# Johnson v. Tuskegee University (CONSENT)

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · August 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130432

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** August 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION

RUSSELL JOHNSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 3:24-CV-360-KFP
)
TUSKEGEE UNIVERSITY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Disqualify. Doc. 63. Defendants argue
that Plaintiff’s counsel, Mia Hollingsworth, is due to be disqualified from participating as
counsel in this case due to her status as a necessary and material fact witness and for
violating the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct and the Local Rules of the Middle
District of Alabama. Id. at 1. The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for review.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
A “court[] ha[s] the inherent authority to regulate [the] professional conduct” of
attorneys appearing before it. Hershewe v. Givens, 89 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1290 (M.D. Ala.
2015) (quoting In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 1976)).1 However, “the court
may not simply rely on a general inherent power to admit and suspend attorneys, without
any limit on such power.” Schlumberger Techs. v. Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir.
1997). “The party bringing the motion to disqualify bears the burden of proving the grounds

1 Opinions issued by the former Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh
Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
for disqualification.” Perez v. City of Hialeah, 526 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2020)
(quoting Herrmann v. GutterGuard, Inc., 199 F. App’x 745, 752 (11th Cir. 2006) (per

curiam)). In reaching a decision to disqualify an attorney, “[t]he court must clearly identify
a specific Rule of Professional Conduct which is applicable to the relevant jurisdiction and
must conclude that the attorney violated that rule.” Herrmann, 199 F. App’x at 752
(alteration in original) (quoting Schlumberger, 113 F.3d at 1561). “Motions to disqualify
are governed by two sources of authority. First attorneys are bound by the local rules of
the court in which they appear.” Id. “Second, federal common law also governs attorneys’

professional conduct because motions to disqualify are substantive motions affecting the
rights of the parties.” Id.
Further, “[a]ttorneys who practice before the Middle District of Alabama must
‘adhere to . . . th[e] Court’s Local Rules, the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Alabama Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline, and, to the extent not inconsistent

with the preceding, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct.’”
Hershewe, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 1290–91 (second alteration in original) (quoting M.D. Ala.
L.R. 83.1(g)). In particular, “[t]hese local rules represent controlling obligations on
attorneys appearing in this court.” Id. at 1291 (quoting Green v. Montgomery Cnty., Ala.,
784 F. Supp. 841, 842 (M.D. Ala. 1992)). Notably, “the ethical standards that govern

attorneys who practice before a federal court are determined by federal and not state law,”
and “the court is not bound by state-court interpretations of [the Alabama State Bar’s]
rules.” Id.
“While ‘a party is presumptively entitled to the counsel of his choice, that right may
be overridden [] if [a] compelling reason[] exist[s].’” Nealy v. Warner Chappell Music,

Inc., 741 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1259 (S.D. Fla. 2024) (alterations in original) (quoting In re
BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 961 (11th Cir. 2003)). A court’s decision to disqualify an
attorney “‘is a harsh sanction, often working substantial hardship on the client’ and should
therefore ‘be resorted to sparingly.’” Herrmann, 199 F. App’x at 752 (quoting Norton v.
Tallahassee Mem’l Hosp., 689 F.2d 938, 941 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982)).

II. BACKGROUND
A. Hollingsworth’s Role as Title IX Coordinator
Before Hollingsworth initiated her representation of Plaintiff in this matter against
Tuskegee University, she served as Tuskegee’s Title IX Coordinator under the name Mia
Maxwell. It is not disputed that Mia Maxwell is the same individual as Mia Hollingsworth
who is now representing Plaintiff. See Doc. 81 at 4 n.4.2 While Hollingsworth was

employed as Tuskegee’s Title IX Coordinator in 2022, Plaintiff’s Title IX complaints3
were forwarded to the Title IX Office. Doc. 81 at 4. The complaints forwarded in January
2022 involved Plaintiff’s “gender disparity and retaliation” claims underlying this action.
The transferred complaints were ultimately resolved on March 31, 2022, when the
Title IX Hearing Board determined that there was no Title IX violation arising from the

consolidated September 2020 and February 2021 complaints. Doc. 81 at 4.

2 For purposes of describing the factual basis underlying this Motion, the Court refers to the undisputed
facts per the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order. Doc. 81.

