued that Abreu had

“competed numerous times in Texas and made tens of thousands of dollars from

it.”

In her response, Schneider embedded screen shots of posts, websites, and

photographs showing Abreu with Oliveira and others from Rockstar in September

2019, a Rockstar advertisement for a seminar featuring Abreu in May 2021, and

Rockstar web pages describing their instructors as brown or black belts in jiu jitsu

7
“under Fight Sports” or “under Roberto Cyborg Abreu of Fight Sports.” She also

included a screen shot showing that while Oliveira worked for Rockstar, he

continued to compete under the Fight Sports banner. Schneider included a screen

shot of text message between her father and Abreu about Oliveira’s visa, as well as

an image of the letter Abreu wrote to USCIS.

Based on these additional jurisdictional facts, she argued that Fight Sports

employed Oliveira at the time of the sexual assault, and that both Fight Sports and

Abreu had sufficient minimum contacts with Texas support the exercise of

personal jurisdiction. In the alternative, she included in her response a request for a

continuance to complete jurisdictional discovery, asserting that there were

deficiencies in the appellants’ responses to discovery.

After a brief oral hearing, the trial court denied the special appearance, and

Fight Sports and Abreu appealed.

Analysis

Fight Sports and Abreu present this Court with a single, familiar issue. They

assert that the trial court erred by denying their special appearance and failing to

dismiss Schneider’s claims against them. We agree. As explained further below,

neither the pleadings nor the jurisdictional evidence supports the exercise of

general or specific jurisdiction over Fight Sports or Abreu.

8
I. We review a court’s ruling on a special appearance de novo.

Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question

of law we review de novo, although the court may have to resolve questions of

fact. BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik, 716 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex. 2025)

(citing Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018));

see also LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. 2023). When a

trial court does not issue findings of fact when ruling on a special appearance, all

facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by the record are implied.

BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002).

These implied findings may be challenged on appeal for legal and factual

sufficiency in the same way an appellate court reviews findings of fact at trial.

Bryan v. Gordon, 384 S.W.3d 908, 913 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no

pet.).

II. A shifting burden applies when personal jurisdiction is challenged.

Initially, the plaintiff has the burden to plead sufficient allegations to bring

the nonresident defendant within the reach of the long-arm statute. LG Chem, 670

S.W.3d at 346. A nonresident defendant may then challenge a Texas court’s

personal jurisdiction over it by filing a special appearance. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

120a. The nonresident defendant must then negate all alleged bases of personal

jurisdiction on either a factual or legal basis. LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 346. Both

9
the defendant in its special appearance and the plaintiff in its response may support

their arguments with jurisdictional evidence. Id.

III. A court must consider several factors, notably the defendant’s actions,
when determining whether personal jurisdiction exists in a particular
case.

“A court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant to issue a binding

judgment.” LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 346. Texas courts may exercise personal

jurisdiction over a nonresident when (1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the

exercise of jurisdiction, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with

federal due process guarantees. Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625

S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2021). “Federal due-process requirements limit a state’s power

to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.” Moki Mac River

Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007). “Personal jurisdiction is

proper when the nonresident defendant has established minimum contacts with the

forum state, and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326

U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific. See Ford Motor Co. v.

Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021). A court exercising

general personal jurisdiction may hear any and all claims against a nonresident

defendant. Id. “General jurisdiction is established by continuous and systematic

10
contacts with a state, while specific jurisdiction exists when the cause of action

arises from or is related to a defendant’s purposeful activities in the state.” Old

Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 559 (Tex. 2018).

A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

whose “affiliations with the state are so continuous and systematic as to render [it]

essentially at home in the forum State.” TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 37

(Tex. 2016) (quoting Daimler v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)). When a court

has general jurisdiction, the alleged liability need not arise from the nonresident

defendant’s continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state. Moki Mac,

221 S.W.3d at 575. The test for general jurisdiction is a “high bar,” and requires a

more demanding analysis of the nonresident’s contacts with the forum state than

we employ with respect to specific jurisdiction. Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 565.

