# Restrepo v. New Phase Electrical Contractors, Inc.

> District Court, E.D. New York · August 28, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130306

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 28, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130306

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming award of post-judgment interest in a confirmation proceeding

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------x
HUMBERTO RESTREPO,

Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
- against - 25-CV-0321 (PKC) (MMH)

NEW PHASE ELECTRICAL
CONTRACTORS, INC.,

Respondent.
-------------------------------------------------------x
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:
Petitioner Humberto Restrepo (“Petitioner”), as Chairman of the Joint Industry Board of
the Electrical Industry (the “JIB”), filed his Petition in this district on January 1, 2025, seeking to
confirm an arbitration award rendered pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between
Local Union #3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (the “Union”) and New
Phase Electrical Contractors, Inc. (“Respondent”). (Pet., Dkt. 1, at 1.) On April 23, 2025, after
Respondent failed to appear or otherwise defend this action, Petitioner requested that his Petition
be deemed as an unopposed motion for summary judgment. (Pet’r’s Ltr., Dkt. 11.) On
June 20, 2025, the Court granted Petitioner’s request and converted his Petition to a motion for
summary judgment (“Motion”). (See 6/20/2025 Dkt. Order.) For the reasons set forth below, the
Court now grants summary judgment in favor of Petitioner.
BACKGROUND1
I. The JIB and Employment Benefit Plans
The JIB is the administrator of various multiemployer employee benefit plans established
and maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the Union, certain employer
associations, and independent or unaffiliated employers in the electrical and other related

industries, including Respondent. (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 4, 16.) The JIB is the administrator and
fiduciary of applicable employee benefit plans (“ERISA Plans”) within the meaning of
§§ 3(16)(A)(i) and 3(21)(A) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)2,
codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(16)(A)(i) and 1002(21)(A).3 (Id. ¶ 5; see Finkel v. Firequench,
Inc., No. 23-CV-4868 (EK) (JAM), 2024 WL 320870, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2024), R&R
adopted as modified, No. 23-CV-4868 (EK) (JAM), 2024 WL 4249224 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 20, 2024);
29 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (West).

1 The following facts are taken from the Petition and exhibits thereto and presumed true,
given Respondent’s failure to respond. Trs. of the Ne. Carpenters Health, Pension, Annuity,
Apprenticeship, & Lab.-Mgmt. Coop. Funds v. Countrywide Home Improvement, Inc.,
No. 17-CV-2570 (DRH) (ARL), 2017 WL 5690922, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2017).
2 These include the Pension, Hospitalization and Benefit Plan of the Electrical Industry,
the Dental Benefit Fund of the Electrical Industry, the Educational and Cultural Trust Fund of the
Electrical Industry, the Annuity Plan of the Electrical Industry, the Health Reimbursement
Account Plan of the Electrical Industry, the Deferred Salary Plan of the Electrical Industry (the
“DSP”), the Joint Apprenticeship and Training Program, and the National Electrical Benefit Plan.
(Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 5.) Each plan is an employee benefit plan within the meaning of § 3(3) of ERISA,
codified as 29 U.S.C. 1002(3), and a multi-employer plan within the meaning of § 3(37) of ERISA,
codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37). (Id. ¶ 7); see 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (West).
3 Each of the ERISA Plans is also jointly administered by a board of trustees that is
comprised of labor and management representatives who share equal representation in the
administration of the ERISA Plans in accordance with Section 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 7.)
As administrator and fiduciary, the JIB undertakes several roles. First, it receives a weekly
remittance consisting of contributions to each of the ERISA Plans4 (“JIB Contributions”) directly
from each signatory employer and a Union assessment collected by the signatory employer from
each Union member employed (the “Union Assessment”).5 (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 6.) The JIB also retains

a third-party record-keeper and investment manager Empower, who receives employee-elective
contributions (“Employee Contributions”) and employer contributions (“Employer
Contributions”) (collectively, “DSP Contributions”) remitted by the signatory employers, allocates
these remittances to the relevant individual accounts, and enables individuals to then “direct the
investment of their DSP Contributions from among various investment alternatives selected by the
JIB in conjunction with Empower.” (Id. ¶¶ 8, 11.) Finally, the JIB may collect employee loan
payments due to the Union, payments against loans made from benefits plans, and contributions
to fund the operations of the JIB via employee deductions from their paychecks. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.)
II. The Collective Bargaining Agreement
The Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the New York Electrical

