# Wright v. Jones

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 28, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130046

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 28, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130046

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the Fourth Amendment protects an arrestee from “unreasonable seizure and intrusion on [her] bodily integrity” (cited with approval by Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2005))
- explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JUSTINA LYNN WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-1108-MMH-SJH
MATTHEW JONES,
Defendant.
_______________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Justina Lynn Wright, an inmate of the Florida Women’s

Reception Center, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on an Amended
Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Amended Complaint; Doc. 7).1
Following the Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the claims against Judge Tatiana
Salvador and Assistant State Attorney Brittany Johnson, one Defendant

remains: Officer Matthew Jones with the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO).
See Order (Doc. 11). As to Defendant Jones, Wright alleges he sexually
assaulted her twice in connection with a traffic stop and arrest, violating her

1 For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the
document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing
System.
Fourth Amendment rights and Florida Statutes sections 901.151 (titled “Stop
and Frisk Law”) and 901.24 (titled “Right of person arrested to consult

attorney”). See Amended Complaint at 7, 9. Wright sues Defendant Jones in
both his individual and official capacities. Id. at 3.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(Motion; Doc. 19). Wright filed a response in opposition to the Motion

(Response; Doc. 20).2 Thus, the Motion is ripe for review.3
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual
allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see
also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.

2 With her Response, Wright filed some exhibits, including a transcript and
filings from her criminal case (Exhibits B, C; Docs. 20-3, 20-4). Generally, a court
should not consider extrinsic evidence when ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). Under the circumstances and
considering the procedural posture, the Court will not consider Wright’s exhibits in
ruling on Defendant’s Motion.
3 The Court summarized Wright’s allegations in its partial dismissal Order and
will not do so again here. See Order (Doc. 11) at 2. In considering Defendant’s Motion,
the Court must accept all factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true,
consider the allegations in the light most favorable to Wright, and accept all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations. Holland v. Carnival
Corp., 50 F.4th 1088, 1093 (11th Cir. 2022). As such, the facts previously summarized,
as drawn from the Amended Complaint, may well differ from those that ultimately
can be proved.
2
2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the
plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,

the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.
BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while
“[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (quotations, citation, and
original alteration omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true

3
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court
must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

III. Summary of Arguments
Defendant Jones asks the Court to dismiss Wright’s Amended Complaint
on the following grounds: (1) it is a shotgun pleading; (2) he is entitled to
qualified immunity on the individual-capacity claim; and (3) any claims

against him in his official capacity are not sufficiently pled in accordance with
Monell.4 See Motion at 5, 7, 10.
Wright counters that Defendant Jones “breached a common law duty of
care owed to [her] pursuant to [Florida Statutes section] 943.085(2),”5 because

he testified under oath at her criminal suppression hearing that he had not
suspected her of having committed a crime when he pulled her over. See
Response at 2. Wright claims she did not consent to a “frisk,” and Defendant
Jones “utilized excessive force, made skin to skin contact, and groped her

4 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
5 This section is titled “Legislative intent with respect to upgrading the quality
of law enforcement officers and correctional officers.”
4
genitalia, stomach, and breast.” Id. at 3. Wright further asserts Defendant
Jones denied her medical attention and violated her rights to equal protection

by treating her “differently due to race or gender.”6 Id. at 3–4. Finally, she
contends Defendant Jones is not entitled to qualified immunity, and she may
proceed on a claim under § 1983 against the City of Jacksonville on a theory of
Monell liability. Id. at 5.

IV. Analysis
A. Shotgun Pleading
Defendant Jones first argues that Wright’s Amended Complaint is a
shotgun pleading because she “attempts to assert . . . multiple causes of action

against multiple defendants in multiple capacities without distinct counts,”

6 As summarized in the Court’s sua sponte dismissal Order, Wright alleges
that Defendant Jones sexually assaulted her, which implicates her rights under the
Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. See Order (Doc. 11). She does not allege the
denial of medical care in her Amended Complaint, and she may not add claims or
factual allegations through a Response. See, e.g., Escutia v. Carnival Corp., No. 23-
24230-CIV, 2024 WL 1931703, at *24 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3201006 (June 27, 2024) (“[The court] will not
consider these new allegations [raised in the response] for purposes of evaluating a
dismissal motion.” (citing cases)).
With respect to the state statutory provisions Wright references in her
Amended Complaint and Response, it appears she references them solely as context
for her sexual assault claim. Defendant Jones appropriately notes that to the extent
Wright seeks to challenge her arrest and conviction, any such claim may be barred
under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Motion at 4. The Court need not
rule as a matter of law, however, whether Heck bars any claims because, even with
the benefit of liberal construction, Wright does not assert a claim for false arrest or
detention, and any violations of the state statutory provisions Wright references do
not give rise to independent claims under § 1983.
5
and her pleading does not comply with Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in that she “does not provide a short and plain statement of [her]

claim[s].” See Motion at 5. A “shotgun pleading” is a complaint that fails to
comply with Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in one of four ways: it contains numerous causes of action adopting the factual
allegations of all preceding counts; it is “replete with conclusory, vague, and

immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”; it
does not separate causes of action into separate counts; or it asserts multiple
claims against multiple defendants while failing to specify which defendants
are responsible for which acts or omissions. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.

Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320–22 (11th Cir. 2015).
Extending Wright, a pro se litigant, the benefit of liberal construction,
the Court declines to dismiss the Amended Complaint as a shotgun pleading.
While Wright’s pleading is not a model of clarity, her claim against Defendant

Jones is stated “discretely and succinctly, so that[] [Jones] can discern what
[s]he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading.” See Barmapov v. Amuial,
986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021) (first alteration in original) (quoting
Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320). For instance, in setting forth her claims on the

Court-approved Civil Rights Complaint Form, Wright identifies in separate
paragraphs the claims she asserts against each named Defendant. See

6
Amended Complaint at 6–7. Against Defendant Jones, Wright asserts the
following:

Defendant Officer Matthew Jones[,] acting
under the color of law[,] violated Plaintiff Justina
Wright’s fourth amendment right [on] September 30,
2022 pursuant to Fla. Stat[.] 901.151 [and 901.24] by
intentionally committing sexual assault during a
traffic stop. Officer Jones utilized excessive force and
invaded Plaintiff’s private person, papers and
property.

Id. at 7. In setting forth the facts, Wright further asserts Defendant Jones
sexually assaulted her “again outside of the investigation office in downtown
Jacksonville.” Id. at 9. To the extent the factual allegations pertaining to the
two dismissed Defendants potentially add confusion because they are
intermingled with the allegations against Defendant Jones, any such confusion
has been resolved given the sua sponte dismissal of the claims against those
Defendants. As such, Defendant Jones’s Motion will be denied to the extent
Jones seeks dismissal of the Amended Complaint as a shotgun pleading.
B. Qualified Immunity
With respect to the sexual assault claim, Defendant Jones asserts he is
entitled to qualified immunity because he was acting in a law enforcement
capacity at the relevant times, and Wright alleges only that he “committed an

7
undefined ‘sexual assault’ against [her].” See Motion at 8–9.7 The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals instructs that a court should “adjudicate a defense of

qualified immunity at whatever stage it is raised.” Miller v. Palm Beach Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., 129 F.4th 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2025). Indeed, it should be
resolved “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Id. (quoting Jordan v. Doe,
38 F.3d 1559, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994)). With respect to the pleading stage,

“[g]enerally speaking, it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified
immunity grounds when the ‘complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly
established constitutional right.’” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th
Cir. 2019) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.

2002)). The Eleventh Circuit has stated:
The qualified-immunity defense reflects an
effort to balance “the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly
and the need to shield officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231 (2009). The doctrine resolves this balance by
protecting government officials engaged in
discretionary functions and sued in their individual
capacities unless they violate “clearly established
federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a

7 Wright does not provide details of the alleged sexual assault(s), but the term
“sexual assault” is generally understood in the legal context to mean, in part, the
following: “Offensive sexual contact with another person, exclusive of rape.” See
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). At some point, Wright will have to explain
the nature and circumstances of the alleged sexual assault(s), but at this juncture,
she has done enough to satisfy the federal pleading standard under Rule 8.
8
reasonable person would have known.” Keating v. City
of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation
marks and brackets omitted).

As a result, qualified immunity shields from
liability “all but the plainly incompetent or one who is
knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro,
284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). But the
doctrine’s protections do not extend to one who “knew
or reasonably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of official responsibility would
violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982)
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

To invoke qualified immunity, a public official
must first demonstrate that he was acting within the
scope of his or her discretionary authority. Maddox v.
Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1120 (11th Cir. 2013). As we
have explained the term “discretionary authority,” it
“include[s] all actions of a governmental official that
(1) were undertaken pursuant to the performance of
his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his
authority.” Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th
Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it
is clear that Defendant Officers satisfied this
requirement, as they engaged in all of the challenged
actions while on duty as police officers conducting
investigative and seizure functions.