3 As referenced in the Court’s Opinion and Order (Doc. 81), Plaintiff’s complaints are based in a series of
formal and informal complaints filed with Tuskegee in September 2020 and February 2021.
Separately, Plaintiff later filed a retaliation complaint against a member of Tuskegee
University’s faculty, Dr. Ruby Perry, in April 2022. Doc. 81 at 5. Hollingsworth transferred

this April 2022 complaint to the Office of Graduate Studies and Research because it did
not have a basis in Title IX law. Doc. 81 at 5.
In addition, Plaintiff brought another Title IX claim to Hollingsworth involving
allegations that Drs. Wirtu and Perry retaliated against Plaintiff for resigning from his
dissertation’s advisory committee. Doc. 81 at 5. Her role involved investigating this
complaint by conducting interviews and speaking with faculty, drafting findings on the

investigation, and drafting the Title IX Decision Summary. Doc. 81 at 11.
B. Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff brought this action on June 14, 2024, and was initially represented by
Algert S. Agricola, Jr., and Barbara H. Agricola. Doc. 1. Following withdrawal of
Plaintiff’s counsel (Docs. 12, 13), Mia Hollingsworth moved to appear pro hac vice in this

case. Doc. 22. The Court granted this motion, and Mia Hollingsworth has since been
serving as counsel in this matter with local counsel Tiffany Johnson-Cole. See Docs. 22,
23.
On February 17, 2025, following receipt of Defendants’ “Re-Notice of Deposition
and Request for Production of Documents” dated February 7, 2025, (Doc. 48-1),

Hollingsworth filed a Motion to Quash (Doc. 48) asserting the Notice was “harassment”
and claiming that “there is no information unknown to Defendants to be gained from
deposing Plaintiff’s counsel other than privileged matter regarding litigation strategy and
work product.” Doc. 48 at 3–4.
Defendants opposed the motion and emphasized the importance of the deposition
for their ability to properly investigate the Complaint. Doc. 52 at 5. They further explain

that at the time of this Response, they chose to “not file a knee-jerk Motion to Disqualify
based on the apparent conflict of interest,” and instead sought “to explore the underlying
facts” in order to defend against the case” and “determine whether a Motion to Disqualify
is appropriate under the circumstances.” Doc. 52 at 7 n.4.
After a hearing, the Court entered an order (Doc. 59) denying Plaintiff’s Motion
(Doc. 48) and finding that “Hollingsworth is a fact witness as to events at issue in Plaintiff’s

case” and that due to “her intimate involvement with matters relevant to the issues in this
case, her status as Plaintiff’s counsel cannot shield her from discovery in her capacity as a
fact witness.” Doc. 59 at 4.
On June 11, 2025, Defendants then filed this Motion to Disqualify. Doc. 63.
III. DISCUSSION

In their Motion to Disqualify, Defendants argue Mia Hollingsworth is due to be
disqualified as Plaintiff’s counsel due to Hollingsworth’s (1) role as a necessary and
material fact witness and (2) the conflict of interest raised by her representation. Doc. 63
at 1, 11. Each of these arguments is discussed in turn.
A. Necessary Witness

Defendants argue that Hollingsworth is a necessary witness whose testimony does
not fall within an exception to Rule 3.7(a) of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct.
Doc. 63 at 6–10. In her Response, Hollingsworth argues that her representation falls under
an exception as her disqualification would cause “substantial harm” to Plaintiff. Doc. 69 at
6–7.

Rule 3.7(a) bars a lawyer from serving as an advocate in a trial when “the lawyer is
likely to be a necessary witness, except where: (1) [t]he testimony relates to an uncontested
issue; (2) [t]he testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the
case; or (3) [d]isqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.”
Hershewe, 89 F. Supp. at 1291–92 (alterations in original) (quoting Ala. R. Prof. Conduct
3.7(a)). “’[A] necessary witness is one who has crucial information in his possession which

must be divulged’ and whose testimony is ‘relevant, material, and unobtainable
elsewhere.’” Id. at 1292 (alteration in original) (quoting Lane v. State, 80 So. 3d 280, 300
(Ala. Crim. App. 2010)). “The necessity standard requires more than mere speculation that
counsel will be required to testify.” Pigott v. Sanibel Dev., LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68623, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 17, 2007) (quoting Bradford v. State, 734 So. 2d 364, 369