Contractors’ Association, Inc. and the Association of Electrical Contractors, Inc. (collectively, the
“Associations”) covering the period of April 10, 2019 through April 13, 2022 (the “2019-2022
CBA”). (Id. ¶ 17.) The 2019-2022 CBA states that it “shall remain in effect until April 13, 2022
at 4:00 P.M., unless otherwise provided in this Agreement. It shall continue in effect from year to
year thereafter, provided, however, any party hereto may terminate this Agreement on
April 13, 2022, and any time thereafter by giving the other party at least ninety (90) days’ notice
in writing of modification or termination prior to April 13th of such year.” (Id. ¶ 19 (quoting

4 Except for the DSP. (Id. ¶ 6.)
5 The JIB acts as a mere collection agent with respect to the Union Assessment. (Id.)
Agreement and Working Rules, Dkt. 1-2, at 99).) On May 11, 2022, the Union and the
Associations extended the 2019-2022 CBA until April 9, 2025. (Id. ¶ 18; see Mem. of Agreement
(“MoA”), Dkt. 1-3, at 1 (setting new contracting term until April 9, 2025 (the “2022-2025 CBA,”
together with the 2019-2022 CBA, the “CBA”)).) On December 19, 2023, Respondent assented

to “be bound by all of the provisions of the [CBA] and working rules.” (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 16; Ltr. of
Assent, Dkt. 1-1). To date, neither the Union, the Associations, nor Respondent have provided the
required notice to terminate the CBA, which remains in effect upon all parties including
Respondent. (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 20–21.)
Under the CBA, Respondent is required to make the employee benefit plan payments
discussed supra, including to the ERISA Plans and the Non-ERISA Plans, “for all work within the
trade and geographical jurisdiction of the Union and to submit weekly payroll reports that provide
the name, gross wages, and hours worked for each worker employed by the company on whose
behalf [the relevant contributions] are made.” (Id. ¶ 22 (citing Agreement and Working Rules,
Dkt. 1-2, at 11–18).) If Respondent fails to remit contributions and has not submitted payroll

reports for such unpaid contributions, under the CBA’s Policy for the Collection of Delinquent
Contributions (the “Delinquency Policy”), the JIB may “use a prior week’s payroll report
submitted by the employer to calculate the amount of Contributions due from the employer.” (Pet.,
Dkt. 1, ¶ 27; Delinquency Policy, Dkt. 1-4, at 5.) The Delinquency Policy also holds that “interest
shall be calculated at the rate set forth in Section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code.”
(Delinquency Policy, Dkt. 1-4, at 4.) Furthermore, Respondent “shall be liable for the remedies
under Section 502(g)(2) of ERISA, including liquidated damages of [20 percent], in the event of
entry of Judgment against [Respondent] in an action or proceeding to collect delinquent
contributions,” (Agreement and Working Rules, Dkt. 1-2, at 21), as well as “liquidated damages
and attorneys’ fees and costs if legal action is commenced,” (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 29; Delinquency Policy,
Dkt. 1-4, at 4). Finally, under JIB’s Arbitration Procedures and Rules Governing Employer
Delinquency Disputes and Audits (“Arbitration Procedures”), an arbitrator shall have the
jurisdiction to determine any disputes between the “JIB against an Employer, related to the

Employer’s obligation to contribute to the [ERISA Plans], including but not limited to Audits,
Delinquencies, interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Arbitration
Procedures, Dkt. 1-5, at 2.)
III. The Arbitration
After Respondent failed to remit JIB Contributions for four payroll weeks in March 2024
and DSP Contributions for nine payroll weeks between January and March 2024, Petitioner
initiated arbitration before the designated arbitrator, Stephen F. O’Beirne, Esq. (Pet., Dkt. 1,
¶¶ 32–33.) Petitioner noticed said arbitration by mailing a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate with
Statement of Claims by electronic mail to Respondent. (Notice, Dkt. 1-6.) In its written
submission to the arbitration, Petitioner stated that Respondent owed: “(1) JIB Contributions for

