# Rogers v. Orleans Parish Sheriff Office

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · August 27, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11128844

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** August 27, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11128844

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to compel for failing to follow Rule 37
- stating that turning over personnel files would invade privacy of employees

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHEILA ROGERS, ET AL. * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 22-5303

ORLEANS PARISH SHERIFF * SECTION “P” (2)
OFFICE, ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before me is Plaintiff Sheila Rogers’ Motion to Quash Rule 45 subpoenas and for a
Protective Order. ECF No. 45. Defendant Susan Hutson filed a timely Opposition Memorandum.
ECF Nos 58. No party requested oral argument in accordance with Local Rule 78.1, and the court
agrees that oral argument is unnecessary.
Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the
applicable law, Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Rule 45 subpoenas and for a Protective Order is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons stated herein.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sheila Rogers is a former employee of the Orleans Parish Sherriff’s Office
(“OPSO”). ECF No. 41. She alleges she began her employment in 2015, at which time she
informed OPSO of her disability—an eye disease that causes blurred vision and sensitivity to light
and glare—that required certain accommodations, which OPSO accommodated until Rogers was
assigned a new supervisor (Latoya Armwood) in 2020. Id. at 4-5 (¶¶ 2-7) . Rogers alleges that,
while under Armstrong’s supervision, she faced disability discrimination, unwarranted
reprimands, retaliation, intimidation, and a hostile working environment. See id. at 5-8 (¶¶ 8-32).
Rogers and her husband originally filed this action against Armwood and OPSO, asserting
claims under (a) the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (Counts
I, II, and III); (b) Louisiana employment discrimination law (“LEDL”), LA. REV. STAT. § 23:323,
et seq. (Count IV); (c) Louisiana whistleblower law, LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967, et seq. (Count V);
and (d) Louisiana tort law for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and for vicarious
liability (Counts VI, VII). ECF No. 1 at 10-16. After considering OPSO and Armwood’s motions
to dismiss,1 Judge Darrel Papillion dismissed with prejudice the claims against OPSO because it

lacked the capacity to be sued and dismissed with and without prejudice claims against Armwood,
but Judge Papillion allowed Rogers leave to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 37.
Rogers filed a substantially similar amended complaint but substituted Sheriff Susan
Hutson in her official capacity as a defendant in place of OPSO and added additional factual
allegations to support Rogers’ IIED claim. See ECF No. 41. Sheriff Hutson and Armstrong then
moved for, among other things, dismissal of Rogers’ IIED claim, which Judge Papillion granted,
leaving only the claims against Sheriff Hutson. ECF No. 46.
Hutson’s February 24, 2025, discovery requests included a request for an executed
authorization to obtain Rogers’ employment records from her other employers. ECF Nos. 54-4,

58-1 at 26 (RFP No. 14). After expiration of the thirty-day response period, on April 2, 2025,
Rogers requested an additional 30 days to respond, and Hutson agreed but asserted that any
objection were waived. ECF Nos. 54-5, 54-6. On May 2, 2025, Rogers served her responses.
ECF No. 58-1.
On July 23 and 30, 2025, Defendant issued Rule 45 subpoenas duces tecum to a subsequent
former employer of Rogers,2 requesting production of:
A full and complete copy of any and all employment records in [its]
possession or control regarding the employment of Sheila Rogers [ ], including but
not limited to her application, resume/CV, interview records, personnel file, e-mail

1 ECF Nos. 8, 22.
2 See ECF Nos. 54-9 at 1, 54-10 at 2; see also ECF No. 58-1 at 9-10 (Rogers’ response to Hutson’s Interrogatory No.
9, identifying, among others, the Mississippi Division of Medicaid as an employer of hers since resigning from OPSO).
and attachments during recruitment, any performance-related documents or
evaluations, compensation and benefits, documents/plans (salary, bonus,
incentives, commission, etc.) coachings, disciplinary actions, investigations, or
complaints.

