# State of Tennessee v. Nathaniel Buchanan, In Re: McAdoo Bonding Company, Surety

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · August 27, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11128483

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** August 27, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court
- **Judges:** Judge Jeffrey Usman
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11128483

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[a] Rule 59 motion should not be used to raise or present new, previously untried or unasserted theories or legal arguments”

## Opinion text

08/27/2025
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
March 11, 2025 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. NATHANIEL BUCHANAN, IN RE: McADOO
BONDING COMPANY, SURETY

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County
No. F-80648 James A. Turner, Judge
___________________________________

No. M2024-00474-CCA-R3-CO
___________________________________

A defendant was charged with one count of first-degree murder and one count of unlawful
possession of a firearm. He was granted bail upon the posting of a $100,000 bond by a
bonding company. In the wake of the defendant’s successive failures to appear, the trial
court ordered the bond forfeited. The defendant was apprehended several weeks after the
bonding company paid the forfeiture, and the bonding company sought a refund. The trial
court denied the refund, and the bonding company moved the trial court to set aside its
order denying the refund. The trial court also denied the motion to set aside, and this appeal
followed. We affirm the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JEFFREY USMAN, SP.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.
MCMULLEN, P.J., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., joined.

Joel H. Moseley, Jr., Murfreesboro, Tennessee (in trial court and on appeal), and John
Mitchell, Murfreesboro, Tennessee (in trial court), for the appellant, McAdoo Bonding
Company.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; William C. Lundy, Assistant Attorney
General; Jennings H. Jones, District Attorney General; and Matthew Westmoreland,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION

I.

In May 2018, Nathaniel Buchanan (Defendant) was charged with one count of first-
degree murder and one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of a
felony.1 The trial court set the bond at $100,000 and ordered Defendant to wear a GPS
monitoring device. McAdoo Bonding Company (McAdoo) issued the bond in July 2018,
and it was filed with the trial court in August 2018.

In April 2021, the trial court entered an order authorizing the removal of the GPS
tracking device as a condition of Defendant’s bond. On December 10, 2021, the State filed
a motion to revoke bail or increase the bond based on new criminal arrests and charges
filed after the monitor removal. Defendant’s counsel also moved to withdraw. The trial
court heard these motions on January 13, 2022, but Defendant failed to appear. The trial
court promptly granted the State’s motion, ordering that a capias warrant be issued for
Defendant and that he be held without bond.

On January 14, 2022, a “Forfeiture and Capias Order” was filed. It provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED by the Court that the State of
Tennessee have and recover of the defendant, Nathaniel Buchanan and
principal, and the said McAdoo Bonding as surety, the sum of $100,000.00
dollars, and all the costs of this cause.

IT IS ORDERED that a Scire Facias be issued against the defendant
and his/her surety and the defendant be notified by certified mail, making
known to him/her these proceedings requiring him/her to appear instanter,
and show cause, if any, why this judgment should not be made final. The
surety, McAdoo Bonding shall be [sic] one hundred eight [sic] (180) days
from this date to surrender the defendant or this forfeiture as to said surety
will be made final.

The order also provides on a separate line, “STATUS OF FORFEITURE HEARING SET
FOR: 7/15/22.” It was mailed to both Defendant and McAdoo on January 18, 2022.

On January 18, 2022, a scire facias was issued, providing as follows:

1
Defendant was subsequently indicted for one count of first-degree murder and one count of
unlawfully possessing a firearm.
-2-
To Any Lawful Officer of Rutherford County:

You are hereby commanded to make known to McAdoo Bonding Company
– Kristy McAdoo, that a conditional forfeiture was rendered by the Judge of
the Rutherford County Circuit Court in and for said County against them, as
bondsman for $100,000.00. If Nathaniel Lamont Buchanan has not appeared
within 180 days from date of issue, the forfeiture will be made final, with the
conditional hearing set for 7/15/2022.

This document was mailed to McAdoo on January 18, 2022.

On July 13, 2022, two days before the scheduled hearing, McAdoo filed with the
trial court a Petition for Extension. McAdoo averred that it was searching for Defendant
and requested “additional time on this forfeiture.” A hearing on this request was scheduled
for August 26, 2022, and that same day the trial court entered an order granting the Petition
for Extension, extending the date of the conditional hearing by 180 days, so that it fell on
Wednesday, January 11, 2023.

On December 16, 2022, McAdoo filed a second Petition for Extension, which the
trial court scheduled for hearing on January 4, 2023. McAdoo requested a ninety-day
extension and, by an order entered on January 4, 2023, the trial court granted an extension
to May 31, 2023.