payroll weeks ending March 6, 2024 through and including March 27, 2024 of $27,598.64; (2)
DSP Contributions for payroll weeks ending January 24, 2024 through and including
March 27, 2024 of $26,625.90; (3) total interest of $4,598.16; (4) liquidated damages of
$10,844.91; and (5) attorneys’ fees and costs of $2,550.00.” (Pet., Dkt. 1, at ¶ 35; see Arbitration
Mem. of Law, Dkt. 1-7, at 18–19.) Respondent failed to provide any submissions or otherwise
contest Petitioner’s claims. (Id. ¶ 36; Opinion and Award (“Award”), Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 6.)
On October 15, 2024, the arbitrator issued his award (the “Award”), finding “that
Respondent did violate the CBA” and ordering Respondent to pay the award of $72,217.61
consisting of: (1) Required Contributions in the total amount of $54,224.54, (2) interest of
$4,598.16, (3) liquidated damages of $10,844.91, (4) and legal fees and costs of $2,550.00.
(Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 7–8.) The arbitrator also found Respondent liable for Petitioner’s
attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at ECF 8.) To date, the Award has not been vacated or modified,
and no application for such relief is pending. (Pet., Dkt. 1, at ¶ 41.)

On January 17, 2025, Petitioner filed his Petition seeking confirmation of the Award in all
respects, including $72,217.61 pursuant to the Award; $2,398.20 in attorneys’ fees and costs
arising out of the Petition; and any other relief deemed just and proper. (Id. at 10.) On
April 23, 2025, after Respondent had failed to respond to the Petition, Petitioner requested that the
Petition be deemed an unopposed motion for summary judgment. (Pet’r’s Ltr., Dkt. 11.) On
June 20, 2025, the Court granted Petitioner’s request and converted the Petition to a Motion for
Summary Judgment. (6/20/2025 Dkt. Order.)
LEGAL STANDARD
“A federal court’s review of labor arbitration awards is narrowly circumscribed and highly
deferential—indeed, among the most deferential in the law.” A&A Maint. Enter., Inc. v.
Ramnarain, 982 F.3d 864, 868 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting N.Y. City & Vicinity Dist. Council of United

Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Ass’n of Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Indus. of N.Y., Inc.,
826 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 2016)). Where an award is issued pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement, the Supreme Court has instructed that “[a]s long as the arbitrator’s award draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement, and is not merely his own brand of industrial
justice, the award is legitimate.” Finkel v. Firequench, Inc., 2024 WL 320870, at *4 (quoting
United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)), R&R adopted
as modified, 2024 WL 4249224 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 20, 2024).
Because a petition to confirm a labor arbitration award is typically accompanied by a
record, “courts treat an unanswered petition to confirm an arbitration award ‘as an unopposed
motion for summary judgment.’” Countrywide Home Improvement, 2017 WL 5690922, at *2
(quoting D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2006)). “Although a
summary judgment standard is applied to arbitration confirmation proceedings” and the moving
party must show that it has “met its burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains

for trial,” Trs. of Ne. Carpenters Health, Pension, Annuity, Apprenticeship, & Lab. Mgmt. Coop.
Funds v. Upstate Interiors, LLC, No. 19-CV-326 (MKB), 2021 WL 2576938, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
June 23, 2021) (citation omitted), confirmation of a labor arbitration award is generally “a
summary proceeding that merely makes what is already a final arbitration award a judgment of the
court, and the court must grant the award unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected.”
D.H. Blair, 462 F.3d at 110 (internal quotations and citations omitted); Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C.
v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008) (“[A] court ‘must’ confirm an arbitration award ‘unless’
it is vacated, modified, or corrected [under 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 or 11].” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 9)). The
arbitrator’s rationale need not be explained, and the Court should confirm the award “if a ground
for the arbitrator’s decision can be inferred from the facts of the case.” D.H. Blair, 462 F.3d

at 110 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, only “a barely colorable justification
for the outcome reached” is necessary to confirm the award. Id. (internal quotations and citation
omitted). Accordingly, courts “play only a limited role when asked to review the decision of an
arbitrator.” Tully Constr. Co. v. Canam Steel Corp., 684 F. App’x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary
order) (quoting Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 36).
DISCUSSION
I. Confirmation of the Award
Upon review of the uncontroverted evidence submitted with the Petition, the Court finds
that the record submitted by Petitioner presents no genuine issue of material fact and provides the
requisite “ground[s] for the arbitrator’s decision.” D.H. Blair, 462 F.3d at 110 (internal quotations
and citations omitted). First, it is clear from the record that Respondent “is bound to [the CBA]
between [the Union] and [the Associations] covering the period April 13, 2022 through
April 9, 2025.” (Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 4–5; see Ltr. of Assent, Dkt. 1-1; MoA, Dkt. 1-3.)
Second, it is clear from the record that the CBA “requires employers to submit payroll reports and

