# DANIELS v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · July 28, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11128978

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 28, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH DIVISION
SHAWN DANIELS, )
) Civil Action No.:
) 2:24-CV-01730-CCW-CBB
Plaintiff, )
) Christy Criswell Wiegand
vs. )
United States District Judge
)
ALLEGHENY COUNTY, C.O. )
PARKER, C.O. DONATO, ) Christopher B. Brown
) United States Magistrate Judge
)
Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS ECF No. 5

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
This civil action was removed to this Court from the Court of Common Pleas
of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania on December 20, 2024. Plaintiff Shawn Daniels,
was a pretrial detainee in the custody of Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”), and alleges
that Defendants Allegheny County (the “County”), Corrections Officer Parker (“C/O
Parker”) and Corrections Officer Donato (“C/O Donato”) violated his civil rights
when he was physically and sexually assaulted by two other inmates while in ACJ’s
custody. ECF No. 1-2. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331.
Presently pending before the Court is a motion by the County to dismiss
Daniels’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 municipal liability claim for failure to state a claim under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 5. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for
consideration. ECF Nos. 6, 10.
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Court

deny the County’s motion to dismiss.
II. Report

a. Background

According to the Complaint, Daniels was a pretrial detainee at ACJ awaiting
trial for DUI charges. ECF No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 1, 10. Despite having no violent criminal
history, he was housed on a maximum-security pod with violent detainees,
including his two assailants, Keyjuan King and Kesean Proctor. Id. at ¶ 10. King
had previously been convicted of robbery and firearm charges, was previously held
in ACJ, and was awaiting trial on weapons and unlawful restraint/false
imprisonment charges. Id. at ¶ 11. Proctor had been convicted of possessing a
weapon at ACJ in 2022 and was awaiting trial on firearms charges. Id. at ¶ 12.
On June 5, 2024 at approximately 6:00 P.M., Daniels returned to his cell
after he attended a Christian mass service on his pod. Id. at ¶ 13. At approximately
6:15 P.M., King and/or Proctor motioned for C/Os Parker and/or Donato, who were
the correction officers on the pod at the time, to open Daniels’ cell door. Id. at ¶¶ 13-
14. Despite ACJ policy precluding corrections officers from allowing inmates to
access other inmates’ cells, and despite knowing that neither King nor Proctor were
Daniels’ cellmate, C/Os Donato and/or Parker opened Daniels’ cell door allowing
King and Proctor to enter. Id.
Upon entering Daniels’ cell, King and Proctor placed a towel on the cell
window and began assaulting Daniels with a homemade shank made from a nail
attached to a spork. Id. at ¶ 15. Despite ACJ policy precluding inmates from

obstructing cell windows and requiring corrections officers to immediately
investigate and/or intervene in such situations, C/Os Donato and Parker took no
action to investigate or intervene. Id.
It is alleged that over a 39-minute period, King and Proctor bound Daniels’
hands and legs, stabbed him 37 times, sexually assaulted him, and repeatedly
punched and kicked him. Id. at ¶ 16. While doing so, King and Proctor attempted to
extort money from Daniels. At the end of the 39-minute assault, King and Proctor

called Daniels’ daughter from Daniels’ jail tablet and demanded she send them
thousands of dollars. Id. at ¶ 17. Daniels’ daughter suspected something was wrong
and asked to speak to her father. Id. at ¶ 18. In response, King and Proctor
continued to beat Daniels and instructed him to tell his daughter to send the
money, which he did. Id. at ¶ 18-19. The call cut off and King and Proctor
attempted to call Daniels’ daughter back several more times. Id.

During the 39-minute attack, C/Os Parker and Donato should have
completed several cell checks on the pod, should have walked past Daniels’ cell at
least three times, and should have seen the towel covering the cell window in
violation of ACJ policy. Id. at ¶ 25. Despite this, it is alleged they took none of these
actions and failed to intervene. Id. . At approximately 6:54 P.M., King and Proctor
left Daniels’ cell, “leaving Daniels to die.” Id. at ¶ 26. When this occurred, it is
further alleged C/Os Parker and Donato still did nothing to intervene or check on
Daniels. Id.
It was only after Daniels’ daughter told her mother, Nilda Daniels, about the

suspected attack that Nilda called the ACJ at approximately 7:00 p.m. Id. at ¶¶ 20-
21. When she did, she spoke to Officer Remini and advised him that she believed
Daniels was being murdered in his cell. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. Officer Remini told Nilda
he would contact the officers on the pod, have them check on Daniels, and thereafter
contacted C/Os Parker and/or Donato to advise them Daniels was being assaulted
and requested they immediately check his cell. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23. C/Os Parker and
Donato allegedly continued to do nothing to check on Daniels despite having actual