McAdoo filed a third request for an extension of time on May 24, 2023. In response
to this request, the trial court entered an order extending the date of the conditional hearing
to June 30, 2023, and stating that no more extensions would be granted. This final request
for an extension and the court’s grant of the extension are referenced in the court’s
subsequent orders but are not included in the record before us, and the record does not
reflect what, if anything, occurred before the trial court on June 30, 2023.

On July 6, 2023, the trial court issued an order of final forfeiture2 providing as
follows:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the Court that on 07/06/23, a
Conditional Forfeiture was made on the bond of the above-named defendant
and his sureties. The amount of the Bond(s) was $100,000.00 issued on
07/26/18. Scire Facias having been duly issued and duly returned into Court
showing proper notice to the Sureties of the Defendant’s Bond, and they have

2
This order was filed on July 7, 2023.
-3-
failed to bring the Body of the Defendant before the Court within the 180-
day period as they are bound to do, nor has the process duly issued for the
arrest of the Defendant been executed.

It is therefore the orders of this Court pursuant to T.C.A. 40-11-139
that the Conditional Forfeiture made in this case against the Defendant and
his Sureties, be and is hereby made final this date. Due notice of this
Forfeiture will be made by mailing a certified copy of this order to all
concerned.

It is therefore ordered by the Court that all the costs of this case be
deducted and applied, and the balance of said amount to be paid to Rutherford
County, Tennessee on the Clerk’s proper agency reports. Final Forfeiture
Due Date: 08/05/23.

McAdoo did not appeal this order within thirty days, and the record reflects that
McAdoo paid the forfeiture in full on August 8, 2023. Defendant was eventually located
and apprehended at his girlfriend’s residence on October 18, 2023, more than two months
after the forfeiture was paid. That same day, McAdoo filed a motion requesting that the
forfeiture be refunded (the Refund Motion). As grounds for relief, McAdoo detailed the
efforts it took to locate Defendant and asserted that Defendant was apprehended based on
information that it provided to law enforcement.

As legal authority for its request, McAdoo relied on Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-11-204. That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

[T]he judges of the general sessions, circuit, criminal and supreme courts
may receive, hear and determine the petition of any person who claims relief
is merited on any recognizances forfeited, and so lessen or absolutely remit
the same, less a clerk’s commission . . . of the original paid final forfeiture
or one thousand dollars ($1,000), whichever is less, and do all and everything
therein as they shall deem just and right, and consistent with the welfare of
the state, as well as the person praying for relief. This power shall extend to
the relief of those against whom final judgment has been entered whether or
not the judgment has been paid, as well as to the relief of those against whom
proceedings are in progress.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-204(a)(1) (effective July 9, 2012, to June 30, 2025).3

3
This statute was amended in 2025. See 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 395 § 1 (effective July 1, 2025).
-4-
On December 7, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying the Refund Motion
(the Order Denying Refund). As grounds for its decision to deny McAdoo’s request for a
refund, the trial court set forth in the Order Denying Refund the following:

After careful review of the record as a whole, the proof presented at
the hearing of this petition, and applicable law, the Court finds that McAdoo
Bonding Company has failed to prove it is entitled to relief from the
forfeiture. McAdoo voluntarily entered a contract that burdened themselves
with the responsibility of ensuring the defendant’s presence on his designated
court dates. When it failed to do so, it was generously afforded three
extensions to locate the Defendant to no avail. Meanwhile, the Defendant,
charged with this state’s most serious violent crime, was unaccounted for
from January 13, 2022 to October 18, 2023 (1 year, 9 months and 5 days).
The Defendant was not located in another state or country, nor was there
proof that he ever left the jurisdiction. Rather he was subsequently found
within the city of his residence, the city of his arrest, the city where McAdoo
maintains its primary office, and at an address 6 miles from the courthouse.

McAdoo argues that its efforts to continue trying to locate the
Defendant should be rewarded by the granting of its petition to the tune of
$100,000.00, less the clerk’s fee. Counsel argues that by granting this
request, the Court would show to the local bonding industry the value in
continuing to search for a defendant past the date of final forfeiture. The
Court views the scenario differently. The Court finds that granting the
petition would equate to eliminating any risk that a bail bonding company
voluntarily assumes. This assumption of risk followed McAdoo receiving a
payment of 10% of the bail amount. There is inherent risk in all business
ventures, especially the bail bonding business. The relief the Court offered
in this case was already granted in the multiple final forfeiture extensions.

