# Miles v. State of Maryland

> District Court, D. Maryland · August 28, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130275

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** August 28, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130275

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that Articles 16 and 25 “have usually been construed to provide the same protection as the Eighth Amendment, although this Court has acknowledged that there is some textual support for finding greater protection in the Maryland provisions”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ARNOLD MILES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-cv-1415-ABA

STATE OF MARYLAND, et al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Arnold Miles (“Miles”), who is incarcerated at the Eastern Correctional
Institute in Westover, Maryland, was housed in a cell with Kevin Clark (“Clark”).
Plaintiff alleges that both he and Clark had requested that they be separated, based on a
combination of safety and religious reasons. In June 2021, Clark assaulted Miles,
resulting in Miles permanently losing his left eye. Plaintiff has sued Warden William
Bailey, Lieutenant James Reich, and Lieutenant Heather Griffiths (“Defendants”),
alleging that they violated the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and several
Maryland laws, in connection with the assault.1 Defendants have filed a motion to
dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in
part.

1 The complaint incorrectly identifies this defendant as “Defendant Lieutenant Griffin,”
which Defendants later clarify should refer to Lieutenant Heather Griffiths. ECF No. 38-
1 at 1 n.1. The complaint also named as defendants the State of Maryland and Carolyn J.
Scruggs in her capacity as Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services, but Plaintiff has since withdrawn his claims against them. ECF
No. 44.
I. BACKGROUND2
On May 13, 2021, Plaintiff and Kevin Clark became cellmates at Eastern
Correctional Institute (“ECI”). ECF No. 1 ¶ 18. Plaintiff “reported that he was concerned
for his safety as it relates to his cellmate Kevin Clark.” Id. ¶ 20. He alleges that, in
addition to that request, “the two men sent a joint request, signed by both men, to be

separated.” Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that the joint request was based on safety concerns.
See id. ¶ 20 (alleging that Plaintiff’s “independent[] report[]” was “also” based on a
“safety” concern). Plaintiff alleges that ECI was thus on notice of a risk to Plaintiff’s
safety from being housed in a cell with Clark, particularly because ECI allegedly “had
prior notice of Clark’s violent tendencies toward other inmates” and had investigated an
assault by Clark on his previous cellmate. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. As far as Plaintiff was aware, the
reason Clark wanted to be separated from Plaintiff was because of “their incompatibility
in religious preference” as Clark is Muslim and Plaintiff is Christian. Id. ¶ 21. But
accepting Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff’s expressed concerns were about safety. Id. ¶
20. Lieutenant Griffin denied the separation requests. Id. ¶ 23.
About a month after Clark was moved into Plaintiff’s cell, on June 14, 2021, “at

approximately 4:00 a.m., Clark attacked Plaintiff in the cell as Plaintiff slept.” Id. ¶ 24.
Plaintiff suffered “significant facial injuries including the complete separation of his left
eye from his head.” Id. ¶ 25. After assaulting Plaintiff, Clark “attempted to get the
attention of officers by banging on the door of the cell.” Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff alleges that
officers initially ignored Clark and did not enter the cell “[m]ore than an hour later.” Id.

2 At the pleadings stage, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”
King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016).
¶ 28. Plaintiff was then taken to the prison medical unit, and then to Tidal Health Care,
and later “Shock Trauma” (presumably referring to the Shock Trauma Center at the
University of Maryland). Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges “there were no security rounds
conducted by the officers on duty during the time of the assault even though the
logbooks on the tier indicated they had been completed.” Id. ¶ 31.

Clark was charged in the Circuit Court for Somerset County (Case No. C-19-CR-
22-000133) with first- and second-degree assault of an inmate pursuant to Md. Code
Ann., Crim. Law § 3-210. Clark v. State, No. 1879, 2023 WL 7627762, at *1 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. Nov. 15, 2023) (unpublished); see also ECF No. 1 ¶ 34. He was convicted
after a trial in December 2022, and sentenced to seven years “to be served consecutively
to any sentences he was already serving.” Clark, 2023 WL 7627762, at *2. The Appellate
Court of Maryland affirmed Clark’s conviction in November 2023. Id.
On May 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed this case against the State of Maryland, Carolyn J.
Scruggs in her capacity as Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services, Warden William Bailey, Lieutenant James Reich, Lieutenant
Heather Griffiths, two John Doe officers, and all other unnamed officers who were on

