# Weber v. Fletcher

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · July 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130116

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** July 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130116

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that to state a claim of denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his position as a litigant was prejudiced as a direct result of the denial of access
- holding that to state a claim of denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his position as a litigant was prejudiced as a direct result of the denial of access

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

TYRONE WEBER CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-0698

SECTION P
VS.
JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

BRANDY G. FLETCHER MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Tyrone Weber, a prisoner at Riverbend Detention Center ("RDC") proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this proceeding on approximately May 20, 2025, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. He names Brandy G. Fletcher as Defendant.1 For reasons below, the Court
should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.
Background

Plaintiff claims that after he filed a grievance,2 Inmate Account Officer Brandy G.
Fletcher failed to ensure that he was reimbursed $71.00, which was deducted from his inmate
account at RDC to pay a fare for his bus ride home when he was released from incarceration
from a previous sentence on June 2, 2024.3 [doc. # 1, p. 3]. He adds that Fletcher’s actions (or
inaction) were unauthorized. [doc. # 9, p. 3]. He maintains that the Department of Corrections
should have paid for his bus fare, that he was not responsible for paying the fare, and that he
never agreed to pay the fare. Id. at 3, 4. He also alleges (i) Fletcher was negligent because she

1 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under
28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.

2 [doc. # 1-2, p. 3].

3 Plaintiff was incarcerated again at an unknown date. [doc. # 1, p. 4].
did not provide him "any invoice/documentation" about the charge to his account and (ii)
Fletcher should not have investigated his grievance because his grievance was against her. Id. at
3. He suggests that, because he lacked the $71.00 from his account, he was unable to purchase
hygiene items, food, and writing materials with which to contact family. [doc. # 9, p. 2].

Plaintiff claims that Fletcher “did everything possible to prevent the exercising of [his]
right to petition, going as far as withholding legal documents as well as flagging incoming and
outgoing mail.” [doc. # 9, p. 2]. He appears to claim that after he filed this proceeding, Fletcher
intercepted his outgoing mailing and failed to mail it to the Court. [doc. # 9-1, pp. 1, 3]. The
mailing was a copy of this Court’s June 20, 2025 Memorandum Order granting Plaintiff in forma
pauperis status, on which he wrote that Fletcher misinterpreted the portion of the order
concerning the monthly withdrawal of funds from his account to pay the filing fee each time his
account exceeds $10.00. Id.
Plaintiff claims that because he complained about Fletcher to a warden, he suffered
retaliation and was moved from his “original housing Phase III” to “a protective environment in

Phase II[.]” [doc. # 9, p. 2]. The “transition made it even harder to contact [his] family and
obtain the resources [he] need[ed].” Id.
Plaintiff seeks $71.00 in reimbursement, as well as compensation for his pain and
suffering. [doc. # 1, p. 5].
Law and Analysis

1. Preliminary Screening

Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a
prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is
subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.4 See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d
578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his
Complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)
provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is

frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is
“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. Courts are also afforded the
unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id.
A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is

facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies
somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

4 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), “‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any
facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations
of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary
program.”
Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, supra. A well-pled complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of
the asserted facts is improbable and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra.

In making this determination, the court must assume that all the plaintiff’s factual
allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the
same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of
“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not
satisfy Rule 8. Id. A complaint fails to state a claim where its factual allegations do not “raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614
F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[U]nadorned, the-defendant
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.
“[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to
make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 632 F.3d 148, 152-53

(5th Cir. 2010). Courts are “not free to speculate that the plaintiff ‘might’ be able to state a claim
if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint.” Macias v. Raul A.
(Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926
F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court may dismiss a prisoner’s civil rights
complaint as frivolous based upon the complaint and exhibits alone. Green v. McKaskle, 788
F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986).
“To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638
(5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the standard above, a
“[S]ection 1983 complaint must state specific facts, not simply legal and constitutional
conclusions.” Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).

2. Parratt/Hudson Doctrine

As above, Plaintiff claims that Inmate Account Officer Brandy G. Fletcher failed to
ensure that he was reimbursed $71.00, which was deducted from his inmate account at RDC to
pay a fare for his bus ride home when he was released from incarceration. [doc. # 1, p. 3]. He
adds that Fletcher’s actions (or inaction) were unauthorized. [doc. # 9, p. 3]. He maintains that
the Department of Corrections should have paid for his bus fare, that he was not responsible for
paying the fare, and that he never agreed to pay the fare. Id. at 3, 4. He also alleges that Fletcher
was negligent because she did not provide him "any invoice/documentation" about the charge.
To the extent Plaintiff is claiming that Fletcher caused or is causing the deprivation of his
funds, the Parratt-Hudson doctrine forecloses his claims. A post-deprivation tort cause of action
in state law is, under the Parratt/Hudson5 doctrine, sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due
process when a plaintiff alleges that he has been deprived of his property, without due process of
law, by the negligent or intentional actions of a state officer that are “random and
unauthorized.”6 Sheppard v. Louisiana Bd. of Parole, 873 F.2d 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533-35). Louisiana law provides an adequate remedy for both