The Court further finds that McAdoo is precluded from relief under
local rules for untimely apprehension. The Court finds that the defendant
was apprehended approximately seventy-four (74) days after the forfeiture
became final. Therefore, the defendant’s apprehension was untimely for
relief pursuant to Local Rule 16.04(F).4

4
Rule 16.04(F) Local Rules of Practice, 16th Judicial District, provides that, “[u]pon a forfeiture
becoming final and timely paid, the bonding entity may apply for the return of bond proceeds if the
defendant is incarcerated within Tennessee within thirty (30) days of the forfeiture becoming final.”

-5-
On January 8, 2024, McAdoo filed with the trial court a motion “pursuant to Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-11-204 and Rule 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure” to set
aside the Order Denying Refund (the Motion to Set Aside). As grounds, McAdoo claimed
(1) that its rights to procedural due process had been violated because there was never a
hearing on the final forfeiture and (2) that the trial court erred in relying on Local Rule
16.04(F).

On February 28, 2024, the trial court filed a written order denying the Motion to Set
Aside (the Order Denying Motion to Set Aside). Initially, the trial court stated that, in
addition to addressing the motion as a Rule 59.04 motion, it was also evaluating the motion
under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 “because McAdoo essentially claims that
the final forfeiture entered on July 6, 2023 is void” due to the alleged failure of the trial
court to hold a final forfeiture hearing.5 Relying on the plain language of Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-11-1396 and this court’s decision in Danny Blankenship Bonding Co.

5
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 provides,

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party’s
legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (3) the judgment is void; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that a judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
6
In July 2023, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-139 provided as follows:

(a) If the defendant whose release is secured under § 40-11-122 does not comply with the
conditions of the bail bond, the court having jurisdiction shall enter an order declaring the
bail to be forfeited. Notice of the order of forfeiture shall be immediately sent by regular
mail by the clerk of the court to the defendant at the defendant’s last known address. The
defendant’s surety will be served with scire facias upon the forfeiture entered and a capias
shall be issued for the defendant. When the defendant, who failed to appear pursuant to
conditions of a bail bond, is arrested on a capias, the surety on the defendant’s forfeited
bond is released.

(b) After the expiration of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date surety is served
with scire facias or scire facias is returned to the clerk unserved or undelivered, the court
may enter judgment for the state against the defendant and the defendant’s sureties for the
amount of the bail and costs of the proceedings.

(c) No execution shall issue upon a final forfeit, nor shall proceedings be taken for its
enforcement until the expiration of thirty (30) days after its entry.

-6-
v. State, No. W2015-00614-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 409663 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3,
2016), the trial court concluded that it had no obligation to conduct a hearing prior to
entering the final forfeiture judgment. The trial court stated:

In the case at bar, McAdoo was never denied a hearing. McAdoo was
given notice of the conditional forfeiture through the scire facias. The Court
conducted multiple hearings on McAdoo’s motions seeking an extension to
locate and surrender the defendant prior to final forfeiture. In each and every
hearing the Court allowed McAdoo to present any evidence it saw fit to
introduce. However, the defendant was ultimately not located in time. An
order of final forfeiture was accordingly entered by the Court. The final
forfeiture was . . . then paid without protest.

Following the Defendant’s apprehension, McAdoo petitioned for
exoneration. A hearing was held on that petition, and the request was denied.
Now, McAdoo asserts, for the first time, after multiple evidentiary hearings,
orders, extensions and payment of the forfeiture, that this Court failed to give
them a hearing prior to final forfeiture.

In applying Danny Blankenship and Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-139,
this Court denies McAdoo’s motion as to this ground.

The trial court also rejected McAdoo’s argument that Local Rule 16.04(F) limited its
discretion in determining relief, noting that Local Rule 1.017 permits a trial judge to
suspend any of the local rules when justice requires.

McAdoo appealed. On appeal before this court, McAdoo maintains that its rights
to procedural due process were violated when the trial court entered the final forfeiture
order on July 6, 2023, without a hearing. McAdoo argues that “it is entitled to a refund

(d) If a court issues a bench warrant due to a defendant’s failure to appear on a felony or
on a Class A or Class B misdemeanor that is violent or sexual in nature as determined by
the court, or if a defendant is charged with a failure to appear, then the defendant shall be
placed on any available state or federal list or database as a fugitive from justice, without
limitation, within ten (10) days of the defendant’s failure to appear. A surety is not liable
for any undertaking if the defendant has not been placed on such a database within the time
required by law.

(e) The surety is only responsible for costs in accordance with § 40-11-201.
7
Rule 1.01 Local Rules of Practice, 16th Judicial District, provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny
of these Rules may be suspended or varied in exceptional cases where the Judge determines justice so
requires.”
-7-
where the trial court failed to follow the lawful procedure” and further asks this Court to
“issue a corrective mandate” as to “the trial court’s behavior.”