“Even when a defendant’s contacts may be continuous and systematic, they are

insufficient to confer general jurisdiction if they fail to rise to the level of rendering

a defendant essentially at home in the forum [s]tate.” Id. (internal quotation

omitted).

“Specific jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less intimately

connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” Ford Motor Co.,

592 U.S. at 359. A court exercising specific personal jurisdiction may hear claims

that arise out of or relate to the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum

11
state. Id. at 359–60 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San

Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)). In the context of specific personal

jurisdiction, the “minimum contacts” standard requires that (1) the nonresident

defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in

the forum state, and (2) there exists a “nexus between the nonresident defendant,

the litigation, and the forum.” Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 14 (quoting Moki Mac, 221

S.W.3d at 579 (emphasis added)).

A. Purposeful Availment

We consider three factors to determine whether a nonresident defendant has

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas:

First, only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not
the unilateral activity of another party or a third person. Second, the
contacts relied upon must be purposeful rather than random,
fortuitous, or attenuated. Thus, sellers who reach out beyond one state
and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of
another state are subject to the jurisdiction of the latter in suits based
on their activities. Finally, the defendant must seek some benefit,
advantage or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction.

Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 151 (Tex. 2013)

(emphasis added) (quoting Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278

S.W.3d 333, 338–39 (Tex. 2009)); see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.

462, 473, 475 (1985). We consider all the evidence and focus on “the quality and

nature of the contacts, not the quantity.” Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 151. With

respect to a particular claim, the defendant’s activities must be deliberate and

12
“justify a conclusion that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being called

into a Texas court.” Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801,

806 (Tex. 2002) (citing World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,

297 (1980)).

Such deliberate activities could include exploiting a Texas market or

communications. See BRP Rotax, 716 S.W.3d at 104. When a plaintiff alleges that

communications are the basis for personal jurisdiction, a reviewing court must

consider the quality and nature of the communications to determine whether they

constitute purposeful availment. See Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 560. Moreover,

“the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum,” and a

proper “minimum contacts analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the

forum state itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.”

Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014).

B. Nexus

The relatedness—or nexus—component of minimum contacts requires that

there be a connection between the nonresident defendant’s purposeful contacts

with Texas and the plaintiff’s suit. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 14. The relatedness

inquiry requires that the suit “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with

the forum.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 362. “[S]pecific jurisdiction requires us to

analyze jurisdictional contacts on a claim-by-claim basis.” Moncrief Oil, 414

13
S.W.3d at 150 (citing Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 660

(Tex. 2010)). Due to the difference between general jurisdiction and specific

jurisdiction, “[i]f a defendant does not have enough contacts to justify the exercise

of general jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause prohibits the exercise of

jurisdiction over any claim that does not arise out of or result from the defendant’s

forum contacts.” Id. (citing Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266,

274–75 (5th Cir. 2006)). A court, however, “need not assess contacts on a claim-

by-claim basis if all claims arise from the same forum contacts.” Id. at 150–51.

C. Fair Play and Substantial Justice

“Once minimum contacts have been established, we must still consider

whether, for other reasons, exercising jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant

would nevertheless run afoul of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.’” Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 18 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). “Only

in rare cases, however, will the exercise of jurisdiction not comport with fair play

and substantial justice when the nonresident defendant has purposefully established

minimum contacts with the forum state.” Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868,

878 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. Eng. China

Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 231 (Tex. 1991)). “We consider the nonresident

defendant’s contacts in light of (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of

the forum state in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining

14
convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in

obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest

of several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Luciano,

625 S.W.3d at 18.

IV. Personal jurisdiction does not exist in this case.

A. There is no general jurisdiction over Fight Sports or Abreu.

On appeal, Schneider argues that Fight Sports had continuous and systematic

contacts that justify the exercise of general personal jurisdiction. She relies on:

(1) Fight Sports’s “affiliation” with Rockstar, its coaches, and other small gyms;

(2) the jiu jitsu seminars that Fight Sports offered in Texas featuring Abreu;

(3) Oliveira’s actions of competing in Texas for Fight Sports and (allegedly)

serving as agent or employee of Fight Sports to further its business in Texas; and

(4) Abreu’s participation in jiu jitsu competitions in Texas.