duty at the time of the assault. In July 2024, the State of Maryland and Secretary
Scruggs filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against them. ECF No. 23. Plaintiff
later filed a stipulation, withdrawing the claims he had asserted against those
defendants. ECF No. 44. The other Defendants, Warden Bailey, Lt. Reich, and Lt.
Griffiths (“Defendants”), filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against them. ECF
No. 38. Plaintiff responded to that motion, ECF No. 43, and Defendants replied. ECF
No. 51.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When a defendant asserts that, even
assuming the truth of the alleged facts, the complaint fails “to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted,” the defendant may move to dismiss the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). At the pleadings stage, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” King, 825 F.3d at 212.
To withstand a motion to dismiss, the complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative relief” by containing “enough facts
to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although a court reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion “must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff,” King, 825 F.3d at 212, bare legal conclusions “are not entitled to the
assumption of truth” and are insufficient to state a plausible claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges six counts: (1) violation of the Eighth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution by failing to protect and/or render aid3; (2) violation of Articles 24
and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights4; (3) violation of Articles 16 and 25 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights; (4) negligence; (5) gross negligence; and (6) intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against Warden
Bailey, Lt. Reich, or Lt. Griffiths should be dismissed for failure to state a claim and/or

on immunity grounds. ECF No. 38-1.
A. Counts 1 and 3: “Failure to Protect and/or Render Aid”
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to protect him from being attacked by
Clark, and then to aid him after he was attacked by Clark, and that those failures
violated the Eighth Amendment (Count 1) and Articles 16 and 25 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights (Count 3).
“It is well settled that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the infliction
of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ reaches beyond a prisoner’s sentence to ‘the
treatment of a prisoner . . . in prison and the conditions under which he is confined.’”
Ford v. Hooks, 108 F.4th 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). That constitutional obligation includes “a duty . . . to protect

prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 833 (1994) (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st

3 The complaint also refers to the Fourteenth Amendment in Count 1, but in his brief in
opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff relies solely on the Eighth Amendment,
and thus the Court will construe Count 1 as a § 1983 claim based on an alleged violation
of the Eighth Amendment. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff does not
address Count 2, or Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, on which
it is based. Accordingly, the Court deems Plaintiff to have abandoned Count 2.
4 Count 2 is asserted under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 50–54.
Cir. 1988)). After all, “[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not ‘part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Id. at 834
(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). But “it is not every injury
suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into constitutional
liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Id. Rather, “[s]uch injury

must be the product of prison officials’ deliberate indifference to the risk of injury.”
Ford, 108 F.4th at 230 (emphasis in original).
Two requirements must be met to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on an
alleged failure to protect. “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently
serious, [and second,] a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (cleaned up). To
satisfy the latter requirement, a plaintiff must allege that the prison official had a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” that is, one of “deliberate indifference to inmate
health or safety.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Ford, 108 F.4th at 230; Brown v. N.C. Dep’t
of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010). “Deliberate indifference is a very high
standard, and a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.” Ford, 108 F.4th at 230

(quoting Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004)). A plaintiff
must show more than just that the prison official “should have recognized the risk and
the inadequacy of his response,” but rather that the prison official had a “culpable mens
rea” such that “the prison official subjectively ‘knew’ of the substantial risk of harm to a
prisoner and ‘consciously disregarded’ it.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 839). The
Maryland courts apply these same standards to prison failure-to-protect claims under
Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which, like the Eighth Amendment
provides, “[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.” Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. 25; see
Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 656 (1995) (“[I]t is well settled in this State
that Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is in para materia with the Eighth
Amendment.”).5
Here, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts in support of Counts 1 and 3 to survive