II.

We begin with a brief explication of the bail bonding process. As recognized by the
Tennessee Supreme Court,

[t]he bail bond itself is a contract between the government on the one side
and the criminal defendant and his surety on the other, whereby the surety
assumes custody of the defendant and guarantees to the State either the
appearance of the defendant in court or the payment of the full amount of the
bail set by the court.

In re Rader Bonding Co., Inc., 592 S.W.3d 852, 859 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting In re Sanford
& Sons Bail Bonds, Inc., 96 S.W.3d 199, 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002)). Thus, if a criminal
defendant under bond fails to appear in court as ordered, the company that issued the bond
may be called upon to pay the full amount of the bond into court as a forfeiture. The
process by which a bonding company may be ordered to pay a forfeiture is controlled by
state statute. See id. (citing 9 David L. Raybin, Tennessee Practice: Criminal Practice &
Procedure § 4:33 (2018)).

Accordingly,

where . . . a defendant fails to appear in court in accordance with the bail
bond agreement, the trial court may enter a conditional judgment of forfeiture
against the defendant and the defendant’s sureties. [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 40-
11-201. The court must then also issue a scire facias notifying the defendant
and his sureties to show cause why the conditional judgment of forfeiture
should not become final. [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 40-11-202. After 180 days,
if the surety has not satisfied the court that it is entitled to relief, “the court
may enter [a final] judgment [of forfeiture] for the state against the defendant
and [his] sureties.” [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 40-11-139(b) (2018 & Supp. 2019).

Id. The purpose of the writ of scire facias “is to give the parties to the bond ‘a plain and
simple notice of the default and forfeiture, and the time when the sureties are to appear and
show cause why judgment final should not be entered against them.’” Goldsby v. State, 19
S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tenn. 1929) (quoting State v. Frankgos, 85 S.W. 79, 80 (Tenn. 1905)).
Thus, in addition to notifying the surety that a forfeiture is pending, the writ of scire facias
serves “to set a date for a hearing on final forfeiture.” Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.

-8-
Blackwell, 653 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-11-
202, 40-11-139).

III.

The procedural history of this case demonstrates that, in accordance with the
applicable statutes, the trial court issued a writ of scire facias and set the hearing date for
July 15, 2022. On three separate occasions, McAdoo requested this hearing date to be
extended. The trial court granted McAdoo’s request for relief on each occasion. The Order
Denying Refund indicates that, after the third request for an extension of the hearing date,
the trial court reset the hearing date to June 30, 2023, and stated that no further extensions
of time would be granted.

The record contains no indication of what, if anything, occurred on June 30, 2023.
Indeed, the record is silent as to any further activities until July 7, 2023, at which point the
trial court entered its order declaring the conditional forfeiture to be final and the final
forfeiture to be paid on August 5, 2023. On August 8, 2023, McAdoo paid the forfeiture.

Months later, after Defendant was finally apprehended in the latter part of October
2023, McAdoo reappeared in court requesting to be refunded the forfeiture. McAdoo
raised no issue with respect to the proceedings in the trial court up to that date. Rather,
McAdoo simply asked that it be refunded its forfeiture because Defendant had finally been
taken into custody. It was not until the trial court denied this request for relief that McAdoo
asserted that its procedural due process rights had been violated because, according to
McAdoo, the trial court had “failed” to conduct a final forfeiture hearing.

Our first task is to determine what, exactly, is properly before this court. McAdoo’s
Notice of Appeal was filed on March 29, 2024. It provides as follows:

Comes McAdoo Bonding Company (“Surety”) pursuant to Rules 3
and 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure (TRAP), and hereby
gives notice of its appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals from the judgment
rendered in the above case on the 28th day of February, 2024, by the
Honorable James A. Turner, Judge of Circuit Court for Rutherford County,
Tennessee, which judgment denied the Surety’s Motion for a refund and the
subsequent motion to set aside the denial, as well as the initial final forfeit
judgment.

Thus, McAdoo is essentially attempting to appeal three distinct judgments: (1) the
judgment of final forfeiture, entered on July 7, 2023 (the Final Forfeiture Order); (2) the

-9-
Order Denying Refund; and (3) the Order Denying Motion to Set Aside. We begin by
considering our ability to consider each of these three judgments.