1. ‘Affiliation’ with Rockstar, its coaches, and other gyms

Schneider argues that Rockstar and some of its coaches are affiliated with

Fight Sports. Fight Sports denied this. In his affidavit, Abreu averred that although

Fight Sports does have affiliated gyms, Rockstar is not one of them. Schneider

presented as evidence screen shots that mentioned “Fight Sports” in reference to

where some Rockstar employees trained, but that was evidence of what Rockstar

did to promote itself, not evidence of a purposeful contact made by Fight Sports.

15
See Moncrief Oil Int’l, 414 S.W.3d at 151 (holding that courts may only consider

actions taken by nonresident defendant when evaluating sufficiency of minimum

contacts for exercise of personal jurisdiction).

To the extent that Schneider was trying to impute Rockstar’s contacts with

Texas to Fight Sports, she failed to do so. Schneider did not provide any evidence

that Fight Sports was anything other than a separate business entity, distinct from

Rockstar. “Texas law presumes that two separate corporations are distinct entities.”

PHC–Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly–Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 173 (Tex. 2007);

see also Costamare, Inc. v. Mamou, No. 01-23-00865-CV, 2025 WL 863779, at

*6, *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 20, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(rejecting alter ego theory of personal jurisdiction). Here, there is nothing in the

pleadings or jurisdictional evidence to refute the presumption that the separate

companies—Rockstar and Fight Sports—are distinct entities.

Schneider also relies on the agreements with Fight Sports that allowed

Rockstar and other smaller gyms to compete in jiu jitsu competitions. The

jurisdictional evidence showed that Rockstar asked Fight Sports to be its sponsor

and, like the other smaller gyms that entered into similar agreements, Rockstar

paid for the privilege of its students fighting in competitions under Fight Sports’s

banner while wearing a Fight Sports patch on their uniforms. Abreu’s affidavit

explained this relationship in context of the sport and competitions, and he averred

16
that it was Rockstar, not Fight Sports, that initiated this relationship. There was no

evidence or allegation that Fight Sports actively advertised or reached out to Texas

gyms seeking to do this kind of business, and in his affidavit, Abreu denied having

ever “actively marketed” in Texas. No evidence demonstrated that the affiliation

extended beyond the use of the Fight Sports name, patch, and banner for entry into

certain competitions. While Fight Sports certainly earned some money from these

agreements, because it was the smaller gyms, not Fight Sports, that sought out

these agreements, we cannot say that Fight Sports purposefully reached beyond

Florida to form continuing relationships and obligations with Texas citizens. See

Moncrief Oil Int’l, 414 S.W.3d at 151. Thus, these contacts can be considered

fortuitous rather than purposeful. See, e.g., Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 559. And

even if they were purposeful contacts, the evidence shows that Fight Sports earned

$41,150 in total from Texas sponsorships for competition in a five-year period,

whereas Fight Sports operates internationally with affiliated gyms on four

continents. The competition sponsorship agreements do not demonstrate that

Abreu or Fight Sports is essentially at home in Texas, as is needed for a court to

exercise general personal jurisdiction. See id. at 565.

2. Jiu jitsu seminars in Texas

Schneider next relies on the jiu jitsu seminars that Fight Sports conducted in

Texas, which were taught by Abreu and for which Fight Sports was compensated.

17
Abreu averred that he had traveled to Texas to give seminars on three or four

occasions, and in each instance, he “was asked to travel to Texas to give the

seminars.” Abreu did not specify whether Fight Sports, a Texas business, or a

Texas resident asked him to travel to Texas. These are not purposeful contacts

between Abreu and Texas because Abreu did not clearly seek some benefit,

advantage, or profit by availing himself of the jurisdiction in this way. However,

the seminars could be considered purposeful contacts between Fight Sports and

Texas because Fight Sports was compensated for the seminars. But even if they are

purposeful contacts by Fight Sports, they were occasional, not systematic and

continuous, and they do not show that Fight Sports is essentially at home in Texas,

as is needed for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction. See id.