Because Defendant Officers have established
that they were acting within the scope of their
discretionary authority, the burden shifts to [the
plaintiff] to demonstrate that qualified immunity is
inappropriate. See id. To do that, [the plaintiff] must
show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to
him, the facts demonstrate that Defendant Officers
violated [Plaintiff’s] constitutional right and that that
right was “clearly established . . . in light of the specific
context of the case, not as a broad general
9
proposition[,]” at the time of Defendant officers’
actions. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct.
2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part on
other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808.
We may decide these issues in either order, but, to
survive a qualified-immunity defense, [the plaintiff]
must satisfy both showings. Maddox, 727 F.3d at
1120–21 (citation omitted).

Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 850–51 (11th Cir. 2017); see also King v.
Pridmore, 961 F.3d 1135, 1142 (11th Cir. 2020).
The Eleventh Circuit has identified three ways a plaintiff can
demonstrate a right was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct:
first, by pointing to “case law with indistinguishable facts”; second, by pointing
to “a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law”;
or third, when the alleged “conduct [is] so egregious that a constitutional right
was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.” Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t
of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246, 1258 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting T.R. by and through
Brock v. Lamar Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 25 F.4th 877, 883 (11th Cir. 2022)). Under
the first two methods, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit may consider only
“three buckets of caselaw”—those from the United States Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court of the relevant state. Id. at 1262–63.
However, in an en banc decision, the Eleventh Circuit recently clarified that,
under the third method, the so-called “obvious clarity” method, district courts
are not constrained to consider only authority from the United States Supreme

10
Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court of the state. Id. at 1263.
Rather, “persuasive decisions from other circuits can be considered in

determining whether a violation was one of ‘obvious clarity’ for purposes of
qualified immunity.” Id. 1259, 1263 (“The Supreme Court has said on
numerous occasions that the decisions of other circuits are a relevant
consideration in determining whether the law is clearly established.”). In other

words, a legal principle can be clearly established, or “settled law,” if there is
“a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority,” which gives a reasonable
officer “fair warning that the[] alleged [conduct] . . . was unconstitutional.” Id.
(emphasis omitted) (first quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48,

63 (2018); then quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
Applying this standard, in Gilmore, based on “a robust consensus of
cases of persuasive authority,” the court reversed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Id. at 1264. In doing so,

the court concluded “any reasonable correctional officer” would have known
that an invasive strip search of a woman visiting her husband in prison “was
obviously unconstitutional,” despite a lack of controlling authority holding that
a strip search must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Id.

Defendant Jones asserts, “[T]he plain language of the [Amended]
Complaint shows that [he] was acting in a law enforcement capacity with

11
[JSO],” so the burden shifts to Wright to demonstrate the violation of a
constitutional right that was clearly established. See Motion at 8–9. Defendant

Jones indeed was acting in a law enforcement capacity when he encountered
Wright, and Wright does not disagree.8
Nevertheless, Defendant Jones is not entitled to qualified immunity at
this stage of the proceeding. Accepting Wright’s allegations as true—that

Defendant Jones sexually assaulted her during a traffic stop and again at the
“investigation office”—she would be able to make an ‘obvious clarity’ showing
even though there is no controlling case law holding that a sexual assault by a
law enforcement officer acting in the scope of his authority violates the

constitution. See Gilmore, 144 F.4th at 1263. There is “a robust consensus” in
other circuits that a reasonable officer would know committing a sexual assault
constitutes a violation either of the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments,
depending on the context (i.e., an arrest, detention, or other encounter). See,

e.g., Hess v. Garcia, 72 F.4th 753, 763 (7th Cir. 2023) (“Not all touches by
officers rise to the level of seizures under the Fourth Amendment, of course,

8 According to the Arrest & Booking Report, Defendant Jones arrested Wright
on September 30, 2022, after pulling her over for having dark tint on her windows
and smelling marijuana coming from her vehicle. See State v. Wright, No. 2020-CF-
8854 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct.). Additionally, the Information filed by the State Attorney’s
office shows that it charged Wright with the following: being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm; possessing a controlled substance; and resisting a law
enforcement officer without violence. Id.
12
but sexual assaults do.”); id. at 764 (“Substantive due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment still protects people from unconstitutional conduct

committed under color of law when neither a search nor seizure occurs.”);
Tyson v. Sabine, 42 F.4th 508, 520 (5th Cir. 2022) (“It is obvious that the right
to bodily integrity forbids a law enforcement officer from sexually abusing a
person by coercing them to perform nonconsensual physical sex acts for his

enjoyment.”); Shepherd v. Robbins, 55 F.4th 810, 817, 820 (10th Cir. 2022)
(holding an officer who pulled over a female only to “flirt with her” and “further
his own sexual gratification” violated her clearly established right to be free
from sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment); Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining
that the Fourth Amendment protects an arrestee from “unreasonable seizure
and intrusion on [her] bodily integrity” (cited with approval by Hicks v. Moore,
422 F.3d 1246, 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2005))); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620,

628 (4th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing between a Fourth Amendment sexual
assault claim—one occurring in the context of an arrest or detention—and a
Fourteenth Amendment sexual assault claim—one occurring outside the
context of an arrest or detention but by someone “acting under color of state

law”).