(Ala. Crim. App. 1999)). “Rules of professional conduct generally disapprove of lawyers
testifying at proceedings in which they are also advocates.” Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d
1223, 1246 (11th Cir. 2001).
Because the Court has granted summary judgment (Doc. 81), there is now no
reasonable expectation of trial in this case. Thus, the arguments Defendants raise

concerning the likely prejudice Defendants will encounter if Hollingsworth were to serve
at trial in the “dual role of counsel for [Plaintiff] and fact witness” are moot. Doc. 63 at 8.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants’ Rule 3.7(a) arguments are due to be
dismissed.
B. Conflict of Interest
Defendants also allege in their motion that Hollingsworth has a conflict of interest

in violation of Rule 1.7(b) for her continued representation in this case involving (1) her
prior role as the Title IX Coordinator at Tuskegee, and (2) her own pro se discrimination
action against Tuskegee. Defendants argue that Hollingsworth cannot meet the two
qualifications for exception under this rule because Hollingsworth could not reasonably
believe her representation of Plaintiff will not be adversely affected. Hollingsworth argues
that this rule is not applicable because she “does not owe the duty of a practicing attorney

or fiduciary to Tuskegee University or any of the other Defendants as a former client or
third party.” Doc. 69 at 7. She further claims that “the rules of professional conduct to
which practicing attorneys are bound do not apply to Title IX Coordinators.” Doc. 69 at 7–
8.
Under Rule 1.7(b), “[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of

that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or a
third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests.” Ala. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(b). The
exceptions to this rule allow for representation if “(1) [t]he lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) [t]he client consents after
consultation.” Id. The comments to the Rule emphasize that “reasonabl[e] belie[f]” in the

context of (b)(1) is defined as “when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client
should not agree to the representation under the circumstances[.]” Id. cmt.
“The party moving for an attorney’s disqualification under Rule 1.7 . . . bears the
burden of proving the existence of a conflict of interest.” Ex parte Tiffin, 879 So. 2d 1160,
1164 (2003). “Rule 1.7(b) governs ‘simultaneous representation of parties whose interests
in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants.” Id. “At a minimum, a party

seeking disqualification for the conflict addressed in Rule 1.7 must demonstrate (1) that it
is a current client of the lawyer whose representation is challenged, and (2) that the party’s
interests ‘conflict’ with the interests of the other client, or with the interests of the lawyer.”
Id. at 1165. “Ordinarily, therefore, a stranger to the attorney-client relationship lacks
standing to assert a conflict of interest in that relationship.” Id. (internal quotations
removed). “[A]s a general rule, courts do not disqualify an attorney on the grounds of

conflict of interest unless the [current or] former client moves for disqualification.” Id.
(second alteration in original) (quoting Lowe v. Graves, 404 So. 2d 652, 653 (Ala. 1981).
While the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct do not directly bar an opposing
party from bringing a motion for disqualification under Rule 1.7, the Comments urge courts
to exercise caution when considering a motion brought by an oppositional party. Hershewe,

89 F. Supp. 3d at 1293. “Where the conflict [of interest] is such as clearly to call in question
the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the
question.” United States v. Jefferson Cnty., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129748, at *22 (N.D.
Ala. Jan. 16, 2008) (quoting Ala. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7 cmt.); “[B]ecause a motion for
disqualification is such a potent weapon and can be misused as a technique of harassment,

the court must exercise extreme caution in considering it to be sure it is not being used to
harass the attorney sought to be disqualified, or the party he represents.” Crum v. Alabama,
453 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (internal quotations removed).
The first question to address here is whether Defendants as the opposing party meet
the substantive requirements to bring a claim under Rule 1.7(b). Hershewe, 89 F. Supp. 3d

at 1293. While Rule 1.7(b) conflicts may involve a conflict between a lawyer’s current or
former client and a third party, it is key that the individual raising the conflict of interest is
an individual who is or was a client. Ex parte Tiffin, 879 So. 2d at 1164.
Here, Defendants would fall into the category of “third party”; Defendants were
never a client of Hollingsworth. Defendants do not articulate an argument in their Motion
describing how they satisfy the substantive requirements to bring a claim under Rule 1.7(b).

Ex parte Tiffin, 879 So. 2d at 1164 (“At a minimum, a party seeking disqualification for
the conflict addressed in Rule 1.7 must demonstrate (1) that it is a current client of the
lawyer whose representation is challenged, and (2) that the party’s interests ‘conflict’ with
the interests of the other client, or with the interests of the lawyer.”). For this reason, the
Court finds that it cannot proceed any further in deciding whether a conflict of interest

exists under Rule 1.7(b).
Instead of focusing on this initial question, Defendants’ argument focuses on why
the exceptions under Rule 1.7(b) do not apply. Defendants argue that because a
disinterested lawyer could not find the client-lawyer relationship between Hollingsworth
and Plaintiff reasonable in light of the conflict, Plaintiff could not meaningfully consent to