5 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in
part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

6 “The doctrine is meant to protect the state from liability for failing to provide predeprivation
process in situations where it cannot anticipate the need for such process (when actions are
random and unauthorized).” Brooks v. George County, Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir. 1996).
intentional and negligent deprivations of property. See Copsey v. Swearingen, 36 F.3d 1336,
1342-43 (5th Cir. 1994); Marshall v. Norwood, 741 F.2d 761, 764 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315 and observing that “Louisiana law affords an opportunity to
redress intentional torts under the same section of the Code by which negligence is remedied.”);

Fuller v. XTO Energy, Inc., 989 So. 2d 298, 302 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing the tort of
conversion).7
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was deprived of money by anyone acting under an
official policy, custom, or procedure; rather, he describes unauthorized action. See Allen v.
Fuselier, 273 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Parratt and concluding, “Allen's assertion that the
defendants improperly removed $75 from his inmate account is frivolous because the existence
of a postdeprivation tort cause of action in [Louisiana] law is sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of due process.”); Washington v. Collier, 747 F. App'x 221, 222 (5th Cir. 2018)
(“[A] state actor's unauthorized deprivation of an inmate’s prison account funds—be it negligent
or intentional—'does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is
available.’”) (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533); Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91 (5th Cir.
1996); Parker v. Davilla, 67 F. App'x 242 (5th Cir. 2003); Cannon v. Howard, 224 F.3d 766 (5th
Cir. 2000).

7 See also Suria v. Wathen, 616 F. App’x 175 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of a claim that
correctional officers lost an inmate’s personal property through gross negligence and dereliction
of duty, on grounds that “negligent conduct is not actionable under § 1983.”).
Plaintiff should, if he wishes, pursue relief under state law in state court because
Louisiana law provides adequate remedies for this alleged conduct. Accordingly, the Court
should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.
3. Grievance Responses

To the extent Plaintiff is claiming that Fletcher failed to properly investigate his
grievances concerning his allegedly improperly deducted funds, he does not state a plausible
claim. Likewise, he does not raise a plausible claim with respect to his allegation that Fletcher
was conflicted and should not have investigated his grievance because his grievance was against
her.
A prisoner does “not have a constitutional right to have his grievances resolved in his
favor or to have his claims reviewed pursuant to a grievance process that is responsive to his
perceived injustices . . . .” Burgess v. Reddix, 609 F. App’x 211 (5th Cir. 2015); see Alexander v.
Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 2020 WL 826452, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 2020) (affirming
dismissal of a claim that grievances were mishandled or improperly denied because “prisoners

have no due process rights in the inmate grievance process.”).
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 475 (1995), the Supreme Court left prisoners without
a federally-protected right to have grievances investigated and resolved. See Taylor v. Cockrell,
92 Fed. App’x. 77, 78 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that “claims that the defendants violated his
constitutional rights by failing to investigate his grievances fall short of establishing a federal
constitutional claim.”); Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[The plaintiff]
does not have a federally protected liberty interest in having . . . grievances resolved to his
satisfaction. . . . [A]ny alleged due process violation arising from the alleged failure to
investigate his grievances is indisputably meritless.”). Here, accordingly, the Court should
dismiss these claims.
4. Access to Court
Plaintiff claims that Fletcher “did everything possible to prevent the exercising of [his]

right to petition, going as far as withholding legal documents as well as flagging incoming and
outgoing mail.” [doc. # 9, p. 2]. He appears to claim that after he filed this proceeding, Fletcher
failed to send his outgoing mailing to this Court, which was a copy of the Court’s June 20, 2025
Memorandum Order granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on which Plaintiff wrote that
Fletcher misinterpreted the part of the order concerning the monthly withdrawal of funds from
his account to pay the filing fee when funds in his account exceed $10.00. [doc. # 9-1, pp. 1, 3].
To succeed on a claimed denial of access to courts, a plaintiff must show that he lost an
actionable claim or was prevented from presenting such a claim because of the alleged denial.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996); Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that to state a claim of denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

his position as a litigant was prejudiced as a direct result of the denial of access). “[T]he
complaint should state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a), just as if it were being independently pursued, and a like plain statement should describe
any remedy available under the access claim and presently unique to it.” Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417-18 (2002).
The “injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim.” Lewis,
518 U.S. at 353. Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the lack of access prevented him from
filing or caused him to lose a case that attacks either his conviction or seeks “to vindicate ‘basic
constitutional rights’” in a civil rights action. Id. at 353-54 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 579 (1974)).
“Denial-of-access claims take one of two forms: forward-looking claims alleging ‘that
systemic official action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff class in preparing and filing suits at the
present time,’ and backward-looking claims alleging that an official action has ‘caused the loss

or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case, the loss of an opportunity to sue, or the loss of an
opportunity to seek some particular order of relief.’” Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 601 (5th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413-14).
“To maintain a backward-looking claim, a plaintiff must identify (1) a nonfrivolous
underlying claim; (2) an official act that frustrated the litigation of that claim; and (3) a remedy
that is not otherwise available in another suit that may yet be brought.” United States v. McRae,
702 F.3d 806, 830-31 (5th Cir. 2012); see Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413-14 ((“These cases do not
look forward to a class of future litigation, but backward to a time when specific litigation ended
poorly, or could not have commenced, or could have produced a remedy subsequently
unobtainable.”).