ECF Nos. 54-9 at 5, 54-10 at 5.3 After the first return date, Rogers filed this Motion to Quash Rule
45 subpoenas and for a Protective Order and an ex parte motion for expedited consideration. ECF
Nos. 54, 55. The Court held a conference on August 11, 2025, to address the expedited hearing
request, during which defense counsel explained that the first subpoena was withdrawn as
defective and that the subpoenaed party had raised objections to the second subpoena, thus
suspending any return date. ECF No. 57; see FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2)(B).
II. THE PENDING MOTION
Rogers now asks the Court to quash the subpoenas pursuant to Rule 45(d) or, alternatively,
enter a Rule 26(c) protective order prohibiting disclosure of the subpoenaed information, as the
requests are irrelevant, overly broad, and disproportionate to the needs of the case and intrude on
her privacy interest. ECF Nos. 54 at 1-2, 54-1 at 12. She first argues Defendant did not meet and
confer in accordance with Rule 37(a)(1) before issuing the subpoenas. ECF No. 54-1 at 3. She
then contends that she has a privacy interest in her employment records. Id. at 5. If the documents
are produced, her reputation in law enforcement and employment prospects are put at risk by the
subpoenas. Id. at 5, 8. Rogers argues her records from former employers are irrelevant because
her prior employment has no bearing on whether Sheriff Hutson violated federal disability laws or
created a hostile work environment. Id. at 7, 10-11. Further, the subpoenas are overly broad as
they seek her entire employment file and may contain documents unrelated to the case. Id.

3 The July 23rd subpoena has an August 8, 2025, response deadline, while the July 30th subpoena has an August 15,
2025, response deadline. ECF Nos. 54-9 at 2, 54-10 at 2.
In Opposition, Hutson first notes that she is “agreeable to the entry of an appropriate
protective order.” ECF No. 58 at 1. Hutson then argues that she was under no obligation to meet
and confer before issuing the subpoenas, and she appears to argue that Rogers has waived any
relevance objections by not asserting timely objections to her discovery requests. See id. at 4-5.

Hutson argues that courts have repeatedly denied motions to quash subpoenas for employment
records and contends the documents are relevant for three issues: (1) application materials, payroll
records, and documents establishing whether Rogers is still employed are relevant to mitigation;
(2) requests for accommodation are relevant to her disability and need for accommodation; and (3)
disciplinary records, performance reviews, and any complaints made by Rogers are relevant to her
state of mind and credibility with respect to her allegation that an unwarranted reprimand was
improper or discriminatory. Id. at 5-6. Hutson also argues Rogers has not shown good cause for
a protective order because she has only alleged a generalized privacy interest. Id. at 7.
III. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Scope of Discovery

Rule 26 authorizes the parties to
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within
this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Information is relevant if it bears on, or reasonably could lead to other
matters that could bear on, any issue related to the claim or defense of any party.4 If relevance is

4 Leonard v. Martin, 38 F.4th 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991)).
in doubt, a court should allow discovery.5
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) mandates that the court limit the frequency or extent of discovery
otherwise allowed, if it determines: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome,

or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery had ample opportunity to obtain the information;
or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).
B. Motion to Quash
Discovery may be obtained from non-parties pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. A non-party served with a subpoena duces tecum may object by sending written
objections to the issuing party within 14 days of service or before the return date, whichever is
earlier. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2)(B). If the non-party timely provides written objections, it has
satisfied its obligations. The serving party may then file a motion to compel seeking compliance.
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i).
Although governed in the first instance by Rule 45, non-party subpoenas are also subject
to the parameters of Rule 26.6 “Both Rules 45 and 26 authorize the court to modify a subpoena

duces tecum when its scope exceeds the boundaries of permissible discovery or otherwise violates
the parameters of Rule 45.”7 The person filing the motion to quash bears the burden of proof to

5 E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., L.L.C., 270 F.R.D. 430, 433 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (quoting Truswal Sys. Corp. v.
Hydro–Air Eng’g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
6 In re Application of Time, Inc., No. 99-2916, 1999 WL 804090, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 1999) (citations omitted),
aff'd, 209 F.3d 719 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Zamora v. GC Servs., LP, No. 15-48, 2017 WL 1861843, at *3 (W.D.
Tex. Feb. 17, 2017) (citing Chamberlain v. Farmington Sav. Bank, No. 06-1437, 2007 WL 2786421, at *1 (D. Conn.
Sept. 25, 2007) (citing, inter alia, FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s notes to 1970 amendment (stating “the
scope of discovery through a subpoena is the same as that applicable to Rule 34 and the other discovery rules”)));
Romac Env’t Servs., LLC v. Wildcat Fluids, LLC, No. 20-581, 2022 WL 1924106, at *4 (W.D. La. June 3, 2022).
7 Hahn v. Hunt, No. 15-2867, 2016 WL 1587405, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2016) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3);
26(c)(1)(D)), aff’d, No. 15-2867, 2016 WL 6518863 (E.D. La. Nov. 2, 2016).
demonstrate that compliance would impose undue burden or expense.8 To determine whether the
subpoena presents an undue burden, the Fifth Circuit considers the following factors: (1) relevance
of the information requested; (2) the need of the party for the documents; (3) the breadth of the
document request; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity with which the
party describes the requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed.9 “Whether a burdensome