this representation. Doc. 63 at 11–12.
The Northern District has examined the application of Rule 1.7(b) when a conflict
issue was raised by an opposing party. In Lavender v. Protective Life Corp., Protective
moved to disqualify Beeman, who was of counsel to the law firm representing the plaintiff,
Lavender. Lavender was a former Protective employee. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13564, at
*1 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2017). Beeman formerly had “an attorney-client privilege

relationship” with Protective, and during the time frame underlying the events in the
lawsuit, he served in a non-litigation role for Protective. Id. at *13–14. Critically, while he
was in this non-litigation role, he involved himself as “of counsel” with an outside law firm
that was representing Lavender in a suit against Protective. Id. at *5–6. When considering
the motion to disqualify, the court found “Rule 1.7(b) precludes Beeman from representing
a client when doing so may be limited by his responsibilities to another client, a third

person, or by the lawyer’s own interests.” Id. at *15. The court recognized that “a conflict
of interest raised by a former client, and now opposing party, should be viewed with
caution,” due to the risk of harassment, but ultimately found that the “fair or efficient
administration of justice” was called into question and was properly raised by opposing
counsel. Id. at *18.

In Lavender, the court found “Protective [] qualifies as a non-client ‘third person,’”
id. at *16, and ultimately this determination featured into the court’s finding that Protective
established a violation of Rule 1.7(b), id. at 18–19. Tuskegee, however, cannot qualify as
a non-client third person under the Rule as there is no evidence that Hollingsworth
represented Plaintiff while she was employed at Tuskegee. In Lavender, Beeman

previously did represent his company. Id. *15. Likewise, Beeman was still an employee of
Protective who stood to gain financially from his employment at Protective while serving
as “of counsel” for a different organization in litigation against his employer. Id. 16. In
addition, the Court emphasized that critical to his violation for Rule 1.7(b) was his failure
to obtain consent “from both parties[]” by not even disclosing his involvement in the
outside law firm to Lavender and also by concealing his activities in the law firm from

Protective entirely. Id. at 17–18. Here, while Hollingsworth served Tuskegee University in
a managerial role, Tuskegee was never Hollingsworth’s client, and Defendants never allege
Hollingsworth needed consent from Tuskegee to serve as counsel to Plaintiff.
For the reasons stated above, Defendants have not shown why the general rule
preventing opposing counsel from raising a disqualification motion based on conflict of
interest does not apply.

IV. CONCLUSION
In addition to the arguments Hollingsworth presented in response to Defendants’
Motion, Hollingsworth remarkably alleges that she is not bound by the Alabama Rules of
Professional Conduct because she is “a Georgia licensed attorney.” Doc. 69 at 3. For this
reason, Hollingsworth asserts she “was not required” to review the Alabama Rules of

Professional Conduct as she is only “making an appearance Pro Hac Vice and is not
admitted to practice in the Middle District of Alabama.” Doc. 69 at 5. Hollingsworth argues
that her admission pro hac vice “is a distinction with a difference,” but she fails to offer
any support for this argument. She contends her Georgia admission requires compliance
with Georgia rules, like those governing professional conduct, but her pro hoc vice

appearance in this District does not require adherence to the rules applicable to those
admitted to this Court like the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct. To the contrary,
the Middle District’s Local Rules governing appearance pro hac vice provide that an
attorney can appear pro hac vice if they are “admitted pro hac vice” by court order. M.D.
Ala. Loc. R. 83.1(b)(1) (emphasis added). Hollingsworth’s attempt to contort a distinction
between “appearance” and “admission” placing her above the rule of law is an incredible

attempt to sidestep the standards for professional conduct included under this same rule
heading applying to all “[a]ttorneys admitted to practice before this Court.” M.D. Ala. Loc.
R. 83.1(g). This Rule does not create any distinction with a difference between admission
pro hac vice and admission by any other means and it certainly does not excuse counsel
from adherence to the rules of professionalism.
As an attorney seeking admission to practice in the State of Alabama (Doc. 69 at 4),

Hollingsworth is cautioned to familiarize herself with the Alabama Rules of Professional
Conduct, and Hollingsworth is reminded that the Middle District’s Local Rules make the
Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct applicable to her practice while she appears pro
hac vice in this Court.
For the reasons articulated above, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to

Disqualify (Doc. 63) is DENIED.
DONE this 29th day of August, 2025.

/s/ Kelly Fitzgerald Pate
KELLY FITZGERALD PATE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130432. Public record. Not legal advice.