Here, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim because he does not allege that he lost an
actionable claim or was prevented from presenting such a claim because the Court did not
receive (until now) his comments concerning the payment of his filing fee. The undersigned
recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s claims in the instant Report and Recommendation on grounds
other than the alleged failure of a prison official to deduct funds from Plaintiff’s account.
Plaintiff does not demonstrate that his position as a litigant is or was prejudiced as a direct result
of Fletcher’s alleged mail interference.
Likewise, Plaintiff does not sufficiently identify a non-frivolous, arguable claim that he
could not raise because of defendant’s actions, that he raised and lost, or for which he could not
obtain a remedy. He states that Fletcher interfered with his right to petition the Court; however,
he was able to initiate this proceeding by filing a complaint, and he was able to file an amended
pleading.
The Court should dismiss this claim.

5. Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff suggests that because he lacked the $71.00 from his account, he was unable to
purchase hygiene items, food, and writing materials with which to contact family. [doc. #s 1, p.
5; 9, p. 2].
“While the Constitution does not require that custodial inmates be housed in comfortable
prisons, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does require
that prisoners be afforded ‘humane conditions of confinement’ and prison officials are to ensure
that inmates receive adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care.” Herman v. Holiday, 238
F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)). To establish
an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must demonstrate that a prison official was

deliberately indifferent to conditions that resulted in the “extreme deprivation[,]” Shannon v.
Vannoy, 682 F. App’x 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2017), of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.”8 Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 2008). To establish
deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that the official knew of and disregarded an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must have been both aware of facts from the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must have drawn

8 The deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
This standard is not static: the inquiry is whether the conditions are contrary to “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 102 (1976) (quotation marks and quoted source omitted).
the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
“Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation in
combination when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing
effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or

exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue
blankets.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (internal quotation marks and quoted
source omitted).9 However, “Nothing so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’ can rise to the level
of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists.”
Id. at 305.
Here, Plaintiff’s claim is impermissibly conclusory. He does not plausibly allege that he
endured an extreme deprivation of any life necessity and that he was exposed to a substantial risk
of serious harm. See Wingfield v. Garner, 2025 WL 1040649, at *4 (5th Cir. Apr. 8, 2025)
(finding that the plaintiff failed to state a conditions of confinement claim because he "failed to
plead what harm he experienced as a result [of the conditions] or what substantial risk of serious

harm" the conditions created). The Court should dismiss this threadbare claim.
6. Retaliation
Plaintiff claims that because he complained about Fletcher to a warden, he suffered
retaliation and was moved from his “original housing Phase III” to “a protective environment in
Phase II[.]” [doc. # 9, p. 2]. The “transition made it even harder to contact [his] family and
obtain the resources [he] need[ed].” Id.

9 “Such things as food, sleep, clothing, shelter, medical attention, reasonable safety, sleep, and
exercise have been recognized by courts as basic physical human needs subject to deprivation by
conditions of confinement.” Wilkerson v. Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d 654, 678 (M.D. La. 2007)
(citing cases).
Plaintiff, however, does not identify a responsible defendant. He references a warden, an
assistant warden, and a captain, but he does not address how they were personally involved.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part: “Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). If a person is not personally involved, then, a fortiori, he
cannot subject another to, or cause, a deprivation of constitutional rights. See Thompson v.
Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Personal involvement is an essential element of a
civil rights cause of action.”).
Plaintiff does not sufficiently identify “any particular defendant’s personal involvement
in conduct that caused constitutional deprivation.” See Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr.
Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2017) (dismissing a claim that supervisory officials failed to
correctly house the plaintiff because despite the magistrate judge’s instruction to “state what
each defendant did[,]” the plaintiff did not identify a responsible defendant). The Court

disregards bare assertions of collective responsibility unsupported by concrete factual
allegations. See Martinez v. City of N. Richland Hills, 846 F. App’x 238, 243 (5th Cir. 2021);
Jones v. Hosemann, 812 F. App’x 235, 238-39 (5th Cir. 2020) (“It is not enough for a plaintiff to
simply allege that something unconstitutional happened to him. The plaintiff must plead that
each defendant individually engaged in actions that caused the unconstitutional harm.”).
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this claim.
Recommendation

For the reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Tyrone Weber’s claims
that Defendant Fletcher deprived him of funds be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as legally
frivolous and for failing to state claims on which relief may be granted but otherwise
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff's right to pursue relief under state law in state court for
the same alleged conduct.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's remaining claims be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as legally frivolous and for failing to state claims on which
relief may be granted.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by
this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation
to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another
party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or
response to the district judge at the time of filing.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the
proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen
(14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the
legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See
Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996).
In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, this 29" day of July, 2025.

Haft Cp Me Chesley
Kavita Dye Mc Chsky
United States Magistrate Judge

13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130116. Public record. Not legal advice.