knowledge of the assault. Id. at ¶ 24.
It is alleged that Daniels remained in his cell for another 30 minutes until
Sergeant Maust and C/O Gilland responded. Id. at ¶ 27. When they did, Daniels
was transported to a hospital where he remained for a week to be treated for life-
threatening injuries. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.
C/Os Parker and Donato were disciplined in connection with the attack for

their failure to intervene. Id. at ¶ 30. King and Proctor were charged with a litany
of felonies in connection with the attack, including aggravated indecent assault. Id.
at ¶ 31.
Daniels claims his assault was not an isolated incident at the ACJ and
suggests two similar assaults occurred around the same time he was assaulted. Id.
at ¶ 32. The same month Daniels was assaulted, another inmate, M.M., was
assaulted in his cell under similar circumstances to Daniels in June 2024. Id. at ¶
33. M.M. was confined for non-violent offenses and was housed on the same pod as
Daniels with violent offenders, including M.M.’s assailants. Id. at ¶ 34. M.M. was

in his cell with the door locked, when another inmate motioned to the corrections
officer on the pod to unlock M.M.’s door. Id. at ¶ 35. The corrections officer opened
the door, three inmates rushed into the cell and held a shank to M.M.’s throat. Id.
at ¶¶ 35-36. When inside they sexually assaulted M.M. for several minutes while
attempting to extort him for money or property. Id. at ¶¶ 35-37. The corrections
officer would have witnessed the inmates rush into the cell, but refused to
intervene. Id. at ¶ 37. As with Daniels, M.M.’s assailants were charged with

numerous felonies related to the assault. Id. at ¶ 38. Daniels also claims, without
specifics, that another inmate, M.G., was assaulted in his cell under circumstances
similar to both Daniels and M.M. Id. at ¶ 39.
In the Complaint, Daniels asserts two causes of action: (1) a Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
C/Os Parker and Donato (Count I); and (2) a municipal liability claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against the County for its failure to train and failure to properly
classify inmates (Count II). Id. ¶¶ 40- 53. Defendants move to dismiss the
municipal liability claim against the County only. ECF No. 6.
b. Standard of Review: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Failure to State a
Claim
A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). The applicable
inquiry under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is well settled. Rule 12(b)(6) works in
conjunction with Rule 8, which requires that a claim for relief contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and a complaint can be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A defendant has the burden
of showing that a complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United
States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding modified by Simon v. United
States, 341 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2003)).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“Though ‘detailed factual allegations’ are not required, a complaint must do more
than simply provide ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.’” Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241

(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, the plaintiff “must plead
facts sufficient to show that [his] claim has substantive plausibility.” Johnson v.
City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10 (2014).
To assess the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court
must take three steps: (1) outline the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a
claim for relief; (2) peel away allegations that are no more than conclusions and
thus not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) look for well-pled factual
allegations, assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement to relief. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012)

abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197,
204 (3d Cir. 2024). The court's plausibility determination is “a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint must be dismissed if it merely alleges
entitlement to relief without supporting facts. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).
With that standard in mind, the Court turns to Defendants’ motion to

dismiss.
c. Discussion
Daniels asserts a section 1983 municipal liability claim against the County in
two respects: First, for its failure to train corrections officers to intervene in
inmate-on-inmate assaults; and second for its failure to have a policy that properly
classifies inmates and results in non-violent detainees being housed on a maximum-
security pod with violent offenders. ECF No. 10 at 2-5. The County argues Daniels
has failed to identify a policy or custom of ACJ that violates his constitutional rights

with respect to its failure to train or its failure to properly classify inmates. ECF
No. 6 at 4-6.
The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal
court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). Section
1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating

federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution
and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3
(1979).
In Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the
Supreme Court of the United States held that “when execution of a government's
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury,” the government as

an entity is responsible. Id. at 694. The facts alleged must plausibly show that the
municipality was the moving force of a constitutional violation. Id.
Thus, to plead municipal liability under Monell, Daniels must allege (1) he
possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) the County had a
policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom ‘amount[ed] to deliberate indifference’ to
that constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the ‘moving force behind

the constitutional violation.’” Vargas v. City of Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 962, 974 (3d
Cir. 2015) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 410 (1997)). The policy or custom can either be a formal policy, where a
“decisionmaker with final authority ‘issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict,”
Williams v. Ponik, 822 F. App'x 108, 112 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Bielevicz v. Dubinon,
915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)), or an “informally adopted” custom. Beck v. City of
Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). Daniels
must show a “direct causal link” between the policy and/or custom and his
“constitutional deprivation.” Kramer v. City of New Kensington, No. CIV.A. 13-606,