subpoena is reasonable ‘must be determined according to the facts of the case,’ such as the party's
need for the documents and the nature and importance of the litigation.”10 “Further, if the person
to whom the document request is made is a non-party, the court may also consider the expense and
inconvenience to the non-party.”11 Modification of a subpoena is preferable to quashing it.12
C. Standing to Quash/Modify a Subpoena
To quash a subpoena duces tecum issued to a non-party, the movant must first have
standing, meaning the movant must: (1) be in possession or control of the requested material; (2) be
the person to whom the subpoena is issued; or (3) have an alleged personal right or privilege in the
subject matter of the subpoena.13 Courts, including courts in the Fifth Circuit, have held that an

8 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); McLeod, Alexander,
Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) (finding party resisting
discovery must show why each discovery request is not relevant or otherwise objectionable).
9 Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 (internal citations omitted).
10 Id. (citation omitted).
11 Id. (citation omitted).
12 Id.; Tiberi v. CIGNA, Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 110, 112 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Linder v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 94 F.3d 693,
698 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[M]odification of a subpoena is generally preferred to outright quashing . . . .”) (citation
omitted).
13 Black v. DMNO, LLC, No. 16-2708, 2018 WL 488991, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2018) (citing Brown v. Braddick,
595 F.2d 961, 967 (5th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Mixon, No. 13-2629, 2014 WL 1764750, at *4 (E.D. La. May 2, 2014));
McHugh v. St. Tammany Par., No. 24-1300, 2024 WL 3617535, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2024) (Long, J.) (“A party
has standing to move to quash a subpoena issued to a third party if the party ‘allege[s] any personal right or privilege
with respect to the materials subpoenaed’; the party’s claim of a personal right or privilege need not ultimately prevail
in order for the party to have standing to move to quash.” (quoting Brown, 595 F.2d at 966); and citing Burkette v. E.
Feliciana Par. Sheriff, 606 F. Supp. 3d 297, 303 n.26 (M.D. La. 2022))); Bounds v. Cap. Area Fam. Violence
Intervention Ctr., Inc., 314 F.R.D. 214, 218 (M.D. La. 2016) (citation omitted) (“Parties have limited standing to
quash subpoenas served on non-parties pursuant to Rule 45.”); see also Weatherly v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,
No. 07-4371, 2009 WL 1507353, at *2 (E.D. La. May 28, 2009) (holding that defendant did not have standing to
challenge the subpoena where it had no privilege over the documents); Guzman v. Latin Am. Ent., LLC, No. 13-41,
2014 WL 12599345, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 2, 2014) (citing U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass'n v. James, 264 F.R.D. 17, 18–19 (D.
employee has a personal right to her employment records and therefore has standing as a party to
challenge a non-party subpoena for them.14
However, a party cannot quash a non-party subpoena on the basis that the subpoena is
overly broad or seeks irrelevant information, even if the party has standing via a personal right or
privilege,15 because only the respondent can object and seek to quash a Rule 45 subpoena on those

grounds.16 That party does have standing to challenge the subpoena as overly broad or seeks
irrelevant information via a motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c).17 Also, because the
scope of discovery through a Rule 45 subpoena is governed by Rule 26(b),18 and the court must
“on its own” limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it determines the proposed discovery “is