A. The Final Forfeiture Order

McAdoo paid the forfeiture in full on August 8, 2023. The record contains no
indication that McAdoo paid the forfeiture under any form of protest. McAdoo remained
silent about the forfeiture for more than ninety days after the trial court entered the Final
Forfeiture Order. Not until October 18, 2023, after Defendant was apprehended, did
McAdoo seek any form of redress. Even then, it raised no issue with respect to the validity
of the Final Forfeiture Order or the process by which it was obtained. It was not until
January 8, 2024, six months after the Final Forfeiture Order was entered, that McAdoo first
claimed that the judgment was invalid because it was entered without a final forfeiture
hearing and therefore in violation of its procedural due process rights.

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 mandates that, for appeals as of right, the
notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the appellate court “within 30 days after the
date of entry of the judgment appealed from.” Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). For “all criminal
cases the ‘notice of appeal’ document is not jurisdictional and the timely filing of such
document may be waived in the interest of justice.” Id. However, “[t]he notice of appeal
requirement is jurisdictional and mandatory in all civil cases. If the notice of appeal is not
filed as required by Rule 4, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to hear the issues
raised on the defective appeal.” Hutcheson v. Barth, 178 S.W.3d 731, 733 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2005) (footnotes omitted). Despite bail bond forfeitures being appealed to the Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals,8 this court has previously and repeatedly recognized that bail
bond forfeitures are civil matters and governed by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
See, e.g., In re Gary’s Bonding Co., No. M2018-00459-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 5617940,
at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2018) (indicating that “[a] bail bond forfeiture is a civil
action, and the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the trial court proceedings”);
In re Guy James Bonding, No. M2003-01033-CCA-R3CD, 2004 WL 1402562, at *1 n.3
(Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2004) (noting that “[t]he bail bond forfeiture process is a civil
one governed by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure”); see also Indem. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 653 S.W.2d at 264-65 (stating regarding bail bond forfeitures that “[t]his process is
a civil one but it is, nevertheless, appealed from the trial court to the Court of Criminal
Appeals . . .[and that] [t]he Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure apply to bail bond
forfeitures just as they would in any other civil action.” (citations omitted)). Tennessee
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) sets forth four types of motions under which “the time
for appeal . . . shall run from entry of the order denying” the motion. These include a

8
In re Gary’s Bonding Co., No. M2018-00459-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 5617940, at *1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Columbia Bonding Co. v. State, 476 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tenn. 1972)).
- 10 -
motion under Rule 50.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment in
accordance with a motion for directed verdict, a motion to amend or make additional
findings of fact under Rule 52.02, a motion for new trial under Rule 59.07, and a motion
to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59.04. Tenn. R. App. 4(b). The rules governing
each of these types of motions indicate that they must be filed within 30 days of the entry
of judgment. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 50.02 (setting the timeframe for filing a motion as “[w]ithin
30 days after the entry of judgment”); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.02 (setting the timeframe for
filing a motion as “not later than 30 days after entry of judgment”); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.02
(“A motion for new trial and all other motions permitted under this rule shall be filed and
served within 30 days after judgment has been entered in accordance with Rule 58.”). As
noted above, neither a notice of appeal nor another time-extending motion was filed within
30 days after the Final Forfeiture Order was entered.

This court has previously considered the effect of untimely efforts to challenge final
forfeiture judgments and concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter. For
example, in In re Gary’s Bonding Co., the trial court entered a final forfeiture order on
May 22, 2017. 2018 WL 5617940, at *1. The bonding company did not promptly file a
notice of appeal. Id. On January 17, 2018, the bonding company filed a motion to set aside
the final forfeiture. Id. The trial court denied this motion, and the bonding company then
filed a notice of appeal, seeking relief from the forfeiture. Id. This court held as follows:

Here, the trial court entered its order of final forfeiture on May 22, 2017. The
appellant, however, did not file a notice of appeal until March 12, 2018.
While the appellant filed a motion to set aside the final forfeiture on January
17, 2018, that motion was not filed within 30 days of the final forfeiture order
and, therefore, did not toll the 30-day requirement for filing a notice of appeal
[as to the final forfeiture order]. Accordingly, we conclude the appellant’s
notice of appeal was untimely filed, thereby barring this Court’s jurisdiction.

Id. Accordingly, this court dismissed the appeal. Id. at *2; see also, e.g., State v. Michael
N. Allen, No. E2004-00292-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2108232, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Sept. 22, 2004) (“Since the appellant did not appeal the forfeiture judgment before it
became final or file one of the motions that would have extended the time for appeal, we
are without jurisdiction to determine whether the trial court erred in entering the final
forfeiture against the appellant.” (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 4(b), (c))); In re Gary’s Bonding
Co., No. M2011-00430-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 4529645, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept.
30, 2011) (holding that an untimely filed notice of appeal from the denial of a petition for
exoneration deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal).