3. Oliveira’s actions as athlete, agent, or employee

The undisputed jurisdictional evidence here showed that Abreu, on behalf of

Fight Sports, filed a petition for Oliveira to a beneficiary for the purpose of a P-1

visa. As Schneider explained and conceded in her brief, considering the undisputed

facts and the special nature of a P-1 visa, Oliveira “entered the United States as a

professional athlete ‘to be employed as an athlete’ for at least four years.”

Appellee’s Br. 17 n.5. The letter Abreu sent to USCIS, on behalf of Fight Sports,

which stated that Oliveira no longer worked for Fight Sports, establishes that

Oliveira had worked for Fight Sports in some capacity, but it does not demonstrate

18
that Oliveira worked for Fight Sports as an agent, instructor, or coach. Schneider

asserts that Oliveira competed under the name and wearing the patch of Fight

Sports while he was in Texas. This is consistent with him working for Fight Sports

as an athlete. But this evidence has no tendency to prove any broader relationship

between Oliveira and Fight Sports: it does not show that Oliveira was an agent,

coach, or instructor for Fight Sports. Abreu’s affidavit similarly denies that

Oliveira was a Fight Sports agent, coach, or instructor.

In her pleading, Schneider alleged that Abreu “brought . . . Oliveira to Texas

where [he] became a Fight Sports affiliated instructor at a Rockstar Martial Arts

gym, which was also affiliated with Fight Sports.”4 In her response to the special

appearance, Schneider argued that she had alleged that “Defendant Abreu trained

and recommended her coach Defendant Oliveira to [Rockstar].”5 That Fight Sports

sent Oliveira to Texas to coach students at Rockstar was refuted by Fight Sports’s

jurisdictional evidence. In his affidavit, Abreu averred: “Neither I nor any [Fight

Sports] entity ‘brought Olivera to Texas.’ Rather, any decision regarding
4
We have already addressed Schneider’s allegations about affiliation in section
IV.A.1., above.
5
On appeal, Schneider argues that “Fight Sports had a duty to ensure that the
professional athlete it sent to Texas to coach and train students at Rockstar Gym
would not injure a student. By sending Oliveira, an unfit coach with aggressive
tendencies, to Texas for the purpose of coaching students at Rockstar Gym, Fight
Sports breached its duty in Texas to keep those students in Texas from harm.”
Nothing in Schneider’s pleading or jurisdictional evidence showed that Fight
Sports knew that Oliveira was an unfit coach with aggressive tendencies before he
went to work for Rockstar.
19
employment, affiliation, training, hiring, direction, or management of Oliveira was

solely made by some or all of the Rockstar Martial Arts entities in Texas.” And

even if Abreu recommended Oliveira, nothing in the record shows that Abreu

sought some benefit, advantage, or profit by doing so. See Moncrief Oil Int’l, 414

S.W.3d at 151.

It is undisputed that Fight Sports trained Oliveira, just as it is undisputed that

such training occurred in Florida, not Texas. Abreu and Fight Sports’s training of

Oliveira cannot be considered a minimum contact with Texas.

4. Abreu’s participation in Texas competitions

Finally, Schneider relies on Abreu’s participation in Texas jiu jitsu

competitions. Abreu did not dispute that he has traveled to competitions in Texas,

and in his response to jurisdictional discovery, Abreu stated that he had

participated in three competitions in Texas between June 2019 and July 2020.

These can be considered purposeful contacts with Texas, but like the seminars,

they were occasional, not systematic and continuous, and they do not show that

Abreu (or Fight Sports) is essentially at home in Texas, as is needed for a court to

exercise general personal jurisdiction. See Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 565.

***

Having considered the pleadings, special appearance, and jurisdictional

evidence, we conclude that neither Abreu, a Florida resident, nor Fight Sports, a

20
Florida business, had such continuous and systematic contacts with Texas as to

render either appellee essentially at home in this state. See TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d

at 37. We hold that the court did not have general personal jurisdiction over Abreu

or Fight Sports. See id.