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Although his allegations regarding the notice
Defendants received about safety-related concerns with housing Miles and Clark
together are not particularly detailed, he has alleged that, on multiple occasions,
Defendants were notified that leaving him in a cell with Clark created a safety risk for
Plaintiff. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 19–23, 32–33. Similarly, although it is not entirely clear from
Plaintiff’s allegations what involvement these particular Defendants (Warden Bailey, Lt.
Reich, and Lt. Griffiths) had in considering Plaintiff’s and Clark’s requests or in
responding to them, Plaintiff has alleged that these Defendants were among the “ECI
administrators” who “had prior notice of Clark’s violent tendencies toward other
inmates,” id. ¶ 32; that Lt. Reich and Lt. Griffith were correctional officers who “fail[ed]
to prevent the brutal attack against Plaintiff,” “cover[ed] up of their failure to protect

Plaintiff after [the] occurrence,” and “fail[ed] to render aid to Plaintiff despite the means

5 Plaintiff also invokes Article 16 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights in Count 3.
Article 16 provides that “no Law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to
be made in any case, or at any time.” Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. 16. It appears the
Maryland Supreme Court has not decided whether Article 16 should be interpreted in
pari materia with the Eighth Amendment, but the Appellate Court of Maryland has
assumed without deciding that it should be. See Torbit v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t,
231 Md. App. 573, 591 (2017); see also Carter v. State, 461 Md. 295, 308 (2018)
(explaining that Articles 16 and 25 “have usually been construed to provide the same
protection as the Eighth Amendment, although this Court has acknowledged that there
is some textual support for finding greater protection in the Maryland provisions”).
and duty to do so,” id. ¶ 37; and that Warden Bailey “had the capacity and authority to
make final decisions for the purpose of ECI policy, practice and conduct,” id. ¶ 7.
At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff will have to support those allegations
not only with evidence that separation requests were made, but that these particular
Defendants “subjectively ‘knew’ of the substantial risk of harm to a prisoner and

‘consciously disregarded’ it.” Ford, 108 F.4th at 230. In Ford, for example, the Fourth
Circuit held that correctional officers who were “aware of Ford’s complaints requesting
protective custody and the reasons for his fear of reprisal” but who “conclude[ed] that
they did not have enough information to carry out an appropriate allegation” (in part
because the plaintiff did not “g[i]ve names or even nicknames in response to the prison
officials’ investigatory efforts”) were entitled to summary judgment on a failure-to-
protect claim. 108 F.4th at 230–31. In contrast, the prisoner in that case was entitled to
proceed to trial on his Eighth Amendment claim against another correctional officer
who, “within earshot of other inmates on the unit, demand[ed] that Ford name the
individuals threatening him,” thereby creating a genuine dispute of fact about whether
that officer “knowingly exacerbated the dangers to Ford that officers had already

recognized.” Id. at 228, 231.
But the question for now is not whether there is evidence sufficient to rise to that
high standard, but whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts that, if true, would
subject Warden Bailey, Lt. Reich, and Lt. Griffiths to liability on Plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference claims. Although the allegations are thin as discussed above—and the Court
notes with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against Warden Bailey that “there is no
respondeat superior liability under § 1983,” Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782
(4th Cir. 2004)—the Court concludes Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim
and thus for Counts 1 and 3 to proceed to discovery.
That leaves Defendants’ assertions of immunity. With respect to Defendants’
assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity, see ECF No. 38-1 at 5–8, Plaintiff does not
dispute that such immunity applies insofar as he has sued Defendants in their official
capacities. Because Plaintiff has alleged sufficient involvement by these Defendants in

failing to prevent the assault as discussed above, the Court concludes that he has
sufficiently alleged claims against these Defendants in their personal capacities. See
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1991) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not erect a
barrier against suits to impose ‘individual and personal liability’ on state officials under
§ 1983.”).
And with respect to qualified immunity, although dismissal of a complaint based
on qualified immunity “is appropriate when the face of the complaint clearly reveals the
existence of a meritorious defense,” Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 506 (4th Cir.
2011) (quoting Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178–181 (4th Cir. 1996)), here
Plaintiff has sufficient alleged that Defendants knew that putting him in a cell with Clark
put him at serious risk of physical danger, and that they consciously disregarded that