- 11 -
In summary, McAdoo filed neither a timely notice of appeal nor an appropriate
timely motion that could extend the time for filing an appeal. Therefore, we are without
jurisdiction to consider McAdoo’s attempted appeal from the judgment of final forfeiture.

B. The Order Denying Refund

The Order Denying Refund was entered on December 7, 2023, a Saturday.
Accordingly, as to this judgment, McAdoo had until Monday, January 8, 2024, to timely
file either a notice of appeal or a motion that would toll the time for filing a notice of appeal.
On January 8, 2024, McAdoo timely filed its Motion to Set Aside Order Denying Refund
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04. After the trial court denied the
Motion to Set Aside, McAdoo timely filed its notice of appeal. Accordingly, McAdoo’s
notice of appeal preserved this court’s jurisdiction to consider both the Order Denying
Refund and the subsequent Order Denying Motion to Set Aside. Because the filing of a
timely 59.04 motion tolls the time for filing a motion to appeal as to the underlying
judgment, the trial court’s denial of McAdoo’s timely filed 59.04 motion enabled McAdoo
to appeal both the underlying judgment and the order denying the motion to alter or amend.
See, e.g., Burris v. Burris, 512 S.W.3d 239, 254 n.11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (“Because
Mother filed a timely Rule 59.04 motion and filed her notice of appeal within thirty days
of the trial court’s denial of that motion, she was entitled to appeal both the underlying
judgment and the denial of her post-trial motion.”).

However, while we have jurisdiction to consider McAdoo’s challenge to the Order
Denying Refund, we do not have a complete record. The Order Denying Refund recites
that an evidentiary hearing was held on the Motion for Refund, yet a transcript of that
hearing is not before us.

Pursuant to its appeal, McAdoo had a duty to transmit to this court a record that
conveys “a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those
issues that are the bases of appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). In the absence of a complete
record, this court may consider itself precluded from considering the issue, see, e.g., State
v. Roberts, 755 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988), or may simply presume that the
trial court’s ruling was supported by the evidence, see, e.g., State v. Bibbs, 806 S.W.2d
786, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Smith v. State, 584 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1979) & Vermilye v. State, 584 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979)).

Although we lack a transcript of the hearing, the trial court made findings of fact
and expressly found credible the witness who testified on behalf of McAdoo. The trial
court recited the efforts undertaken by McAdoo to find Defendant, including its
communications with the United States Marshals Office, the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation, the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office, the Office of the District Attorney,
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and the Murfreesboro Police Department. The trial court also credited McAdoo’s use of
bounty hunters and its posting of a reward for information about Defendant’s whereabouts.
The trial court noted that McAdoo’s efforts continued even after it had paid the forfeiture.
However, the court also noted that Defendant was ultimately at large for over a year and a
half and was apprehended less than six miles from the courthouse, in close proximity to
McAdoo’s headquarters. The trial court’s delineation of the relevant facts enables us to
undertake a review of the Order Denying Refund on the merits.

Initially, we emphasize that McAdoo bore the burden of establishing that it was
entitled to relief. In re Rader Bonding Co., Inc., 592 S.W.3d at 860 (citing In re Paul’s
Bonding Co., 62 S.W.3d 187, 193 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)). We review the trial court’s
decision on McAdoo’s request for relief from its forfeiture for an abuse of discretion. See
id. at 858 (citing Goldsby, 19 S.W.2d at 242). We may conclude that the trial court abused
its discretion only if it applied an incorrect legal standard, reached an illogical conclusion,
based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or used reasoning that
caused an injustice to McAdoo. Id.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has expressly stated that “trial courts ordinarily
should not grant relief from forfeiture simply because a defendant fails to appear and a
surety makes ordinary, good faith – but unsuccessful – efforts to locate the defendant . . . .
Indeed the defendant’s nonappearance is the very risk a surety assumes in the contract.”
Id. at 858 n.7 (citing In re Sanford & Sons Bail Bonds, Inc., 96 S.W.3d at 202)).
Additionally, this court has observed that “[b]ecause the surety has entered into an
agreement to assure the presence of the defendant thereby assuming calculated risk in the
ordinary course of business, it can rarely be said that the trial court has abused its discretion
by enforcing the terms when there has been a breach of the contract.” State v. Elijah D.
Truitt, No. M2005-01226-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2738876, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept.
21, 2006); see also, e.g., State v. Sergio Lara, No. M2020-00263-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL
2701797, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2021) (affirming denial of surety’s petition to
be released from its bond on basis that defendant fled the jurisdiction, noting that “a
bondsman must evaluate the inherent risk of flight before writing the bond and be diligent
‘in keeping tabs on the defendant after the bond is written’” (quoting In re Sanford & Sons
Bail Co., Inc., 96 S.W.3d at 202)).