Maine 2010) (“The general rule is that a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except
as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought.”)); Frazier v. RadioShack Corp., No. 10-855, 2012
WL 832285, at *1 (M.D. La. Mar. 12, 2012) (citations omitted) (“As an initial matter, it should be noted that a plaintiff
cannot challenge a Rule 45 subpoena directed to a third party on the basis that it violates another person's privacy
rights . . . that the subpoena is overly broad, or that the subpoena seeks information that is irrelevant because only the
responding third party can object and seek to quash a Rule 45 subpoena on those grounds.”).
14 See Zamora, 2017 WL 1861843, at *4 (quoting Garcia v. Pro. Servs., Inc., No. 15-585, 2017 WL 187577, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2017); and citing Singletary v. Sterling Transp. Co., 289 F.R.D. 237, 239 (E.D. Va. 2012)
(“[N]umerous courts from within a wide variety of circuits have approved” that “a party possesses a personal right in
the information contained in employment records sufficient to confer standing.” (listing illustrative cases)); Gehring
v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that turning over personnel files would invade privacy of
employees)); Rice v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., No. 11-44, 2011 WL 5513181, at *1 (M.D. La. Nov. 10, 2011); MC
Trilogy Tex. v. City of Heath, No. 22-2154, 2023 WL 7190652, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2023) (“[A] party may
establish a ‘personal right’ to subpoenaed materials in limited circumstances, including when a subpoena seeks to
discover . . . employment records . . . .” (citing Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 974 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (citing cases))).
15 MC Trilogy Tex., LLC v. City of Heath, No. 22-2154, 2023 WL 7004442, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2023) (citing
Steel Dust Recycling, LLC v. Robinson, No. 19-2818, 2023 WL 4946533, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2023)).
16 Salmon v. Waffle House, Inc., No. 19-1349, 2020 WL 6708382, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 16, 2020) (citing Frazier, 2012
WL 832285, at *1).
17 Bounds, 314 F.R.D. at 218; Humphries v. Progressive Corp., No. 20-548, 2022 WL 1018404, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
5, 2022); Singletary, 289 F.R.D. at 240 n.2 (citing cases); Artis v. Murphy-Brown LLC, No. 14-237, 2018 WL 3352639,
at *2 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2018) (citing Brown v. Mountainview Cutters, LLC, No. 15-204, 2016 WL 3045349, at *2
(W.D. Va. May 27, 2016) (“[E]ven if the court could find that [the movant] did not have standing to quash the
subpoenas under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, she would still have standing under Rule 26 to
challenge the subpoenas as irrelevant and overbroad.”)).
18 Zamora, 2017 WL 1861843, at *3 (citing Chamberlain, 2007 WL 2786421, at *1 (citing, inter alia, FED. R. CIV.
P. 45 advisory committee’s notes to 1970 amendment (stating “the scope of discovery through a subpoena is the same
as that applicable to Rule 34 and the other discovery rules”))); Romac Env’t Servs., 2022 WL 1924106, at *4.
outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1),”19 the court must quash a non-party subpoena duces
tecum that is overly broad or seeks irrelevant information.20
D. Standard for Protective Order
Under Rule 26, a “court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person

from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P.
26(c)(1). “Good cause” exists when disclosure will result in a clearly defined and serious injury
to the party seeking the protective order.21 In determining good cause, the court must balance the
risk of injury without the protective order and the requesting party's need for information.22 The
party seeking the protective order bears the burden of showing that a protective order is necessary,
“which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from
stereotyped and conclusory statements.”23 And, “under Fifth Circuit law, the party resisting
discovery must show specifically how each discovery request is not relevant or otherwise
objectionable,” including “on a [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(c) motion for a protective
order.”24

Rule 26 offers a variety of potential options that the court may use to protect the moving
party, including forbidding or limiting the scope of discovery into certain matters. FED. R. CIV. P.
26(c)(1)(D). A district court may exercise its sound discretion in determining how far to restrict

19 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(C)(iii).
20 See Zamora, 2017 WL 1861843, at *3 (“[W]hile ‘Rule 45 does not list irrelevance or overbreadth as reasons for
quashing a subpoena[,] . . . the [c]ourt must review . . . subpoena duces tecum under the relevancy standards set forth
in Rule 26(b).’” (quoting HDSherer LLC v. Nat’l Molecular Testing Corp., 292 F.R.D. 305, 308 (D.S.C. 2013)));
Singletary, 289 F.R.D. at 241 (“Thus, regardless of whether the Court considers Plaintiff’s Motion under Rule 45 or
Rule 26, the Court must review Defendant’s subpoenas under the relevancy standards set forth in Rule 26(b).”).
21 Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation and quotation omitted).
22 Blanchard & Co., Inc. v. Barrick Gold Corp., No. 02-3721, 2004 WL 737485, at *5 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2004).
23 E.E.O.C. v. BDO USA, L.L.P., 876 F.3d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing In re Terra Int’l, 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th
Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978))).
24 Humphries, 2022 WL 1018404, at *2 (quoting Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Chung, 325 F.R.D. 578, 593 (N.D. Tex.
2017)).
discovery, and in particular, the decision whether to grant or deny a request for a protective order
is entrusted to the district court’s sound discretion.25 The trial court enjoys wide discretion in
setting the parameters of a protective order.26
E. Rule 26(c)(1) Certification