risk. And the legal standards under the Eighth Amendment based on threats among
prisoners are clearly established, as discussed above. Indeed, Defendants only offer a
single conclusory sentence in support of the argument that the complaint should be
dismissed at the pleadings stage based on qualified immunity. See ECF No. 38-1 at 12
(“[E]ven if Plaintiff had stated a plausible claim that the defendants violated a
constitutional right, they still would be entitled to qualified immunity.”). And the case
Defendants cite, Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 391 (4th Cir. 2013), is a summary
judgment case, not a dismissal at the pleadings stage. It may turn out that the
evidentiary record will show, for example, that these Defendants were not, in fact,
sufficiently put on notice of the risk that Clark would attack Miles to give rise to Eighth
Amendment liability or to overcome qualified immunity. But at the pleadings stage, the
Court must accept Plaintiff’s allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom as true,
including with respect to qualified immunity. And when those facts are accepted as true,

they do not “clearly reveal[]” that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Cf.
Brockington, 637 F.3d at 506.
For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss counts 1 and 3 will be denied.
B. State-law tort claims
Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are for negligence (count 4), gross negligence (count
5), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (count 6). Defendants argue those
counts do not state claims on which relief can be granted, and that in any event they are
entitled to immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”).
To establish a negligence claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that “(1)
the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached that duty, (3)
the plaintiff sustained an injury or loss, and (4) the defendant’s breach of the duty was

the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.” Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc. v.
Rummel Klepper & Kahl, LLP, 451 Md. 600, 610 (2017) (citing 100 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v.
Columbia Town Ctr. Title Co., 430 Md. 197, 213 (2013)). Gross negligence is “an
intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences
as affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard of
the consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid them.” Barbre v. Pope, 402
Md. 157, 187 (2007).
With respect to Defendants’ assertion of public officer immunity, “[s]tate
personnel” sued in the performance of their public duties are entitled to immunity
under the MTCA. Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-101 through 12-110. Section 12-105 of
the MTCA provides that State personnel have “immunity from liability” as provided
under § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. That section, in turn,
provides that State personnel “are immune from suit in courts of the State and from

liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties
of the State personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence, and for which the
State or its units have waived immunity[.]” Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b). This statutory
immunity extends not only to simple negligence claims, but also to “non-malicious
intentional torts and constitutional torts.” Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 255 (2004).
Here, for the same reasons that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts in support
of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims (Counts 1 and 3), discussed above, the factual
allegations are sufficient to state a claim for gross negligence. See § III.B, supra. Thus
the motion to dismiss Count 5 will be denied. But because public officer immunity
requires, at minimum, gross negligence, Count 4, for negligence, will be dismissed
based on the immunity conferred by § 5-522(b).

That leaves Count 6, Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. That claim requires Plaintiff to allege certain elements about the conduct of
Defendants: “(1) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be
extreme and outrageous, (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful
conduct and the emotional distress; [and] (4) the emotional distress must be severe.”
Oliver v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Correctional Servs., 350 F. Supp. 3d 340, 354 (D. Md.
2018) (quoting Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566 (1977)). Plaintiff argues that this
count states a claim on which relief can be granted because “Defendants knowingly
placed Plaintiff in harm’s way by refusing to separate him from Kevin Clark, despite
documented risks and repeated separation requests.” ECF No. 43-1 at 17. But Maryland
courts have recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress claims only in limited
circumstances. See Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 734 (1992) (“We have upheld claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress only three times and only in cases which

involved truly egregious acts.”). None of the cases Plaintiff cites persuades this Court
that the Maryland courts would expand the tort to include the type of claim at issue in
this case. The closest Plaintiff comes is citing Young v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
303 Md. 182 (1985). But there, the allegations were that the defendant had engaged in
conduct the “purpose” of which was “to harass the Plaintiff into . . . committing suicide.”
Id. at 198–99. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count 6 will be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1. The motion to dismiss filed by the State of Maryland and Secretary
Scruggs (ECF No. 23) is GRANTED in light of Plaintiff’s withdrawal of the claims
against those defendants, ECF No. 44. Accordingly, the Clerk shall TERMINATE the

State of Maryland and Secretary Scruggs as defendants on the docket.
2. The motion to dismiss filed by the other defendants (ECF No. 38) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Counts 4 and 6 are DISMISSED; the
motion to dismiss is denied as to the remaining counts.

/s/
Date: August 28, 2025 __________________
Adam B. Abelson
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130275. Public record. Not legal advice.