13
Despite the absence of controlling case law, a reasonable law
enforcement officer conducting his lawful duties would know that his authority

does not include the right to sexually assault an arrestee. See Walker v. Heard,
No. 7:15-cv-924-RDP, 2016 WL 6699417, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 15, 2016)9
(“Simply put, while a deputy sheriff has the authority to detain an individual
for violating the law and to use reasonably necessary physical force in order to

effectuate that arrest, see Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197,10 a deputy sheriff does not
have the authority to engage in coerced sexual activity with a detainee during
detention.”); see also Weeks v. Colquitt Cnty., Ga., No. 7:23-cv-77 (LAG), 2025
WL 897531, at *8 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2025) (denying an officer qualified

immunity because “a reasonable officer would have known that . . . sexually
assaulting [the plaintiff when conducting an investigation] violated her
Constitutional right to be free from discrimination on the basis of her sex”);
Anderson v. Johnson, No. 1:22-cv-598, 2023 WL 6296648, at *4–5, 8 (M.D.N.C.

Sept. 27, 2023) (holding the plaintiff plausibly stated a Fourth Amendment
claim when she alleged officers sexually assaulted her during an arrest, and
denying the officers qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage because

9 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not
binding, they may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp.,
371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would
not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision would
have significant persuasive effects.”).
10 Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).
14
a “sexual assault during a traffic stop is an established constitutional violation
about which a reasonable person would have known”).

Affording Wright the benefit of liberal construction and accepting her
allegations as true, Defendant Jones is not entitled to qualified immunity at
this stage of the proceeding. Of course, Jones many renew his request for
qualified immunity on a more complete record in consideration of all the

circumstances of the encounter. For instance, without the benefit of discovery
or further explanation by Wright, it is unclear whether Defendant Jones, in
the scope of his lawful duties, intentionally or inadvertently touched Wright’s
body in a sexual manner. See, e.g., Hicks, 422 F.3d at 1253–54 (“[N]ot every

intrusion, touching, discomfort[,] or embarrassment during an arrest is
actionable as a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Some of these acts may be
provably accidental or just too insignificant and thus within the range of the
constitutionally reasonable.”). As such, Defendant Jones’s request for

dismissal of the sexual assault claim is due to be denied.
C. Monell Liability
Defendant Jones also asserts Wright may not proceed on a claim against
him in his official capacity because she does not allege that “an official policy

or custom of the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” See Motion at 11. In Monell, the Supreme Court

15
held that local governments can be held liable for constitutional torts caused
by official policies. 436 U.S. at 694. However, such liability is limited to “acts

which the [government entity] has officially sanctioned or ordered.” Pembaur
v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). See also Hoefling v. City of
Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Monell . . . is meant to limit §
1983 liability to ‘acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or

ordered’”). Accordingly, under the directives of Monell, a plaintiff must allege
that the constitutional deprivation was the result of “an official government
policy, the actions of an official fairly deemed to represent government policy,
or a custom or practice so pervasive and well-settled that it assumes the force

of law.” Denno v. School Bd. of Volusia Cnty., Fla., 218 F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th
Cir. 2000).
In her Amended Complaint, Wright does not identify an official JSO
policy or an unofficial JSO custom or practice that was the moving force behind

Jones’s alleged constitutional violation. See Amended Complaint at 7, 9. On
the contrary, she alleges Defendant Jones acted “intentionally” or
“unprofessional[ly],” see id., and in her Response, she asserts Defendant Jones
“depart[ed] from the essential requirements of the law and training provided

by [JSO],” see Response at 20. These assertions belie any suggestion that
Defendant Jones was acting in accordance with an official policy or unofficial

16
custom for which JSO can be held responsible under § 1983. See id. As such,
Wright’s official-capacity claim is due to be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part. The Motion is GRANTED only to the extent the
official-capacity claim against Defendant Jones is DISMISSED. In all other
respects, the Motion is DENIED without prejudice subject to Defendant
Jones’s right to renew a qualified immunity defense later in the proceedings.
2. Defendant Jones must answer the Amended Complaint (Doc. 7)
within twenty days of the date of this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 28th day of
August, 2025.

United States District Judge

Jax-6 8/19
C: Justina Lynn Wright, #C91747
Counsel of record

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11130046. Public record. Not legal advice.