We have recited above the trial court’s stated reasons for denying McAdoo’s request
for a refund. In light of the facts before us and the foregoing authority, we see no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in reaching its conclusion. We hold that McAdoo is not entitled
to relief on this basis.9

9
After concluding that McAdoo was not entitled to a refund of the forfeiture on the merits, the trial
court in its Order Denying Refund stated the following:
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C. The Order Denying Motion to Set Aside

As set forth above, we have jurisdiction to consider the Order Denying Motion to
Set Aside. The record on appeal is also complete insofar as we have the written motion, a
transcript of the hearing on the motion, and the trial court’s written order denying relief.
Accordingly, we are in a position to consider McAdoo’s appeal from the Order Denying
Motion to Set Aside.

Somewhat confusingly, McAdoo expressly indicated it was filing under Rule 59.04
of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure but, nevertheless, labeled its motion as a motion
to set aside, rather than a motion to alter or amend. As noted above, the trial court analyzed
the motion both as a Rule 59.04 motion and a Rule 60.02 motion. On appeal before this
court, McAdoo characterizes its motion as a motion to alter or amend. “Rule 59.04 allows

The Court further finds that McAdoo is precluded from relief under local rules for
untimely apprehension. The Court finds that the defendant was apprehended
approximately seventy-four (74) days after the forfeiture became final. Therefore, the
defendant’s apprehension was untimely for relief pursuant to Local Rule 16.04(F).

As set forth above, Rule 16.04(F) Local Rules of Practice, 16th Judicial District, provides that, “[u]pon a
forfeiture becoming final and timely paid, the bonding entity may apply for the return of bond proceeds if
the defendant is incarcerated within Tennessee within thirty (30) days of the forfeiture becoming final.”
McAdoo argued in its Motion to Set Aside that this rule impermissibly limits a trial court’s wide discretion
to refund forfeitures pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-204(a).

In its Order Denying Motion to Set Aside, the trial court addressed this issue as follows:

The Court notes that the text of this local rule does not state what the outcome of
a petition for exoneration will be if it is filed after the 30-day time period. Additionally,
Local Rule 1.01 states that any of the local rules may be suspended where a judge finds
that justice so requires. Candidly, even if McAdoo is correct in stating that Local Rule
16.04(F) limits the Court’s discretion, the order denying exoneration clearly sets out the
factual and legal basis for the Court’s decision beyond the citation to Local Rule 16.04(F).
As such, this ground for relief substantially lacks merit. The Court finds that the local rule
does not limit its exercise of discretion . . . . The Court denies McAdoo’s motion as to this
ground.

McAdoo does not address the trial court’s determination of this issue in its brief before this court.
Accordingly, this issue is waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7); Trezevant v. Trezevant, 696 S.W.3d 527,
530 (Tenn. 2024) (recognizing that an issue may be considered waived “when the brief fails to include an
argument satisfying the requirements of [Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure] 27(a)(7)” (quoting Hodge
v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012))). The trial courts of the Sixteenth Judicial District may wish
to consider the possible conflict between Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-204(a) and Local Rule
16.04(F) and make any changes they deem necessary.

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a party to seek relief from a judgment within thirty days after being entered; conversely,
Rule 60.02 affords a party a means to seek relief from a final, non-appealable judgment.”
Ferguson v. Brown, 291 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). Where “the judgment
was not yet a final, non-appealable judgment . . . Rule 59.04 is the applicable rule.” Id.;
see also In re Lyric N., No. E2021-00578-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 3010501, at *7 (Tenn.
Ct. App. July 29, 2022) (construing a motion to set aside that did not indicate what
procedural rule it was filed under as a Rule 59.04 motion because it was filed while the
decree was still appealable). Though inartful, we accept McAdoo’s labeling of its motion
as a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend, and we consider it as such.

We will reverse a trial court’s ruling on a motion to alter or amend “only for an
abuse of discretion.” Stovall v. Clarke, 113 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tenn. 2003) (citing Harris
v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tenn. 2000)). As set forth above, a trial court abuses its
discretion only if it “applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical conclusion,
bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning
that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” In re Rader Bonding Co., Inc., 592
S.W.3d at 858 (quoting State v. Jones, 568 S.W.3d 101, 127-28 (Tenn. 2019)).