benefit contributions to a variety of employee benefit plans administered by the JIB” and governed
by ERISA. (Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 5; see Agreement and Working Rules, Dkt. 1-2, at 15–18,
23, 24–25.) Third, it is clear from the record that Respondent failed to meet certain obligations
under the CBA for the periods identified by Respondent. (Award, Dkt. 1-9, ECF 6–7; see
Breakdown of Benefits Owed, Dkt. 1-6, at ECF 25 (showing missed contributions); Payroll
Inquiry, Dkt. 1-7, at ECF 33 (showing missing payroll information).) Finally, it is clear from the
record that, under the Delinquency Policy and Arbitration Procedures, both incorporated into the
CBA by reference, the arbitrator had the authority to hear and decide the underlying dispute
between Petitioner and Respondent, (Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 6; see Delinquency Policy, Dkt. 1-4,
at 1–2; Arbitration Procedures, Dkt. 1-5, at ECF 2), and that Respondents were provided notice of

the dispute, (Notice, Dkt. 1-6, at ECF 1). Therefore, the Court finds that the record presents no
genuine issue of material fact and that there is more than “colorable justification” for the Award,
D.H. Blair, 462 F.3d at 110 (internal quotations and citations omitted), which the Court confirms.
II. Prejudgment and Post-Judgment Interest
A. Prejudgment Interest
Under ERISA, “interest on unpaid contributions shall be determined by using the rate
provided under the plan, or, if none, the rate prescribed under section 6621 of Title 26.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g)(2). Here, the Delinquency Policy provides that interest on unpaid contributions “shall
be calculated at the rate set forth in Section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code.” (Delinquency
Policy, Dkt. 1-4, at 4.) The prejudgment rate under Section 6621 is the sum of the Federal short-
term rate plus three percentage points, to be compounded daily. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6621(a)(2),
6622(a). Petitioner does not request prejudgment interest as relief separate from the confirmation
of the Award, (see Pet., Dkt. 1, at 10), which includes interest on the delinquent contributions,

(Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 7). Accordingly, the Court confirms the Award as-is and declines to
award additional prejudgment interest. See Finkel, 2024 WL 320870 at *5 (recommending no
prejudgment interest separate and apart from the interest that is already included in the award);
Team Air Express, Inc. v. A. Heffco Techs., Inc., No. 06-CV-2742 (NG) (CLP), 2008 WL 4790464,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 3, 2008) (“[I]t is respectfully recommended that in the absence of a specific
request, plaintiff not be awarded prejudgment interest[.]”), R&R adopted, 2008 WL 4790460
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008).
B. Post-Judgment Interest
Post-judgment interest is “mandatory” in the Second Circuit and should be awarded at the
statutory rate prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). See Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D’Urso, 371
F.3d 96, 100–02 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Lewis v. Whelan, 99 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 1996)

(affirming award of post-judgment interest in a confirmation proceeding); Trs. of the N.Y. City
Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Golden Dev. & Constr. Corp., No. 17-CV-1051
(VSB) (JLC), 2017 WL 2876644, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2017) (“The award of post-judgment
interest is mandatory on awards in civil cases as of the date judgment is entered, including orders
that confirm arbitration awards.”) (internal citations omitted), R&R adopted, 2017 WL 3309737
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2017). Though not explicitly identified as such in the Petition, (see Pet., Dkt. 1,
at 10), Petitioner, in effect, seeks post-judgment because the Award includes interest “accru[ing]
on the principal amounts owed until paid in full,” (Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 8). Accordingly, the
Court grants post-judgment interest from the date of entry of the judgment to the date when the
judgment is satisfied, at the rate provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
III. Petitioner’s Attorneys’ Fees and Costs6
A. Attorneys’ Fees
Petitioner seeks a total of $1,878, reflecting 5.8 hours of work by its attorneys, Lillianna