A motion for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1) “must include a certification that
the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an
effort to resolve the dispute without court action.” These requirements are the same as that of Rule
37(a)(1).27 Conference requirements are no “empty formality”:28
Conference requirements encourage resolving discovery disputes without
judicial involvement. Failure to confer or attempt to confer may result in
unnecessary motions. When the court must resolve a dispute that the parties
themselves could have resolved, it must needlessly expend resources that it could
better utilize elsewhere. Failure to confer generally serves as a basis for denying a
discovery motion.29

Courts retain discretion to waive strict compliance with Rule 26(c)(1) and generally do so when a
conference would be a “waste of time” or when “it is clear that the motion is opposed and that a
conference would neither have eliminated nor narrowed the parties dispute.”30 While Rule 45 does
not require certification that parties (and non-parties) have met and conferred before filing a motion

25 Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 209 n.27 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
26 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (“To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the
trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”).
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1) (“The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without
court action.”); see also Riverbend Env’t Servs., LLC v. Crum & Foster Specialty Ins. Co., No. 22-31, 2023 WL
2563228, *3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 17, 2023) (“Both [Rule] 26(c)(1) and [Rule] 37(a)(1) require a certification of good
faith.”); Prince v. Transportes Zuazua LLC, No. 17-21, 2018 WL 2985910 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2018) (noting meet-
and-confer certification required for a Rule 26(c)(1) motion is the “same” required for a Rule 37 motion to compel);
Brown v. Bridges, No. 12-4947, 2015 WL 11121361, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015); Baxter v. Louisiana, No. 21-
555, 2022 WL 1509118, at *2 n.11 (M.D. La. May 12, 2022).
28 Riverbend, 2023 WL 2563228, *3.
29 Bridges, 2015 WL 11121361, at *3 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
30 Id. at *5 (quoting Pulsecard, Inc v. Discover Card Servs., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 295, 302 (D. Kan. 1996); Vinewood
Cap., L.L.C. v. Al Islami, No. 06-316, 2006 WL 3151535, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2006); Obregon v. Melton, No.
02-1009, 2002 WL 1792086, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2002)).
to quash, when such a motion is filed in conjunction with a Rule 26(c)(1) motion, the movant is
required to meet and confer and provide the necessary certification.31
IV. ANALYSIS
Contrary to Rogers’ contention, Hutson is not required to meet and confer before issuing a
subpoenas duces tecum.32 Rather, a party issuing a subpoena need only serve notice and a copy

of the subpoena on the other party before service upon the person to whom the subpoena is
directed. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(4). In contrast, however, because Rogers has filed a motion for
a protective order in conjunction with her motion to quash, she is required to comply with Rule
26(c)(1)’s meet-and-confer and certification requirements.33 Rogers has failed to provide the
requisite pre-filing certification, and it does not appear she attempted to confer with Hutson at any
point between the issuance of the first subpoena and the filing of this motion.34 The failure to
engage in a fulsome meet and confer prior to filing a motion constitutes sufficient reason in itself
to deny the motion.35 Indeed, courts routinely deny discovery motions for failure to comply with
Rule 37(a)(1).36