2015 WL 5672640, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2015) (quoting Jiminez v. All Am.
Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2007)). “‘Failure to’ claims – failure
to train, failure to discipline, or . . . failure to supervise – are generally considered a
subcategory of policy or practice liability.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d
307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S.
822 (2015).
i. Failure to Train

The County argues that Daniels failure to train claim should be dismissed as
it “does not identify a specific training that the County failed to provide or that any
such training exists that would reduce the risk of inmate-on-inmate violence.”. ECF
No. 6 at 5.
A municipality’s “decision not to train certain employees about their legal
duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official government

policy for purposes of [section] 1983. A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation
of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick
v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (cleaned up). For a failure to train claim under
section 1983 against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege either a “pattern of
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees” id. at 62 (“pattern” based
section 1983 failure to train claim), or if no pattern is alleged, “the need for more or
different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers . . . can reasonably be said
to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (“single-incident” based section 1983 failure to train claim).
To state a claim for either a pattern or a single-incident based section 1983 failure
to train claim, the plaintiff must allege “that the deficiency in training actually
caused” the constitutional violation. Harris, 489 U.S. at 379.
Daniels’ allegations more than adequately state a failure to train as the
direct cause or moving force behind his injuries arising from the failure to protect
him from inmate violence. He alleges that his assault was the direct result of the

County’s failure to train corrections officers on inmate safety and prevention of, and
intervention in, inmate-on-inmate assaults. ECF No. 1-2 at ¶ 49. He further
adequately alleges that the need for training was so obvious given the pattern of
violations from the two identical attacks that occurred in the same month as
Daniels was attacked. Id. at ¶¶ 33-39. See Board of County Com'rs of Bryan County,
Okl., 520 U.S. at 407 (“If a program does not prevent constitutional violations,

municipal decisionmakers may eventually be put on notice that a new program is
called for. Their continued adherence to an approach that they know or should
know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the
conscious disregard for the consequences of their action—the ‘deliberate
indifference’—necessary to trigger municipal liability.”). Given this, Daniels has
sufficiently alleged enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
may reveal evidence to support his failure to train claim against the County.
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended the Court deny Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Daniels’ failure to train claim against the County.

ii. Failure to Properly Classify
The County next argues Daniels’ claim that it failed to properly classify
inmates is “conclusory” and does not “set forth any specific basis for such a claim
other than that inmate-on-inmate assaults have occurred” and “fail[s] to plead how
‘proper’ classification would have prevented such an assault.” ECF No. 6 at 6.
At the pleading stage, Daniels has adequately alleged a County policy or
practice of housing pretrial detainees with no history of violence on a maximum-

security pod with violent offenders in violation of his constitutional right to be free
from inmate violence. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (prison
officials have a constitutional duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of
other prisoners); Hightower v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 21-4075-KSM, 2022 WL
1121418, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2022) (inmate stated a Monell claim by identifying
prison practices to house inmates with a history of violence or severe mental health

illness in cells with other inmates); Williams v. Delaware Cnty. Bd. of Prison
Inspectors, No. CV 17-4348, 2018 WL 4558190, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2018)
(same and addressing pretrial detainees). Daniels alleges he was a non-violent
detainee, was housed on the maximum-security pod with his assailants who were
violent offenders, one of whom had been previously convicted of possessing a
weapon at ACJ in 2022, the County knew the assailants were dangerous, and this
policy created the opportunity for Daniels to be attacked. ECF No. 10 at 4-5. At this
stage, Daniels has sufficiently alleged enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery may reveal evidence to support a finding the County had

an unconstitutional housing policy or practice with respect to non-violent detainees.
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended the Court deny Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Daniels’ failure to properly classify claim against the County.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny
the County’s motion to dismiss.

Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72,
and the Local Rules for Magistrates, the parties have until August 11, 2025 to
object to this report and recommendation. Unless otherwise ordered by the District
Judge, responses to objections are due fourteen days after the service of the

objections. Failure to file timely objections will waive any appellate rights.
Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
DATED this 28th day of July, 2025.

Respectfully submitted:

s/Christopher B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Honorable Christy Criswell Wiegand
United States District Judge
via CM/ECF electronic filing

Counsel of record
via CM/ECF electronic filing

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11128978. Public record. Not legal advice.