Iorfino (“Iorfino”) and Maura Moosnick (“Moosnick”). (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 49.) Parties are entitled to
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in an action initiated to recover delinquent
contributions pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement under Section 502 of ERISA. 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). “Although that entitlement does not necessarily extend to petitions to
confirm arbitration awards, courts tend to award fees when respondents refuse to abide by an
arbitrator’s decision without justification.” Finkel v. IDL Commc’n & Elec., Inc., No. 22-CV-5889
(NRM) (RML), 2023 WL 4565403, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 20, 2023) (internal quotations and
citation omitted), R&R adopted, 2023 WL 4564911 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2023); see Finkel v.
Millennium Fire Servs., LLC, No. 22-CV-6225 (RPK) (RML), 2023 WL 3620615, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 6, 2023) (awarding fees incurred in confirmation proceeding); Finkel v. JCF Elec., Inc.,

No. 21-CV-3161 (CBA) (RER), 2022 WL 3682834, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2022) (same).
To determine a reasonable attorney’s fee, courts must calculate a “lodestar figure” by
multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate, yielding a
presumptively reasonable fee. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Millea v.
Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens
Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008)). Courts consider the community in

6 Petitioner’s attorneys’ fees and costs for the arbitration itself were included in the Award.
(Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 7.)
which the district court sits and look to the prevailing rates for attorneys in that field with
comparable experience to determine what a reasonable client would pay. See Gesualdi v. Bestech
Transp., LLC, No. 14-CV-1110 (JS) (ARL), 2022 WL 866853, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2022)
(“The reasonableness of hourly rates is guided by the market rate prevailing in the community for

similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.”) (citation
modified); Rudler v. Houslanger & Assocs., PLLC, No. 18-CV-7068 (SFJ) (AYS), 2020
WL 473619, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2020) (following the Second Circuit’s “‘forum rule,’ which
‘generally requires use of the hourly rates employed in the district in which the reviewing court
sits in calculating the presumptively reasonable rate’” (quoting Trs. of NE Carpenters Health
Pension, Annuity, Apprenticeship, and Labor Mgmt. Coop. Funds v. Cali Enters., Inc.,
No. 18-CV-3556 (SFJ) (AYS), 2019 WL 2076784, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2019)). “[T]he
prevailing rates for attorneys in the E.D.N.Y. . . . are approximately $300-$450 per hour for
partners, $200-$300 per hour for senior associates, and $100-$200 per hour for junior associates.”
Rudler, 2020 WL 473619, at *2 (quoting Cleanup N. Brooklyn by Chantrtanapichate v. Brooklyn

Transfer LLC, 373 F. Supp. 3d 398, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)).
1. Moosnick’s Fees
Moosnick is a partner at Virginia & Ambinder, LLP (“V&A”) with four years of practice
experience, and she has billed her time at $410 per hour. (See Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 46; Billing, Dkt. 1-10.)
Courts in this district have previously noted that Moosnick’s requested hourly rate is high
compared to her years of experience. See Finkel, 2024 WL 320870, at *7 (noting that “courts
typically award hourly rates of $200-$250 for attorneys with more years of experience than
[Moosnick]” and reducing her hourly rate to $200); IDL Commc’n & Elec., 2023 WL 4565403,
at *4 (finding Moosnick’s requested hourly rate high for a second-year associate and
recommending reducing this to $200 per hour); Millennium Fire Servs., 2023 WL 3620615, at *5
(same). While Moosnick is now a partner rather than an associate, the Court agrees that her
requested hourly rate does not reflect her years of experience, regardless of her current title. The
Court therefore reduces Moosnick’s hourly rate to $300 and otherwise finds the 0.8 hours billed

by Moosnick to be reasonable. (See Billing, Dkt. 1-10 (detailing total hours billed by Moosnick).)
The Court awards Moosnick $240 in fees.
2. Iorfino’s Fees
Iorfino is an associate at V&A with four years of practice experience, and she has billed
her time at $310 per hour. (See id. ¶ 45.) Iorfino appears to have only begun her ERISA practice
in November 2024. (See id.) Accordingly, the Court finds the requested hourly rate of $310 too
high. See, e.g., Finkel v. J&H Elec. Contracting, Inc., No. 22-CV-4293 (MKB), 2023
WL 3948752, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2023) (reducing rate of $290 to $250 for associate who
graduated in 2016 and had three years of ERISA litigation experience); Ally Fin. Inc. v. Comfort
Auto Grp. NY LLC, No. 20-CV-1281 (MKB) (RLM), 2022 WL 3703955, at *18 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 26, 2022) (recommending $250 hourly rate for associate with seven years’ experience), R&R