31 UMB Bank, N.A. v. Sanofi, No. 15-8725, 2017 WL 3738457, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2017); accord. 4R4 Sons,
LLC v. Tru G. Wilhelm, Inc., No. 21-1081, 2022 WL 1359827, *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 8, 2022) (denying party’s motion to
quash non-party subpoena or for a protective order because the party did not properly meet and confer).
32 See Noatex Corp. v. King Constr. of Hous., LLC, 864 F. Supp. 2d 478, 491 (N.D. Miss. 2012); see also Shi v. Cent.
Ariz. Coll., No. 08-80131, 2008 WL 4001795, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2008); Spencer v. Greenwald, No. 20-
440, 2022 WL 2180052, at *4 (D. Idaho June 15, 2022); cf. Brown & Root Indus. Servs. v. Brown, No. 21-291, 2023
WL 3480882, at *2 (M.D. La. May 16, 2023) (“[T]he meet and confer requirement of Rule 37 do not apply to motions
brought pursuant to Rule 45 (citing cases)).
33 See Hardy v. Scandinavian Airline Sys., No. 21-1591, 2025 WL 416106, at *8 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2025) (citing Sanofi,
2017 WL 3738457, at *1 n.1).
34 See ECF No. 58 at 3.
35 Shaw Grp. Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 12-257, 2014 WL 4373197, at *3 (M.D. La. Sept. 3, 2014); see also
Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc. v. Babcock Law Firm, LLC, No. 11-633 (M.D. La. July 2, 2014) (denying motion
to compel where defense counsel made a single attempt by email to meet and confer and did not do so in a good faith
effort to resolve the dispute without court intervention).
36 See, e.g., Greer v. Bramhall, 77 F. App’x 254, 255 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying motion to compel for failing to follow Rule 37); D.H. Griffin Wrecking Co., Inc. v. 1031 Canal
Dev., L.L.C., No. 20-1051, 2020 WL 8265341, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2020) (citations omitted).
Many of the issues raised in this motion could have, and should have, been resolved by the
parties after a good faith meet-and-confer, without the need for court intervention.37 For instance,
courts routinely address a plaintiff’s privacy or reputational concerns incident to a release of
employment records via a protective order limiting the use and disclosure of the documents to
purposes of the litigation only.38 Likewise, with respect to personnel files, the court must balance

the competing interests of discovery and privacy in a considered manner with regard for the
breadth of the federal discovery rules.39 Personnel files often contain tax records, drug tests results,
and other such personal, sensitive material.40 In light of these concerns, courts typically require
that a party requesting employment information specify the needed requests with particularity41
rather than allowing a blanket request for complete personnel files, which no doubt contain private
or personal information of no relevance to any claim or defense.42
With this guidance, the parties are directed to meet and confer regarding the discovery
sought. If, after a fulsome conference, the parties are then unable to reach an agreement as to the
protections governing any produced documents and the proper scope of the request for

37 See ECF No. 58 at 1 (indicating Defendant is agreeable to the entry of an appropriate protective order).
38 See, e.g., Clark v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 18-93, 2019 WL 13253888, at *2-3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2019);
Cunningham v. Concentrix Sols. Corp., No. 20-661, 2021 WL 425099, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2021); Rice, 2011
WL 5513181, at *2-3, *5. A sample order of the undersigned is available on the court’s website. See The
Honorable Donna Phillips Currault, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA,
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/judges-information/judge/honorable-donna-phillips-currault (last visited August 22,
2025) (“Sample Documents”).
39 In re Gulf Inland Contractors, Inc., No. 22-2453, 2023 WL 11884364, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2023) (citing George
v. Entergy Servs., Inc., No. 09-3676, 2010 WL 3802452, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2010)); see also Dufrene v. Am.
Tugs, Inc., No. 18-554, 2018 WL 6448838, at *9 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2018) (stating that “personnel files have a specific
discovery test in the Fifth Circuit for a reason: They are special”).
40 Dufrene, 2018 WL 6448838, at *9 (“The privacy concerns implicated by a personnel file are distinct from those
presented by a custodial file, because they are far more likely to contain personal, sensitive material”) (citing Williams
v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co. L.L.C., 51 F. App’x 483, 2002 WL 31319337, at *6 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that “alimony
and child support garnishment, tax records, and drug test results” may be found in a personnel file)).
41 Gulf Inland Contractors, 2023 WL 11884364, at *3 (citing Dufrene, 2018 WL 6448838, at *9).
42 See Hamm v. Acadia Healthcare Co., No. 20-1515, 2023 WL 8237270, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 2023) (finding that
Plaintiff’s request for the complete personnel file of each and every supervisory employee “far exceeds the ultimate
and necessary boundaries of discovery”); Canon U.S.A., Inc. v. S.A.M., Inc., No. 07-01201, 2008 WL 11350298, at
*8 (E.D. La. June 19, 2008) (“In seeking the contents of [employee’s] employment file, the Court notes that
[defendant] attempts to engage in a fishing expedition.”).
employment records, the parties may then file a proper motion. At this time, however, the request
for court intervention is premature.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Rule 45 subpoenas and for a Protective
Order (ECF No. 54) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons stated herein.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of August, 2025.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11128844. Public record. Not legal advice.