B. There is no specific jurisdiction over Fight Sports or Abreu.

Having concluded that there is no general jurisdiction over either Fight

Sports or Abreu, we now consider whether the court has specific personal

jurisdiction over either of them. Our specific jurisdiction requires us to consider

whether Schneider’s lawsuit arose out of or related to their purposeful contacts

with Texas. See Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 362. We need not assess Abreu’s and

Fight Sports’s contacts on a claim-by-claim basis in this case, however, because

Schneider’s claims arise, if at all, from the same forum contacts. See Moncrief Oil,

414 S.W.3d at 150–51.

In her original petition, Schneider alleged claims for vicarious liability,

negligent failure to protect, and negligent hiring, retention, supervision and training

arose out of or were related to Abreu’s and Fight Sports’s contacts with Texas. 6

First, Schneider seeks to impose liability on Abreu and Fight Sports for Oliveira’s

6
Vicarious liability is not a cause of action but a legal doctrine and an
exception to the general rule that a person has no duty to control the conduct
of another. See Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125, 130
(Tex. 2018) (quoting St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 540 (Tex.
2002) (plurality op.)).
21
sexual assault through various theories of vicarious liability. Second, in her

negligent failure to protect cause of action, Schneider seeks to impose liability on

Abreu and Fight Sports for failing to warn “against the risk of injury by instructors,

including Defendant Oliveira.” Third, in her negligent hiring, retention,

supervision, and training cause of action, Schneider seeks to impose liability on

Abreu and Fight Sports for failing to “properly screen, hire, and train their coaches,

including Defendant Oliveira,” and for providing “Oliveira direct and continued

access to minors, despite failing to adequately investigate, regulate, monitor, and

supervise Defendant Oliveira.”

In our analysis in section I.A., we identified the forum contacts that could be

attributed to Fight Sports or Abreu. Specifically, in sections I.A.1 and I.A.2, we

explained that the competition sponsorship agreements with Texas and the

seminars held in Texas are purposeful contacts that can be imputed to Fight Sports.

In section I.A.3, we explained that the evidence demonstrates that Fight Sports

employed Oliveira as an athlete within the meaning of the P-1 visa while he was in

Texas. In section I.A.4., we concluded that Abreu’s only purposeful forum contact

is his participation in three jiu jitsu competitions in Texas between 2019 and 2020.

Schneider’s claims are unrelated to Abreu’s participation in three jiu jitsu

competitions in Texas between 2019 and 2020. The court lacks specific personal

jurisdiction over him.

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Schneider’s claims are also unrelated to Fight Sports’s sponsorship of

Rockstar to participate in jiu jitsu tournaments, holding jiu jitsu seminars in Texas,

or employing Oliveira as an athlete under a P-1 visa. While a “but for” relationship

may exist between some of Fight Sports’s contacts i.e., but for the sponsorship,

Oliveira might not have driven Schneider to Houston, or but for the P-1 visa,

Oliveira might not have been working in the United States—the Texas Supreme

Court has held that but-for causation alone cannot form the basis for specific

jurisdiction in Texas. See Moncrief at 157. Schneider’s claims of failure to protect

and negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training are premised on an

employment relationship in which Oliveira is either an instructor or coach for Fight

Sports. These claims do not arise out of Fight Sports’s employment of Oliveira as

an athlete under a P-1 visa because the claims center on Oliveira’s intentional tort

of sexual assault, not his performance as an athlete. We conclude that the court

lacks specific personal jurisdiction over Fight Sports because there is no nexus

between Fight Sports, Schneider’s claims, and the State of Texas. See Luciano, 625

S.W.3d at 14.

23
Conclusion

We conclude that no personal jurisdiction exists as to Abreu or Fight Sports,

and we hold that the trial court erred by denying their special appearance. We

reverse the order of the trial court, and render judgment dismissing Schneider’s

claims against Abreu and Fight Sports.

Susanna Dokupil
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Dokupil.

24

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130466. Public record. Not legal advice.