adopted, 2022 WL 4813505 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2022); Trs. of Ne. Carpenters Health, Pension,
Annuity, Apprenticeship, & Lab. Mgmt. Cooperation Funds v. CEI Contractors, Inc.,
No. 18-CV-3467 (JFB) (GRB), 2019 WL 117603, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2019) (reducing the
hourly rate for associate who graduated four years prior from $265 to $200). The Court therefore
reduces Iorfino’s hourly rate to $200.
Regarding the 5 hours billed by Iorfino, the Court finds 5 hours to be high for a petition
and memorandum of law such as those submitted in this case. (See Billing, Dkt. 1-10 (detailing
total hours billed by Iorfino)); see, e.g., J&H Elec. Contracting, Inc., 2023 WL 3948752 at *6
(finding 2.5 hours billed to be reasonable); IDL Commc’n & Elec., 2023 WL 4565403, at *5
(finding 3.2 hours billed to be reasonable); Millenium Fire Servs., 2023 WL 3620615, at *5
(finding 4.1 hours billed to be reasonable). However, the additional time expended appears to
correspond with Iorfino’s relative lack of experience with ERISA complaints. The Court therefore
accepts Iorfino’s total billed time of 5 hours, and awards Iorfino $1,000 in fees.

3. Fees for Legal Assistants
Petitioner’s counsel also notes that “V&A will bill the legal assistants’ time at a rate of
$155 per hour for work performed in connection with this action.” (Id. ¶ 47.) However, the Court
sees no billing by or from any legal assistants, or at the hourly rate of $155. (See Billing,
Dkt. 1-10.) Therefore, it assumes there are no such fees to recover, and awards none.
B. Costs
Finally, Petitioner’s counsel requests “$520.20 in court filing fees and service charges upon
the filing of the instant petition.” (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 50.) ERISA provides for the recovery of costs
associated with litigation commenced to recover unpaid fringe benefit contributions. See 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). “[C]ourts routinely make awards for costs pursuant to ERISA in
confirmation proceedings.” Loc. 363, United Elec. Workers of Am., Int’l Union of Journeymen &

Allied Trades v. Laser Lite Elec., Inc., No. 17-CV-0267 (DLI) (SMG), 2017 WL 9939041, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2017) (quoting Abondolo v. Jerry WWHS Co., 829 F. Supp. 2d 120, 130
(E.D.N.Y. 2011)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a
court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the
prevailing party.”). “The party requesting reimbursement of its costs, however, must provide the
court with adequate documentation not only showing costs were incurred, but that they were paid.”
Finkel v. KLK Elec., Inc., No. 19-CV-4945 (NG) (SJB), 2020 WL 3885739, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
June 25, 2020) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Here, Petitioner’s counsel has failed to provide any documentation of the costs they seek
to recover. Without documentation to show that the costs claimed were in fact incurred and paid,
the Court cannot award such costs. However, the Court will award the filing fee of $405, because
the docket indicates that this fee was paid by Petitioner’s counsel. (See 1/17/2025 Dkt. Entry); see

also Shalto v. Bay of Bengal Kabob Corp., No. 12-CV-0920 (KAM) (VMS), 2013 WL 867420,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (holding that filing fees are recoverable without supporting
documentation if verified by the docket). Therefore, the Court awards Petitioner $405 in costs.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court confirms the Award in full and grants Petitioner’s
motion. The Court orders Respondent to pay the total Award amount of $72,217.61 as follows:
1) $27,598.64 in delinquent payroll contributions owed Petitioner and $1,109.25 in
interest on the same;
2) $3,408.88 in additional interest on the unpaid contributions owed Petitioner;
3) $10,844.91 in liquidated damages owed Petitioner;
4) $26,625.90 in delinquent payroll contributions owed Empower and $80.03 in interest
on the same; and
5) $2,550.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as part of the arbitration.
The Court also orders Respondent to pay Petitioner $1,645 in attorneys’ fees and costs
arising out of the Petition and post-judgment interest to be calculated by the Clerk of Court in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Pamela K. Chen
Pamela K. Chen
United States District Judge
Dated: August 28, 2025
Brooklyn, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130306. Public record. Not legal advice.