In its motion, McAdoo claimed, for the first time in these proceedings, that the Final
Forfeiture Order was infirm because it had been entered without the trial court having first
conducted an actual hearing. That is, McAdoo began claiming six months after the fact
that it had suffered a procedural due process violation. In rejecting McAdoo’s claim, the
trial court considered the text of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-13910 and a
decision from this court indicating that a bonding company must only be provided with the
opportunity to be heard before a final forfeiture is ordered. See Danny Blankenship
Bonding Co., 2016 WL 409663, at *3 (holding that bonding company was not entitled to
relief on basis that there was no hearing prior to entry of the final forfeiture because the
court had provided the bonding company with “the opportunity to be heard”); see also In
re Sanford & Sons Bail Bonds, Inc., 96 S.W.3d at 204 (“Generally speaking, a trial court
must afford a surety an opportunity to establish its suitability for relief . . . .”).

The trial court stated,

In the case at bar, McAdoo was never denied a hearing. McAdoo was
given notice of the conditional forfeiture through the scire facias. The Court
conducted multiple hearings on McAdoo’s motions seeking an extension to
locate and surrender the defendant prior to final forfeiture. In each and every
hearing the Court allowed McAdoo to present any evidence it saw fit to

10
See footnote six, supra, for the text of this statute.

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introduce. However, the defendant was ultimately not located in time. An
order of final forfeiture was accordingly entered by the Court. The final
forfeiture was . . . then paid without protest.

Emphasizing that McAdoo was asserting an issue regarding the final forfeiture hearing “for
the first time,” the trial court denied relief “as to this ground.”

At oral argument, counsel for McAdoo asserted that the trial court erred in denying
its motion because, for sui generis reasons, the Final Forfeiture Order should be set aside
to correct a clear error of law or to prevent injustice. See Vaccarella v. Vaccarella, 49
S.W.3d 307, 312 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). We disagree.

Motions to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
59.04 “‘may be granted (1) when the controlling law changes before a judgment becomes
final, (2) when previously unavailable evidence becomes available, or (3) when, for sui
generis reasons, a judgment should be amended to correct a clear error of law or to prevent
injustice.’” Id. However, a Rule 59.04 motion should not be used to alter or amend a
judgment “if it seeks to raise new, previously untried legal theories” or “to present new,
previously unasserted legal arguments.” Bradley v. McLeod, 984 S.W.2d 929, 933 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1998); see also, e.g., Lawrence A. Pivnick, 2 Tenn. Cir. Ct. Prac. § 28:4 (2025)
(observing that Rule 59.04 motions “should not be used to raise or present new, previously
untried or unasserted theories or legal arguments”); In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 895
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that “[a] Rule 59 motion should not be used to raise or
present new, previously untried or unasserted theories or legal arguments”). Rather, “[t]he
judgment of a court should not ‘be lightly changed, altered, amended or set aside, but only
done upon very clear, convincing, cogent evidence that a true injustice has been done to
the complaining party and that the complaining party is in no wise responsible, or termed
in another way, negligent in protecting that party’s interest.’” Polster v. Polster, No.
M2020-01150-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 4167927, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2021)
(quoting Myers v. Myers, 891 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)).

The first time that McAdoo raised its due process objection was in its Rule 59.04
motion, asserting a due process objection that could have been raised much earlier in
seeking relief. McAdoo could have responded to the trial court’s January 2022 show cause
order by requesting a hearing. McAdoo does not assert that it sought and was denied such
a hearing in response to the trial court’s show cause order as to which it failed to take
action.11 McAdoo could have filed an appropriate motion immediately following the
11
“Parties have the responsibility to see to it that the record contains the evidence necessary to
support their arguments on appeal.” Levine v. March, 266 S.W.3d 426, 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “More
particularly, the burden falls on the party asserting error: ‘it is incumbent upon the appellant to provide a
record that is adequate for a meaningful review.’” Riddle v. Miclaus, No. M2024-01335-COA-R3-CV,
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original final forfeiture order, objecting to the entry of this order in the absence of a hearing.
McAdoo could have presented its due process argument in its petition for a refund as
further support for obtaining a refund. McAdoo raised a new legal basis, a new theory, for
why it should obtain a refund for the first time in its motion to alter or amend. McAdoo
has provided absolutely no explanation for failing to raise this argument earlier. Such
failure is not cured by labeling in a conclusory manner the hearing issue “sui generis.”
Under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying McAdoo’s motion to alter or amend on the basis of a new argument that McAdoo
could have previously raised.
IV.

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

s/ Jeffrey Usman
JEFFREY USMAN, JUDGE

2025 WL 1166481, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2025) (quoting Tanner v. Whiteco, L.P., 337 S.W.3d
792, 796 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010)). McAdoo has also failed to ensure that the record contains the critical
third extension order. The absence of this order has further complicated considering McAdoo’s argument
on appeal.
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11128483. Public record. Not legal advice.